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This dissertation theoretically examined the process of disciplined inquiry in the social 
sciences from its philosophical foundations to its extensions into practice. Key to 
conceptualization of disciplined inquiry were two regulative ideals: the commitment to the 
concepts that define the possibility of experience and the commitment to processes for 
combining the concepts of experience. The paradigm theory of Lincoln, Lynham, and Guba (e.g., 
Lincoln & Lynham, 2011; Lincoln, Lynham, & Guba, 2011) provided a sophisticated 
explanation of the possibility of experience that inquirers can commit to when engaging in 
disciplined inquires. Review of literature revealed an inadequacy in the state of theoretical 
understanding of processes for combining the concepts of experience. To develop a theoretical 
agenda of research for disciplined inquiry, the literature on paradigm theory and theory building 
was analyzed. A historical analysis of paradigm theory revealed milestones in more than 40 
years of inquiry focused on conceptualization of the theory. A reverse engineering analysis 
theoretically examined paradigm theory and its milestones identified from the historical analysis 
for key features of the theoretical process. A revised conceptualization of disciplined inquiry was 
presented and a theoretical agenda for developing the underlying theoretical framework for the 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Overview of Research 
Disciplined inquiry may be considered a diligent, purposeful, and methodical process for 
forming justified belief—one that makes explicit the underlying belief system, criteria of quality 
process and product, and respects the role of peer acceptance in justification of knowledge 
claims (Clovis & Cobban, 2006; Cronbach & Suppes, 1969; Lincoln & Guba, 1986b; Smith, 
1981; Shulman, 1997). Even though disciplined inquiry can encompass a number of forms of 
explicit systematic inquiry (e.g., the scientific method or grounded theory), it has its background 
in the behavioral, human, and social sciences, where justification of systematic and methodic 
practice was a necessity for legitimization of alternative forms of inquiry (e.g., Lincoln & Guba, 
1985b). Key to the practice of disciplined inquiry, as well as what makes it different from other 
forms of inquiry, is the explication of the foundational assumptions of the belief system within 
which knowledge claims will be made. 
The current research proposed that the process of disciplined inquiry may initially be 
conceptualized at the intersection of two phenomena: the phenomenon of methodology and the 
phenomenon of inquiry paradigms. It was argued that while the phenomenon of inquiry 
paradigms was a well-developed and sophisticated theory (Lincoln & Lynham, 2011; Lincoln, 
Lynham, & Guba, 2011), the phenomenon of inquiry methodology remains somewhat primitive 
and underdeveloped theoretically. As a consequence, the whole of the conceptualization of 
disciplined inquiry remains less informative than it could if methodology were better understood, 
and therefore also less informative for the practice of disciplined inquiry. To address the 




employed (see Appendix A for an examination of literature review research methods in 
comparison to less formal literature review approaches) to bring together the literature on inquiry 
paradigms, theory, and theory building, and to begin the work necessary to develop the 
theoretical underpinnings the phenomenon of inquiry methodology. 
Statement of Research Problem 
To better position the literature review research conducted, the type of research problem 
was framed within the problem syllogism articulated by Lincoln and Guba (1985b; see also 
Guba, 1978b; Guba & Lincoln, 1981). A research problem is both more than a research question 
and different from a research objective. A research problem may be defined as  
…a state of affairs ‘resulting from the interaction of two or more factors… that yields (1) 
a perplexing or enigmatic state (a conceptual problem); (2) a conflict that renders the 
choice from among alternative courses of action moot (an action problem); or (3) an 
undesirable consequence (a value problem)’. The interacting factors may be concepts, 
empirical data, experiences, or any other elements that, when placed alongside one 
another, signal some basic difficulty, something that is not understood or explained at 
that time. (Lincoln & Guba, 1985b, p. 226) 
The current research agenda addresses a conceptual problem, i.e., #1, with implications 
on action, i.e., #2 (Lincoln & Guba, 1985b). Booth, Colomb, and Williams (2008) articulated the 
nature of these two types of research problems as a contrast between understanding and action, 
whereby the condition of a practical problem is a state of affairs in the real world within which 
one does not know what to do. Accordingly, they stated, “The condition of a conceptual 
problem, however, is always some version of not knowing or not understanding something” (p. 
56). To solve a practical problem, they further stated that “someone had to first solve a research 
problem that improved their understanding. Then on the basis of that better understanding, 




a practical problem may be considered knowing what to do in the world, whereas the solution to 
a conceptual problem is considered as more abstractly answering a question, or set of questions, 
that improves our understanding and bridges a gap in our knowledge. 
Booth et al. (2008) further emphasized the difference between the cost of a practical 
problem and the consequence of a conceptual problem. The cost associated with a practical 
problem may be considered an undesirable state in the real world, resulting from not knowing 
what to do. The consequence associated with a conceptual problem “is a second thing that we 
don’t know or understand because we don’t understand the first one, and that is more significant, 
more consequential than the first” (p. 57). Therefore, given that the current inquiry addressed a 
conceptual problem with implications for action, the following problem structure was argued.  
 First, as principle tenet, a general state of affairs was defined within which something 
unknown was presented as a gap in understanding. 
 Next, as principle proposition, the condition of knowing within the general state of 
affairs was made explicit. 
 Then, as interactive proposition juxtaposed against principle proposition, the 
condition of not knowing within the general state of affairs was stated.  
 Lastly, as consequence and cost of the interacting proposition, the second more 
significant thing not understood as a result of the interactive proposition was stated in 
association with the practical cost related to the more significant lack of 
understanding. 
 In response, a solution was described, with the aim of improving conceptual 




Principle Tenet  
Disciplined inquiry is a methodical process for forming justified belief comprising (at 
least) two essential phenomena: the paradigm of inquiry phenomenon and the methodological 
phenomenon. Interaction of the two essential phenomena make possible the explication of 
underlying belief system and criteria of quality process and product.  
Principle Proposition  
Analysis of the literature on paradigms, one of the integral phenomena for understanding 
disciplined inquiry, revealed a wealth of information on the paradigm of inquiry phenomenon. In 
particular, review of the past 40 plus years of published literature by Egon Guba, Yvonna 
Lincoln, Susan Lynham, and colleagues exposed a sophisticated and well-developed theoretical 
framework for the inquiry paradigm phenomenon. 
Interactive Proposition 
Analysis of the literature on methodology, the second of two integral phenomena for 
understanding disciplined inquiry, revealed that the methodological phenomenon remains 
underdeveloped conceptually and theoretically. Rather, the methodological phenomenon existed 
as a broad range of possible ideas, principles, and processes, but never unified under a common 
conceptual framework.  
Consequence and Cost 
As a result of the underdeveloped methodological phenomenon, both (a) a knowledge 




the ability to methodically practice disciplined inquiry, given the lack of informing integrated 
framework, remain. That is, the consequence associated with the lack of theoretical 
understanding of the methodological phenomenon is a bigger and more important gap in 
understanding the process of disciplined inquiry. The cost of not fully understanding the process 
of disciplined inquiry is a gap in knowing how to practice disciplined inquiry; and therefore, a 
gap in knowing how to form justified beliefs. 
A Solution 
To better understand the process of disciplined inquiry conceptually, as well as inform 
the improved practice of disciplined inquiry, the current research began the incremental 
theoretical work necessary to advance the methodological phenomenon of disciplined inquiry 
from its primitive, underdeveloped state to a more sophisticated theoretical state. This was 
accomplished by historically and theoretically analyzing the well-developed theoretical 
framework for the inquiry paradigm phenomenon. The result of historical and theoretical 
analysis of paradigm theory was an understanding of the process of theory necessary to 
conceptually develop the underlying theoretical framework for the methodological phenomenon, 
and therefore advancing knowledge of disciplined inquiry, as defined by both the paradigm of 
inquiry and methodological phenomena. 
Approach 
The ultimate aim of the research was to begin the incremental work of a larger research 
agenda aimed at conceptualizing an initial theoretical framework for the phenomenon of 
methodology and synthesizing the framework with the existing paradigm theory to better 




conceptualization of the phenomenon of methodology must be completed before integration with 
paradigm theory, a number of steps must be completed prior to conceptualizing the theoretical 
framework for the phenomenon of methodology. Due to the steps that must be taken to get to the 
point of understanding from which the phenomenon of methodology may be conceptualized, 
multiple studies were (and remain) warranted. The first two studies employed literature review 
research methods, each with their own research designs for the purpose of building a unique 
piece of incremental understanding necessary for transition into later phases of the research 
agenda on disciplined inquiry.  
Both the literature reviews conducted examined the work on paradigms of inquiry by 
Lincoln, Lynham, and Guba (Lincoln & Lynham, 2011; Lincoln et al., 2011) as an exemplar for 
the theorizing on methodology. The first study was a historical analysis of paradigm theory 
conducted by reviewing the authors’ body of work that contributed to the exemplar. The second 
study methodologically focused on the theoretical process and product of paradigm theory, with 
a reverse engineering analysis of the theory. The two studies concluded with a refined research 
agenda for modeling the phenomenon of methodology and reconceptualization of the model for 
the practice of disciplined inquiry. 
Rationale and Significance of the Research 
The research problem argued that because of the underdeveloped phenomenon of 
methodology, both a knowledge gap in our conceptual understanding of disciplined inquiry and 
an applied cost in our ability to methodically practice disciplined inquiry exist. The emphasis on 
both understanding and practice highlights that this is not simply a conceptual problem for the 




Becker (1970) stated, “Methodology is too important to be left to the methodologists” (p. 3). If 
inquirers would like to make knowledge claims at the conclusion of their inquiries, then they 
must be able to explicitly articulate how the inputs, processes, and outputs led to the formation of 
justified belief. The articulation should be made both prior to engaging in inquiry as prescription 
for action to be taken and at the end of inquiry as description of actions taken. 
Purpose and Objectives 
The purpose of the current research was to study and understand the process of 
disciplined inquiry. To achieve the purpose, a number of specific research objectives were 
identified. These objectives were:  
 Generation of a historical account of significant contributions and milestones 
culminating in current thinking (Lincoln & Lynham, 2011) about the inquiry 
paradigm phenomenon 
 Identification and description of the theoretical research process of the exemplar 
paradigm theory by Lincoln et al. (2011; Lincoln & Lynham, 2011) 
 Reevaluation of the initial conceptualization of disciplined inquiry, given any new 
learning 
 Development of a refined and more informed research agenda for generating an initial 
theoretical framework for methodology and its integration into the conceptualization 






Three general research questions guided the overall research agenda, although a number 
of more targeted research questions were further specified in each study’s respective method 
chapters. These guiding questions were:  
1. How did the exemplar paradigm theory of Lincoln et al. (2011) evolve into its current 
theoretical state, and what features are characteristic of the paradigm theory? 
2. What surrogate theoretical research process can be inferred about the development of 
the exemplar subject system? 
3. Can understanding of disciplined inquiry be advanced given a more complete 
understanding of the phenomena of methodology and inquiry paradigms?  
Delimitations, Limitations, and Assumptions 
Research on the process of disciplined inquiry was delimited to the behavioral, human, 
and social sciences. For the topic of disciplined inquiry and paradigms, the principle literature 
examined was education evaluation; however, also included were texts on the philosophy of 
science. For the theory topics that supported the current work, the primarily literatures examined 
were in the social and behavioral science disciplines of education, sociology, psychology, 
management, and human resource development. This broad, yet still bounded, scope established 
the boundary conditions manifest in the conscious exclusionary/inclusionary decisions made 
across all literature examined. For example, literature about theories, proofs, and models in 
mathematics were not included, and therefore not representative of the findings. It should further 




within the disciplines of education and psychology; thus, personal experiences with disciplined 
inquiry in operation can also be restricted to the disciplines of education and psychology. 
The research conducted involved literature review research methods. As a consequence, 
all information and data that can be considered are limited to those available in the literature. The 
notion of available in the literature has at least two important consequences with regard to 
limitations. The first limitation of literature review research was that the sampled literature must 
be accessible by reasonable means (i.e., library catalogues, electronic database searches, and 
Internet searches). Sources that show up in searches but are not accessible by reasonable means 
limit the source’s availability to make a contribution in a literature review. The ongoing 
copyright issues with ERIC and limited availability of full-text and many conference papers 
served as such a limitation. The second limitation of literature review research was that any 
unpublished literature (e.g., course notes, personal communications, and unpublished 
manuscripts) were often unknown and/or difficult to access, with the rare exception of the 
“invisible college” (Cooper 1982, p. 295) approach to sampling literature. In meta-analysis, this 
is known as the file drawer problem (Rosenthal, 1979) in reference to negative or null 
experimental findings that are not disseminated publicly. Therefore, while literature review 
research in general is not inherently limited to published research, it is limited to literature that 
the inquirer may consciously become aware of and access through reasonable means. 
As a whole, the current research was based on a self-study form of inquiry; therefore, it 
may be helpful to espouse the nature of meta-research. The term meta can generally be 
understood as reference to something more abstract and highly organized; yet, the meta- prefix is 




(Glass, 1976, p. 3); meta-cognition is cognition about cognition; and a meta-framework is a 
framework of frameworks. Disciplined inquiry is an inquiry process; the current research was 
inquiry about the disciplined inquiry process. As a consequence, the current research was 
strongly based on the methodological assumption that the study of the application of method 
produces meaningful understanding about how method should be applied.  
Summary of Research Findings 
The historical analysis of the paradigm theory by Lincoln et al. (2011; Lincoln & 
Lynham, 2011) revealed the evolution of the theory from an early two-approach model (e.g., 
Guba, 1978b) to a fully articulated axiomatic form of theory (e.g., Guba & Lincoln, 1982a) to its 
current five-paradigm, five-axiom subject form (e.g., Lincoln & Lynham, 2011; Lincoln et al., 
2011). Also documented in the historical analysis were development of axiom extensions into 
practice and criteria for basic questions of quality for inquiries.  
The reverse engineering analysis of the paradigm theory by Lincoln et al. (2011; Lincoln 
& Lynham, 2011) revealed it to be an axiomatic form of theory with many similarities to the 
typological form of theory. The theory building used was interpreted a theory-then-research 
theorizing process that continuously moved between the conceptual development and 
operationalization phases of theory-building research. The theory’s axiom subjects, axiom 
positions, paradigms of inquiry, and theorems were also mapped to theoretical units, values taken 
on by the units, theoretical system states, and theoretical propositions, respectively. 
Learning as the result of the conduct of the two reviews gave rise to an expanded model 




belief (Best-JB) (Jacquette, 2012) might be produced, how warranted assertions accumulate as 
knowledge, and how accumulated knowledge can inform future disciplined inquiries. A revised 
conceptualization of disciplined inquiry was proposed. In addition, the theoretical understanding 
of theory and theory building from studying the exemplar found in paradigm theory helped form 
a refined research agenda for developing a theoretical framework for the phenomenon of 
methodology. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
The solution proposed to the research problem highlighted the larger research agenda that 
demanded incremental theoretical work to accomplish its goals. The two studies presented in the 
current manuscript were the first two incremental steps in the larger agenda. The learning 
resulting from the two studies helped clarify the next steps needed to advance the agenda and 
begin development of a theoretical framework for the phenomenon of methodology. Future 
inquiries need to begin concretely addressing what a theory of methodology would explain and 
identifying the variables and associated values that might define a methodology (e.g., axiom 
subjects and positions); the theoretical relationships those theoretical positions might have with 
each other; the boundaries of the explanatory shell for the phenomenon of methodology; the 
types of research approaches that might be defined by each theoretical system state; and how 
those system states might be operationalized in a manner grounded in methodological process in 
action. As each theoretical component of the framework for methodology takes shape, the 
process should accommodate continuous interaction and re-imagination of the relationship with 





Organization of the Manuscript 
Chapter 2 of this manuscript explores the concept of disciplined inquiry philosophically 
and further examines the current state of knowledge for both the phenomenon of inquiry 
paradigms and the phenomenon of methodology. The in-depth examination of the two 
phenomena was used to further develop and support the research problem. Chapter 3 presents the 
literature review research method used for historical analysis, and chapter 4 presents the results 
of the historical analysis. Chapter 5 presents the literature review research method used for 
reverse engineering and theoretical analysis, and chapter 6 presents the results of theoretically 
reverse engineering paradigm theory. Chapter 7 synthesizes learning from the two studies and 
looks at the next steps in the research agenda. Appendices A, B, and C are supplemental reviews 
in support of the research—a methodological review of literature review research methods, a 





CHAPTER 2:  BACKGROUND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Purpose and Organization of Background Literature Review 
Chapter 2 presents an overview of the literature supporting the current conceptualization 
of disciplined inquiry. The topics analyzed and the order in which they are introduced were 
intentional in order to develop the sufficiency of the research problem and clearly identify the 
conceptual knowledge gaps to be addressed. Chapter 2 serves as a content background literature 
review that aims to introduce and synthesize literature on the concept and process of disciplined 
inquiry, the phenomenon of inquiry paradigms, and the phenomenon of methodology. Each of 
these three literatures is presented in a manner necessary to formulate the following fundamental 
argument regarding disciplined inquiry. 
Disciplined inquiry is a methodical process for forming justified belief comprising two 
essential phenomena: the phenomenon of inquiry paradigms and the phenomenon of inquiry 
methodology. Analysis of the literature revealed that the phenomenon of inquiry paradigms has 
been explained as a well-developed sophisticated theory with a fully defined theoretical 
framework. However, the phenomenon of methodology remains underdeveloped theoretically. It 
has been conceptually defined as a broad range of possible ideas, principles, and processes, yet 
never unified under a common meta-framework. Consequently, both a knowledge gap in our 
conceptual understanding of disciplined inquiry and an applied gap in our ability to methodically 





Development of the argument in the literature was organized sequentially around three 
topical areas. In the first area, the review focused on conceptualizing the concept and process of 
disciplined inquiry philosophically by examining (a) knowledge, (b) inquiry versus disciplined 
inquiry, and (c) how and why disciplined inquiry can be conceptualized with paradigms of 
inquiry and methodology. In the second area, the review focused on the paradigm of inquiry 
phenomenon by examining (a) definitions of the term paradigm, (b) key contributors to the 
development of the paradigm conceptualization as a phenomenon, and (c) the roles of paradigms 
of inquiry in the conceptualization and process of disciplined inquiry. In the third area, the 
review examined the literature on methodology to demonstrate (a) its breadth of definitions as a 
term and (b) its primitive state as a phenomenon.  
Conceptualizing Disciplined inquiry 
To conceptualize the concept and process of disciplined inquiry, as presented here, three 
key areas of the literature were reviewed: (a) knowledge, and more specially, knowledge claims; 
(b) definitions of inquiry versus disciplined inquiry; and (c) the two regulative ideals of 
disciplined inquiry (i.e., the possibility of experience as an ideal that drives the paradigm 
phenomenon, and the principles and practices by which the concepts of reality are interrogated as 
an ideal that drives the methodological phenomenon). 
Knowledge 
One may ask, “What do we know—what is the extent of our knowledge?” One may also 
ask, “How do we decide in any particular case whether we know—what are the criteria, if 
any, of knowing?” The “problem of the criterion” arises out of the fact that if we do not 
have the answer to the second pair of questions, then, it would seem, we have no 




answer to the first pair of questions, then, it would seem, we have no reasonable 
procedure for finding out the answer to the second. (Chisholm, 1966, p. 3) 
The definition of knowledge and the requisite conditions for knowledge have been two 
highly related yet different conversations. The former can be characterized as a study or analysis 
of knowledge (i.e., “epistemology,” Goldman, 2002, p. 164), while the latter can be 
characterized as a study or analysis of the process by which inquirers form the belief(s) upon 
which they make knowledge claims and upon which inquirers judge whether (or to what extent) 
they have come to know (i.e., “doxology,” p. 164). Critical to forming a conceptualization of the 
concept and process of disciplined inquiry was a review of these two conversations (i.e., what 
constitutes knowledge and what constitutes the conditions necessary to know), with the aim of 
laying an appropriate philosophical foundation of ends and means, respectively, for inquiry. By 
first reviewing the philosophical foundations of epistemology and doxology, the proceeding 
conversations about definitions of inquiry and the defining phenomena of disciplined inquiry 
were afforded leverage points and the conceptual traction upon which to establish the argument 
that disciplined inquiry is a methodical process for forming a justified belief that is defined by 
the paradigm of inquiry phenomenon and the methodological phenomenon. 
Formulations of knowledge. Ongoing conversations in the literature regarding the 
question of what is knowledge typically involved three general dialogs. These can be described 
as (a) what is the standard formulation for knowledge, (b) in what ways does the standard 
formulation fail to account for knowledge, and (c) how might the standard formulation be 




The standard formulation of knowledge. “Standard accounts” (Goldman, 2002, p. 164) 
of knowledge have been taken as “justified true belief” (p. 164; Jacquette, 2012, p. 430; Jenkins, 
2011, p. 59; Morvan, 2005, p. 145), where a person, S, knows that proposition p, if and only if:  
1. S believes that p,  
2. S is justified in believing that p, and  
3. p is true 
(Chisholm, 1966; Gettier, 1963; Goldman, 1967, 1979, 2002; Jacquette, 2012; Lehrer, 
1979, 1990; Morvan, 2005; Pappas, 1979; Scheffler, 1965)  
This core formulation for knowledge holds that much of what a person knows at any 
given time is jointly based on believing in a proposition; having propositional justification (i.e., 
evidence) for the belief; and thinking that the external state of affairs in which the justifiably held 
belief is actually true. Key to this formulation is the idea of propositional belief and justification 
that is accessible by the knower and can be expressed as a statement or in propositional form 
(Jenkins, 2011; Moser, 1987; Pappas, 1979). These three conditions for knowledge (i.e., S 
believes that p, S is justified in believing that p, and p is actually true) entail the core formulation 
for the dialog surrounding the question of what is knowledge.  
Consideration of propositional knowledge as justified true belief (JTB) dates back to 
Plato’s dialogues Meno and Theaetetus several hundred years BCE (Chisholm, 1966; Gettier, 
1963; Jacquette, 2012; Jenkins, 2011; Moser, 1987; Stalkfleet, 2011; Starmans & Friedman, 
2012). In early Socratic dialogues, Socrates debated the conditions sufficient for claims to 
knowledge; the necessity of a justification condition; and in particular, the tensions and 




As argued by Jenkins, many of the principled arguments concerning the justification status 
originally put forth by Socrates persist today and continue to be reflected in the critiques on the 
conditions for knowledge more commonly framed as those provided by Gettier (1963) and 
Gettier-like proponents (e.g., “insufficiency thesis,” Morvan, 2005, p. 152).  
Criticisms of the formulation of knowledge. While the core formulation of knowledge is 
fairly straightforward (i.e., S believes that p, S is justified in believing that p, and p is true), it has 
not been without its criticisms. The criticisms have been leveled primarily at the last two 
conditions; that is, justification and the truth condition. The criticisms aimed at justification and 
the truth condition can be summarized as follows: 
S does not know p, if: 
 S believes that p and S is justified in believing that p, but p is not true, i.e., justified 
belief that is not true. 
 S believes that p and p is true, but S arrives at the belief in p through a faulty 
justification process, i.e., true belief that is not justified. 
In both of these summarized cases, the claim to knowledge cannot be made, yet the state of 
insufficient conditions for knowledge is not necessarily accessible to the inquirer’s awareness. 
That is, the inquirer does not have access to external truth against which to see the flaw in the 
belief, nor any reason to suspect unknowingly engaging in a flawed belief forming process. If the 
inquirer is not aware that the conditions for knowledge have not been met, the standard account 




account for knowledge or requires amendment to include a more rigorous justification process 
and/or expansion of the requisite conditions for knowledge. 
An examination of the critiques leveled at JTB epistemology cannot proceed without 
acknowledgment of Gettier’s (1963) publication titled Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Even 
though earlier instances of fault in JTB have been acknowledged in the literature (e.g., “Gettier’s 
point that JTB is not sufficient for knowledge was previously argued by Socrates,” Jenkins, 
2011, p. 59), Gettier’s article represents the perpetual footnote to virtually all post-mid 1960s 
work discussing whether JTB is sufficient for knowledge. In his seminal paper, Gettier presented 
two counterexamples in which JTB does not result in knowledge. Both counterexamples outline 
the potential instances in which (a) a knower can arrive at a justified belief that is not true and (b) 
a knower only incidentally holds a belief that is true (i.e., true belief that is not justified). 
Because both counterexamples presented by Gettier somewhat redundantly demonstrate the same 
flaws in JTB epistemology, only the first case (i.e., that of Smith and Jones) is highlighted here 
as an example. 
Gettier’s “Case I” (1963, p. 122) demonstrated how a person may be justified in believing 
a proposition that is actually true, but the proposition believed in was unknowingly deduced from 
a false proposition, and as a result, the person only coincidentally arrives at a belief that happens 
to be true. His example was as follows: 
Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And suppose that Smith has 
strong evidence for the following conjunctive proposition:  




Smith's evidence for (d) might be that the president of the company assured him 
that Jones would in the end be selected, and that he, Smith, had counted the coins in 
Jones's pocket ten minutes ago. Proposition (d) entails:  
(e) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.  
Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (d) to (e), and accepts (e) on 
the grounds of (d), for which he has strong evidence. In this case, Smith is clearly 
justified in believing that (e) is true.  
But imagine, further, that unknown to Smith, he himself, not Jones, will get the 
job. And, also, unknown to Smith, he himself has ten coins in his pocket. Proposition (e) 
is then true, though proposition (d), from which Smith inferred (e), is false. In our 
example, then, all of the following are true: (i) (e) is true, (ii) Smith believes that (e) is 
true, and (iii) Smith is justified in believing that (e) is true. But it is equally clear that 
Smith does not know that (e) is true; for (e) is true in virtue of the number of coins in 
Smith's pocket, while Smith does not know how many coins are in Smith's pocket, and 
bases his belief in (e) on a count of the coins in Jones’s pocket, whom he falsely believes 
to be the man who will get the job. (p. 122) 
In Gettier’s example, Smith initially forms a belief in proposition d based on evidence j, 
where j is the assurance provided by the president and Smith’s counting of coins in Jones’ 
pocket. Of course d is not true as it turns out because Smith is the man who will get the job; 
however, due to the strong evidence j, Smith is actually justified in believing that d. At time t, 
Smith does not have access to the external truth that he and not Jones will be the man who will 
get the job, so even though Smith believes in d, and Smith is justified in believing in d based on 
strong evidence j, d is not true and Smith has no way of knowing that at t. In this instance, Smith 
(although unknown to him) has formed a justified belief that is not true, yet he does not know 
that the third condition for knowledge has not been met and has no opposing reason to question 
his justified belief in d. 
Next, through a faulty chain of logic, Smith then deduced incidentally true proposition e 
from false proposition d due to the entailment of e by d. Because Smith is operating on the 




this instance, e is actually true, but Smith’s belief in e has nothing to do with Smith being the 
man who will get the job. Here, Smith believes e, Smith is justified in believing e given the 
assumed truth of d, and e is actually true. Smith does not know e, though, because it is only a 
matter of luck that Smith is correct (Jenkins, 2011; Lehrer, 1990; Morvan, 2005). According to 
Jenkins, “The problem is that we do not want to admit that Smith knows (e) because he did not 
actually know that he, and not Jones, would get the job” (p. 60). However, expanding the 
analysis beyond that of Smith’s inference from d to e out to the full chain of logic containing j to 
d to e, it can be understood that Smith’s full justification process is flawed; therefore, Smith is 
not actually justified in believing e. Goldman acknowledged the necessity of true inputs in his 
discussion of conditional reliability of the full chain of logic: “A process is conditionally reliable 
when a sufficient proportion of its output-beliefs are true given that its input-beliefs are true” 
(1979, p. 13). 
These critiques undergird Morvan’s (2005) discussion of the insufficiency thesis with 
regard to JTB; that is, “to count any true belief whatsoever as an instance of knowledge, no 
matter how accidentally or irrationally or unjustifiably formed, does not seem to conform to the 
standard sense of ‘knowledge’” (p. 152). Just because something is true, someone believes it is 
true, and that person is even justified in believing it is true, if the facts on which the inferences 
and beliefs are based are not true or only coincidentally lead the person to believing the true 
proposition, that person cannot be said to know the true proposition, based on the faulty path to 
it.  
False premises in the chain of logic momentarily aside, Smith’s initial belief in d 




epistemology “is the inclusion of a truth T condition independently of the best justification of 
which we are capable” (p. 430) as a condition of knowing. Jacquette called into question whether 
an inquirer can ever truly know if his or her justified belief has met the third condition for 
knowledge; that is, that the proposition that is justifiably believed in is actually true. 
Furthermore, if an inquirer were capable of accessing an external truth, then justification or 
belief would be unnecessary; the inquirer would simply know. Not having access to the external 
truth condition creates a flawed circular logic in the JTB formulation in practice. This is, in 
essence, Chisholm’s (1966) problem of the criterion; that is, in the practice of inquiry, if one has 
no access to what is true in the capital T sense of truth, then one can judge neither the validity of 
the knowledge claim nor the processes that produce true knowledge claims. 
Smith’s initial belief in d emphasizes one of the major weakness in the three conditions 
of JTB as knowledge (i.e., S believes that p, S is justified in believing that p, and p is true). 
According to Gettier (1963), “It is possible for a person to be justified in believing a proposition 
that is in fact false” (p. 121), but the person has very limited capability to understand whether the 
third condition has been met. Jenkins (2011) provided further evidence of the difficulty 
associated with knowing the third condition for knowledge in his example of believing in a 
hallucination. 
If we have never hallucinated before, are not on any drugs, etc.; we can be justified in 
relying on our reliable cognitive faculties. However, this can lead to the outcome that we 
are justified in believing that we saw something that we, in fact, did not see. (p. 52) 
The issue surrounding whether a person has met the conditions sufficient for knowing 
(presumably by engaging in some belief-producing process) under the JTB formulation of 




from the actual practice of inquiry. However, the notion of forming a justified belief about a 
proposition that is false is quite troublesome for the actual practice of inquiry. If the processes 
upon which inquirers rely to form the beliefs they feel justified holding are capable of producing 
beliefs that are in fact false even when rigorously adhered to, then all the resources involved in 
conduct of inquiry for the purpose of gaining knowledge are arguably somewhat futile. That is, if 
one cannot have faith, evidence, argument, or some justifying leverage upon which to assume the 
processes to be fruitful in terms of yielding an improved state of knowing, then one has little 
reason to engage in the belief-forming process, apart from its intrinsic value to the inquirer. 
The argument that one could form a justified belief that is not true might shake the faith 
of inquirers in the legitimacy of their belief-forming process; however, as indicated by Richmond 
(1975),  
Surely, it is something peculiar about the justificatory status of S’s belief that Q which 
leads us to deny to that belief the status of knowledge, however tempted we may be to 
say that S is justified in believing Q.” (p. 439). 
Richmond’s statement highlighted that critiques of JTB as knowledge point back to the belief’s 
justification status; that is, any unjustified belief cannot be knowledge, even if incidentally true. 
More importantly, any justified belief that is not true likely is not really justified to begin with 
when the full chain of logic is examined or the belief is examined from the broader perspective 
of the other, from which the flaws in justification would be apparent. This public role of the 
other in knowledge claims is one of the integral components of disciplined inquiry. 
Amended formulations of knowledge. In response to the critiques of the JTB formulation 
and the sufficient conditions for knowledge, numerous amendments have been proposed over the 




modifications to indicate some additional requirement (e.g., J*TB [Jacquette, 2012] and justified 
true belief (plus) [Goldman, 2002]). A number of the amendments to JTB epistemology are 
discussed in this section. 
One of the simplest modifications to JTB adds the additional requirement of time. Here, 
as discussed by Chisholm (1966), belief, justification, and truth are all temporally bound such 
that “S knows at t that h is true, provided: (1) S believes h at t; (2) h is true; and (3) h is evident at 
t for S” (p. 23), where S is a person, h is a proposition, and t is time. The temporal qualification 
acknowledges, in part, that what is known is not static, but neither is belief nor the state of being 
evident static. This amendment resonates with Kuhn’s (1996) analysis of the relationship 
between myth and fact (discussed later in the section on paradigms of inquiry). 
Two additional amendments to the JTB formulation were proposed by Ayer (1956) and 
Lehrer (1990). Both proposed amendments attempted to qualify the belief of person S in 
proposition p and the justification status of the belief in p. Ayer probabilistically qualified 
knowledge by adding to the belief of person S in proposition p that “S is sure that P is true” (p. 
34) and to the belief’s justification status that “S has the right to be sure that P is true” (p. 34). 
Ayer’s qualification of the right to be sure addressed that the person must believe the outcome is 
likely and can establish the right for the likely belief by providing backing of the position on the 
grounds of some sort of evidence or proof to satisfy the claim. Less probabilistically, Lehrer 
suggested that “S knows that p if and only if it is true that p, S accepts that p, and S is completely 
justified in accepting that p” (1990, p. 16). Lehrer’s proposed amendment similarly attempted to 
qualify the belief and justification status of the belief with the notion of acceptance, where 




As pointed out by Gettier (1963), if a person deduced a belief in a proposition from a 
false proposition that entailed the deduced proposition (e.g., “Jones is the man who will get the 
job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket... The man who will get the job has ten coins in his 
pocket,” p.122), then the person may actually be justified, in a strict sense, in accepting the 
deduced proposition or being sure it is based on available evidence, yet fail to have knowledge, 
in this case, of the man who will get the job. Acknowledging this weakness in how JTB has been 
interpreted, the idea of a justified belief barring a false premise (Goldman, 1979; Lehrer, 1990) 
was introduced such that “if S knows that p, then S is completely justified in accepting that p in 
some way that does not depend on any false statement” (Lehrer, p. 18). One of the problems with 
JTB epistemology (a problem captured by Gettier) is that there is no explicit mandate that the 
entire chain of reasoning be examined simultaneously. Goldman attempted to reframe the false 
premise within the full chain of logic by adding that “a reasoning procedure cannot be expected 
to produce true belief if it is applied to false premises… A process is conditionally reliable when 
a sufficient proportion of its output-beliefs are true given that its input-beliefs are true” (p. 13). 
Further modification to the JTB epistemology focused on the requirements of the 
justification process itself. Two examples of this come in Goldman’s (1967) requirement of 
causal connections between the belief in a proposition and the fact that p, and Pappas’ (1979) 
requirement of inferential relation between the believed proposition and some reasonable 
evidence for the proposition. Here, Goldman modified the justified belief condition for 
knowledge with the requirement that “the fact p is causally connected in an ‘appropriate’ way 
with S’s believing p” (p. 369), where appropriate was qualified as knowledge-producing causal 
process involving “a causal chain… which is correctly reconstructed by inferences, each of 




370). Similarly, Pappas added the requirement that a person has knowledge when the believed 
proposition, h, stands in inferential relation to some total evidence, e, where “S’s, belief that h is 
inferentially based on evidence e that S has if and only if h is deductively or inductively 
supported by e, or h is epistemically derivable from e” (pp. 51–52).  
While Goldman’s (1967) causal links were grounded in cause-and-effect inferential 
philosophy (e.g., Guba & Lincoln, 1982a; Habermas, 1971), Pappas (1979) offered the 
requirement in a philosophically neutral inferential framework; however, both philosophers 
added the requirement of inferential connection between starting evidence and final conclusion. 
Adding inferential criteria to the belief-forming processes of JTB represents an interesting shift 
away from what person S knows or believes, toward how the person came to hold his or her 
belief. The shift in focus onto how the belief was formed represents a significant refocusing of 
the conditions necessary for knowledge. Even though other issues (e.g., temporal nature; 
appropriateness of the justification and belief status, given evidence; and exclusion of false 
premises in the chain of logic) were not ignored, the emphasis here on the inferential connection 
between starting evidence and final conclusion explicitly highlights how the belief was formed 
as an indicator of the quality of the belief and therefore the truth merit of the justified belief. 
In addition to internal examinations of the belief, justification, and belief-forming 
processes underlying standard accounts of knowledge, philosophers (e.g., Jacquette, 2012; 
Lehrer, 1979; Scheffler, 1965) also expanded the conditions for knowledge under JTB 
epistemology to include analysis of competing claims and evidence. Lehrer formally articulated 




Whether a proposition is evident for a person depends, I maintain, on how well the 
proposition fares in conflict with other propositions. Thus, I propose that h is evident for 
S if and only if, for any proposition c that competes with h for S, either h beats c for S or c 
is neutralized with respect to h for S. (p. 67) 
By expanding the conditions for knowledge to competing beliefs and justification processes, JTB 
epistemology was afforded relative merit, rather than simply sound, absolute justified belief. 
Lehrer (1979) further refined the external conditions by defining what was meant by a 
competing proposition, the state of one proposition beating a competitor, and the state of one 
proposition neutralizing a competitor. To understand Lehrer’s (1979) definition of a competing 
proposition, first Chisholm’s (1966) notion of an evident proposition must be reviewed. 
Chisholm stated that: 
A proposition is reasonable or “beyond reasonable doubt,” if believing it is more 
reasonable than withholding it… And a proposition h may be said to be evident for a 
subject S provided (1) that h is reasonable for S and (2) that there is no proposition i such 
that it is more reasonable for S to believe i than it is for him to believe h. (p. 22) 
Therefore, a proposition is reasonable if it makes more sense to accept it than it does to deny it, 
and a proposition is evident when it is both reasonable and there is no other proposition that is 
more reasonable in juxtaposition. Building on Chisholm’s idea of what is reasonable, Lehrer 
defined a competing proposition as “one that diminishes the epistemic worth or reasonableness 
of accepting the [original] proposition” (p. 67). Formally stated, “c competes with h if and only if 
it would be less reasonable for S to accept h if c were certain for S than if the denial of c were 
certain for S” (pp. 67–68), where being certain is not only a matter of being reasonable or even 
more reasonable, but maximally reasonable. In other words, two propositions compete on the 
basis of whether one is more reasonable than the other or calls into question the maximally 




For a proposition to be beaten or neutralized, it must first be a competitor. If two 
propositions are not in competition, then one cannot beat or neutralize the other. However,  
if c competes with h for S, then h beats c if and only if it is more reasonable for S to 
accept h than to accept c, and c is neutralized with respect to h for S if and only if there is 
some proposition n such that the conjunction of n and c does not compete with h for S 
and it is as reasonable for S to accept the conjunction as it is for him to accept just c. 
(Lehrer, 1979, p. 68) 
Here, Lehrer called attention to a principle of maximal reasonableness for defeating a competing 
proposition. However, neutralizing a proposition negates the competing proposition’s status as a 
competitor, thereby eliminating reasonableness as a winning criterion. Lehrer demonstrated 
neutralizing a proposition by creating a conjunctive proposition with the competing proposition 
that is not in competition with the original proposition and that is as reasonable to accept as the 
competing proposition by itself. When a proposition is neutralized, no proposition wins, but an 
alternative proposition is negated as a competing proposition, making it equally reasonable to 
accept as a third conjunctive proposition that does not compete with the original proposition. In 
this case, the conjunction of n and c does not compete with h, and as Lehrer stated, 
Moreover, it is as reasonable for me to accept the conjunction as it is for me to accept the 
skeptic’s remark alone. So the remark of the skeptic, though not beaten, is neutralized. 
Many skeptical challenges must be dealt with by neutralization. (p. 69) 
Although various JTB amendments have been examined individually, the set of 
modifications also have been tackled together under an umbrella of total or adequate evidence 
(Chisholm, 1966; Scheffler, 1965). Scheffler (1965) defined an “evidence condition” (p. 55) in 
order to “distinguish genuine knowing from mere true belief, by reference to appropriate 
evaluation of the belief by the believer” (p. 56). Scheffler’s proposal of total or adequate 




proposal tied in the evaluative process more explicitly than did the other examples discussed so 
far. In addition to acknowledging the time-bound nature of knowing, being able to back up a 
belief with evidence, and considering competing propositions, Scheffler called attention to three 
further considerations pertaining to the evaluation of a person’s evidence condition: the idea of 
the total evidence available to the believer versus evidence available to the other, the appraisal of 
the believer’s grounds for belief according to standards, and the development and demonstration 
of a proof to support belief.  
First, with respect to total evidence, Scheffler (1965) stated, 
It appears, then, that we need to put a special interpretation on the condition that X has 
adequate evidence for “Q”: X’s total evidence must provide adequate support for “Q”. 
His total evidence cannot, of course, generally be expected to be the same as our total 
evidence, but the adequacy of his support for “Q” needs to be judged by reference to 
every relevant item of evidence that he has; adequacy cannot be bought as the price of 
ignoring available contrary indications. The totality of evidence available to X may, 
furthermore, change over time, but the question whether X knows that Q, needs itself, 
strictly speaking, to be understood as referring to a particular time. Whatever time is in 
question, it is the totality of X’s evidence at that time which needs to be adequate. (pp. 
56–57) 
Scheffler’s (1965) presentation of total evidence pointed to two important issues. First, an 
inquirer must take into consideration all available evidence (i.e., competing, contrary, and the 
like) if the inquirer can be judged as possessing adequate total evidence. In other words, an 
inquirer cannot simply look within his or her process and conclusion, but must examine the 
processes and claims of others. Second, an unresolved tension exists between the total evidence 
the inquirer has available and the total evidence the other (who may be judging adequacy) has 
available. Scheffler indicated that the inquirer’s total evidence cannot “be expected to be the 
same as our total evidence, but the adequacy of his support for ‘Q’ needs to be judged by 




available evidence must be considered, but that the set of all available evidence may not be the 
same (or cannot be expected to be the same) between the inquirer and the other. This tension in 
judgment on adequacy of total evidence leaves the appraisal of whether X knows that Q 
unresolved, because Scheffler also acknowledges that 
In general, if you think I am mistaken in my belief, you will deny that I know, no matter 
how sincere you judge me to be and no matter how strong you consider my conviction. 
For X to be judged mistaken is sufficient basis for rejecting the claim that he knows. It 
follows that if X is admitted to know, he must be judged not to be mistaken, and this is 
the point of the truth condition… Knowing, it would appear, is incompatible with being 
wrong or mistaken, and when I describe someone as knowing, I commit myself to his not 
being mistaken. (p. 23) 
Thus, under Scheffler’s (1965) formulation, a person may possess adequate total 
evidence for a proposition at a particular time, yet still be mistaken, and therefore not know, 
because some relevant contrary evidence that existed was not available to the person at that point 
in time. This tension stresses Scheffler’s idea of adequate total evidence. The path to knowledge 
was weakened without appropriate appraisal by the other, whose total evidence may be different 
(or more) than the total evidence available to the inquirer. Without the other’s appraisal, an 
inquirer’s total evidence may lead to a state of justified belief, based on “every relevant item of 
evidence that he has” (p. 56), which was not true. That is, the inquirer may be justified, given 
limited evidence, but the belief may not be justified, given a broader body of total evidence. 
Second, with respect to appraisal according to standards, Scheffler (1965) stated, 
A second feature of the evidence condition that requires interpretation is its implicit 
reference to standards. Adequacy is, after all, a matter of appraisal, involving standards 
of judgment that may differ from age to age, from culture to culture, and even from 
person to person. The variability of such standards does not, however, imply that 
assessments of knowledge are arbitrary or that the would-be assessor is somehow 
paralyzed. He needs to assess in accord with his own best standards at the time, but he 




standards. The situation is, in principle, no different from other situations involving 
appraisal. (p. 57) 
In addition to consideration of all available evidence between the inquirer and the other in the 
knowledge, belief, and evidence appraisal process, Scheffler also addressed the appraisal of the 
believer’s grounds for belief according to standards. The standards against which belief and truth 
are appraised represent the philosophical or epistemological quality criteria matched against 
indicators in the justification process and resulting belief. However, the commitment to any set 
of standards at any particular point in time is also a reflection of “epistemological 
commitments—that is, his espousal of certain standards of evidence by which beliefs are to be 
appraised as well- or ill-grounded” (p. 58). Therefore, what was to be considered adequate 
evidence or proof of a claim, an appropriate inferential process, or warranted acceptance of p and 
being justified in accepting p, are all grounded in epistemological assumptions about what truth 
is, what can be believed about that truth, and what counts as justification for belief in that truth.  
Third, with respect to demonstration of a proof to support belief, Scheffler (1965) stated, 
We just need to recognize that having adequate evidence for a given statement is not 
simply having materials adequate for the demonstration of that statement. Finding a 
demonstration is, in general, not a routine process [e.g., a priori methodological process], 
even though checking a demonstration, once found, is routine [a posteriori 
methodological process]. Since finding a demonstration is rather a matter of ingenuity 
and luck—a “creative” outcome rather than a methodical application of rule to available 
items—possession of rule and items is clearly weaker than having a demonstration: not 
only is it itself no proof, but it does not routinely or mechanically yield proof, even where 
such a proof exists. We thus plausibly differentiate having adequate evidence, in the form 
of an actual proof, from having merely the rules and items adequate to support proof. We 
ask, in short, that the rules and items be organized and elaborated into an appropriate 
proof pattern. Having adequate evidence for “Q” is not, in general, simply having 





Scheffler’s third consideration pertaining to the evaluation of a person’s evidence condition 
highlighted the necessity that an inquirer must both have adequate evidence to be appraised and 
present that evidence in an appropriate proof pattern or the proper pattern of argument, such that 
it makes the justified case. This further emphasized the importance, or even obligation, to 
espouse epistemological commitments, because “knowing in the strong sense is more than just 
true belief, involving also the ability to justify or back up the belief in appropriate manner” (p. 
55), where an appropriate manner is tied to the epistemologically grounded standards of 
appraisal, such that the other can suitably appraise the inquirer’s total evidence against all other 
available evidence. A significant requirement for presenting evidence in an appropriate pattern of 
proof is understanding both how the epistemological commitment shapes the conditions for 
knowledge and what counts as the proper pattern of argument, given an epistemological 
commitment. Only after gaining conscious awareness of those two requirements can inquirers 
understand that they have evidence and then be able to present it suitably as such. 
The most significant proposed amendment to JTB epistemology reviewed was 
Jacquette’s (2012) proposal for Best-JB. Jacquette argued not only for a modification of the 
justification condition, but more significantly for the replacement of the truth condition 
altogether with a best-justified condition, thus entirely reformulating the conditions for 
knowledge from JTB, including the JTB modifications, to Best-JB. He defined Best-JB as 
beliefs in the truth of whatever propositions we are (a) justified in believing to be true, (b) 
when there is no better countermanding justification for their negations… The account 
preserves truth as a concept, even if it does not make truth a condition of knowledge. It is 
moreover compatible with the anti-skeptical expectation that truth is a potentially 
attainable goal for epistemic justification… We are free to suppose that truth is nothing 
more than the descriptive aptness of a proposition linguistically representing a 
corresponding existent truth-making state of affairs. Truth is nevertheless a semantic 




charged, truth philosophically has no business as a condition of knowledge. (pp. 430–
431) 
Jacquette’s reformulation of what it means to know as Best-JB was a fundamental 
reconceptualization of both knowing and the conditions sufficient for knowledge. Best-JB 
captured the notion of truth as a regulative ideal (Guba, 1990c; Kant, 1781/2007) and as an 
idealization of “the possibility of experience” (Kant, p. 250) that exerts normative force on our 
expectations of knowledge. As an idealization, truth serves in “showing us what it would be if it 
were extracted and refined to its utmost purity” (Kaplan, 2009, p. 11). However, as a condition 
for knowledge, truth serves only as guide or criterion for what we are able to approximate. Truth 
as a regulative ideal is something that can never be fully achieved in experience. According to 
Jacquette, it defines, as an ideal, the hypothetical world of possible experience, but also as an 
ideal, is incapable of actualization empirically. In other words, by replacing truth as a condition 
for knowledge, and making truth a regulative ideal in the formulation of knowledge, Jacquette 
managed to bring the conditions for knowing  
Back down to earth, eliminating truth as a condition of knowledge independently of the 
best justification of which we are capable, but without stepping away from the concept of 
truth as an attainable goal in the pursuit of best justification. (p. 431) 
One of Jacquette’s (2012) foundational arguments for replacing truth as a condition for 
knowledge was grounded in analysis of the accessibility of knowing truth. He argued that our 
access to belief in what is true or false is limited to our judgments about which propositions are 
supported by the best available justification. However, if inquirers were actually capable of fully 
apprehending truth epistemically, then what and how good the justification is becomes an 




in a proposition’s truth, then they would quite simply know and need not provide justification. 
Jacquette made the distinction in knowing between a godlike sense and a supported claim sense: 
Justification does the heavy lifting in discovering knowledge and supporting knowledge 
claims. Truth as a property of propositions transcending what we can learn from the best 
justification practically available to us is a condition that can only be satisfied by a 
godlike transcendent intelligence. (p. 431) 
All critiques of JTB epistemology that were reviewed (with the exception of Best-JB) 
were built upon either possessing unjustified belief in the truth of a proposition or the condition 
for knowledge that p is true (i.e., a truth condition that ultimately can only be corroborated or 
denied, but never truly known in a godlike sense). Inquirers can fix their belief-forming 
processes to address the justification status of their beliefs, but still potentially hold beliefs in 
propositions that are not true. Because inquirers and appraisers lack access to godlike 
intelligence, “the way we actually validate knowledge claims in practice is by appealing to 
whatever we take to be the best justification for the truth of whatever propositions are supposed 
to be known” (Jacquette, 2012, p. 432), given the evidence presented and the availability of 
competing claims at that particular time. Over time, if the chain of evidence presented changes or 
new competing claims are developed or simply become available for relative appraisal, then 
judgment of a proposition’s truth would change according to whatever is taken as the best 
justification at that time. Both practically and epistemically speaking, Jacquette made the point 
that “best justification is the best epistemically that we can do, and therefore the best that we 
should be expected to do” (p. 434) in the practice of making knowledge claims.  
For the Best-JB proposal of propositional knowledge, Jacquette (2012) offered eight 
theoretical advantages for Best-JB over standard accounts of knowledge (pp. 437–444). Each of 




Table 1.  
Theoretical Advantages of the Best-JB Formulation for Propositional Knowledge Over the JTB 
Formulation for Propositional Knowledge 
Theoretical advantage Explanation 
1. Ockham’s razor Best-JB is simpler than JTB. Under Best-JB, justified knowledge claims 
are temporally unbound and relative to the developmental state of the 
best, most-informed disciplined methodology. 
2. Avoiding epistemic hypocrisy in 
theory and practice 
If the best, most-informed disciplined methodology available for forming 
justified beliefs does not involve direct access to justification-
independent, justification-transcending truth, then truth should not be a 
theoretical condition for knowing. In practice, it is judgment of the 
justification in the belief of a proposition’s truth as the most adequate, 
Best-JB that awards the status of knowledge. 
3. Projecting a practically attainable 
ideal of best justification, and hence 
of knowledge according to the 
analysis, bringing epistemology 
pragmatically back down to earth 
By treating truth as a regulative ideal rather than a condition for 
knowledge, and further replacing the justification, J, and truth, T, 
conditions of JTB epistemology with the best justification condition of 
Best-JB, the unattainable is swapped out for the practically attainable. 
4. Making justification scientific Because best justification is linked to the temporally unbound and relative 
developmental state of the most informed disciplined methodologies, 
what is considered best justification at any point in time is never out of 
style. That is, best justification is always grounded in what is considered 
state of the science methodologically. 
5. Avoiding what we shall call 
flimsy Borgesian ‘anthill’ 
justifications. 
Jacquette argued that JTB epistemology overemphasizes the truth, T, 
condition and under emphasizes the justification, J, condition. As a result, 
Gettier (1963) cases have increased merit in the sense of an increased 
likelihood of forming weakly justified beliefs that are not true. However, 
by eliminating Truth as a condition for knowledge and replacing the 
traditional justification, J, condition with a best justification, Best-J, 
condition, “flimsy” judgments of Gettier-like knowledge are also replaced 
with judgments based on whether better scientific justification, practically 
available to others, is available for acceptance instead the negation of the 
Gettier-like belief. 
6. Avoiding Gettier counterexamples 
without ad hoc provision 
In Gettier’s counterexample, Smith has weak justification for believing 
that Jones will get the job. Collectively, not limited to Smith’s one 
interaction with the company president whom indicated that Jones would 
get the job (p. 122), there is available better justification for the negation 
of the belief that Jones will get the job. While individually Smith satisfies 
the justification condition under JTB epistemology, Smith collectively 
fails to satisfy the Best-J condition under Best-JB. In this sense, Best-JB 
avoids the Gettier counterexample. 
7. Explaining reversals of knowledge 
claim validations 
In a Kuhnian sense of the temporally-based tension between myth and 
fact, i.e., “if these out-of-date beliefs are to be called myths, then myths 
can be produced by the same sorts of methods and held for the same sorts 
of reasons that now lead to scientific knowledge” (1996, p. 2), Best-JB 
accommodates reversals of knowledge claims when better evidence 
becomes available. The Best-JB condition is tied to whatever inquirers 
determine to be the most successful, philosophically and practically 




evolve and advance, what is to be judged the Best-JB may also change, 
and as a result, negate a previously held Best-JB (e.g., “We cannot fault a 
forensic scientist investigating a crime in 1941 for not using evidence of 
DNA analysis in order to identify a suspect,” Jacquette, p. 444). 
8. Offering at least an equally good 
solution to the problem of universal 
ignorance when compared with 
condition T in JTB and J*TB 
Because the Best-JB analysis of the concept of knowledge includes the 
“concept of defeasible best justification” (Jacquette, p. 446), there is 
always the possibility of not-p; that is, better justification becoming 
available for the negation of p. Best justification is temporally bound to 
the best justification available. Consequently, while an individual may 
either not know they are not best justified when compared to the 
collective wisdom (and therefore not know p) or become no longer best 
justified when better justification avails itself (and again retrospectively 
be judged to not know p), a collective society may also be universally 
ignorant that better justification exists. In this universal case, even though 
the better hypothetical justification was never considered, the collective 
society remains defeasibly, but not manifestly, justified in their belief in 
the truth of p. In JTB epistemology, not only is the individual justified in 
believing a false truth, but the collective society is justified in believing a 
false truth and neither have knowledge. 
Formally, Jacquette’s (2012) formulation for knowledge was as follows, where the 
doxastic subject is an inquirer concerned with the belief forming process: 
Best-J: Doxastic subject S is best (albeit defeasibly) justified (Best-J) at time t in 
believing proposition p = df (a) S is justified at time t in believing proposition p, and (b) 
there is at t no countermanding better or stronger justification available in practice for any 
doxastic subject to disbelieve proposition p or any proposition invoked in justifying belief 
in the truth of proposition p, or to believe instead the negation of proposition p or at least 
one proposition invoked in justifying belief in the truth of proposition p. (p. 433)  
Altogether, Best-JB encompasses a temporally bound knowing that is not tied (as a condition for 
knowledge) to an inaccessible godlike truth condition. A Best-JB has no warranted basis for 
denial, where warranted denial (i.e., not-p) is a case in which the best justification for the truth of 
a believed in proposition may be overturned by better justification for the proposition’s negation. 
In addition, beliefs in the truth of a proposition must be justified, beat (or neutralize) all available 
competitors, and be based on premises that themselves are justified, unbeaten by competing 
propositions, and not false. In a final clarification on the distinction between analyses of 




If it is asked in conclusion whether Best-JB is supposed to be an analysis of knowledge 
itself or only of best justified knowledge claims, the answer is that Best-JB analyzes the 
concept of knowledge, but that its applications, whenever we get down to individual 
cases, can only address the justification status of particular knowledge claims. (p. 446) 
Belief. The prior section reviewed various formulations and definitions of knowledge. 
Despite the diversity of available conditions for and assumptions of knowledge, two critical 
elements persist: belief and justification. In the current section, the concept of belief is examined, 
followed by an examination of justification in the following section. The overall discussion on 
knowledge concludes with a review of the importance of justified belief for the process of 
disciplined inquiry. 
What is a belief and how does believing relate to knowing? Foundational to knowing is 
holding a belief, regardless of its status as justified, best justified, or in the truth of the expressed 
proposition. According to Dewey (1933), 
A belief refers to something beyond itself by which its value is tested; it makes an 
assertion about some matter of fact or some principle or law. It means that a specified 
state of fact or law is accepted or rejected, that it is something proper to be affirmed or at 
least acquiesced in. It is hardly necessary to lay stress upon the importance of belief. It 
covers all the matters of which we have no sure knowledge and yet which we are 
sufficiently confident of to act upon and also the matters that we now accept as certainly 
true, as knowledge, but which nevertheless may be questioned in the future. (p. 6) 
Dewey’s belief definition has three key elements. First, a belief is an acknowledged acceptance 
of a state of affairs or in a proposition. However, second, the acceptance exists along a 
continuum of certainty (e.g., “affirmed or at least acquiesced in,” p. 6) from accepted as certainly 
true to sufficiently confident to act upon. Third, the belief must be capable of holding up to 
scrutiny of its merit. As a building block for knowledge, belief in this sense represents an 




Even though a belief represents an individual’s confidence in the match between fact and 
nature, belief by itself is neither justified nor haphazard. A belief should be the conclusion 
formed “as the result of personal mental activity, such as observing, collecting, and examining 
evidence” (Dewey, 1933, p. 7); however, the belief has not yet been fully vetted according to an 
external justification process. A belief is the outcome of the orderly process an individual 
engages in prior to broader acceptance of an idea. 
One man, if challenged, could produce little or no evidence for thinking as he does. It is 
an idea that he has picked up from others and that he accepts because the idea is generally 
current, not because he has examined into the matter and not because his own mind has 
taken any active part in reaching and framing the belief. (pp. 6–7) 
The active role in reaching and framing belief is what Dewey attributed to distinguishing belief 
from the thoughts considered mere “mental furniture” (p. 7). Beliefs require an “intellectual and 
practical commitment” (p. 7) that sooner or later will necessitate or “demand our investigation to 
find out upon what grounds they rest” (p. 8). It is this propensity of a belief to hold up to future 
scrutiny that builds the momentum necessary for an inquirer to eventually attempt to substantiate 
the belief in a manner, or by a process, that itself holds up to scrutiny and concludes with an 
affirmed, justified belief as its product. 
What is justified belief? Justified belief can be defined as an intellectual and practical 
commitment to “an assertion about some matter of fact” (Dewey, 1933, p. 6) that is based on 
grounds that have been adequately tested, investigated, and properly affirmed. Critical to the 
conception of belief justification is how the belief was formed (i.e., tested, investigated, and 
affirmed). Goldman (1979), focusing on the belief-forming process, tackled the conception of 




A justified belief is, roughly speaking, one that results from cognitive operations that are, 
generally speaking, good or successful… [such that] If S’s believing p at t results from a 
reliable cognitive belief-forming process (or set of processes), then S’s belief in p at t is 
justified. (p. 13) 
Central to Goldman’s ideas was the formation of belief by reliable process. His theory of 
justified belief attempted  
An explanation of why we count, or would count, certain beliefs as justified and others as 
unjustified. Such an explanation must refer to our beliefs about reliability, not to the 
actual facts. The reason we count beliefs as justified is that they are formed by what we 
believe to be reliable belief-forming processes. (p. 18) 
While Goldman’s (1979) internal (i.e., inquirer-centric mental activities) emphasis on 
reliable cognitive belief-forming processes fell short of embodying the external scrutiny of belief 
product and belief-forming process suggested by Jacquette (2012) and Scheffler (1965), it did 
shift the lion’s share of responsibility for a justified belief onto the belief-forming process itself. 
This is not to say that the process should not have to stand up to competing processes or that the 
process’ output should not have to stand up to competing processes’ outputs. However, it does at 
least add to the appraisal speculation by asking if this belief is justified and how the belief is 
justified (epistemological and doxological speculations, respectively, whereby epistemology 
generally speculates about the “conditions definitive of knowing” [Goldman, 2001, p. 346], and 
doxology generally speculates about what belief-forming processes produce beliefs that meet the 
conditions for knowing). According to Goldman, “Since knowledge entails belief, a study of the 
most effective or powerful routes to knowledge must take into account the available routes to 
belief. Nobody can attain knowledge without attaining belief” (p. 347). 
A symbiosis exists between epistemology and doxology in the evaluation of justified 




Goldman calls “reliable” (1979, p. 18) is, in this espoused context, a relative term rather than 
absolute. Belief in this sense represents an individual’s confidence in a match between an idea 
and nature (Goldman, 2002), so what is a reliable process for the production of belief under one 
set of epistemological assumptions about nature is not the same under a different set of 
epistemological assumptions about nature. Nature is relative to assumptions; therefore, so is the 
reliability of the belief-forming processes. Furthermore, what would be appraised as “an 
appropriate proof pattern” (Scheffler, 1965, p. 68) in the process and presentation of “the proper 
pattern of argument” (p. 68) in the product would also, by logical association, be a relative 
evaluation according to an espoused set of epistemological commitments and associated 
standards of appraisal. 
Goldman (1979) stated that “the term ‘justified’… is an evaluative term, a term of 
appraisal” (p. 1). Therefore, when evaluating a belief as justified, what is really ventured is an 
evaluative “explanation of why we count, or would count, certain beliefs as justified and others 
as unjustified” (p. 18). The tricky part of the justification appraisal is accessing and applying the 
appropriate standards for belief-forming process and belief product. As indicated by Scheffler 
(1965), assessments of knowledge are not arbitrary, but even when universally formulated, the 
content of knowledge remains relative to assumptions about nature, assumptions about the 
closest a person can come to know something about nature, assumptions about the most 
appropriate and reliable routes to belief about that nature, and agreement about what counts as 
proper presentation of justified belief within the relative system of justification status (Jenkins, 




The appraisal of justified belief is critical to knowledge judgments. The appraisal of 
status as justified belief serves to distinguish “mere belief” (Goldman, 2002, p. 190) and “mere 
justification” (Jenkins, 2011, p. 58) from genuine knowing. The distinction of the mere from the 
genuine safeguards against circumstances wherein “there would be no problem about ‘knowing’ 
that a theory matches nature; for it is certainly possible for some to believe that there is such a 
match” (Goldman, p. 190); however, the belief must be justified in order to begin consideration 
as knowledge about nature. 
Justification. Chisholm (1966) addressed what it means to have evidence and the criteria 
for determining case by case whether an inquirer actually has evidence: 
If one man has made a lucky guess… but doesn’t really know, and another man knows, 
but isn’t saying, and doesn’t need to guess, what is it that the second man has (if 
anything) that the first man does not? One may say, of course, that the second man has 
evidence and that the first man does not, or that something is evident to the one that is not 
evident to the other. But what is it to have evidence, and how are we to decide in any 
particular case whether or not we do have evidence? (p. 1) 
Chisholm’s question was a theme echoed by Scheffler (1965) in his examination of the evidence 
condition as means to identify “genuine knowing” (p. 56). There is a proverb that one man’s 
trash is another man’s treasure. Both the proverb and Chisholm’s quote make clear that each 
person has something; however, the distinctions between trash and treasure or luck and evidence 
must be made according to some external and shared standards of merit. The review of 
knowledge turns to these standards or conditions of merit in the examination of justification. 
What is justification? Regardless of the formulation of knowledge (i.e., Best-JB, JTB, or 
JTB plus), all accounts overlap with respect to the requirement of a belief condition; however, 




exist, a core feature of knowledge is that the held beliefs are justified. The issue of whether a 
belief is justified is essentially a matter of being able to state the grounds upon which one holds 
belief in p, and then having others judge the grounds as adequate. As expressed by Jenkins 
(2011), “for justification we must be able to answer the question, ‘How do you know that you 
know?’” (p. 59).  
In response to the question “How do you know that you know?” Jacquette’s (2012) 
formal definition of Best-JB highlighted the merit of the belief (i.e., output) and its premises (i.e., 
inputs) in contributing to justification. Not only should no counterfactual claims be better 
justified or justify the negation of the proposed knowledge claim available for consideration at 
that particular point in time, but the premises upon which the claim is based must also be 
justified, unbeaten by competing premises, and not false. In this sense, justification of a belief in 
p and its premises is not a dichotomous judgment of justified versus not; rather, it is an 
evaluation along a justified continuum indicating whether the belief and premises are the best 
justified set of inputs and outputs “maximally practically attainable… [given] the most strongly 
corroborated work” (p. 434) available to consider. 
In contrast with emphasis on inputs and outputs, Goldman’s (1979, 2001, 2002) writings 
on justified belief focused on the process by which the belief was formed.  
Returning to a categorical concept of justifiedness, we might ask just how reliable a 
belief-forming process must be in order that its resultant beliefs be justified. A precise 
answer to this question should not be expected. Our conception of justifiedness is vague 
in this respect. It does seem clear, however, that perfect reliability isn’t required. Belief-
forming processes that sometimes produce error still confer justification. It follows that 




Therefore, through Goldman and Jacquette (2012), we have a threefold conception of a 
justification continuum as merit appraisal of the inputs, process, and outputs that lead or 
contribute to the justification of knowledge claims.  
Interestingly, Goldman (1979) further defined two time-bound uses of the justified 
condition: “an ex post use and an ex ante use” (p. 21). The primary difference between the two 
uses of justified points to the evaluand of the justification appraisal, or subject of the justification 
evaluation. The ex post use describes the evaluation of an existing belief as likely justified or not, 
given all of the merit considerations of inputs, process, and outputs discussed so far. The ex ante 
use describes an evaluation of the inquirer by whom the justification judgment is made, such that 
“p is (or isn’t) suitable for him [the inquirer] to believe” (p. 21). Ex ante justification is 
independent of the belief itself, such that the ex ante use of justification is an evaluation of 
whether the inquirer is, or would be, justified to hold the belief if or when it is formed; that is, 
“the ex ante use occurs when no such belief exists, or when we wish to ignore the question of 
whether such a belief exists” (p. 21). In other words, ex ante justification establishes the potential 
to be justified given a set of conditions, which Goldman defined as 
Person S is ex ante justified in believing p at t if and only if there is a reliable belief-
forming operation available to S which is such that if S applied that operation to his total 
cognitive state at t, S would believe p at t-plus-delta (for a suitably small delta) and that 
belief would be ex post justified. (p. 21) 
When associated with cycles of iterative inquiry (e.g., the general method of applied 
theory building [Lynham, 2002b], living systematic inquiry [Wadsworth, 2010], theory-research-
development-practice cycle [Swanson, 2007; Swanson & Holton, 1997]), the ex ante use of 
justification becomes a powerful methodological appraisal. Within this cycle of inquiry context, 




into the inquiry cycle, premises used as inputs, and available methodological routes from here to 
there (Yin, 2009). To better understand these “routes to belief” (Goldman, 2001, p. 347), the 
background review turns to belief-forming processes. 
What is a belief forming, justification conferring process? Prior to jumping directly into 
the Goldman literature on belief-forming processes (1979, 2002), a more general concept of 
belief formation can be found in the earlier writings of Dewey (1933): 
That operation in which present facts suggest other facts (or truths) in such a way as to 
induce belief in what is suggested on the ground of real relation in the things themselves, 
a relation between what suggests and what is suggested. (p. 12) 
In reference to the operation, Dewey described a process of reasoning in which the inquirer 
moves through a progression of initial truths, relations among the initial truths, and finally the 
suggestion of a new truth. Interestingly, the progression of the inquirer depends upon three facts 
and three beliefs in the truth of the facts. First, the inquirer begins with a set of givens for which 
he or she presumably has some grounds for taking as truthful premises; that is, the inquirer feels 
justified in believing in the truth of the starting facts. Next, the inquirer reasons about the relation 
or connection among the premises, and forms belief in the truth of the perceived relations. 
Lastly, the inquirer makes inference about a new fact, which he or she feels justified believing, 
given the premises and perceived relations among them. The process of inference from premise 
to conclusion that induces belief is the thing that connects what Dewey refers to as the “relation 




The entire reasoning process described by Dewey (1933) contains premises as inputs, 
inference as process, and belief as outputs. The input-process-output belief-forming process is 
similar to standard input/process/output (IPO) process models. Conveniently, the IPO process 
model provides a helpful conceptual framework to capture the idea of a belief-forming process, 
both as accounted for by Dewey and by Goldman (1979, 2002). Goldman (1979) defined the 
notion of a belief forming process as 
A functional operation or procedure, i.e., something that generates a mapping from 
certain states – ‘inputs’ – into other states – ‘outputs’. The outputs in the present case are 
states of believing this or that proposition at a given moment… But when we say that a 
belief is caused by a given process, understood as a functional procedure, we may 
interpret this to mean that it is caused by the particular inputs to the process (and by the 
intervening events “through which’ the functional procedure carries the inputs into the 
output) on the occasion in question. (p. 11) 
Jacquette (2012) emphasized the justification of input and output, while Goldman (1979) 
emphasized the justification in the process by which we form “a mapping from certain states – 
‘inputs’ – into other states – ‘outputs’” (p. 11). It is this mapping, or process of inference from 
premises to a new state of belief, that encompasses a belief-forming process. However, the 
belief-forming process can be considered a general case, one in which some belief outputs are 
justified and some are not. For a belief-forming process to be considered a more specific justified 
instance, it must conform to certain conditions, just as Jacquette similarly outlined, whereby a 
premise and formed belief must meet the condition that neither are demonstrated false nor 
negated or beaten by competitors that are better justified. Here, the justified belief-forming 
process must both demonstrate a reliable tendency for producing justified beliefs judged as true 
or best justified in practice, but also hold the promise of producing the same as an idealized 




Goldman (1979) captured the idea of the conditions necessary for a justification-
conferring process to be an instance of a belief-forming process in the following statement: 
I have characterized justification-conferring processes as ones that have a ‘tendency’ to 
produce beliefs that are true rather than false. The term ‘tendency’ could refer either to 
actual long-run frequency, or to a ‘propensity’, i.e., outcomes that would occur in merely 
possible realizations of the process. (p. 11) 
In Goldman’s statement, the “actual long-run frequency” maps to the process’s reliable tendency 
in practice and the propensity maps to the promise of what would or should produce justified 
beliefs in idealized form (Goldman, 1979; Kaplan, 2009). However, in both cases (i.e., practice 
and idealization), the tendency and propensity are of the more general belief-forming process to 
“produce beliefs that are true rather than false” (p. 11), where ‘true’ is a state or condition of 
epistemic appraisal.  
To disambiguate general belief-forming processes from the more specific justification-
conferring, belief-forming processes, Goldman (1979) outlined several types of functional belief-
forming operations and examples of both faulty processes and fruitful justification-conferring 
processes. Four functional operations were defined: (a) “reasoning processes, where the inputs 
include antecedent beliefs and entertained hypotheses” (p. 11); (b) “functional procedures whose 
inputs include desires, hopes, or emotional states of various sorts (together with antecedent 
beliefs)” (pp. 11–12); (c) “memory process, which takes as input beliefs or experiences at an 
earlier time and generates as output beliefs at a later time” (p. 12); and (d) “perceptual processes” 
(p. 12), which take environmental stimuli as inputs and transform the stimuli through cognitive 




Among these four functional belief-forming operations, Goldman (1979) offered 
examples of both faulty processes and fruitful justification-conferring processes. Examples of 
belief-forming processes that would be classified as unjustified, or non justification-conferring, 
were “confused reasoning, wishful thinking… mere hunch or guesswork, and hasty 
generalization” (p. 9). Each of these examples of faulty process has the tendency to produce 
belief in something that is not true, where ‘true’ is dependent upon the assumptions concerning 
the possibility of experience. Originally included in Goldman’s list of faulty processes was 
“reliance on emotional attachment” (p. 9); however, it seemed an epistemologically laden value 
judgment (covered in more detail in the section on philosophical paradigms of inquiry), rather 
than an epistemologically neutral example, and was consequently excluded here. Examples of 
belief processes that would be classified as justification conferring were “standard perceptual 
processes, remembering, good reasoning, and introspection” (p. 10). These justification-
conferring processes have the tendency to reliably produce output beliefs that are true, where 
truth is a paradigmatic assumption about knowing whose value judgment is at least partially a 
product of the belief-forming process that produced it as an output belief. 
How does a belief achieve justification status? Two points are important for 
understanding the status of justified belief. First, as a status, it is something achieved or granted 
but not given as an absolute upon meeting some set of initial conditions. Meeting an initial set of 
conditions only provides the inquirer the potential to be justified in holding the belief. Second, 
upon completion of a justification-conferring belief-forming process, judgment concerning 
justification must be made externally for a belief to achieve its status as legitimately justified and 




Chisholm (1966) posed the following question: 
How are we to decide, in any particular case, whether we know? is to refer to the 
“sources” of our knowledge and to say that an ostensible item of knowledge is genuine if, 
and only if, it is the product of a properly accredited source. (p. 57) 
Here, Chisholm drew attention to the relational value that knowing has to the sources from which 
knowledge or justified belief were produced. The sources of interest in the production of belief 
that contribute to the belief’s achieved status as justified (and therefore address the question of 
whether we know) are the belief inputs, the mapping operation from input sources to output 
sources, and the belief output. 
With regard to having a belief that is justified, Jacquette’s (2012) writing on Best-JB 
highlighted the importance of the premise beliefs (i.e., inputs) and formed beliefs (i.e., outputs), 
while Goldman’s writings on belief-forming processes (1979, 2001, 2002) highlighted the 
importance of process that takes as its inputs a set of premises, and through functional belief-
forming operations, produces beliefs as its outputs. As pointed out by Goldman, “a justified 
belief gets its status of being justified from some processes or properties that make it justified. In 
short, there must be some justification-conferring processes or properties” (p. 2). These two 
examples underscore the “evaluands” (Mertens & Wilson, 2012, p. 13) of the justification-
appraisal process, indicating that judgments concerning the justification status of a belief must be 
made about the “process and product” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985b, p. 50). Furthermore, as pointed 
out by Scheffler (1965), justification evaluation of the process and product evaluands must be 
made according to standards of quality or merit, but the burden of presenting or demonstrating 





The best an inquirer can achieve without external appraisal is Goldman’s (1979) concept 
of ex ante justification, where ex ante justification status suggests whether the inquirer is, or 
might be, justified to hold the belief if or when it is formed. Demonstrating the possession of 
quality (or justification-conferring) indicators in process and product essentially establishes 
whether the inquirer is ex ante justified, such that the inquirer has satisfied some measure of 
disciplined, methodical inquiry to the best of his or her knowledge. However, the belief produced 
only possesses the potential for ex post justification until judged externally. In this sense of 
externally appraised justification, ex post justification is the achieved status that might more 
commonly be thought of as what it means for a belief to be justified.  
It can be concluded that ex ante justification, even though focused on the inquirer, is held 
to a set of internal standards or judgments, while ex post justification focused on the belief 
output itself is held to a set of external standards or judgments. These external standards can be 
summarized as two basic criteria: whether the inquirer is ex ante justified and whether the belief 
output is more reasonable than any other belief available in the collective at that point in time. 
This distinction between ex ante justification of the inquirer (i.e., whether the inquirer is justified 
in making a particular claim) and ex post justification of the belief (i.e., whether a particular 
claim is itself justified) is important then because the inquirer may input justified premises, 
engage in satisfactory belief forming process, and even produce belief that is reasonable to 
accept; however, these three conditions only give good reason for conferring ex ante 
justification. The produced belief may not be judged ex post justified if a more reasonable belief 




Given the distinction between ex ante and ex post justification, more should be said about 
both forms of justification with regard to the justification-appraisal process. We have already 
identified ex ante justification as an evaluation of the merit of two evaluands (i.e., the belief 
premises and the belief-forming process) and identified ex post justification as an evaluation of 
the merit of one final evaluand, the belief output. However, both evaluations require specific 
criteria that the evaluands are held accountable to and specific indicators in the evaluands of their 
inherent criterial value. Ex ante justification is somewhat analogous to evaluation of the inquiry 
process, while ex post justification appraisal is somewhat analogous to evaluation of the inquiry 
product. For ex ante justification appraisal, several internal indicators of quality must be 
evaluated. Goldman (2002) refers to these internal ex ante indicators as justifiers:  
I shall use the term “justifiers” for facts or states of affairs that determine the justification 
status of a belief, or the epistemic status a proposition has for an epistemic agent. In other 
words, justifiers determine whether or not a proposition is justified for an epistemic agent 
at a given time. (p. 5) 
Internally, the inquiry must at a minimum be designed, or in totality also be executed and 
demonstrated, in an appropriate manner for the inquirer to achieve ex ante justification. Instances 
may exist in which the inquirer actually holds a belief that is accepted externally, but the inquirer 
may still not be ex ante justified if acceptable process did not lead to the held belief. That is, “a 
true belief may be based on superstition, improper authority, or ‘mere chance’; unless it is 
reached on the basis of an ‘appropriate method’, it is not justified, and does not constitute 
knowledge” (Richman, 1975, p. 438); that is, “a belief is [ex ante] justified if and only it is ‘well-
formed’” (Goldman, 1979, p. 14). 
Discussion of judgment concerning justification status includes a subtle yet important 




leads to a judgment that the inquirer is ex ante justified in believing in the truth of a proposition, 
the appraisal of ex post justified belief must be made about the belief itself in addition to ex ante 
justification of the inquirer holding the belief. This is the difference between Smith being 
justified in believing that Jones is the man who will get the job (Gettier, 1963) and a belief that is 
the Best-JB available at the time (Jacquette, 2012). 
Scheffler (1965) pointed out that an inquirer’s  
Total evidence cannot, of course, generally be expected to be the same as our total 
evidence, but the adequacy of his support for “Q” [with respect to ex ante justification] 
needs to be judged by reference to every relevant item of evidence that he has. (p. 56)  
However, ex post justification is held to external standards in the sense that the total evidence 
available in the collective is weighed in the judgment of maximally reasonable belief. The 
tension between what an inquirer does not know that he or she does not know (i.e., evidence 
beyond the inquirer’s total evidence) and what others know that the inquirer does not know (i.e., 
the total evidence available collectively) has existed in the literature for a long time (e.g., 
Jacquette, 2012; Richman, 1975; Scheffler, 1965). Somewhat conveniently, the distinction 
between ex ante and ex post justification accommodates this tension nicely. The convenient 
accommodation of the distinction can be inferred from Richmond’s statement regarding the point 
of view from which justification appraisals are made. 
It might help if we were to ask not whether S was justified in holding Q, but whether the 
belief Q, held by S, was justified, since the former manner of speaking strongly suggests 
that the question at issue is one of “subjective justification,” i.e., one in which the 
question of justification is viewed from the point of view of the subject, here S. The latter 
way of speaking has the merit—for present purposes—of leaving that question open. Of 
course, from S’s point of view, and on the basis of evidence available to him, we may say 
that S is justified in believing Q. But, again, it is not from that perspective or on that 




Ex post justification emphasizes the importance of appropriate demonstration of evidence 
and belief for the purpose of public scrutiny. It is through the public scrutiny and evaluation of 
belief output that a belief may either run up against better justified beliefs unavailable to the 
inquirer or be judged the Best-JB available. While Jacquette (2012) referred to the process of 
standing up to public appraisal as judgment of best available justification, Lehrer (1979) and 
Chisholm (1966) referred to the appraisal as judgment concerning the maximally reasonable.  
Evaluating whether a belief output is the maximally reasonable belief for the purposes of 
ex post justification acknowledges the ex ante status of the inquirer and presumed reasonableness 
of the held belief, but additionally acknowledges whether or not the belief output is evident and 
no more reasonable belief exists in comparison. Chisholm (1966) framed this relationship in a 
hierarchy of appraisal terms, where “every proposition that is evident is reasonable, but not 
conversely; and every proposition that is reasonable is acceptable, but not conversely” (p. 22). 
Therefore, a proposition is reasonable if it makes more sense to accept it than it does to deny it, 
and a proposition is evident when it is both reasonable and no other proposition is more 
reasonable in juxtaposition. In this context, an evident belief is one that has achieved the status of 
ex post justification from the point of view of the collective’s total evidence.  
Judgments about a belief’s justification status are both relative and somewhat circular. 
That is, judgments about the product of inquiry are made relative to other competing products (or 
possible products), such that the belief product beats or is the best product available at that time; 
and similarly, a process is judged reliable, or to demonstrate a reliable tendency, in a relative 
sense when compared with competing processes (or idealized processes) that also produce 




justified, based on the process by which it was formed, and at the same time, a belief-forming 
process may or may not be judged as justified, based on the belief output it produced. The 
inherent circularity is what Chisholm referred to as the “problem of the criterion” (p. 3). 
The importance of justified belief for understanding disciplined inquiry. Opening the 
discussion on knowledge, Chisholm (1966) stated, “One may ask, ‘What do we know—what is 
the extent of our knowledge?’ One may also ask, ‘How do we decide in any particular case 
whether we know—what are the criteria, if any, of knowing?’” (p. 3). Understanding and judging 
what it means to know has been a contended issue in both philosophy and practice since the time 
of Socrates. Disciplined inquiry has attempted to address issues of understanding and judgment 
in both philosophy and practice through an explicit belief system and inspectable and verifiable 
product and process (Lincoln & Guba, 1985b). Here, it is argued that the answer to the first of 
Chisholm’s questions is held in the axioms of paradigm theory, and the answer to the second 
may be held in a theory of methodology; both theories are accommodated under the process and 
concept of disciplined inquiry. 
What counts for knowledge is a contentious and tricky state of affairs. The truth 
condition and the belief condition must interact at some level, but as should be evident from the 
past 2000 years of discussion on the requisite conditions sufficient for knowledge claims, the 
extent and requirements for interaction of truth and belief for knowledge remains unsettled. 
However, the same conversation (e.g., “Nobody can attain knowledge without attaining belief,” 
Goldman, 2002, p. 165) should clarify that two fundamental elements must always be present to 
make propositional knowledge claims: (a) belief in the truth of a proposition, and (b) sufficient 




Standardized accounts of these two elements get messy without explicit recognition of 
the underlying roles of philosophical commitments (Kuhn, 1996; Scheffler, 1965) to the nature 
of the relationship between the inquirer and belief, as well as between belief and truth (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1982a). The assumptions made about the nature of truth and what can be known about 
that truth define, somewhat precisely, both the extent and requirements for interaction of truth 
and belief for knowledge claims. Furthermore, what counts as the nature of truth and what 
inquirers can know about that truth also define what counts as sufficient justification in the 
beliefs inquirers come to hold. Given the role of the other, or the collective, in confirming and 
appraising knowledge claims, the criteria for sufficiency must also be made explicit or the 
appraisal process for a knowledge claim will fall apart. This idea of what counts as sufficient 
justification needing to be made explicit was precisely what Scheffler was conveying in his 
statement concerning the “espousal of certain standards of evidence by which beliefs are to be 
appraised as well- or ill-grounded” (1965, p. 58).  
As indicated by Chisholm (1966), in order to know, we must be able to define both what 
it is possible to know and how we determine whether we can claim to have attained knowledge 
in any particular occasion. The process of disciplined inquiry incorporates espousal of both what 
is possible for an inquirer to come to know and the standards against which judgments can be 
made regarding whether an inquirer has justifiably come to believe something about what is 
possible to ultimately know. Even though the term disciplined inquiry has been around for more 
than half a century (Cronbach & Suppes, 1969) and has been cited as the underlying framework 
for both scientific and naturalistic paradigms of inquiry (Guba & Lincoln, 1982a), the concept of 




from a review of the conditions for knowledge that relate to disciplined inquiry into a detailed 
examination of the concept of disciplined inquiry. 
Inquiry Versus Disciplined Inquiry  
Inquiry in general is the process by which inquirers form beliefs. Beliefs can be construed 
as a best approximation of objective truth or an intersubjective construction of relative truth 
(Kant, 1781/2007; Lincoln et al., 2011; Scheffler, 1965). Disciplined inquiry is the process by 
which inquirers form justified beliefs about the assumed truth defining the possibility of 
experience. The process of disciplined inquiry applies methodological understanding of the 
“features of the methods or practices used in forming these beliefs” (Goldman, 2002, p. 187) that 
most regularly align the produced beliefs with the assumed truth values. 
Because belief justification, as well as inquirer justification (i.e., ex ante justification), lie 
in a criterion-based process for producing belief, the criterion-based process should and will be 
examined in more detail throughout the remainder of this manuscript. In addition, it will be 
argued in the following section that, while we may generate beliefs (including potentially 
unjustified beliefs, e.g., “gratuitous” or “unacceptable,” Chisholm, 1966, p. 23) through general 
processes of inquiry, the criterion-based process of specific interest here is by definition the type 
of inquiry termed disciplined inquiry. In the present discussion, disciplined inquiry is considered 
a specific type of inquiry. Consequently, first inquiry is generally defined, and then disciplined 
inquiry is further defined as a specific form of the more general definition. 
Inquiry defined. According to Lincoln and Guba, “The purpose of a research inquiry is 




understanding or explanation” (1985b, p. 227). Several definitions of inquiry are provided in 
Table 2, but broadly speaking, inquiry can be thought of as a process of generating and 
accumulating knowledge that is driven by speculation and curiosity, within which problems and 
questions are defined, and evidence and answers sought and discovered (Dewey, 1933; Lincoln 
& Guba, 1985b). Key to Dewey’s conception of inquiry and reflection is the perplexing state, 
which is a catalyst to inquiry and triggers an examination of the relation between something 
observed and something suggested in order to arrive at a belief. However, arriving at a belief is 
not haphazard; rather, it is a process in which “something is believed in (or disbelieved in), not 
on its own direct account, but through something else which stands as witness, evidence, proof, 
voucher, warrant; that is, as ground of belief” (Dewey, p. 11), and “it includes a conscious and 
voluntary effort to establish belief upon a firm basis of evidence and rationality” (p. 9). 
Across the breadth of definitions for inquiry, a few fundamental elements of inquiry were 
reinforced: 
 Inquiry is problem and/or question driven (Dewey, 1933; Lincoln & Guba, 1985b; 
Llewellyn, 2002). 
 Inquiry involves deliberate collection, examination, and investigation of relevant 
facts, evidence, and data (Brunk-Chavez & Foster, 2010; Dewey, 1933; Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985b; Llewellyn, 2002). 
 The aim of inquiry is to generate knowledge that is in the form of belief, speculation, 
or inference; that is grounded in evidence; and that offers resolution, explanation, or 




Foster, 2010; Dewey, 1933; Lincoln & Guba, 1985b; Llewellyn, 2002; Rallis & 
Rossman, 2012). 
Lacking from general definitions of inquiry are any references to inherent standards of 
worth concerning the quality of the speculation or the quality of the process through which the 
speculation was produced. Furthermore, no external process is included through which 
judgments are made concerning the speculation as a real solution or actual knowledge. 
Disciplined inquiry, in contrast, advances the notion of inquiry further by adding systematic 
planning, execution, and critique requirements, as well as a philosophical framework of belief 
tied to ways of knowing, ways of coming to know, and the standards that all the aforementioned 
advances should measure up to for justification. Because disciplined inquiry advances more 
stringent and specific standards than those of general inquiry, disciplined inquiry is examined as 
a specific kind of inquiry in the next section. 
Table 2.  
Definitions of Inquiry 
Source Definition of inquiry 
Dewey, J. (1933). How we think: A 
restatement of the relation of reflective 
thinking to the educative process. 
Boston, MA: D.C. Heath. 
Inquiry is the activity “adapted to bring to recognition facts that will 
answer the question presented” [by an uncertainty or problem] … For 
the result of the act is to bring facts before the mind that enable a 
person to reach a conclusion on the basis of evidence. In so far, then, as 
the act… was deliberate, was performed with the intention of getting 
an external basis on which to rest a belief, it exemplifies … the 
operation of hunting, searching, inquiring” (p. 13), where the 
uncertainty or problem is further defined as “whatever – no matter how 
slight and commonplace in character – perplexes and challenges the 
mind so that it makes belief at all uncertain, there is a genuine problem, 
or question, involved in an experience of sudden change” (pp. 12-13). 
Dewey, J. (1933). How we think: A 
restatement of the relation of reflective 
thinking to the educative process. 
Boston, MA: D.C. Heath. 
[on thinking] “that operation in which present facts suggest other facts 
(or truths) in such a way as to induce belief in what is suggested on the 
ground of real relation in the things themselves, a relation between 
what suggests and what is suggested” (p. 12). 





what.html, accessed on 10.14.12 
“Inquiry is a dynamic process of being open to wonder and puzzlement 
and coming to know and understand the world. As such, it is a stance 
that pervades all aspects of life and is essential to the way in which 
knowledge is created. Inquiry is based on the belief that understanding 
is constructed in the process of people working and conversing 
together as they pose and solve the problems, make discoveries and 
rigorously testing the discoveries that arise in the course of shared 
activity”. 
Llewellyn, D. (2002). Inquire within: 
Implementing inquiry-based science 
standards. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Corwin Press. 
“inquiry is the science, art, and spirit of imagination. It can be defined 
as the scientific process of active exploration by which we use critical, 
logical, and creative thinking skills to raise and engage in questions of 
personal interests. Driven by our curiosity and wonder of observed 
phenomena, inquiry investigations usually involve: [a] Generating a 
question or problem to be solved, [b] Choosing a course of action and 
carrying out the procedures of the investigation, [and c] Gathering and 
recording the data through observation and instrumentation to draw 
appropriate conclusions. As we communicate and share our 
explanations, inquiry helps us connect our prior understanding to new 
experiences, modify and accommodate our previously held beliefs and 
conceptual models, and construct new knowledge. In constructing 
newly formed knowledge, students are generally cycled back into the 
processes and pathways of inquiry with new questions and 
discrepancies to investigate.” (p. 16). 
Brunk-Chavez, B. L. & Foster, H. 
(2012). In S. F. Rallis, & G. B. 
Rossman (Eds.), The research journey: 
An introduction to inquiry (p. 9). New 
York, NY: The Guilford Press. 
Inquiry is “a conscious process of curiosity that guides planned, 
strategic exploration and investigation” (p. 9) 
Rallis, S. F., & Rossman, G. B. (2012). 
The research journey: An introduction 
to inquiry. New York, NY: The 
Guilford Press. 
Inquiry “critiques, confirms, or creates knowledge” (p. 10) 
Rallis, S. F., & Rossman, G. B. (2012). 
The research journey: An introduction 
to inquiry. New York, NY: The 
Guilford Press. 
“inquiry involves ongoing processes of learning about the world, how 
it works, and how it can be changed” (p. 15) 
Rallis, S. F., & Rossman, G. B. (2012). 
The research journey: An introduction 
to inquiry. New York, NY: The 
Guilford Press. 
“Ultimately, inquiry is not about proving something, not about 
establishing certainty. Instead, inquiry—that is, learning—is heuristic, 
a discovery of possibilities and potential answers or solutions, albeit 
temporary, ephemeral, and context bound” (p. 16) 
Green, J. L., & Chandler, S. (1990). 
Toward a dialog about implementation 
within a conceptual cycle of inquiry. In 
E. G. Guba (Ed.), The paradigm dialog 
(pp. 202-215). Newbury Park, CA: 
Sage Publications. 
“Inquiry refers to any examination for the purpose of discovering 
information or examining particular phenomena” (p. 204) 
Disciplined inquiry defined. Clovis and Cobban (2006) gave the following definition: 
Disciplined inquiry is conceptually and practically distinguishable from other forms of 
lay inquiry. The systematic process of research is intentional, planned, and executed 
according to accepted criteria, and the results are critiqued publicly. The process of 




direction and strategies to be used. There is fundamental agreement regarding the aim of 
inquiry as a way of knowing and understanding through a systematic approach or 
discipline that is distinct from other forms of inquiry. Indeed, the uniqueness of the 
approach includes not only systematic inquiry but also critiquing and dissemination of the 
results, a process akin to seeking the truth and questioning the acquired wisdom. (p. 26) 
Generally, all the definitions of discipline inquiry in Table 3 share features of explicit methodical 
process and explicit quality criteria that, together, make disciplined inquiry distinct from a more 
broad Q&A formulation of inquiry. Cronbach and Suppes (1969, p. 15) emphasized the conduct 
and reporting of inquiry in a manner that lends itself to be “painstakingly examined.” Smith 
likewise stated, “For an inquiry to qualify as disciplined, it must be conducted and reported so 
that its logical argument can be carefully examined” (1981p. 585). Lincoln and Guba (1986b, p. 
547) offered a definition that closely resonated with that of Cronbach and Suppes (1969) and 
Smith (1981), but further articulated conduct to include the nature, sources, and context of data 
collection, as well as the treatments, transformations, and interpretations of data analysis—all 
packaged and transparently presented to the audience for public confirmation. Shulman’s (1997) 
definition further stressed the ability of the inquiry to stand up to peer critique by adding “that its 
data, arguments, and reasoning be capable of withstanding careful scrutiny by another member 
of the scientific community” (p. 3). Hiles’s (1999) definition provided the opposite bookend to 
Shulman’s by adding that disciplined inquiry is “a form of inquiry that is rigorous and 
systematic” (p. 1). All in all, Clovis and Cobban (2006) offered the most comprehensive 
definition of disciplined inquiry. 
In addition to the fundamental elements of inquiry outlined previously, across the breadth 
of definitions for disciplined inquiry, a few additional fundamental elements are reinforced 




 Disciplined inquiry is systematic and methodical, such that all inquiry decisions stand 
in constant relation to each other. That is, justification of any single component (e.g., 
overarching belief framework, inquiry aim, belief inputs, reasoning process, data, 
arguments, interpretations, and belief outputs) does not stand on its own merits 
independent of other components of the disciplined inquiry, but rather stands in a 
mutual dependence with the entire disciplined inquiry. Consequently, disciplined 
inquiry is systematic and methodical because its components are logically and 
meaningfully connected, as well as carefully and intentionally planned and executed. 
 Disciplined inquiry demands external critique and scrutiny of the entire inquiry 
process and product by members of the associated community, whereby the product 
includes presentation and organization of the belief output and its argument, as well 
as the method and means of documenting and reporting for public consumption. 
 Disciplined inquiry makes explicit the standards of quality for justification appraisal 
(ex ante and ex post) of knowing, design/execution, and evaluation/critique 
throughout the entire process of disciplined inquiry (i.e., conception/formulation, 
design/planning, execution of belief forming process, and presentation/dissemination 
of belief output). 
If knowledge broadly can be conceived of as a commonly accepted and confirmed system 
of beliefs, then disciplined inquiry is the process through which high-quality beliefs are formed, 
transformed, and transported throughout that system. The systematic and methodical qualities of 
disciplined inquiry contribute to initial ex ante justification. The external critique, in addition to 




quality standards of disciplined inquiry define what is necessary for ex ante and ex post 
justification of both the inquirer and the belief output. 
Table 3.  
Definitions of Disciplined Inquiry 
Source Definition of disciplined inquiry 
Shulman, L. S. (1997). Disciplines of inquiry in education. 
In R. M. Jeager (Ed.) Complementary methods for 
researchers in education (pp. 3-19). Washington, DC: 
American Education Research Association. 
 
“What is important about disciplined inquiry is that 
its data, arguments, and reasoning be capable of 
withstanding careful scrutiny by another member of 
the scientific community” (p. 3). 
Cronback, L. J., & Suppes, P. (Eds.). (1969). Research for 
tomorrow’s schools: Disciplined inquiry for education. 
New York, NY: MacMillan.  
 
“Disciplined inquiry has a quality that distinguishes 
it from other sources of opinion and belief. The 
disciplined inquiry is conducted and reported in 
such a way that the argument can be painstakingly 
examined” (p. 15) 
Hiles, D. (1999). Paradigms lost – paradigms regained. A 
summary of the paper presented to the 18th International 
Human Science Research Conference, Sheffield, UK, July 
26-29. Retrieved from 
http://www.psy.dmu.ac.uk/drhiles/Paradigms%20Lost.htm 
“The danger here is in forgetting that, first and 
foremost, the goal of science is an addition to 
knowledge, and not the method itself. It is a form of 
inquiry that is rigorous and systematic, and as such 
it is best conceived as a disciplined inquiry” (p. 1). 
Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1986b). Research, 
evaluation, and policy analysis: Heuristics for disciplined 
inquiry. Review of Policy Research, 5(3), 536–565. 
 
“That is, to qualify as disciplined, the report of an 
inquiry must inform the reader, in ways that are 
publicly confirmable, what the nature of the “raw” 
data is, the sources of those data, and the context in 
which they were collected… At the same time, the 
processes for transforming the data into 
information—interpretations, conclusions, 
extrapolations, recommendations—must also be 
apparent to the reader; they too must be publicly 
confirmable so that their logic and coherence can be 
tested” (p. 6). 
Clovis, J. B., Cobban, S. J. (2006). The theory and method 
of disciplined inquiry. Canadian Journal of Dental 
Hygiene, 40(1), 26. 
 
“Disciplined inquiry is conceptually and practically 
distinguishable from other forms of lay inquiry. 
The systematic process of research is intentional, 
planned, and executed according to accepted 
criteria, and the results are critiqued publicly. The 
process of research is conducted within a 
framework of beliefs and practices that define the 
direction and strategies to be used. There is 
fundamental agreement regarding the aim of 
inquiry as a way of knowing and understanding 
through a systematic approach or discipline that is 
distinct from other forms of inquiry. Indeed, the 
uniqueness of the approach includes not only 
systematic inquiry but also critiquing and 




seeking the truth and questioning the acquired 
wisdom” (p. 26). 
Smith, M. L. (1981). Naturalistic research. Personnel and 
Guidance Journal, 59, 585-589. 
“For an inquiry to qualify as disciplined, it must be 
conducted and reported so that its logical argument 
can be carefully examined; it does not depend on 
surface plausibility or the eloquence, status, or 
authority of its author; error is avoided; evidential 
test and verification are valued; the dispassionate 
search for truth is valued over ideology. Every 
piece of research or evaluation, whether 
naturalistic, experimental, survey, or historical must 
meet these standards to be considered disciplined” 
(p. 50) 
Cronback, L. J., & Suppes, P. (Eds.). (1969). Research for 
tomorrow’s schools: Disciplined Inquiry for Education. 
New York: MacMillan. 
“The report of a disciplined inquiry has a texture 
that displays the raw materials entering the 
argument and the logical processes by which they 
were compressed and rearranged to make the 
conclusion credible” (p. 49) 
Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1985b). Naturalistic 
inquiry. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. 
“The feature that most prominently distinguishes 
disciplined inquiry from other forms is that it be 
conducted (the process) and reported (the product) 
in such a way that all of its aspects can be examined 
publicly… the twin criteria of inspectable and 
verifiable process and product” (pp. 49-50) 
Rallis, S. F., & Rossman, G. B. (2012). The research 
journey: An introduction to inquiry. New York, NY: The 
Guilford Press. 
“Systematic inquiry… is a patterned and deliberate 
process of making decisions about: how you will 
define and frame the focus of inquiry; what will 
constitute evidence; how, where, and from whom 
you will collect data; how you will make sense of 
the data and the ensuing information; and how and 
with whom you will share or report what you learn” 
(p. 14) 
Rallis, S. F., & Rossman, G. B. (2012). The research 
journey: An introduction to inquiry. New York, NY: The 
Guilford Press. 
“Systematic inquiry is a process of conceptualizing, 
designing, conducting, documenting, and reporting 
what is learned” (p. 15) 
As a specific form of inquiry, disciplined inquiry is “conceptually and practically 
distinguishable from other forms of lay inquiry” (Clovis & Cobban, 2006, p. 26) through its 
explicit underlying beliefs and belief forming process, methodical practices, criteria of quality, 
and public scrutiny of process and output. Disciplined inquiry involves explicit, intentional, and 
methodical alignment of thought and action (i.e., “as we think, so do we act,” Lincoln & Guba, 
1985b, p. 15), such that “there is fundamental agreement regarding the aim of inquiry as a way of 
knowing and understanding through a systematic approach” (Clovis & Cobban, 2006, p. 26) for 




synthesize, disciplined inquiry can be thought of as a methodical inquiry process consisting of 
systematic design, execution, and public scrutiny by making explicit inquiry elements, such as 
underlying beliefs and assumptions about knowing, quality criteria, inquiry aim, methodological 
process followed, arguments made, and audience for consumption.  
The justifiers embedded in disciplined inquiry. In disciplined inquiry, the justification of 
belief can be considered a function of aligned thought, action, and evidence. The importance of 
disciplined inquiry for justified belief and knowledge accumulation can be demonstrated in an 
analysis of the ways that both ex ante and ex post justifiers for the quality of a belief output are 
manifestly reflected in the process of disciplined inquiry (Goldman, 2002). Recall that Goldman 
(1979) defined justifiers as “facts or states of affairs that determine the justification status of a 
belief, or the epistemic status a proposition has for an epistemic agent” (p. 5); ex ante 
justification as an evaluation of whether the inquirer or epistemic agent is or would be justified to 
hold the belief if or when it is formed; and ex post justification as the evaluation of an existing 
belief as likely justified or not, given merit considerations of belief inputs, process, and outputs. 
The states of affairs embedded in disciplined inquiry that contribute to the justification status of 
both belief and epistemic agent can be summarized as follows:  
 Clearly positioned and explicit underlying framework of beliefs 
 Clearly positioned reasoning models and explicit belief forming processes 
 Explicit strategies of action and research design for enacting the belief processes in 
specific methodical practices 




 Explicitly connected and unified approach from problem through to solution; that is, 
justified alignment of thought and action 
 Deliberate presentation of inquiry for public scrutiny of process and output that 
emphasize and package the entire inquiry in the appropriate pattern of argument and 
proof (Scheffler, 1965) 
As a special case of inquiry, disciplined inquiry sets out the requirements that inquiry 
must meet “the twin criteria of inspectable and verifiable process and product better than do 
conventional inquiries” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985b, p. 50). To further understand the twin criteria 
of disciplined inquiry, they are visually examined in the context of belief justifiers in Table 4.  
Table 4 






Ex ante justification 
 A priori documentation of proposed 
research problem including associated 
reasoning and belief forming process 
aimed at problem resolution. 
Ex post justification 
 A posteriori documentation of the entire 
belief forming process. 
 A posteriori organization of the 
reasoning process about the argument 
and proof produced. 
Ex ante justification 
 A priori documentation of the 
characteristics of the hypothetical 
solution that may bring the problem to 
resolution. 
Ex post justification 
 A posteriori documentation of the belief 
output as solution to the research 
problem. 
 A posteriori organization of the belief 
output within the appropriate pattern of 
argument and proof. 
 
Verifiable 
Ex ante justification 
 A priori demonstration and description 
of problem formulation under a belief 
framework. 
 A priori demonstration and description 
of embedded quality indicators in the 
proposed research strategy and research 
design. 
Ex post justification 
Ex ante justification 
 A priori demonstration and description 
of the alignment of hypothetical 
solution’s characteristics with the belief 
framework, research problem, and belief 
input. 




 A posteriori presentation of the 
reasoning model underlying the entire 
belief forming process that was 
executed. 
 A posteriori explanation why the 
argument and proof align problem with 
solution under a framework of beliefs. 
 A posteriori presentation of the belief 
output as a product of the justified belief 
forming process. 
 A posteriori explanation why belief 
output as a solution takes the research 
problem towards resolution under the 
established framework of beliefs. 
The ex ante justifiers shown in Table 4 should serve as grounds for why the inquirer 
would be justified if the inquiry were carried out. Inspectability demands documentation and 
proposal. Verifiability demands demonstration and description of the future or proposed state of 
affairs. The ex post justifiers shown in Table 4 should serve as grounds for why the belief formed 
is justified, given the inquiry that was executed. Inspectability demands documentation and 
organization of the argument, and proof that was developed. Verifiability demands presentation 
and explanation of the connected and unified approach from formulated problem through 
developed solution.  
Evaluation of the extent that each of the justifiers embedded in a disciplined inquiry 
meets standards for ex ante and ex post justification can be related back to the philosophical 
assessments of justified belief discussed. That is, the belief inputs, belief forming processes, and 
belief outputs exist on a continuum of epistemic value and appraised merit where: 
 The belief inputs must be justified, unbeaten by competing premises, and not false. 
 The belief forming processes must be “maximally reasonable” (Chisholm, 1966; 
Lehrer, 1979), both in regard to the appropriateness under the belief framework (i.e., 
justified as an idealization) and in regard to its reliability in producing beliefs that are 
epistemically not false (i.e., reflective of what works in practice). 
 The belief outputs must be the “maximally practically attainable… [given] the most 




to no other counterfactual beliefs that are better justified or that justify the negation of 
the proposed knowledge claim available for consideration at that particular point in 
time. 
The Constructs of Disciplined Inquiry 
The prior sections were aimed at exposing the general ideas of knowledge, belief, 
justification, belief formation, and inquiry, and then connecting, focusing, and synthesizing those 
ideas to the specific idea of disciplined inquiry. This section builds upon the prior syntheses by 
suggesting a partition that conceptually frames disciplined inquiry into two interdependent 
ideals. The partitioning of disciplined inquiry into two underlying ideals was achieved by first 
introducing and relating the idea of regulative ideals, then discussing two specific types of 
regulative ideals, and lastly mapping the two regulative ideals to the two defining phenomena of 
disciplined inquiry that will occupy the remainder of chapter 2: the phenomena of paradigms of 
inquiry and methodology. 
Briefly, before exploring the phenomena of disciplined inquiry, it may be of further help 
for understanding disciplined inquiry to examine a statement by Eisner (1990) on the generation 
and appraisal of the forms that are central to inquiry. Eisner’s statement is a relevant transition 
into discussion about the constructs of disciplined inquiry because it further captured the nature 
of the conceptual alignment of the act of generating knowledge with the act of evaluating that 
knowledge product in a connected manner. In his dialog on alternative paradigms of inquiry, 
Eisner described paradigms as: 
Those ideational structures that portray humans as beings who generate different forms 




believe that the different forms they use to understand and represent that world should be 
appraised by criteria appropriate to the form. Further, these paradigms hold that ‘truth’ is 
ultimately a kind of mirage that in principle cannot be achieved because the worlds we 
know are those crafted by us and because we cannot uncouple mind and matter to know 
the world as it ‘really’ is. (p. 89) 
Eisner highlighted several points relevant to the proceeding discussion. The statement alluded to 
truth as an unachievable mirage, one that sets the criterion for the forms that inquirers generate. 
The assumptions made by inquirers a priori about the nature of the world that is central to their 
inquiries not only bounds the world they will come to know through inquiry, but also a priori 
defines the kind of understanding and representation that will characterize the forms ultimately 
produced from their inquiries. However, the forms generated from inquiry are only 
approximations of a crafted conceptual reality for the purpose of understanding and representing 
a systematically investigated empirical reality. Consequently, the forms produced for 
understanding or representation should be held accountable to the standards specific to the 
mirage upon which the forms were meant to approximate in the manner with which any 
particular form of that specific mirage would be manifest in experience. 
In the following discussion, the idea of truth as a criterion for inquiry and as a driving 
force that legitimizes inquiry is further discussed broadly as a regulative ideal. The nature of the 
form’s criterion, or ideational structure, is examined as the regulative ideal concerning the 
possibility of experience (Kant, 1781/2007) and linked to the paradigm of inquiry phenomenon 
(Lincoln et al., 2011). The nature of the process for generating forms through inquiry is 
examined as the regulative ideal concerning the rules for the conduct of inquiry (Kant, 
1781/2007) and linked to the methodological phenomenon (Kaplan, 2009; Lincoln & Guba, 




The regulative ideal. According to Phillips (1987),  
On all sides in science there is commitment to truth as a regulative ideal (as Popper and 
others have termed it); scientists try to determine the truth and to hold true beliefs—their 
disputes are about whose views are true. (p. 24). 
But what type of truth can be attained, and how does an inquirer know if the attained view is 
true? Phillips emphasized that inquirers must commit to a form of truth, or idealization of 
knowing. It is that very commitment to an idealized form of knowledge that regulates both the 
ends and means of their inquiries. The current section explores the commitment to truth as a 
regulative ideal and the roles that regulative ideals have in disciplined inquiry. 
Underlying the process of disciplined inquiry is a concept-practice relationship; that is, an 
idealized concept of knowing that shapes both what we experience and how we go about 
attempting to gain experience of it in practice. This idealization has frequently been referred to as 
the regulative ideal (Guba, 1990), although it was introduced centuries ago by Kant (1781/2007) 
as various regulative principles in Critique of Pure Reason. The role of the regulative ideal is 
paramount to disciplined inquiry, and therefore must be introduced and examined in fundamental 
connection with the two phenomena of disciplined inquiry. 
Generally speaking, the regulative ideal is precisely a “commitment to truth” (Phillips, 
1987, p. 24), whether implicitly/ignorantly or explicitly/intentionally, that defines the empirical 
world through a metaphysical framework (in disciplined inquiries, the commitment is made 
explicitly and intentionally). The commitment manifests empirically by defining the types of 
concepts that can be developed in reference to empirical things, as well as the ways inquirers 
meaningfully attempt to make sense of concepts (Kant, 1781/2007). However, a gap always 




regulative ideal defines what the concept-practice relationship is, but does not promise 
attainment of concept in practice; rather, the regulative ideal only guides practice. The regulative 
ideal exerts normative force on our expectations of experience by characterizing “what it would 
be if it were extracted and refined to its utmost purity” (Kaplan, 2009, p. 11). 
The normative force of regulative ideals stresses why regulative ideals remain only ideals 
incapable of ever being perfectly attained empirically in practice. In other words, regulative 
ideals serve a normative role rather than an attainable role. Kant (1781/2007) articulated his 
ideas on the regulative ideal as an indispensable illusion: 
Thereby concepts of certain objects should be given, and that, if they are so understood, 
they are merely sophistical (dialectical) concepts. They have, however, a most admirable 
and indispensably necessary regulative use, in directing the understanding to a certain 
aim, towards which the directional lines of all its rules converge in one point. And 
although this point is only an idea (focus imaginarius), that is, a point from which, since 
it lies completely outside the limits of possible experience, the concepts of the 
understanding do not in reality proceed, it serves nevertheless to impart to these concepts 
the greatest unity and the greatest expansion. Hence there arises, no doubt, the illusion 
that those directional lines sprang forth from an object itself, outside the field of 
empirically possible knowledge (just as objects are seen behind the surface of a mirror). 
Yet this illusion (by which we need not allow ourselves to be deceived) is nevertheless 
indispensably necessary if, besides the objects which are before our eyes, we want to see 
also those which lie far away behind our back; that is to say, the illusion is necessary if, 
as in our case, we wish to direct the understanding beyond every given experience (as 
part of the sum total of possible experience), and thus to its greatest possible and most 
extreme expansion. (p. 533) 
Kant’s thoughts are of utmost importance to the process of disciplined inquiry. Ultimately, belief 
(even true belief) represents some sliver of understanding, some small kernel of knowing, from a 
seemingly infinite knowledge about the world. The regulative ideal is a type of conceptual 
commitment to the nature of the world, and therefore to the types of things that can come to be 
known about that world. However, the conceptual commitment further offers the indispensable 




meaningful way that is regulated, governed, or directed by the assurance that the sum total of 
possible experience is structured in the same meaningful way and is capable of neatly 
assimilating that kernel of knowing into its gestalt. Kant described the empirical experience as an 
illusion because inquirers attribute the meaning and understanding gained through inquiry as 
inherent to the empirical object itself. In other words, “the illusion that those directional lines 
sprang forth from an object itself” (p. 533) is the product of an a priori conceptual commitment 
to the nature of the world. Thus, the regulative ideal as concept exerts normative force on 
experience. 
Kant (1781/2007) defined three “mental powers” (p. 172) that comprised general logic: 
(a) understanding with the function of concepts, (b) reason with the function of inference, and (c) 
the power of judgment with its function in the application of concepts and inference to the 
empirical world. Kant described the former two to serve regulative use for inquiry, while the 
third to serve as a “special talent” (p. 173) for applying the other two in practice. Understanding 
and reason are described in more detail in the proceeding sections, but the power of judgment 
only resurfaces later, in the discussion of disciplined inquiry and the power of judgment. 
To form a justified belief, an inquirer must apply the principles of reason and 
understanding to the empirical world (Kant, 1781/2007). That is, the inquirer must apply the rule 
for “how the empirical regress is to be carried out” (p. 449; i.e., inference as the function of the 
mental power of reason) to the objects defined within “the possibility of experience” (p. 250; i.e., 
concepts as the function of the mental power of understanding). The purpose of this, as described 




Bring facts before the mind that enable a person to reach a conclusion on the basis of 
evidence. In so far, then, as the act… was deliberate, was performed with the intention of 
getting an external basis on which to rest a belief. (p. 13). . 
In the next two sections, understanding and its concepts are explored as the regulative ideal 
concerning what Kant calls “the possibility of experience” (p. 250), and reason and its inference 
are explored as the regulative ideal concerning the rules for “how the empirical regress is to be 
carried out” (p. 449). 
The regulative ideal concerning the possibility of experience. According to Kant 
(1871/2007), “All principles of the pure understanding are nothing more than a priori principles 
of the possibility of experience; and to this possibility alone do all a priori synthetic propositions 
relate… their possibility itself rests entirely on this relation” (p. 250). One of the two mental 
powers discussed by Kant that serves regulative use for inquiry is understanding and its 
concepts. It is important to comprehend that one type of conceptual commitment made in inquiry 
is to the regulative ideal concerning “the possibility of experience” (p. 250). A purely empiricist 
perspective would dictate that the world experienced is the world that inquirers come to know; 
however, Kant’s regulative ideal concerning the possibility of experience suggested (even 
argued) that the world that inquirers come to experience is dictated by the world a priori believed 
to exist. That is, a commitment to the type of empirical world that exists, and further to the form 
of knowledge that can be attained about that empirical world, defines the types of concepts that 
might fit that possible experience a priori; therefore, the objects experienced are viewed in the 
context of those types of concepts when inquirers attempt to make sense out of experience and 
place their individual experiences in the larger context of the “sum total of possible experience” 
(p. 533). Even though the specific understanding generated from inquiry can be considered a 




possibility of experience) were part of an a priori commitment to the types of concepts that could 
be used to understand experience—an a priori commitment that manifests itself regulatively in 
the aim of empirical inquiry. 
It is of further importance to stress that the commitment by inquirers to the possibility of 
experience is also a commitment to the aim of inquiry. As examined earlier, the purpose of 
inquiry is to produce belief and generate knowledge. The possibility of experience as a regulative 
ideal both sets the standards or benchmarks against which belief output is measured and focuses 
the belief outputs of inquiry at a structured, idealized goal state. That is, the configuration and 
design of an inquiry’s aim, or belief output, is normatively regulated by the characteristics and 
conditions sufficient for the nature of the knowledge that was committed to through the 
commitment to the possibility of experience. 
The regulative role of an inquirer’s commitment to the possibility of experience can be 
further understood through examination of the role of concepts in forming understanding. The 
mental power of understanding takes as its principle focus experiences and empirical things, and 
for those objects, understanding provides the concepts needed for conceptually grasping and 
making sense out of them (Banham, 2010; Kant, 1781/2007). That is, the understanding concerns 
itself “only with the connection whereby series of conditions everywhere come into being 
according to concepts… [and] unites the manifold in the object by means of ideas, making a 
certain collective unity the aim of the acts of the understanding” (Kant, 1781/2007, pp. 532–
533). The nature of the concepts used to provide meaning and connection are dependent upon, 
perhaps even determined by, the nature of the possibility of experience that a priori shapes the 




The regulative ideal concerning rules for uniting the concepts of experience. According 
to Kant (1871/2007), 
In order to properly define the meaning of this rule of pure reason, it should be remarked, 
first of all, that it cannot tell us what the object is, but only how the empirical regress is to 
be carried out, in order for us to arrive at the complete concept of the object. (pp. 448–
449) 
The second of Kant’s mental powers that serves regulative use for inquiry is reason and its 
inference. The regulative ideal concerning the unity of the concepts of experience represents 
another commitment, one to the rules for “how the empirical regress is to be carried out” (p. 
449). This regulative ideal is distinct from the regulative ideal for the possibility of experience in 
two important ways. First, the mental power of reason is independent of the objects of 
experience rather than interactive with them. Second, the mental power of reason takes as its 
principal focus the concepts of understanding rather than the objects of experience (Banham, 
2010; Kant, 1781/2007). Issues of commensurability plaguing mixed-method research (e.g., see 
Lincoln, 2010; Lincoln et al., 2011) are strongly tied to arguments about whether the 
commitment to how inquiries are carried out needs to be tied to the assumptions about the 
concepts being inquired into. 
Inference, as a function of reason, serves inquiry by connecting concepts and facilitates 
drawing logical conclusions. While numerous types of inference exist (e.g., see Kaplan, 2009; 
Lipton, 2004; Popper, 2010), they all encapsulate a particular set of rules for arranging the 
concepts of understanding and moving from premise to conclusion (or vice versa). The rules of 
the inferential process work because the commitment to the possibility of experience guarantees 
that the world is structured in a specific way. The mental power of reason is therefore antecedent 




understanding according to the believed in systematic nature of knowledge (Kant, 1781/2007). 
The relationship between the rules of empirical regress and the possibility of experience is 
analogous to the following conditional statement: If the presumed possibility of experience is X 
and so dictated is the systematic nature of knowledge, then Y are the rules for systematically 
ordering the concepts of experience such that they can be unified and contribute to the whole of 
that systematic knowledge. That is,  
The proper province of reason is the attempt to establish the systematic nature of that 
knowledge, that is, its coherence due to one principle. This unity of reason always 
presupposes an idea, namely, that of the form of a whole of knowledge preceding the 
determinate knowledge of the parts and containing the conditions according to which we 
are to determine a priori for every part its position and its relations to the other parts. 
(Kant, 1781/2007, p. 534) 
In addition to the discussion about why reason serves as a regulative ideal, it is important 
to further understand how reason, as a regulative ideal, manifests in the conduct of inquiry. 
These rules of empirical regress do more than simply regulate the actions of inquiry; they also 
attempt to ensure a certain type of belief output by providing an inferential blueprint of sorts. 
Earlier it was noted that underlying disciplined inquiry is a concept-practice relationship. While 
the possibility of experience governs the idea behind the concept part of that relationship, the 
rules for empirical regress govern the idea of the practice part of that relationship. Concept and 
practice must be in sync to produce a quality belief output that systematically fits back into the 
whole of knowledge. In this relationship, the rules for empirical regress are interdependent with 
the presumed possibility of experience, yet independent of the objects of experience themselves. 
Therefore reason, “as a rule, postulates what we ought to do in the regress, but does not 




Inquiry itself is dependent upon—in fact, designed to meet—a world with defined 
structure and relationships. There is little to no meaning inherent in an empirical world without 
boundaries and a prior context within which to give meaning to its data, or furthermore to even 
define what its data are considered to be. The idea of a world defined solely by assumptions may 
be unsettling. It might seem that the same emotion was being conveyed by others in their 
references to the world as a “mirage” (Eisner, 1990, p. 89) or “illusion” (Kant, 1781/2007, p. 
533) in the same respect; however, that assumption-based chimera of the empirical world is 
necessary for the mind to make sense of things. Recognizing that inquirers see and act in 
accordance with structured assumptions and associated rules underlies all of disciplined inquiry. 
So how does the a priori commitment to the mental power of reason manifest regulatively in the 
conduct of empirical inquiry, yet independent of the empirical objects? It does so because the 
rules of empirical regress “are not derived from nature; rather, we only interrogate nature 
according to these ideas [emphasis added], and consider our knowledge as defective as long as it 
is not adequate to them” (Kant, 1781/2007, p. 534). 
In sum, the regulative principles of reasoning “can only refer to the relations of 
existence” (Kant, 1781/2007, p. 205); that is, they provide the rules for reasoning from which we 
know a priori the relations between the concepts of objects, but not anything about the concepts 
of objects themselves. In other words, regulative principles are “schemata” (p. 206) that structure 
and organize the concepts applied to empirical experience (i.e., “the conditions of the unity of 
empirical knowledge,” p. 206). They shape the perceived relations of the empirical world a 
priori, yet do not shape the understanding of the actual objects of empirical experience. For 
example, cause-and-effect relations are subsumed a priori under the conventional 




one to see cause and effect in the empirical world and act in a manner that would determine the 
order of the concepts in that relationship, the regulative principle of reason does nothing to 
inform what is understood about the objects of experience, beyond their relational existence. 
The proposed constructs of disciplined inquiry. A breadth of philosophical literature 
and further framing of that literature within the context of inquiry has been stressed up to this 
point in the background literature review. While the theme of the review remains the same, the 
review subtly shifts to viewing the idea of disciplined inquiry as the intersection of two specific 
phenomena. This framing of the idea of disciplined inquiry as the intersecting space between two 
phenomena was necessary for both representing the conceptual gap in understanding articulated 
as part of the research problem, as well as for the conceptual development that is proposed as 
part of the research solution. 
While numerous syntheses have been made throughout chapter 2 thus far, the following 
proposal represents the first significant conceptual synthesis necessary for the argument being 
developed in the literature. The first tenet of the developing argument claimed that disciplined 
inquiry is a methodical process for forming justified belief comprising two essential phenomena: 
the paradigm of inquiry phenomenon and the methodological phenomenon.  
Within this specific framing, the regulative ideals of disciplined inquiry are conceived; 
that is, disciplined inquiry comprises (a) an ideal defining the possibility of experience in terms 
of the possible concepts of understanding applied to objects of experience that determines the 
nature of knowledge and belief and (b) an ideal defining the possible relationships among the 
concepts of experience that determine how we are to make sense of the concepts we come to 




actions of inquiry, and further provide the basis upon which inquirers judge whether the process 
and product of empirical inquiry meet and fit the criteria of the ideals defined a priori. 
The regulation of how empirical acts should be carried out, as well as the regulation of 
the concepts that can be experienced, are visually represented in Figure 1. Disciplined inquiry 
was conceptually defined by the paradigm of inquiry and methodological phenomena. The 
paradigm of inquiry phenomenon embodies the regulative ideal defining the possibility of 
experience (i.e., the possibility of experience in terms of the possible concepts of understanding 
applied to experience and the possible relationships among concepts themselves). The 
methodological phenomenon embodies the regulative ideal defining the principles for organizing 
the concepts of the possibility of experience, manifest in method, in a manner intended to align 
actions of inquiry in accordance with possible experience and produce knowledge fitting the 
criteria of a priori defined empirical concepts. 
 
Figure 1. The two proposed phenomena of disciplined inquiry are methodology and paradigms. 
Chisholm (1966) presented two principled questions relating to the analysis of knowing: 





particular case whether we know—what are the criteria, if any, of knowing?” (p. 3). If we 
attempt to frame our understanding of the answers to the pair of questions within the proposed 
phenomena of disciplined inquiry, then we can argue both what we know and why we might be 
justified in our claim to know. The frame for our answers to the latter question is held in the 
theoretical framework of methodology. The frame for our answers to the former question is held 
in theoretical framework of a paradigm of inquiry. Together, these two frameworks form the 
crux of disciplined inquiry thus presented together as initially conceived in Figure 1. 
Disciplined inquiry and the power of judgment. Given the initial conceptual framing 
of disciplined inquiry as the intersecting space of the methodological and paradigm of inquiry 
phenomena developed to guide the present inquiry, attention turns to the process of disciplined 
inquiry in practice and returns to the third of Kant’s (1781/2007) mental powers of logic: the 
power of judgment. Recall that Kant defined a threefold division of the higher faculties of logic: 
understanding, reason, and the power of judgement. The regulative roles of both understanding 
and reason have been discussed in detail; however, for the examination of the process of 
disciplined inquiry in practice, it is necessary to discuss the power of judgment as the special 
talent for applying the other two in real world practice of inquiry. 
The power of judgment can be understood as skill in the practice of inquiry. The power 
of judgment is informed regulatively by the understanding and reason; however, as a skill of 
practice, it represents the rules in action rather than merely declarative know-how. That is, the 
two constructs of disciplined inquiry can be learned and mastered conceptually, except that “the 
power of judgement is a special talent which cannot be taught, but can only be practiced” (Kant, 




A physician, a judge or a politician may carry in his head many beautiful pathological, 
juridical or political rules, even to the degree that he may become an accurate teacher of 
them, and he may yet in the application of these rules commit many a blunder. For either 
he is deficient in the natural power of judgement, though not in understanding, and may 
know the universal in abstracto, but yet be unable to distinguish whether a case in 
concreto falls under it; or it may be that his judgement has not been sufficiently trained 
by examples and practical experience. (p. 174) 
Here, Kant argued that conceptual mastery of understanding and reason are a necessary precursor 
to the power of judgment, yet alone do not guarantee success with the power of judgment. 
Practice engaging in disciplined inquiry with explicit recognition of the regulative roles of 
understanding and reason fosters the power of judgment, and examples “sharpen the power of 
judgement” (p. 174). However, Kant cautioned against misguided learning that can occur within 
the tension of the attainable in practice and the ideal in concept “because they only rarely fulfill 
the conditions of the rule quite adequately (as casus in terminis)” (p. 174). As a result, the gap 
between the empirically attainable and its ideational state can inadequately inform the inquirer of 
the true regulative conditions; that is, the naïve inquirer may not be able to distinguish the 
regulative commitments from the particular circumstances of empirical experience, and therefore 
build a conceptual misunderstanding of proper inquiry through misguided practice.  
The process of disciplined inquiry protects against both poor-quality belief outputs and 
misguided learning of the power of judgment. Because disciplined inquiry makes explicit the 
connection of its underlying belief system with the unification and alignment of belief system, 
problem formulation, planning process, execution process, presentation process, and evaluation 
process, the power of judgment is truly sharpened not only as a way of thinking about inquiry but 
also for practicing and evaluating inquiry. The regulative roles ideals play in disciplined inquiry 




against which to compare empirical-conceptual gaps. Nonetheless, the adequacies of experiences 
against the ideal conditions do not deceive inquirers of the regulative universal conditions. 
Previously, numerous justifiers embedded in disciplined inquiry were listed. Through the 
justifiers embedded in disciplined inquiry, it can be understood that the power of judgment in the 
practice of disciplined inquiry both carries the conceptual into practice and reinforces the 
practice of inquiry against the conceptual. Disciplined inquiry, in abstracto and in concreto, 
demands aligned thought and action, consensus on process and product, and appropriate 
reinforcement in the development of the power of judgment that leverages the tension between 
the attainable in practice and the ideal in concept. 
Summary of disciplined inquiry. From the analyses presented in chapter 2, we can draw 
two conclusions about disciplined inquiry. First, we can consider the deliberate empirical act of 
disciplined inquiry, or “special talent” (Kant, 1781/2007, p. 173) of practice (i.e., the “power of 
judgement,” p. 172) to be the means upon which justified belief is attained. This means is 
represented here as the process of disciplined inquiry, with its “twin criteria of inspectable and 
verifiable process and product” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985b, p. 50). Second, we can consider 
disciplined inquiry to be undergirded by a twofold regulative ideal that shapes the entirety of the 
process. Both these ideals are never perfectly attained empirically: the idealized criterion of how 
is conceived as the methodological construct, and the idealized criterion of what is conceived as 
the paradigm of inquiry construct.  
The next sections explore the two constructs of disciplined inquiry in detail. In addition 
to providing in-depth reviews of each phenomenon, each section attempts to further develop the 




sections on paradigms and methodology present additional background literature for the two 
juxtaposed conditions that define a conceptual problem that needs to be addressed. The paradigm 
of inquiry phenomenon is described as a well-developed sophisticated theory, with fully defined 
theoretical framework, paradigm-specific axioms, and extensions into practice. The 
methodological phenomenon is described as primitive and underdeveloped; it is under defined as 
a broad range of possible ideas, principles, and processes, but never unified under a common 
framework.  
Paradigms of Inquiry 
For the purpose of the current research, three relevant contributors to the 
conceptualization of the phenomenon of paradigms are discussed: (a) the theory-bearing, 
disciplinary oriented Kuhnian (1996) paradigms; (b) the knowledge-constitutive interests 
oriented paradigms of Habermas (1971); and (c) the axiomatically oriented paradigms of Lincoln 
et al. (e.g., 2011; Lincoln & Lynham, 2011). Although different in the elements of each 
paradigm conceptualization, the three contributors each captured the boundary condition for the 
possibility of experience within inquiry. Before exploring each conceptualization in detail, 
general definitions of the term paradigm are explored.  
What is a paradigm of inquiry? 
Over the past several decades, the term paradigm has been examined in great detail, 
arguably spawned at least in part by the writings of Thomas Kuhn (1996; Hacking, 2012). Even 
though Kuhn’s work has come under criticism for inconsistent usage of the term paradigm 




science’… [or] coherent traditions of scientific research” (Kuhn, 1996, p.10). Other descriptions 
range from the “basic set of beliefs that guides action” (Guba, 1990c, p. 17) to the net containing 
a researcher’s metaphysical assumptions (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 22) to the “particular way 
in which scientists make sense of the world” (Crotty, 1998, p. 35). Most authors share definitions 
about the idea that a paradigm of inquiry shapes the inquired-into reality with regard to what is 
seen, what is not seen, and why that is the case in the context of inquiry. Several definitions of 
paradigm are offered in Table 5. 
Table 5 
Paradigm Definitions 
Source Definition of paradigm 
Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1994). 
Competing paradigms in qualitative 
research. In N. K. Denzin & Y.S. 
Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of 
qualitative research (pp. 105–117). 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications. 
“Inquiry paradigms define for inquirers what it is they are about, and 
what falls within and outside the limits of legitimate inquiry” (p. 108). 
Eisner, E. W. (1990). The meaning of 
alternative paradigms of practice. In E. 
G. Guba, The paradigm dialog (pp. 88-
102). Sage Newbury Park, CA: 
Publications. 
“Those ideational structures that portray humans as beings who 
generate different forms through which they hope to understand and 
represent the world they inhabit and who believe that the different 
forms they use to understand and represent that world should be 
appraised by criteria appropriate to the form.” (p. 89) 
Guba, E. G. (1990c). The paradigm 
dialog. Sage Newbury Park, CA: 
Publications. 
“Basic set of beliefs that guides action.” (p. 17) 
Denzin, N., & Lincoln, Y. (2005). The 
Sage handbook of qualitative research. 
3rd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications.  
“The net that contains the researcher’s epistemological, ontological, 
and methodological premises [metaphysical assumptions].” (p. 22) 
Mertens, D. M., & Wilson, A. T. 
(2012). Program evaluation theory 
and practice. New York, NY: The 
Guilford Press, 
“Paradigms are broad metaphysical constructs that include sets of 
logically related philosophical assumptions. Theories provide 
frameworks for thinking about the interrelationships of constructs and 
are more limited in scope than paradigms. Hence a variety of 
theoretical perspectives can be associated with a particular paradigm.” 
(p. 34) 
Lincoln, Y.S., & Guba, E.G. (1985b). 
Naturalistic inquiry. Beverly Hills, 
CA: Sage. 
“Certain sets of such basic or metaphysical beliefs are sometimes 
constituted into a system of ideas that either give us some judgment 
about the nature of reality, or a reason why we must be content with 




for taking hold of whatever can be known. We shall call such a 
systematic set of beliefs, together with their accompanying methods, a 
paradigm.” (p. 15) 
Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1985b). 
Naturalistic inquiry. Beverly Hills, 
CA: Sage. Publications 
“A paradigm is a world view, a general perspective, a way of breaking 
down the complexity of the real world. As such, paradigms are deeply 
embedded in the socialization of adherents and practitioners; paradigms 
tell them what is important, legitimate, and reasonable. Paradigms are 
also normative, telling the practitioner what to do without the necessity 
of long existential or epistemological consideration. But it is this aspect 
of paradigms that constitutes both their strength and their weakness—
their strength in that it makes action possible, their weakness in that the 
very reason for action is hidden in the unquestioned assumptions of the 
paradigm.” (p. 15) 
Kuhn, T. (1996). The structure of 
scientific revolutions (3rd ed.). 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press. 
“Accepted examples of actual scientific practice—examples which 
include law, theory, application, and instrumentation together—provide 
models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific 
research.” (p. 10) 
Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1989). 
Fourth generation evaluation. 
Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.  
“It is useful, by way of introduction, to think of a paradigm as a basic 
set of beliefs, a set of assumptions we are willing to make, which serve 
as touchstones in guiding our activities [of inquiry]… Now the crucial 
thing to note here is that these paradigms are basic belief systems; they 
cannot be proven or disproven, but they represent the most fundamental 
positions we are willing to take. If we could cite reasons why some 
particular paradigm should be preferred, then those reasons would form 
an even more basic set of beliefs. At some level we must stop giving 
reasons and simply accept wherever we are as our basic belief set—our 
paradigm.” (p. 80). 
Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1982a). 
Epistemological and methodological 
bases of naturalistic inquiry. 
Educational Communication and 
Technology, 30(4), 233–252. 
“Paradigms are axiomatic systems characterized essentially by their 
differing sets of assumptions about the phenomena into which they are 
designed to inquire.” (p. 233) 
Kuhn’s Contributions to the Paradigm Construct 
Kuhn’s historical analysis of science (1996; see also Andersson, 1994; Delanty & 
Strydom, 2003) produced a view for how knowledge accumulated and science progressed that 
resulted in a counter argument to Popper’s notion of falsification of theory (2010; see also 
Andersson, 1994; Gorton, 2006). Accordingly, Kuhn observed that science was governed by a 
tradition of research and underlying paradigm. The underlying paradigm included all “accepted 
examples of actual scientific practice—examples which include law, theory, application, and 
instrumentation together—provide models from which spring particular coherent traditions of 




commitment to the paradigm. When both tradition of research and underlying paradigm were in 
place, Kuhn called the resulting research strategy “normal science” (Kuhn, 1996, p. 90). Normal 
science represents a research strategy of small incremental refinements, or modifications, to the 
paradigm through application of the paradigm to solving puzzles. Although the paradigm 
ensured solution, the primary activities of science involved application of the paradigm to figure 
out how to solve the puzzles (Andersson, 1994; Kuhn, 1996). Notably, Kuhn’s paradigm 
definition did not deviate far from a disciplinary perspective. For example, Repko (2008) stated,  
The defining elements of a discipline’s perspective include the phenomena it studies, the 
kind of data it collects, the assumptions it makes about the natural and human world, its 
epistemology or rules about what constitutes evidence or proof, its theories about the 
causes and behaviors of certain phenomena, and its methods (the way it gathers, applies, 
and produces new knowledge)… Members of each discipline… agree on what constitutes 
an interesting and appropriate question to study, what constitutes legitimate evidence, and 
what a satisfactory answer to the question should look like. (p. 58) 
Essential to Kuhn’s concept of normal scientific activity was the commitment of its 
scientists to the governing paradigm. “The study of normal-scientific traditions discloses many 
additional rules, and these provide much information about the commitments that scientists 
derive from their paradigms” (1996, p. 40). Kuhn listed five such commitments that scientists 
make to the paradigm:  
1. Commitment to law, concepts, and theory 
2. Commitment to instrumentation 
3. Commitment to metaphysical concepts 
4. Commitment to methodological process 




The first commitment that scientists must make to a paradigm is to its laws, concepts, and 
theories. “These are explicit statements of scientific law and about scientific concepts and 
theories. While they continue to be honored, such statements help to set puzzles and to limit 
acceptable solutions” (Kuhn, 1996, p. 40). By committing to law, concepts, and theory, the 
scientist is defining the concepts of knowledge and how the basic concepts of knowledge 
interact, and is bounding the scope of application (both what does matter and what does not 
matter).  
Next Kuhn described the commitment of scientists to the instrumentation of the 
paradigm. “At a level lower more concrete than that of laws and theories, there is, for example, a 
multitude of commitments to preferred types of instrumentation and to the ways in which 
accepted instruments may legitimately be employed” (1996, p. 40). Together with the 
commitment to laws, concepts, and theories, the commitment to both what tools are used in the 
process of inquiry and how they are to be used serves to unify the community of scientists 
toward a common goal, on common ground and with common methods and common processes.  
The commitment scientists make to the metaphysical assumptions and methodological 
process is less explicit than that made to theory and instrumentation. “Less local and temporary, 
though still not unchanging characteristics of science, are the higher level, quasi-metaphysical 
commitments that historical study so regularly displays… That nest of commitments proved to 
be both meta-physical and methodological” (Kuhn, 1996, p. 41). Even though less explicit than 
to, say, instrumentation, metaphysical and methodology commitments are equally normative. 




not contain. The methodological commitments tell scientists “what ultimate laws and 
explanations must be like” (p. 41). 
The last commitment Kuhn (1996) described that scientists make to a normal-scientific 
tradition is to its puzzle-solving activities. The engagement in shared puzzle-solving activities 
within a paradigm enacts all other commitments (e.g., the nest of commitments in a common 
scientific pursuit). This common scientific pursuit allows the inquirer to define himself or herself 
as a scientist. Kuhn explained: 
Finally, at a still higher level, there is another set of commitments without which no man 
is a scientist. The scientist must, for example, be concerned to understand the world and 
to extend the precision and scope with which it has been ordered. That commitment must, 
in turn, lead him to scrutinize, either for himself or through colleagues, some aspect of 
nature in great empirical detail. And, if that scrutiny displays pockets of apparent 
disorder, then these must challenge him to a new refinement of his observational 
techniques or to a further articulation of his theories. (p. 42) 
Altogether, these five commitments to the paradigm (i.e., conceptual/theoretical, 
instrumental, metaphysical, methodological, and puzzle-solving pursuit) define and embody 
Kuhn’s (1996) concept of the tradition of normal science. Without those commitments, neither 
the science nor the scientist has any relative association upon which to claim belonging to either 
of those labels. The normal-scientific paradigm, according to Kuhn,  
Provides rules that tell the practitioner of a mature specialty what both the world and his 
science are like, [and as a consequence] he can concentrate with assurance upon the 
esoteric problems that these rules and existing knowledge define for him. (p. 42)  
According to Kuhn (1996), normal science progresses until anomalies emerge for which 
the paradigm is insufficient for puzzle solving. Here, no amount of paradigm modification can be 
made to accommodate, and therefore assimilate, the anomaly. The persistence of these anomalies 




paradigm for ensuring solutions. The loss of faith in the paradigm is called a state of “crisis” (p. 
7), and crisis results in researchers seeking alternative paradigms and theories. Kuhn called the 
research strategy during crisis “extraordinary science” (p. 90). A state of extraordinary science is 
where a new paradigm is sought out and articulated. It is characterized not only by acting outside 
the rules of normal science to identify a new explanatory framework, but is “a reconstruction of 
the field from new fundamentals” (p. 85) that articulates the basis of the new paradigm. The 
philosophical analysis of fundamental assumptions represents a novel activity for researchers 
who previously operated on unconditional acceptance of a set of implicit assumptions 
undergirding the paradigm during the state of normal science. On the effectiveness of the 
assumption analysis for breaking tradition Kuhn noted: 
Indeed, normal science usually holds creative philosophy at arm’s length, and probably 
for good reasons. To the extent that normal research work can be conducted by using the 
paradigm as a model, rules and assumptions need not be made explicit… the full set of 
rules sought by philosophical analysis need not even exist. But that is not to say that the 
search for assumptions (even for non-existent ones) cannot be an effective way to weaken 
the grip of a tradition upon the mind and to suggest the basis for a new one. (p. 88) 
Eventually crisis is brought to a close through a combination of identification, 
articulation, and finally acceptance of a new paradigm. The acceptance of a new paradigm yields 
not simply a different but an entirely new (and fundamentally different) way of viewing 
phenomena; the types of solutions that can be achieved; and the methods, instruments, and 
puzzle-solving process afforded by the structure of the paradigm. This “paradigm shift” (Kuhn, 
1996, p. 85) represents a change in the gestalt of the researcher, in which 
Led by a new paradigm, scientists adopt new instruments and look in new places. Even 
more important, during revolutions scientists see new and different things when looking 
with familiar instruments in places they have looked before. It is rather as if the 
professional community had been suddenly transported to another planet where familiar 




The acceptance ultimately brings researchers to a new state of normal science; “the phase 
of normal science begins again and will continue until a new crisis occurs” (Andersson, 1994; p. 
32). Kuhn (1996) called this move from one paradigm and state of normal science into a new 
paradigm and new state of normal science a scientific revolution: “Scientific revolutions are here 
taken to be those non-cumulative developmental episodes in which an older paradigm is replaced 
in whole or in part by an incompatible new one” (p. 92). The idea of scientific revolutions was 
crucial to Kuhn’s view on the accumulation of knowledge and progression of science. His view 
can be used to critique Popper’s (2010) conjecture and refutation of knowledge accumulation 
and progression of science by contrasting historical states of normal science with historical states 
of extraordinary science.  
In Popper’s view (2010; see also Andersson, 1994; Gorton, 2006), discoveries are 
cumulatively made when theories and explanations are proposed by conjecture and then 
deductively tested. Propositions are critically examined and attempts are made to refute them. 
Here, any form of inductive method never justifies the conclusions. A notable exception to the 
rejection of induction is when the accumulation of numerous deductive investigations forms an 
overall inductive trend in which well-corroborated theories “advance towards theories of an ever 
higher level of universality—as ‘quasi-inductive,’” Popper, 2010, p. 276). In Kuhn’s (1996) 
view, the Popperian falsification view of science only occurs during states of extraordinary 
science when discovery and articulation of a new paradigm is the focus of researchers in crisis. 
In states of normal science, paradigms are not critically tested; rather, they are used as 
instruments to solve problems (Andersson, 1994). Moreover, as instruments for solving 
problems, paradigms are continually refined to come into closer alignment with the reality they 




careers of many researchers is what Kuhn termed the mopping-up operations (1996, p. 24) of 
normal science; he said “that enterprise seems an attempt to force nature into the preformed and 
relatively inflexible box that the paradigm supplies” (p. 24). 
Kuhn’s (1996) view of scientific revolutions as the mechanism for progress additionally 
requires eventual rejection of an existing paradigm. Kuhn challenged the notion that this process 
for the rejection of a paradigm follows Popper’s (2010) logic of discovery: 
No process yet disclosed by the historical study of scientific development at all resembles 
the methodological stereotype of falsification by direct comparison with nature [where 
direct comparison with nature is a critical element in Popper’s view of critically testing a 
theory]… The decision to reject one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to 
accept another, and the judgment leading to the decision involves the comparison of both 
paradigms with nature and with each other. (p. 77)  
Therefore, rejection of a theory requires both the emergence of crisis to call into question an 
existing paradigm and an alternative paradigm to consider in contrast that is more promising for 
solving problems (Andersson, 1994). 
Yet, beyond the point-counterpoint arguments of competing theories of the philosophy of 
science and social science, for which there are many (e.g., see Feyerabend, 1987a, 1987b, 1993; 
Lakatos & Musgrave, 1970; Popper, 2002, 2010 for detailed analyses of contrasting views and 
see Andersson, 1994; Delanty & Strydom, 2003 for perspective summaries), Kuhn’s (1996) 
work left a lasting and important impression upon minds in the scientific community. The notion 
of a paradigm has forever changed the way philosophers of science look upon—and scientists 
self-identify with—the community of researchers, who despite nuanced differences in their day-
to-day activities, all generally agree on what constitutes good inquiry and what problems are 




as relating to knowledge accumulation and the progress of science, it was of greater relevance for 
the current research to illuminate the contribution of Kuhn’s work to the development and 
definition of the term paradigm.  
Habermas’s Contribution 
Jurgen Habermas was a German critical theorist of the Frankfurt School who proposed a 
critical theory of cognitive interests in the social sciences (1971; see also Delanty & Strydom, 
2003). Habermas’s theory was in reaction to positivism and challenged the “objectivist illusion 
that deludes sciences with the image of a reality-in-itself” (p. 305) whereby law-like facts as 
knowledge exist independent of human interests in the world. Central to his theory were 
knowledge-constitutive interests that drove methodological approaches to inquiry in connection 
with the desired knowledge sought. Habermas distinguished “three categories of processes of 
inquiry for which a specific connection between logical-methodological rules and knowledge-
constitutive interests can be demonstrated” (p. 308). He termed these three categories, or types, 
of inquiry the “empirical-analytic sciences” (p. 308), the “historical-hermeneutic sciences” (p. 
309), and the “critical social sciences” (p. 310). An inquiry typology of the three ideal types is 
shown in Table 7; however, prior to Table 7 discussion focuses on the four elements that 
comprise each type of inquiry described by Habermas and are outlined using his four-category 






Four Category Taxonomy of Habermas’s Ideas 









Methodological processes of 
inquiry 
Objective methodological rules for controlled observation and propositional 
understanding 
Intersubjective methodological rules for hermeneutic understanding 





The three types of human interests defined by Habermas (1971) are technical, practical, 
and emancipatory. Technical interests represents “the cognitive interest in technical control over 
objectified processes” (p. 309); practical interests represents the cognitive interest in “mutual 
understanding in the conduct of life” (p. 311); and emancipatory interests represents the 
cognitive interest in “ideologically frozen relations of dependence that can in principle be 
transformed” (p. 310). These human interests define the general areas of the world of interest to 
people. Further defined were three forms of “knowledge-constitutive interests” (p. 313): work, 
language, and power. A knowledge-constitutive interest is a category of knowledge that is sought 
within an area of human interest. The work knowledge-constitutive interest is the general 
category of knowledge sought with the technical human interest area, the language knowledge-
constitutive interest is in the practical human interest area, and the power knowledge-constitutive 




Habermas (1971) logically connected each category of knowledge-constitutive interest to 
specific methodological “processes of inquiry” (p. 308) for the production of knowledge 
associated with each form; that is, the process for generating knowledge of the particular 
category. The first of these processes of inquiry contains the objective methodological rules for 
controlled observation and propositional understanding, whereby “theories comprise 
hypothetico-deductive connections of propositions, which permit the deduction of law-like 
hypotheses with empirical content. The latter can be interpreted as statements about the 
covariance of observable events; given a set of initial conditions, they make predictions possible” 
(p. 308). Predictive statements are translated into and tested under controlled experimental 
conditions that serve as reliable, objective evidence for or against the success of the prediction. 
The second methodological process of inquiry contains the intersubjective 
methodological rules for hermeneutic understanding, whereby “the subject of understanding 
establishes communication between both worlds [part and whole]. He comprehends the 
substantive content of tradition by applying tradition to himself and his situation” (Habermas, 
1971, p. 310). This second process of inquiry represents a unification of interpretation, 
agreement, and application whereby “the understanding of meaning is directed in its very 
structure toward the attainment of possible consensus among actors in the framework of a self-
understanding derived from tradition” (p. 310). 
The third methodological process of inquiry contains the transformative methodological 
rules for emancipatory awareness. It represents psychological movement away from an initial 
condition of “unreflected consciousness” (Habermas, 1971, p. 310) and toward a state of 




frozen ideological structures, therefore setting “off a process of reflection in the consciousness of 
those” (p. 310) caught in the state of dependence with the ideology. Here, the process of self-
reflection on the ideological structures “releases the subject from dependence on hypostatized 
powers” (p. 310). 
Lastly, Habermas (1971) described three different types of knowledge produced by 
engaging in each specific process of inquiry: predictive knowledge, practical knowledge, and 
transformative knowledge. Predictive knowledge is knowledge produced from propositions and 
deduced hypotheses wherein the “basic statements are not simple representations of facts in 
themselves, but express the success or failure of our operations. We can say that facts and the 
relations between them are apprehended descriptively” (pp. 308–309). Practical knowledge, or 
hermeneutic knowledge, “is always mediated through this [the inquirer’s] pre-understanding, 
which is derived from the interpreter’s initial situation… hermeneutic inquiry discloses reality 
subject to a constitutive interest in the preservation and expansion of the intersubjectivity of 
possible action-orienting mutual understanding” (pp. 309–310). Transformative knowledge is a 
self-reflective awareness of the dependence upon a frozen ideology. 
Table 7 
Habermas’s Inquiry Typology 
Type Typology characteristic 
Empirical-analytic sciences 
Technical human interest 
Work knowledge-constitutive interest 
Objective methodological rules for controlled 
observation and propositional understanding 
Production of predictive knowledge 
Historical-hermeneutic sciences 
Practical human interest 
Language knowledge-constitutive interest 





Production of practical knowledge 
Critical social sciences 
Emancipatory human interest 
Power knowledge-constitutive interest 
Transformative methodological rules for emancipatory 
awareness 
Production of transformative knowledge 
 
The Contributions of Guba, Lincoln, Lynham, and Colleagues 
The paradigm structure proposed by Egon Guba and Yvonna Lincoln, with the additional 
contributions of Heron and Reason (1997) and Susan Lynham (Lincoln & Lynham, 2011), 
represented an evolution of more than 40 years of thinking (e.g., Guba, 1969, 1978b, 1979, 
1981a, 1987a, 1987b, 1990c; Guba & Lincoln, 1982a, 1988, 1989, 1994, 2005; Heron & Reason, 
1997; Lincoln, 1986; Lincoln & Guba, 1985b, 1986a, 1986b, 2000; Lincoln & Lynham, 2011; 
Lincoln et al., 2011). What appeared as alternative quality criteria for the naturalist paradigm 
early on (e.g., Guba, 1979, 1981a) evolved into a meta-framework of axiomatic subjects and 
axiomatic systems for the naturalist and positivist paradigms (Guba & Lincoln, 1982a, 1988; 
Lincoln & Guba, 1985b). Later, the framework expanded to include the postpositivist, critical 
(Guba, 1990c; Guba & Lincoln, 1994) and participatory paradigms (Guba & Lincoln, 2005; 
Heron & Reason, 1997; Lincoln & Guba, 2000; Lincoln et al., 2011).  
Based on an underlying axiomatic form of theory (Guba & Lincoln, 1982a, 1988; Lincoln 
& Guba, 1985b, Reynolds, 1971), the modern day paradigm theory (Lincoln & Lynham, 2011; 
Lincoln et al., 2011) is represented as a set of five “basic beliefs” (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, p. 83):  
1. What is there that can be known? 
2. What is the relationship of the knower to the known? 




4. How do values mediate inquiry? 
5. To what ends is knowledge gained through inquiry? 
The answers given to the set of five basic questions defines the belief system of a 
paradigm of inquiry (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). The five questions represent the metaphysical 
subjects of ontology, epistemology, methodology, axiology, and teleology, respectively. The 
metaphysical subject of ontology (Table 8) pertains to the assumption about the nature of reality. 
The metaphysical subject of epistemology (Table 9) pertains to the assumption about the nature 
human knowledge about reality. The metaphysical subject of methodology (Table 10) pertains to 
the assumption about the nature of the means by which knowledge about reality can be attained. 
The metaphysical subject of axiology (Table 11) pertains to assumptions about how the 
inquirer’s stance toward inquiry serves to either separate or integrate the set of researcher values 
from or into the process of inquiry (Lincoln et al., 2011). The metaphysical subject of teleology 
pertains to the ends to which knowledge is sought through inquiry (Table 12). The full 
framework of metaphysical subjects and positions is shown in Table 13. 
Ontology is defined as “that branch of philosophy (specifically, of metaphysics) that is 
concerned with issues of existence or being” (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, p. 83). Table 8 shows the 










Naive realism Assumes a law-like reality that is both external to and independent of the inquirer; 
“there exists a single reality independent of any observer's interest in it” (Guba, 1987, p. 
34).  
Critical realism Similar the realism of positivism in that an external law-like reality is assumed; yet, 
critical realism assumes a reality that is only capable of being imperfectly perceived and 
understood “because of basically flawed human intellectual mechanisms and the 
fundamentally intractable nature of phenomena” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 110). 
Critical realism therefore differs from the realist position in the assumption about the 
extent that the real external reality can be apprehended.  
Historical realism In some instances (e.g., Guba, 1990) also referred to as critical realism due to the 
assumption of an imperfectly apprehensible reality; however, unlike the critical realism 
of postpositivism, the disjunction between real reality and understood reality is not due 
to an imperfect objectivity, rather, due to a historically, socially, culturally, 
economically, and/or politically shaped reality (Guba, 1990; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). In 
this sense, a real nature is presumed to exist, but that “nature cannot be seen as it ‘really 
is’ or ‘really works’ except through a value window” (Guba, 1990, p. 24).  
Relativism Assumes a reality that is dependent upon, and exists in relation to, the knower; “there 
exist multiple socially constructed realities, ungoverned by any natural laws” (Guba, 
1987, p. 34). Relativism assumes that the act of apprehension of reality results in 
“multiple, intangible mental constructions, socially and experientially based, local and 
specific in nature (although elements are often shared among many individuals and even 
across cultures), and dependent for their form and content on the individual persons or 
groups holding the constructions” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, pp. 110-111).  
Participative reality Assumes a reality that is based on a human participation with the world and other 
humans resulting in an “interaction of the given cosmos and the way mind engages with 
it” (Heron & Reason, 1997, p. 279). Based on active participation, reality is assumed to 
be socially co-created. 
Epistemology is defined as “that branch of philosophy that deals with the origin, nature, 
and limits of human knowledge” (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, p. 83). Table 9 shows the metaphysical 










Dualism/objectivism Assumes that objective unbiased knowledge of reality can be attained; “it is possible for 
an observer to exteriorize the reality studied, remaining detached from it and uninvolved 
with it” (Guba, 1987, p. 34). The duality of “the investigator and the investigated ‘object’ 
are assumed to be independent entities, and the investigator to be capable of studying the 
object without influencing it or being influenced by it” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 110). 
Modified 
dualism/objectivism 
Takes an amended position on the objectivism of positivism (in rejection of logical 
positivism) in order to accommodate some uncertainty in the nature of knowledge. While 
objective knowing is retained as a regulative ideal, its perfect attainment is reduced to an 
idealized goal that can at best be only approximated (Guba, 1990); consequently, “special 
emphasis is placed on external ‘guardians’ of objectivity such as critical traditions (Do the 
findings ‘fit’ with preexisting knowledge?) and the critical community (such as editors, 
referees, and professional peers)” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 110). 
Transactional/subjectiv
ism (critical paradigm) 
Assumes that what is subjectively known exists in the tension between the 
historically/socially mediated reality of institutions and a real reality. This tension is 
crucial to the subjectivist epistemology of the critical paradigm because two states of 
awareness are assumed: “false consciousness” (Guba, 1990c, p. 24), i.e., the accepted 
historical reality, and “true consciousness” (p. 24), i.e., external real reality. The false 
consciousness is real to the knower yet remains a reality mediated by the value system of 
institutions. Real reality, or true consciousness, becomes the consequence of an interaction 
with another other in which tension between realities is exposed. In other words, “the 
investigator and the investigated object are assumed to be interactively linked… what can 
be known is inextricably intertwined with the interaction between a particular investigator 





Similar to that of the critical paradigm given the assumption of a subjectively constructed 
knowledge of reality; yet, differs in that the constructivist subjectivism is not power-
based. Rather, it assumes a form of knowledge that is intertwined with the knower and 
created as a transaction between inquirer and inquired. That is, “the investigator and the 
object of investigation are assumed to be interactively linked so that the ‘findings’ are 
literally created as the investigation proceeds. The subjectivist form of knowledge as a 
formed belief is not more or less true in a justified sense; rather, it is more or less informed 
and sophisticated (Guba, 1990c; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). 
Critical subjectivity Assumes an “extended epistemology. A knower participates in the known, articulates a 
world, in at least four interdependent ways: experiential, presentational, propositional, and 
practical” (Heron & Reason, 1997, p. 280). Experiential knowing means “the experiential, 
the embodied, the emotive qualities of human experience” (Guba & Lincoln, 2005, p. 
205). Experiential knowing is a “direct encounter… feeling and imaging the presence of 
some energy, entity, person, place, process, or thing... knowing through participative, 
empathic resonance with a being, so that as knower I feel both attuned with it and distinct 
from it” (Heron & Reason, 1997, pp. 280-281). Presentational knowing is an expression 
of experiential knowing. Propositional knowing is declarative knowledge; it is knowing 
that. Practical knowing is knowledge in action; it is one’s know how, such as a skill (Guba 




Methodology is defined as “a more practical branch of philosophy (especially of 
philosophy of science) that deals with methods, systems, and rules for the conduct of inquiry” 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1989, p. 83). Table 10 shows the metaphysical positions on the 
methodological subject. 
Table 10 
Metaphysical Positions on the Methodological Subject 
Metaphysical position Definition 
Experimental/manipulative Also called the “interventionist” methodology, Guba, 1987, p. 34) prescribes a 
belief forming process in which the independence of investigator and the 
investigated is meticulous maintained through careful empirical control over nature; 
that is, inquiry takes place as if “behind a thick wall of one-way glass, observing 
nature as ‘she does her thing’ ” (Guba, 1990c, p. 19). Within the belief forming 
process of the experimental/manipulative methodology, “questions and/or 
hypotheses are stated in propositional form and subjected to empirical test to verify 
them; possible confounding conditions must be carefully controlled (manipulated) 




The uncertainty of imperfect knowing methodologically shifts the nature of 
controlled observation. Belief outputs are re-characterized as “probably true (but 
always subject to falsification)” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 110) and an added 
emphasis was placed “on ‘critical multiplism’ (a refurbished version of 
triangulation) as a way of falsifying (rather than verifying) hypotheses” (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1994, p. 110).  
Dialogic/dialectical A transformative, political belief forming process. Here, “the transactional nature of 
inquiry requires a dialogue between the investigator and the subjects of the inquiry 
[and/or the readers of an inquiry]; that dialogue must be dialectical in nature to 
transform ignorance and misapprehensions (accepting historically mediated 
structures as immutable) into more informed consciousness” (Guba & Lincoln, 
1994, p. 110). The methodological position is dialogic in that it demands a 
conversation between people or literatures and dialectic in that it also demands that 
the conversation take a point – counterpoint – resolution structure in order to reveal 
the dominant historical reality, the alternative disempowered reality, and 
move/transform knowing to a new state of consciousness.  
Hermeneutical/dialectical An iterative and circular belief forming process. The methodology is hermeneutic 
in the sense that inquirers “must understand the whole from the individual and the 
individual form from the whole” (Gadamer in Connolly & Keutner, 1988, p. 68). 
Further, the methodology is dialectic in the sense that inquiry demands an iterative 
comparing and contrasting of constructions to the point of consensus among 
participants. In other words, “the methodology involves a dialectic of iteration, 
analysis, critique, reiteration, reanalysis, and so on, leading to the emergence of a 
joint (combined emic/etic) understanding of a case” (Guba, 1987, p. 34).  
Cooperative inquiry Also called collaborative action inquiry, assumes a political participation in the 




object (Heron & Reason, 1997; Lincoln et al., 2011). As a belief forming process, 
cooperative inquiry is a democratic process, “a collaborative form of inquiry, in 
which all involved engage together in democratic dialogue as coresearchers and as 
cosubjects” (Heron & Reason, 1997, p. 283). Inquiry iterates democratically 
through all four forms of knowing, ultimately culminating in an improved practical 
knowledge to serve an improved human condition. The cooperative process 
collectively involves coresearchers and cosubjects.  
Axiology is defined as “the branch of philosophy dealing with ethics, aesthetics, and 
religion” (Guba & Lincoln, 2005, p. 200); however, in this paradigm meta-framework, axiology 
is more specifically defined as a value-mediated position on “how researchers act based on the 
research they produce” (Lincoln et al., 2011, p. 111). Table 11 shows the metaphysical positions 
on the axiological subject. 
Table 11 




Positivist position Positivists value “propositional knowing about the world is an end in itself, is 
intrinsically valuable” (Guba & Lincoln, 2005, p. 198); consequently, the axiological 
position on how inquirers should act based on the propositional research aim regulates 
that “researchers should remain distant from the subject so that their actions are not to 
have influence on populations – only the laws their inquiry produces” (Lincoln et al., 
2011, p. 111). 
Postpositivist position Postpositivists also value propositional knowing about the world (as with the 
positivists), but take the axiological position on inquirer actions that “researchers should 
attempt to gain better understanding of reality and as close as possible to truth through 
the use of statistics that explains and describes what is known as reality” (Lincoln et al., 
2011, p. 111). 
Critical position Critical inquirers value true consciousness and change; and consequently, take the 
axiological position on inquirer actions that “researchers seek to change existing 
education as well as other social institutions’ policies and practice” (Lincoln et al., 
2011, p. 111). 
Constructivist position The constructivist values shared understandings; and consequently, takes axiological 
position on inquirer actions that “propositional, transactional knowing is instrumentally 
valuable as a means to social emancipation, which is an end in itself, is intrinsically 
valuable” (Guba & Lincoln, 2005, p. 198). 
Participatory position Participatory inquiry values a balance between “deciding for others, with others, and for 
oneself” (Heron & Reason, 1997, p. 287); consequently, “the participatory paradigm 
answers the axiological question in terms of human flourishing, conceived as an end in 
itself, where such flourishing is construed as an enabling balance within and between 




Teleology is defined as “the end to which the knowledge gained through inquiry ought to 
be applied” (Lincoln & Lynham, 2011, p. 8). Table 12 shows the metaphysical positions on the 
teleological subject. 
Table 12 




Positivist position “Technical – To explain, in order to replicate, predict and control.” (Lincoln & Lynham, 
2011, p. 8) 
Postpositivist position “Technical – To explain, in order to replicate, predict and control.” (Lincoln & Lynham, 
2011, p. 8) 
Critical position “Critically informed praxis – ‘to critique and transform, restitute and emancipate. Thus, 
to enlighten and emancipate through the process of critique and identifying potential’ 
(Guba & Lincoln, 2005, 194), in order ‘to develop more critically informed practice’ 
(Valentin 2006, 27)” (Lincoln & Lynham, 2011, p. 8) 
Constructivist position “Improved praxis – ‘To make sense of, understand and interpret. To understand and 
interpret through meaning of phenomena (obtained from the joint 
construction/reconstruction of meaning of lived experience); such understanding is 
sought to inform praxis (improved practice)’ (Guba & Lincoln, 2005, 194)” (Lincoln & 
Lynham, 2011, p. 8) 
Participatory position Not defined 
The axiomatic theory explaining the phenomenon of inquiry paradigms (Lincoln & 
Lynham, 2011; Lincoln et al., 2011) defines the phenomenon primarily through the set of axiom 
categories articulated as the basic beliefs or metaphysical subjects, the set of meta-physical 
positions to each axiom category for a particular paradigm, and the operationalized positions on 
practical issues (Table 13, modified from Guba & Lincoln, 2005; Lincoln & Guba, 2000; 
Lincoln & Lynham, 2011; Lincoln et al., 2011). Structurally, the sets of metaphysical positions 
defined for each paradigm are similar to the typological structure of Habermas (1971; see Table 
7). At least two significant contributions to the paradigm of inquiry theory emerged through 








































































knowing… as a 
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emancipation” 
(Guba & Lincoln, 
2005, p. 198). 
“Practical 
knowing about 
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Lincoln, 2005, p. 
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order to predict 
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order to improve 
practice 
Not yet defined 
First, individual philosophical paradigms of inquiry can be best understood from within 
each paradigm (or ideal type), based on the underlying set of axioms and theorems expressed as 
a specific combination of positions on metaphysical assumptions and postures (or operational 
characteristics of inquiry). The specific lens of each paradigm was made more explicit through 
each paradigm’s specific framework of ideals. The second significant contribution that emerged 




at a meta level that facilitated understanding between paradigms. Previously, trying to 
understand one paradigm from the perspective of another was burdened by issues of 
commensurability and accommodation, somewhat akin to a form of ethnocentric philosophy 
science (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Lincoln & Guba, 2000). Cross-paradigm comparison was 
achieved with the set of axiomatic subjects systematized into a framework of each paradigm’s 
fundamental of beliefs. Even though achieved previously by Habermas (1971), it had not been 
achieved with the added sophistication by Lincoln and Guba, nor had it been achieved for the 
breadth of paradigm frameworks articulated within the sophisticated formulation of the paradigm 
of inquiry axiomatic theory by Lincoln et al.  
With its unifying organization, the paradigm of inquiry theory (Lincoln & Lynham, 2011; 
Lincoln et al., 2011) defined the general structure, or meta-structure, of a paradigm of inquiry 
outside the context of any particular paradigm of inquiry. That is, all paradigms of inquiry could 
be understood within the paradigm meta-framework of axiomatic subjects, even though 
understanding any particular paradigm of inquiry was accomplished by first substituting a 
specific axiomatic position for each axiomatic subject, and then understanding all the axiomatic 
position pieces of the paradigm’s framework within their unified gestalt context. As articulated 
by Guba (1990c) regarding ontology, epistemology, and methodology, “all these past paradigms, 
as well as emergent contenders, can be characterized by the way their proponents respond to… 
[its] basic questions” (p. 18). 
What roles do paradigms of inquiry have in the process of disciplined inquiry? 
Guba (1990c) stated, “Our concern here, however, is with those paradigms that guide 




three key contributors; yet, attention now turns more specifically to exploring the roles that 
paradigms of inquiry have in the process of disciplined inquiry.  
The roles of Kuhnian paradigms in disciplined inquiry. Normal science represents a 
research strategy of small incremental modifications to the paradigm through application of the 
paradigm to solving puzzles (Andersson, 1994; Kuhn, 1996). According to Kuhn, all activities of 
normal science fall within one of three “foci” p. 25) of normal science: “determination of 
significant fact, matching of facts with theory, and articulation of theory” (p. 34). The editor of 
the 50th anniversary edition of Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Hacking (2012), 
did an excellent job describing these foci in layman’s terms. These three foci of normal science 
determine the form of inquiry to be conducted in relation to the paradigm theory: 
 Determination of significant facts: “Theory leaves certain quantities or 
phenomena inadequately described and only qualitatively tells us what to expect. 
Measurement and other procedures determine the facts more precisely” (p. xvi). 
 Matching of facts with theory: “Known observations don’t quite tally with theory. 
What’s wrong? Tidy up the theory or show that the experimental data were 
defective” (p. xvi). 
 Articulation of theory: “The theory may have a solid mathematical formulation, 
but one is not yet able to comprehend its consequences. Kuhn gives the apt name 
articulation to the process of bringing out what is implicit in the theory, often by 
mathematical analysis” (p. xvi). 
Accordingly, normal-science inquiry is completely guided by the paradigm, such that the 




normal science. Alternatively, in “extraordinary science” (Kuhn, 1996, p. 90), the lack of 
paradigmatic focus guides inquiry in a different manner. Here, inquiry is guided outside the rules 
of the paradigm and focuses on both seeking out a new paradigmatic framework and re-analysis 
of typically implicit fundamentals. 
The roles of philosophical paradigms in disciplined inquiry. Philosophical paradigms 
of inquiry (e.g., Habermas [1971]; Lincoln et al., [2011]) are conceptual structures for the reality 
that can be inquired into. The conceptual structure of philosophical paradigms of inquiry make 
explicit the otherwise implicit, underlying, and undemonstrated metaphysical assumptions, belief 
systems, or “axioms” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985b, p. 33) that establish what is justified to be 
known, why, how, and to what end. These metaphysical assumptions “are the starting points or 
givens that determine what inquiry is and how it is to be practiced” (Guba, 1990c, p. 18).  
Recall that disciplined inquiry also makes explicit the underlying belief system and 
further makes explicit the standards of quality associated with inquiry guided by that belief 
system. A paradigm of inquiry contextualizes the regulative ideal concerning the possibility of 
experience within an axiomatic system. The contextualization of a set of axiomatic positions is 
what disciplined inquiry makes explicit when explicating its underlying belief system. In other 
words, philosophical paradigms of inquiry have the following roles in disciplined inquiry: 
 Provide the assumption structure of knowledge 
 Define what it means to know or believe something about the empirical world 
 Provide quality criteria for inquiry (i.e., “criteria defined from one perspective may 




example, it is not appropriate to judge Catholic dogma as wrong from the perspective 
of say, Lutheran presuppositions” [Lincoln & Guba, 1985b, p. 293]) 
The importance of paradigms of inquiry for understanding the process of inquiry. 
As succinctly expressed by Guba (1990c), paradigms of inquiry are important for understanding 
the process of inquiry because paradigms “determine what inquiry is and how it is to be 
practiced” (p. 18). Guba’s statement highlights the dependence of inquiry upon the assumed 
possibility of experience. Inquiry is not generic. It does not exist empirically in a context free 
manner. That is, inquiry depends upon the nature of the world being inquired into. The nature of 
the world inquired into is an assumed and imposed empirical world. That is precisely why 
paradigms of inquiry are important for understanding disciplined inquiry. Paradigms of inquiry 
define the nature of the world, and therefore also define what inquiry is.  
Crotty (1998) articulated how the scientific paradigm was important to understanding 
inquiry within the world of the positivist: 
The scientific world [of the positivist] is not, of course, the everyday world that people 
experience. Not even [positivist] scientists experience it that way in their everyday mode 
of being… In other words, the world addressed by positivist science is not the everyday 
world we experience…. The scientific world is an abstraction from the ‘lived’ world; it 
has been distilled from the world of our everyday experiences, distances us from the 
world of our everyday experiences, and takes us further still from the world of immediate 
experience lying behind our everyday experiences… The world perceived through the 
[positivist] scientific grid is a highly systematic, well-organized world. It is a world of 
regularities, constancies, uniformities, iron-clad laws, absolute principles. As such, it 
stands in stark contrast with the uncertain, ambiguous, idiosyncratic, changeful world we 
know at first hand. (p. 28) 
Crotty’s scientific world presupposes the nature of the world that can be inquired into, 
and in consequence, defines what inquiry is when conducted within that system of knowledge. 




and what inquiry should be. Disciplined inquiry embraces this relationship of paradigms with the 
inquiry appropriate to that paradigm. Disciplined inquiry makes explicit the presupposed belief 
system, and by association with that belief system, also makes explicit what constitutes quality 
inquiry within that belief system.  
Methodology 
“How can the inquirer (would-be knower) go about finding out whatever he or 
she believes can be known? Again, the answer that can be given to this question is 
constrained by [the presumed nature of the world inquired into]; that is, not just any 
methodology is appropriate. For example, a “real” reality pursued by an “objective” 
inquirer mandates control of possible confounding factors, whether the methods are 
qualitative (say, observational) or quantitative (say, analysis of covariance). (Conversely, 
selection of a manipulative methodology-the experiment, say-implies the ability to be 
objective and a real world to be objective about.) The methodological question cannot be 
reduced to a question of methods; methods must be fitted to a predetermined 
methodology” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 108). 
Review of the methodological phenomenon for the purpose of the present inquiry sought 
to demonstrate the breadth of definitions that can found for methodology and distinguish 
definition of methodology as a term from understanding the idea of methodology as a 
phenomenon. The contrast of the disconnected state of definitions as a term and the lack of 
conceptual framework as a phenomenon was used to demonstrate that methodology remains a 
primitive underdeveloped phenomenon under defined as a broad range of possible ideas, 




What is methodology? 
In Pathways to Knowledge, Goldman (2002) posed the following methodological 
questions:  
If some beliefs are regularly aligned with the truth, how does that transpire? What 
features of the methods or practices used in forming these beliefs account for this result? 
If another set of beliefs are not so well aligned with truth, what features of the belief-
forming methods or practices produce this result? (p. 187) 
If the methodological question is “How can the inquirer (would-be knower) go about finding out 
whatever he or she believes can be known?” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 108), then methodology 
from a disciplinary perspective might be defined as the study of the “features of the methods or 
practices used in forming these beliefs” (Goldman, 2002, p. 187) that regularly account for both 
alignment and lack of alignment of what inquirers believe can be known with the actual beliefs 
formed from their inquiries.  
Up to now, the construct of methodology has only been defined as the regulative rule for 
“how the empirical regress is to be carried out” (Kant, 2007, p. 449) or the basic question asking 
“how should the inquirer go about finding out knowledge” (Guba, 1990c, p. 18). Although the 
ultimate goal of the current work is to conceptually structure the phenomenon of methodology, 
the work begins by focusing on some of the definitions associated with the term methodology. 
Analysis of definitions revealed an inconsistently defined construct that lacks any coherent 
structure similar to the axiomatic system of paradigms by Lincoln et al. (2011).  
Several definitions for the term methodology are offered in Table 14. Numerous key 
descriptors can be pulled from the sample of definitions, such as the rules, procedures, logic, 




with the conduct of inquiry. Although the descriptors provide some further breadth to the lexicon 
for describing methodology, they fail to specifically capture the semantics or pragmatics of the 
term methodology in any concrete way. Altogether, they do little more than serve as a list of 
further adjectives for what has already been described as the rules that govern how inquirers go 
about acquiring knowledge.  
Table 14 
Table of Definitions for the Term Methodology 
Source Definition of methodology 
Popkewitz, T. S. (1990). The meaning 
of alternative paradigms of practice. In 
E. G. Guba, The paradigm dialog (pp. 
51–52). Newbury Park, CA: Sage 
Publications. 
“Methodology, in this context, is concerned with the relations of the 
various parts of study with the production of findings. Methodology is 
concerned with the moral order (the rules, values, and priorities given 
to social conditions and individual action) presupposed in the practices 
of science. It is the study of what is defined as legitimate knowledge 
and how that knowledge is obtained and ordered. Conventional ways of 
talking about science that conflate methods and procedures provide 
little understanding of the underlying matrix of assumptions, 
dispositions, questions, concepts, and procedures that interrelate in the 
production of knowledge.” (pp. 51–52) 
Schwandt, T. R. (1990). Paths to 
inquiry in the social disciplines: 
Scientific, constructivist, and critical 
theory methodologies. In E. G. Guba, 
The paradigm dialog (pp. 258–276). 
Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. 
“To study a methodology is to explore a logic of justification or a meta-
framework for understanding the exercise of method, that is, for 
examining the principles and procedure by which we formulate inquiry 
problems, develop answers to those problems, and evaluate the 
correctness and profundity of those answers.” (p. 262) 
Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1989). 
Fourth generation evaluation. 
Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. 
“Methodology is a more practical branch of philosophy (especially of 
philosophy of science) that deals with methods, systems, and rules for 
the conduct of inquiry. Another way to phrase the question is: ‘How 
can we go about finding out things?’” (p. 83) 
Creswell, J. W., & Plano Clark, V. L. 
(2007). Designing and conducting 
mixed methods research. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
“A methodology refers to the philosophical framework and the 
fundamental assumptions of research (van Manen, 1990). Because the 
philosophical framework one uses influences the procedures of 
research, we define methodology as the framework that related to the 
entire process of research.” (p. 4) 
Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1989). 
Fourth generation evaluation. 
Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. 
“Methodology is best understood as the overall strategy for resolving 
the complete set of choices or options available to the inquirer. Far 
from being merely a matter of making selections among methods, 
methodology involves the researcher utterly-from unconscious 
worldview to enactment of that worldview via the inquiry process.” (p. 
183) 
Bryman, A. (2008a). Of methods and 
methodology. Qualitative Research in 
Organizations and Management: An 
“Methodology is the study of the methods that are employed. It is 




International Journal, 3(2), pp. 159–
168. 
 
use methods of different kinds. However, practices and assumptions are 
somewhat different matters.” (p. 160)  
Bryman, A. (2008a). Of methods and 
methodology. Qualitative Research in 
Organizations and Management: An 
International Journal, 3(2), pp. 159–
168. 
 
Methodology “is concerned fundamentally with the nature of what I 
would call methodic practice. That is, it is concerned with revealing in 
a systematic manner the practices of researchers and the ideas and 
presuppositions that lie behind those practices” (p. 167) 
Frankfort-Nachimias, C., & 
Nachimias, D. (1992). Research 
methods in the social sciences, 4th ed. 
New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press. 
“A system of explicit rules and procedures on which research is based 
and against which claims for knowledge are evaluated” (p. 555) 
This same ambiguity in use of the term methodology was noted by Kaplan (2009), who 
acknowledged two broad uses of methodology: first as a discipline or the actual study of 
methods through “the description, the explanation, and the justification” (p. 18) of their use, but 
not the methods themselves, and second, as the method practices of inquiry conventions. 
However, despite the simplistic dual usage distinguishing the study of from the practice of, he 
noted uncertainty with use of the latter definition. Kaplan argued that the uncertainty had to do 
with four particular uses of the term methodology in reference to a feature of the process of 
inquiry: that of technique, that of honorifics, that of epistemology, and that of methods.  
The four uses of the term methodology discussed by Kaplan (2009), with respect to the 
practice of inquiry, can be hierarchically organized in ascending order of magnitude in the 
following manner: techniques, methods, honorifics, and epistemology. Kaplan described 
techniques as “the specific procedures” (p. 19) used within an accepted context of inquiry within 
a given discipline. Notably, both Kaplan and Guba (1990c) emphasized that much of the training 
that occurs for scientists has been traditionally provided at the level of techniques, and as a 
consequence, greatly distances students from the philosophical basis that established the 




In science as in any other work… there are better and worse ways of doing it. The 
techniques of a science are the ways of doing the work of that science which are 
regarded, for more or less compelling reasons, as being acceptable. Scientific training is 
to a significant extent the mastery of techniques. (Kaplan, 2009, p. 19) 
Several example techniques are offered such as the particular way that a data collection 
instrument is used; the manner in which a particular test is administered; the specific application 
of a particular statistical procedure; the use of a specific research design in a particular context 
(e.g., conducting an interview or setting up an experiment); and so forth (Kaplan, 2009). 
Sometimes, what is referred to as methodology is often made in reference to the types of 
techniques just described. “Techniques differ from one another in the scope of their application, 
some being appropriate only to very narrowly defined contexts, others playing a part in a wide 
variety of inquiries” (p. 23). In this sense, a scientist skilled at the methodology of the discipline 
is well versed in the specific, and often compartmentalized, practices of various steps or phases 
of the research process.  
Too direct an association of methodology solely with techniques of inquiry can blur the 
connectedness and unified process of disciplined inquiry. For example, one team member may 
have mastery of a range of statistical techniques and be an authority on the appropriate 
application of those techniques, given a particular data context. However, the same team member 
may be unaware of the appropriate application of a statistical technique, given the context of the 
entire research process. Techniques are therefore narrow enough in application to only be 
descriptive of a small part of the whole of the inquiry process. 
As with techniques, the use of methodology in reference to methods applies to a range of 




collective techniques. Kaplan (2009) designated the term methods to describe references to 
methodology as follows:  
Middle range techniques and principles… sufficiently general to be common to all 
sciences, or to a significant part of them… [and] include such procedures as forming 
concepts and hypotheses, making observations and measurements, performing 
experiments, building models and theories, providing explanations, and making 
predictions. (p. 23).  
Methods in this case (i.e., middle-range techniques and principles) are sufficiently broad enough 
to encompass the logical and philosophical principles of different forms of inquiry, yet 
sufficiently specific enough to distinguish different paradigms of inquiry from each other. In this 
sense, methods are both descriptive and prescriptive of the entire process of inquiry. 
The third usage of methodology was that of honorifics. Honorific use was described by 
Kaplan (2009) as the ritualistic descriptions of a type of research to position the work in a 
particular area, without much concern for whether the actual inquiry to follow meets that 
classification. In this sense, honorific methodology is only a verbal expression of adherence and 
allegiance to a particular research approach, with a concern primarily for whether the output is 
awarded a particular status and approved as acceptable. “This honorific use of methodology 
expresses that concern without any clear indication of how the concern was embodied in the 
inquiry itself” (Kaplan, 2009, p. 20). 
The last of the four usages for the term methodology was equated to “works of the mind” 
(Kaplan, 2009, p. 21). As such, Kaplan argued that the epistemological usage of methodology 
makes it “indistinguishable” (p. 20) from philosophy of science. This fourth usage of 
methodology is metaphysically laden and extensible to descriptions of underlying assumptions 




speaking—of the most basic questions that can be raised concerning the pursuit of truth” (p. 20). 
Similar to techniques and methods, epistemological use of the term methodology applies to a 
range of issues that “differ in the breadth of their import” (p. 23). Some, issues, according to 
Kaplan, “like the problem of the justification of induction, bear on the whole of human 
knowledge, while other, like the problem of determinism, relate more especially to some 
particular science or part of it” (p. 23) 
The focus on the basic question underlying the quest for knowledge with the 
epistemological use of the term methodology resonates with the methodological question of 
paradigm framework (e.g., How can the knower go about knowing? Guba, 1987a, 1987b, 1990c; 
Guba & Lincoln, 1989, 1994, 2005; Lincoln & Guba, 2000; Lincoln et al., 2011). Challenges to 
the answers to these basic questions often originate from different philosophical perspectives, 
rather than from problems directly encountered in empirical inquiry. However, this does not 
mean the answers and problems of the basic question cannot be informed by actual inquiry. 
Methodology should generally not conform to actual practice or it risks reinforcing “the 
acceptance of unsatisfactory hypotheses on the ground that this is what everybody is doing” 
(Kaplan, 2009, p. 25).  
Becker (1970) criticized methodology (and methodologists) for its apparent normative 
force on practice, yet for maintaining existence and merit independent of it. Becker took issue 
with methodology’s “predominantly proselytizing character” (p. 4), claiming that “methodology 
is too important to be left to the methodologists” (p. 3). Part of Becker’s case built on the 
epistemological use of methodology (Kaplan, 2009), and he argued for a more practice-based 




methodology from philosophy of science, Becker saw methodology simply as an armchair 
discipline that preached to scientists how to do things in order to get them to conform to an 
appropriate method. Kaplan acknowledged this normative tension, but framed the methodologist 
in the following (more flattering) analogy: 
For the criterion being put forward is decidedly not the question whether everybody’s 
doing it, but the very different question whether anything gets done by it. What I am 
protesting is the conception of the methodologist as baseball commissioner; writing the 
rules; or at any rate as umpire, with power to thumb an offending player out of the game. 
He [the methodologist] is at best only a coach, and the merit of his recommendations 
rests entirely on what the play of the game shows to be effective. (p. 25) 
Acknowledging the same confounded use of the term methodology as did Kaplan (2009), 
Bryman (2008a) undertook an examination of what the term might be taken to mean by 
exploring the practices of researchers and publication trends. Bryman questioned Becker’s 
(1970) assertion and accusation of “proselytizing” (Becker, p. 4), and examined whether 
methodology was common to the analysis of the practices of those who use methods (i.e., actual 
methods and/or techniques employed within inquiries) or the analysis of the assumptions that lie 
behind the practices of those who use methods (i.e., the method rationale). The former option 
aligned with Kaplan’s techniques and methods, while the latter with epistemological use. 
For his investigation, Bryman (2008a) offered the following definitions: 
[Methods are] the techniques that researchers employ for practicing their craft. 
“Methods” might be instruments of data collection like questionnaires, interviews or 
observation; they might refer to the tools used for analyzing data, which might be 
statistical techniques or extracting themes from unstructured data; or the term might refer 
to aspects of the research process like sampling. (p. 160) 
Bryman ultimately concluded that term methodology aligned with both the study of method 




what I would call methodic practice. That is, it is concerned with revealing in a systematic 
manner the practices of researchers and the ideas and presuppositions that lie behind those 
practices” (p. 167). There is both a sufficiency and efficiency to Bryman’s methodological 
definition across all sampled meanings of the term provided in Table 14, in addition to alignment 
with the definition for disciplined inquiry provided by Clovis and Cobban (2006) in Table 3. 
Consequently, Bryman’s definition of methodology will serve as interim operational definition, 
with respect to the study of methods, until a more complete conception can be generated. 
The Primitive State of Methodological Conceptualization 
Aside from the noted limitations of the term methodology (i.e., “there are relatively few 
examinations of what we mean by methodology,” Bryman, 2008a, p. 159]), the idea of 
methodology as a phenomenon lacks conception of parts, relationships among parts, organization 
of parts and relationships, operationalized extensions into practice, and an overall way to 
conceptualize and represent methodology as a whole consisting of those parts and relationships. 
When compared with the paradigm of inquiry phenomenon, methodology as a phenomenon is 
missing a systematically conceived abstract scheme that facilitates relating it to other constructs, 
in addition to lacking any particulars (i.e., concepts) of that scheme that can be extended (and 
observed and enacted) into the practice of inquiry. In contrast with methodology, the inquiry 
paradigm phenomenon has been developed into a theoretical scheme that not only conceptualizes 
the general structure and organization of the parts of a paradigm (e.g., the set of axiomatic 
subjects or basic questions), but also further offers specific positions (specific axiom positions or 




paradigms of inquiry and describe the operational characteristics of each of those specific 
paradigms that can be observed and/or practiced in empirical inquiry. 
In the sense just described, through comparison with the inquiry paradigm phenomenon, 
the methodological phenomenon remains both under defined as a term and underdeveloped as a 
phenomenon. Not only does the methodological phenomenon lack the theoretical structure 
necessary for conceptualization and the operational characteristics for extension into practice, but 
its lack of development as a theoretical phenomenon inhibits it from being related to the 
paradigm of inquiry phenomenon in a specific theoretical way. This, thus, inhibits both improved 
understanding and practice of disciplined inquiry. 
Movement from a primitive to sophisticated state. What specific frameworks of ideals 
could capture the essences of the myriad of inquiry methodologies available to inquirers? 
Furthermore, what higher level framework could systematize the organizational structures of 
specific methodologies? Analysis of the literature on methodology reveals that no such set of 
frameworks and meta-framework has yet been defined; however, simply because it has not been 
defined should not imply that it does not exist. Methodologists just need to look in the right 
places, look for the right things, and clear away the right debris occluding its discovery. The first 
step in this process is identifying the methodological construct as something, then recognizing it 
as something that needs to be developed, and then focusing efforts on developing it. For a 
conception of how to add what is missing, the review turns to Dubin’s (1978; see also Lynham, 
2002a) discussion on primitive versus sophisticated theoretical units.  
In Dubin’s (1978; see also Lynham, 2002a) theory-building process, the first step 




out that when an inquirer “deals with logical structures he is constrained to point out that a 
starting point upon which defined categories rest is one or more undefined or primitive terms” (p. 
53). In a similar manner, units of a theory that are undefined are considered primitive, while 
units that are defined are considered sophisticated. That is, theoretical units need to be defined, 
structured, and characterized in relation to the overall theoretical structure in order to be 
considered sophisticated; units that exist as placeholders in the theory but lack the defining 
characteristics are considered primitive.  
A clear intention is associated with defining a construct as primitive: “the admission of a 
unit as a primitive unit into a theory immediately cries out for translation into a sophisticated 
unit” (Dubin, 1978, p. 54). The “theoretical scheme” (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000, p. 40) for 
disciplined inquiry has been initially outlined, and two primary phenomena have been entered 
into that initial scheme. The tension between sophisticated and primitive in this scheme creates 
the researchable conceptual problem in the context of theory development. Dubin described this 
process as one in which the inquirer introduces “an unknown X into his theory and then spend[s] 
his time trying to discover the X”, (p. 53). In this scenario, “The scientist is perfectly willing to 
use a primitive unit precisely because it then presents him with an important research problem to 
turn X into a sophisticated unit of his theory” (p. 53). The inquirer, when confronted with an 
intuition or observation that seems to suggest common core underpinnings, initially identifies the 
primitive construct by applying a name to whatever is presumed to be underlying the intuition or 
observation. By applying “an identifying label that serves to tag it but not to define it… the 
scientist is then in a position to focus attention on the tagged thing and bring it into a new 




phenomenon—acts as catalyst for focused inquiry, leading to transformation of the 
methodological phenomenon from primitive to sophisticated. 
An analysis of Schwandt’s statement concerning methodology. Using the 
sophisticated phenomenon of inquiry paradigms as a model for the phenomenon of methodology 
provides a conceptual endpoint concerning a potential structure for the methodological 
framework, and with some recreation, a potential means to that structured conceptual endpoint. 
However, the paradigm example does little to define the actual elements that should be 
represented within that structure. Given that conceptually structuring the phenomenon of 
methodology for improved understanding of disciplined inquiry remains the goal of the larger 
research agenda, a statement by Schwandt (1990) can be examined as a stepping-off point. In his 
commentary on methodology as the path between the metaphysical world and the practical 
world, Schwandt made the following provocative comment: 
To study a methodology is not simply to examine the exercise of method, it is to study a 
way of knowing; in other words, methodology and epistemology are linked. Ways of 
knowing are guided by assumptions concerning what we are about when we inquire and 
by assumptions concerning the nature of the phenomenon into which we inquire… [the 
former assumption stands in relation to methodological ‘regulative ideals’ and the latter 
assumption in relation to paradigmatic ‘regulative ideals’]… Examining how these two 
sets of assumptions (which themselves evolve) shape our understanding of inquiry and 
guide the development and evaluation of methods is what makes the study of 
methodology more than an examination of the “how-to” of inquiry. To study a 
methodology is to explore a logic of justification or a meta-framework for understanding 
the exercise of method, that is, for examining the principles and procedure by which we 
formulate inquiry problems, develop answers to those problems, and evaluate the 
correctness and profundity of those answers. (p. 262)  
Here, Schwandt (1990) implied a methodology comprising a meta-framework extending 
over all exercises of method to include principles, procedures, problem formation, answer 




outcomes. If method is taken to mean Kaplan’s (2009) “middle range techniques and 
principles… [that] include such procedures as forming concepts and hypotheses, making 
observations and measurements, performing experiments, building models and theories, 
providing explanations, and making predictions” (p. 23), then the exercise of method can be 
expanded to include formation of concepts, systematic empirical inquiry, generation of theory, 
and use of models of inference. Given the structural provision of the paradigm phenomenon as 
theoretical exemplar, along with the writings of scholars such as Schwandt, Kaplan, and many 
others on the topic of methodology, at the outset of the current research, sufficient basis exists to 
hypothesize the viability of a theoretical framework for the methodological phenomenon. The 




CHAPTER 3:  METHOD FOR HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PARADIGM THEORY 
Chapter 3 Preface 
Chapter 3 describes the method of historical analysis used to move beyond the current 
state understanding of paradigm theory represented in the second chapter to understanding its 
changing states overtime. The method of historical analysis describes how the inquiry was 
conducted that led to characterization of milestones in the phenomenon’s evolution. Even though 
the process of historical analysis specifically targeted understanding of changing states overtime, 
within the larger research agenda the historical analysis represented the first step towards 
understanding the theoretical exemplar found in the well-developed, sophisticated 
conceptualization of paradigms of inquiry.  
The process described in chapter 3 follows the integrative literature review research 
design framework of Appendix A. First, the method chapter specifically positions the historical 
analysis in the context of its purpose, conceptual frame, research problem, need, and research 
questions. Next, the method chapter includes details on the literature sampled, the data collected 
from the sample, the coding scheme used to index the literature, and the strategies used to code 
and analyze the literature. The novelty of the methodological approach described in chapter 3 
should be considered. Few examples of using similar historical analyses as part of theory 
development work exist. 
Background Information 
Paradigm theory (Lincoln et al., 2011; Lincoln & Guba, 2011) provides an abstract 
taxonomy of metaphysical categories (e.g., ontology and epistemology) and specific 




positions can define the axiomatic system of a particular science by organizing assumptions 
about reality; what can be known about that reality; and the processes appropriate to coming to 
know something about that reality (e.g., the hypothetico-deductive scientific method or 
interpretive hermeneutic science).  
Although earlier formations about the traditions and associated processes of inquiry 
received significant attention (e.g., Feyerabend, 19871, 1987b; Lakatos & Musgrave, 1970), 
comprehensive analysis of the parallel ways that alternative forms of inquiry systematically vary 
had not been done in education prior to the early writing of Guba and Lincoln (1981) explicating 
a common framework from within which various traditions could be compared as different 
commitments to similar metaphysical categories (given the obvious acknowledgment of Dewey 
[1933] and perhaps the exception of critical theorist Habermas [1971]). Initially appearing in the 
1970s, Guba and Lincoln began publishing on epistemological differences between naturalist and 
rationalist inquiry, focusing their arguments on legitimization of naturalist inquiry through 
examination of parallel trustworthiness criteria (Guba, 1981a). Their efforts to make explicit the 
quality criteria inherent to a tradition of research by mapping the trustworthiness criteria back to 
the underlying axiomatic system of metaphysical positions was perhaps the most valuable 
contribution of their body of work.  
Collectively, Guba, Lincoln, and Lynham’s publications on the topic near 100 sources 
(e.g., Guba, 1969, 1978b, 1979, 1990c; Guba & Lincoln, 1981, 1982a, 1989, 1994; Lincoln, 
2010; Lincoln & Guba, 1985b, 1986a, 2000; Lincoln & Lynham, 2007; Lincoln et al., 2011). The 
breadth of literature contains the incremental puzzle pieces of their theoretical thinking; 




products throughout the evolution of paradigm theory. Perhaps the best historical account to date 
is the autoethnographic history provided by Lincoln’s (1990) “The Making of a Constructivist,” 
but given the 20-plus years since its publication, it remains midpoint in the historical evolution of 
the 40-plus year history.  
Positioning 
The purpose of the historical analysis of paradigm theory (Lincoln et al., 2011; see also 
Lincoln & Lynham, 2011) was to better understand the foundations of their exemplar theory by 
tracing and reconstructing the inquiry paradigm’s theoretical evolution over time. Fundamental 
to the review was a need to document and understand a body of work—specifically, the authors’ 
body of work represented in their own publications as contributing pieces to their evolving ideas. 
Their paradigm theory is a mature topic existing in a single body of literature. The most 
comprehensive documentation of this evolution exists in the published journal articles, 
conference papers, and textbooks from approximately the 1960s to the present day. 
Consequently, a historically organized integrative literature review was an appropriate approach 
to the research. 
Using Cooper’s (1988; Randolph, 2009) taxonomy, the following taxonomic positioning 
of the historical analysis was suggested:  
 Focus: Theory (paradigmatic theory) 
 Goal: Integration and identification of central issues (contributions and timeline) 
 Perspective: Neutral (no espoused position, neutral) 





 Organization: Historical (reconstructed according to meaningful milestones and time 
periods)  
 Audience: Specialized scholars and practitioners 
Conceptual Frame 
The phenomenon central to paradigm theory, paradigms of disciplined inquiry, was not 
something instantaneously talked into existence in a single seminal publication. Rather, the 
phenomenon was incrementally written into existence over more than four decades of 
publication. What started out as an initial comparison of research approaches (e.g., Guba, 1978b) 
evolved into an overarching framework for analogous systems of inquiry (e.g., Guba & Lincoln, 
1982a through to Lincoln et al., 2011). The perspective that the conceptualization of the 
phenomenon evolved over time by building upon prior ideas, adding new ideas, and revising old 
ones framed the historical analysis of paradigm theory by Lincoln et al. (2011; Lincoln & Guba, 
2011). That is, through the process of critical analysis, the literature was viewed as a collection 
of incremental thinking on the paradigm phenomenon over time. Viewing the phenomenon 
through its history was a process of understanding paradigm theory through its developmental 
milestones.  
Research Problem and Proposed Solution 
The paradigm theory of Lincoln et al. (2011; Lincoln & Guba, 2011) serves as a 
sophisticated explanation of the phenomenon of an inquiry paradigm. As an exemplar for the 
development of a theory for the phenomenon of methodology, the theory and its development 
should be critically and historically understood. Even though an autoethnographic account of the 




connects the theory’s development up through the proceeding 20 years (e.g., Lincoln, 2010). As 
a consequence, current historical accounts remain incomplete, if not simply out of date.  
The gap in historical analysis of paradigm theory demanded a more sophisticated 
understanding of the evolution of theoretical ideas over time. To update and complete the 
historical account of paradigm theory by Lincoln et al. (2011; Lincoln & Guba, 2011), and 
therefore critically examine and understand the theoretical exemplar, the current study reviewed 
and historical analyzed the authors’ body of literature relevant to the topic. Beginning with 
paradigm theory (Lincoln et al., 2011; Lincoln & Guba, 2011), references were traced backwards 
through time, and the events and states of the theory’s development reconstructed. 
Need 
As an exemplar theory, it is important to extend understanding of paradigm theory 
beyond its current state by examining the events that contributed to its development over time. 
The framework of metaphysical assumptions, positions, and implications on the practice of 
inquiry of most modern writings on paradigm theory (e.g., post 1990) represent only snapshots in 
time rather than the rich history of intellectual tradition implicit in the text. To truly understand 
the authors’ paradigm theory is to understand its history; its origins, its response, and its 
revisions as the authors got smarter and/or changed their minds (e.g., Guba & Lincoln, 2005).  
As highlighted by Guba (1990c), to study “intellectual traditions is to consider the 
relation of rules in historical conditions. A philosophy of science is also its history” (p. 52). 
Thus, the need addressed by the historical analysis was not one of the visibility of the 
phenomenon, but rather the need to redress understanding of the current state of the paradigm 




on historical conditions, and as a consequence, change the way inquirers understand, and perhaps 
relate to, the phenomenon through the process of how it came to be rather than simply how it 
currently exists. 
Research Questions 
The general research question guiding historical analysis was: how did the exemplar 
paradigm theory of Lincoln et al. (2011; Lincoln & Guba, 2011) evolve into its current 
theoretical state? In addition, the following more specific research questions further guided 
historical analysis of paradigm theory: 
1. What milestones best characterize paradigm theory’s evolution and development? 
2. What features are characteristic of paradigm theory? 
Sample 
Sampling was a systematic and exhaustive process of identifying, locating, reviewing, 
and filtering relevant literature (exhaustive in terms of the ancestry of citations, but only semi-
exhaustive in terms of all the authors’ publications). Beginning with Lincoln et al. (2011) and 
Lincoln and Lynham (2011), an ancestry approach of tracking citations from one source to the 
next was used to sample literature (Cooper, 1982). Sources were traced back to the earliest 
relevant sources cited. The ancestry search represented a front-to-back, present-to-past 
movement through time. Starting with the most recent sources, bibliographies were used to 
sample older and older works. The ancestry sampling approach highlights within-study 
exhaustive sampling, given accessibility considerations, but non-exhaustive sampling with 
regard to an entire population of work. That is, the sampling method produced a subset of an 




Execution of the ancestry sampling strategy followed two general steps. For each primary 
source reviewed, first all relevant references within the primary source were identified. Next, the 
primary sources for each identified reference were retrieved, and again all relevant references 
were identified for that source. The process was repeated until the chain of source  references 
 source ended at the earliest cited source. It is important to define the ancestry sampling 
procedure as a means to initially identify the set of potential sources considered for review. After 
the full set of potential sources was identified, each source was subject to inclusion criteria. 
Each source identified in the ancestry reference sample had to meet four conditions for 
inclusion in the historical analysis. These inclusion criteria were: 
 A primary source must have cited the work in reference to a significant contribution 
to the conceptualization of the inquiry paradigm phenomenon. 
 The sampled source must have been reasonably accessible by means of electronic 
databases, university libraries, or Internet searches. 
 The cited work itself must have discussed a significant contribution to the 
conceptualization of the inquiry paradigm phenomenon, such that the work 
contributed to the historical reconstruction of the conceptualization over time. 
 The cited work must have been by one of the theory’s authors (i.e., Egon Guba, 
Yvonna Lincoln, or Susan Lynham). 
In addition to the ancestry sample, occasionally a pivotal source was included using a 
purposive sampling strategy. In these instances, the pivotal source that was not part of the 
ancestry sample was brought in for the purpose of providing additional citation support for an 




participatory paradigm emerged from the ancestry literature as a key milestone in the evolution 
of paradigm theory; however, in support of the ideas on the participatory paradigm, several 
pivotal works not of the theory’s authors were included to support the body of cited sources on 
the paradigm (e.g., early works of Heron and Reason). These purposively sampled sources 
outside the ancestry sample were neither included in the analysis nor in the results of the ancestry 
sampling discussed next. 
A total of 94 sources were sampled from the ancestry searches. Table 15 shows the status 
of each source in the current review as a result of inclusion criteria. Out of the 94-source sample, 
58 sources met the inclusion criteria, 30 were not accessible, and six did not meet the inclusion 
criteria. Three types of exclusion can be noted. First, a source was located and judged to not meet 
the inclusion criteria. Second, a source could not be accessed. Third, a source, although in 
existence and relevant, was not present in the ancestry of cited sources, and therefore was not 
part of the ancestry sample.  
Table 15 
Set of All References From Ancestry Search 
Status in review Sources (most recent first) 
Excluded - Not accessible 
Lincoln, Y. S., & Lynham, S. A. (Forthcoming). Criteria for assessing theory in 
applied disciplines from a critical, and indigenous perspective. Fort 
Collins, CO: Colorado State University. 
Included 
Lincoln, Y. S., & Lynham, S. A. (2011). Criteria for assessing good theory in 
human resource development and other applied disciplines from an 
interpretive perspective. Human Resource Development International, 
14(1), 3-22. 
Included 
Lincoln, Y. S., Lynham, S. A., & Guba, E. G. (2011). Paradigmatic 
controversies, contradictions, and emerging confluence, revisited, in N. 
K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), The Sage Handbook of Qualitative 
Research (4th ed.) (pp. 97-128). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.  
Included 
Lincoln, Y. S. (2010). What a long, strange trip it's been: Twenty-five years of 




Excluded - Not accessible 
Lynham, S. A., & Y. S. Lincoln. (2009). Foundations of educational research. 
Unpublished course notes. Fort Collins, CO: Colorado State University. 
Included 
Lincoln, Y. S., & Denzin, N. K. (2008). Epilogue: The lions speak. In N. K. 
Denzin, Y. S. Lincoln, & L. T. Smith (Eds.), Handbook of critical and 
indigenous methods (pp. 563-571). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications. 
Included 
Lincoln, Y. S., & Lynham, S. A. (2007). Criteria for assessing good theory in 
human resource development and other applied disciplines from an 
interpretive perspective. In Proceedings of the Academy of Human 
Resource Development Conference, In F. M. Nafukho & T. J. Chermack 
(Eds.), 2007 Academy of Human Resource Development Conference 
Proceedings (pp. 23-30). Bowling Green: AHRD. 
Included 
Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (2005). Paradigmatic controversies, contradictions, 
and emerging confluence. In N. K. Denzin & Y.S. Lincoln (Eds.), 
Handbook of Qualitative Research (3rd ed.) (pp. 191–215). Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Included 
Lincoln, Y. S. (2005). Content, lived experience, and qualitative research. In R. 
A. Swanson & E. F. Holton (Eds.), Research in organizations: 
Foundations and methods of inquiry, (pp. 221–232). San Francisco, CA: 
Berrett-Koehler. 
Excluded - Did not meet 
inclusion criteria 
Lincoln, Y. S., & Cannella, G. S. (2004). Dangerous discourses: Methodological 
conservatism and governmental regimes of truth. Qualitative Inquiry, 
10, 5-14. 
Excluded - Not accessible 
Lynham, S. A. (2002a). Applied theory building. Unpublished course notes, 
College Station, TX: Texas A&M University. 
Included 
Lynham, S. A. (2002b). The general method of theory-building research in 
applied disciplines. Advances in Developing Human Resources, 4(3), 
221–241. 
Included 
Lynham, S. A., & R. J. Torraco. (2001). HRD theory and theory building 
preconference. Tulsa, OK: Academy of Human Resource Development. 
Excluded - Not accessible 
Lynham, S. A. (2000a). The development and operationalization of a theory of 
responsible leadership for performance. Technical Report. HRD 
Research Center, St. Paul, MN: UMN. 
Included 
Lynham, S. A. (2000b). Theory building in the human resource development 
profession. Human Resource Development Quarterly 11(2), 159–178. 
Included 
Denzin, N. K., & Y. S. Lincoln (2000). Introduction: The discipline and practice 
of qualitative research. In N. K. Denzin & Y.S. Lincoln (Eds.), 
Handbook of Qualitative Research (2nd ed.) (pp. 1–32). Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage Publications. 
Included 
Lincoln, Y.S., & Denzin, N.K. (2000). The Seventh Moment: Out of the Past. In 
N. K. Denzin & Y.S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of Qualitative Research 
(2nd ed.) (pp. 1047–1065). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.  
Included 
Lincoln, Y.S., & Guba, E.G. (2000). Paradigmatic Controversies, Contradictions, 
and Emerging Confluence. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), 
Handbook of Qualitative Research (2nd ed.) (pp. 163-188). Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.  
Excluded - Not accessible Lincoln, Y. S. (in press 2000). Varieties of validity: Quality in qualitative 
research. In S. Smart & C. Ethington (Eds.), Higher Education: 
Handbook of Theory and Research. New York, NY: Agathon Press. 
Excluded - Not accessible Lincoln, Y. S. (1999, June). Courage, vulnerability and truth. Keynote address 
delivered at the conference Reclaiming Voice II: Ethnographic Inquiry 
and Qualitative Research in a Postmodern Age. Irvine, CA: University 
of California. 
Excluded - Did not meet 
inclusion criteria 
Lincoln, Y. S. (1998a). Commodification and contradiction in faculty life in the 





Lincoln, Y. S. (1998b). From understanding to action: New imperatives, new 
criteria, new methods for interpretive researchers. Theory and Research 
in Social Education, 26(1), 12-29. 
Included 
Lincoln, Y. S. (1998c). The ethics of teaching qualitative research. Qualitative 
Inquiry, 4, 305–317. 
Excluded - Did not meet 
inclusion criteria 
Lincoln, Y. S. (1998d). When research is not enough: Community, care, and 
love. Presidential Address delivered at the annual meeting of the 
Association for the Study of Higher Education. Miami, FL. 
1998 not accessible; 2000 reviewed in its place: 
Lincoln, Y.S. (2000). When research is not enough: Community, care, and love. 
The Review of Higher Education, 23(3), 241-256. 
Included 
Lincoln, Y. S. (1997a). Reading response-ability: Ethnography and prudential 
caring. Qualitative Studies in Education, 10(2), 161-164. 
Included 
Lincoln, Y. S. (1997b). What constitutes quality in interpretive research? In C. 
K. Kinzer, K. A. Hinchman, and D. J. Leu (Eds.), Inquiries in Literacy: 
Theory and Practice (pp. 54-68). Chicago, IL: National Reading 
Conference. 
Included 
Guba, E. G. (1996). What happened to me on the road to Damascus? In L. 
Heshusius & K. Ballard (Eds.), From Positivism to Interpretivism and 
Beyond: Tales of Transformation in Education and Social Research (pp. 
43-49). New York, NY: Teachers College Press. 
Included 
Lincoln, Y. S. (1995a). Emerging Criteria for Quality in Qualitative and 
Interpretive Research. Qualitative Inquiry, 1(3), 275-289. 
Included 
Lincoln, Y. S. (1995b). The sixth moment: Emerging problems in qualitative 
research. Symbolic Interaction Review Annual, 19, 37-55. 
Included 
Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1994). Introduction: Entering the field of 
qualitative research. In N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), The 
Handbook of Qualitative Research (pp. 1-17). Newbury Park, CA: Sage 
Publications. 
Included 
Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1994). Competing paradigms in qualitative 
research. In N. K. Denzin & Y.S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of 
Qualitative Research (pp. 105-117). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications.  
Excluded - Did not meet 
inclusion criteria 
Lincoln, Y. S. (1994). Emergent Paradigms and the Crisis in Psychology. 
Interamerican Journal of Psychology, 28(2), 139-154. 
Included 
Lincoln, Y. S. & Denzin, D. K. (1994). The Fifth Moment. In N. K. Denzin and 
Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of Qualitative Research (pp. 575-585). 
Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. 
Included 
Lincoln, Y. S. (1993a). I and thou: Method, voice, and roles in research with the 
silenced. In D. McLaughlin & W. G. Tierney (Eds.), Naming Silenced 
Lives: Personal Narratives and the Process of Educational Change (pp. 
29-47). New York, NY: Routledge. 
Excluded - Not accessible 
Lincoln, Y. S. (1993b). Love among the ruins: Higher education in crisis. Paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the Association for the Study of 
Higher Education, Pittsburgh, PA. 
Excluded - Not accessible 
Lincoln, Y. S. (1993c). Notes toward a fifth generation of evaluation: Lessons 
from the voiceless, or, Toward a postmodern politics of evaluation. 
Paper presented at the Fifth Annual Meeting of the Southeast 
Evaluation Association, Tallahassee, FL. 
Included Guba, E. G. (1992). Relativism. Curriculum Inquiry, 22(1), 17-24. 
Excluded - Not accessible 
Lincoln, Y. S. (1991). The detached observer and the passionate participant: 
Discourses in inquiry and science. Paper presented at the annual 





Excluded - Not accessible 
Guba, E. G. (1990a). Relativism. Paper presented at the meeting of the American 
Educational Research Association, Boston, MA. 
Included 
Guba, E. G. (1990b). Subjectivity and objectivity. In E. W. Eisner & A. 
Peshkin's (Eds.), Qualitative Inquiry in Education: The Continuing 
Debate (pp. 74-91). New York, NY: Teachers College Press. 
Included 
Guba, E. G. (1990c). The Paradigm Dialog. Newbury Park, CA: Sage 
Publications. 
Included 
Lincoln, Y. S. (1990a). The Making of a Constructivist: A Remembrance of 
Transformations Past. In E. G. Guba (Ed.) The Paradigm Dialog (pp. 
67-87). Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. 
Included 
Lincoln, Y. S. (1990b). Towards a Categorical Imperative for Qualitative 
Research. In E. W. Eisner & A. Peshkin's (Eds.), Qualitative Inquiry in 
Education: The Continuing Debate (pp. 277-295). New York, NY: 
Teachers College Press. 
Included 
Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1990). Judging the quality of case study reports. 
International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, 3(1), 53-60. 
Included 
Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1989). Fourth Generation Evaluation. Newbury 
Park, CA: Sage Publications. 
Excluded - Not accessible 
Lincoln, Y. S. (1989). Trouble in the land: The paradigm revolution in the 
academic disciplines. In John C. Smart (Ed.), Higher Education: 
Handbook of Theory and Research, (Volume 5, pp. 57-133). New York, 
NY: Agathon Press. 
Included 
Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1989). Ethics: The failure of positivist science. 
Review of Higher Education, 12(3), 221-241. 
Excluded - Not accessible 
Guba, E. G. (1988). Sorting out alternative paradigms for inquiry: Parameters 
and issues. Unpublished proposal for the International Conference on 
Alternative Paradigms for Inquiry, San Francisco, CA. 
Included 
Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1988). Do inquiry paradigms imply inquiry 
methodologies? In D.M Fetterman (Ed.), Qualitative approaches to 
evaluation in education: The silent scientific revolution (pp. 89-115). 
New York, NY: Praegers Publishers.  
Excluded - Not accessible 
Lincoln, Y. S. (1988a). A categorical imperative for qualitative inquiry. Paper 
presented at the Problems in Qualitative Research Conference, Palo 
Alto, CA: Stanford University. 
Excluded - Not accessible 
Lincoln, Y. S. (1988b). The role of ideology in naturalistic research. Paper 
presented at the American Educational Research Association, New 
Orleans, LA. 
Included 
Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1988). Criteria for assessing naturalistic inquiries 
as reports. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American 
Educational Research Association, New Orleans, LA.  
Included 
Guba, E. G. (1987a). Naturalistic Evaluation. In D.S. Cordray, H.S. Bloom, & 
R.J. Light (Eds.), Evaluation Practice in Review: New directions for 
program evaluation, (no 34, pp. 23-43) Jossey-Bass Publishers, San 
Francisco, CA. 
Included 
Guba, E. G. (1987b). What have we learned about naturalistic evaluation? 
Evaluation Practice, 8(1), 23-43. 
Included 
Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1987). The countenances of fourth generation 
evaluation. In D.J. Palumbo (Ed.), The politics of program evaluation 
(pp. 202-234). Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. 
Excluded - Not accessible 
Lincoln, Y. S. (1987). The passionate participant vs the detached observer. 
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational 
Research Association, San Francisco, CA. 
Excluded - Not accessible 
Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1987). Ethics: The failure of positivist science. 
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational 




Excluded - Not accessible 
Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1986). Types of inquiry defined in terms of an 
insider or outsider stance and inquirer or respondent control. 
Unpublished mimeograph. 
Included 
Lincoln, Y. S. (1986). The Development of Intrinsic Criteria for Authenticity: A 
model for trust in naturalistic researches. Paper prepared for the 
Symposium “Issues of Trustworthiness and Authenticity in New-
Paradigm Research”, American Educational Research Association 
Annual Meeting, San Francisco, CA. 
Included 
Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1986a). But is it rigorous? Trustworthiness and 
authenticity in naturalistic evaluation. New Directions for Program 
Evaluation, 30, 73-84. 
Included 
Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1986b). Research, Evaluation, and Policy 
Analysis: Heuristics for Disciplined Inquiry. Review of Policy Research, 
5(3), 536-565. 
Excluded - Not accessible 
Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1986 in press). Understanding and doing 
naturalistic inquiry. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. 
Included 
Guba, E. G. (1985). The Context of Emergent Paradigm Research. In Y. S. 
Lincoln (Ed.), Organizational theory and inquiry (pp. 79-104). Beverly 
Hills, CA: Sage Publications. 
Excluded - Not accessible 
Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1985). The Countenances of Fourth Generation 
Evaluation: Description, Judgment, and Negotiation. Paper presented at 
Evaluation Network annual meeting, Toronto, Canada. 
Included 
Lincoln, Y. S. (1985a). Epilogue: Dictionaries for Languages not yet Spoken. In 
Y. S. Lincoln (Ed.), Organizational theory and inquiry (pp. 221-228).  
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. 
Included 
Lincoln, Y. S. (1985b). Introduction. In Y. S. Lincoln (Ed.), Organizational 
theory and inquiry (pp. 29-40). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. 
Included 
Lincoln, Y. S. (1985c). Preface. In Y. S. Lincoln (Ed.), Organizational theory 
and inquiry (pp. 21-25). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. 
Included 
Lincoln, Y. S. (1985d). The ERS standards for program evaluation: Guidelines 
for a fledging profession. Evaluation and Program Planning, 8, 251-
253. 
Included 
Lincoln, Y. S. (1985e). The Substance of the Emergent Paradigm: Implications 
for researchers. In Y. S. Lincoln (Ed.), Organizational theory and 
inquiry (pp. 137-157). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. 
Excluded - Not accessible 
Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1985a). Ethics and Naturalistic Inquiry. 
Unpublished manuscript, University of Kansas. 
Included 
Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1985b). Naturalistic inquiry. Beverly Hills, CA: 
Sage Publications. 
Included 
Guba, E. G. (1984). The Effect of Definitions of Policy on the Nature and 
Outcomes of Policy Analysis. Educational Leadership, 42, 63-70. 
Excluded - Did not meet 
inclusion criteria 
Lincoln, Y. S. (1983). The structure of promotion and tenure decisions in 
institutions of higher education: A policy analysis. Review of Higher 
Education, 6, 217-232. 
Excluded - Not accessible 
Guba, E. G. (1982). The role of client-experienced policy on the nature and 
outcomes of policy analysis. Unpublished paper. Lawrence, KS: 
University of Kansas, Center for Public Affairs. 
Included 
Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1982a). Epistemological and Methodological 
Bases of Naturalistic Inquiry. Educational Communication and 
Technology, 30(4), 233-252. 
Included 
Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1982b). The Place of Values in Needs 
Assessment. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 4(3), 311-
320. 
Excluded - Not accessible 
Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1982 in press). Issues in naturalistic inquiry. 





Guba, E. G. (1981a). Criteria for Assessing the Trustworthiness of Naturalistic 
Inquiries. Educational Communication and Technology, 29(2), 75-91. 
Included 
Guba, E. G. (1981b). Investigative Journalism. In N. L. Smith (Ed.), Metaphors 
for Evaluation: Sources of New Methods. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage 
Publications. 
Included 
Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1981). Effective Evaluation: Improving the 
Usefulness of Evaluation Results Through Responsive and Naturalistic 
Approaches. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers. 
Excluded - Not accessible 
Lincoln, Y. S. (1981). Strategies for Insuring the Dependability (reliability) of 
Naturalistic Studies. Paper presented at the joint annual meeting of the 
Evaluation Network and the Evaluation Research Society, Austin, TX. 
Excluded - Not accessible 
Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1981). Do evaluator wear grass skirts? Going 
native and ethnocentrism as problems of utilization in evaluation. Paper 
presented at the joint annual meeting of the Evaluation Network and the 
Evaluation Research Society, Austin, TX. 
Included 
Lincoln, Y. S. & Guba, E. G. (1980). The Distinction Between Merit and Worth 
in Evaluation. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 2(4), 61-71.  
Included 
Guba, E. G. (1979). Naturalistic Inquiry. Improving Human Performance 
Quarterly, 8(4), 268-276. 
Excluded - Not accessible 
Guba, E. G. (1978a). Metaphor Adaptation Report: Investigative Journalism. 
Research on Evaluation Project Monograph. Portland, OR: Northwest 
Regional Educational Laboratory. 
Included 
Guba, E. G. (1978b). Toward a Methodology of Naturalistic Inquiry in 
Educational Evaluation. Center for the Study of Evaluation Monograph 
Series in Evaluation, no. 8. 
Excluded - Not accessible 
Guba, E. G. (1978c). The Methodological Rigor of Qualitative Methods. Paper 
presented at University Council for Educational Administration 
workshop on Qualitative Methods in Administrative Research, 
Bloomington, IN. 
Excluded - Not accessible 
Guba, E. G. (1978d). The use of metaphors in constructing theory. Paper and 
Report Series, No.3, Research and Evaluation Program, Northwest 
Regional Educational Laboratory, Portland, OR. 
Excluded - Not accessible 
Lincoln, Y. S. (1978). An Organizational Assessment of the Potential of Bureaus 
as Agencies for Knowledge Production and Utilization. Unpublished 
doctoral dissertation, Indiana University. 
Excluded - Did not meet 
inclusion criteria 
Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1978). Reward systems and emergent missions: 
Higher education's dilema. Phi Delta Kappan, 59(7), 465-467. 
Excluded - Not accessible 
Guba, E. G. (1977). The State of the Art of Educational Evaluation. Proceedings 
of the Evaluation Network Annual Meeting, St. Louis, MO. 
Included 
Guba, E. G. (1975). Problems in Utilizing the Results of Evaluation. Journal of 
Research and Development in Education, 8, 42-54. 
Included 
Guba, E. G. (1969). The Failure of Education Evaluation. Educational 
Technology, 9(5), 29-38. 
Excluded - Not accessible 
Guba, E. G. (1967). Report on the Evaluation Provisions of Twenty-One Title III 
Proposals. Report to the National Panel on Title III Evaluation. 
Data Collection 
Each source meeting inclusion criteria was reviewed in its entirety. The process of 
deconstructing ideas in the sources initially involved summarizing sources for their contributions 




and a brief summary of its significant contribution(s) to the conceptualization of the inquiry 
paradigm phenomenon. The key ideas extracted from each source are summarized in Table 16, 
organized by publication date (oldest to newest), with a short citation of the source. 
Table 16 





Summary of key ideas 
Guba (1969) 1969 
Critiques the viability of traditional methods of evaluation for assessing the 
impact of educational innovations. 
Guba (1975) 1975 
Provides commentary on “criteria of good evaluation” (p. 44) primarily from the 
scientific perspective; however, many of the criteria listed, e.g., internal validity 
and credibility, are early signs of consideration for criteria significant to both the 
scientific and naturalistic perspectives, respectively. 
Eleven criteria of good evaluation are discussed: (a) Internal validity, (b) 
External validity, (c) Reliability, (d) Objectivity, (e) Relevance, (f) Importance, 
(g) Scope, (h) Credibility, (i) Timeliness, (j) Pervasiveness, and (k) Efficiency. 
Guba (1978b) 1978 
Important seminal work in the sample. Discusses a number of critical points 
including: 
A model of inquiry approaches along two dimensions: high to low control over 
antecedent conditions and high to low control over noted outcomes or responses 
of interest. 
14 distinctions are made between the lens of the naturalist and the lens of the 
conventionalist: (a) philosophical base: positivism vs phenomenological, (b) 
inquiry paradigm: experimental vs ethnographic, (c) inquiry purpose: verification 
vs discovery of phenomena) (d) stance of the inquirer: reductionist vs 
expansionist, (e) the framework/design: preordinate, fixed design vs emergent, 
variable design, (f) the style of coming upon the elements to be studied as 
intervention: manipulation of independent and dependent variables vs selection 
of those variables considered critical for inquiry purposes, (g) the reality 
manifold as a singular, objective reality vs multiple, subjective realities, (h) the 
value structure of value free neutrality vs advocacy of multiple values, (i) the 
setting of inquiry such that it is contrived vs a nature, non-contrived 
environment, (j) Context, as in the role of context inquiry, where inquiry is either 
context free vs context embedded, (k) conditions of study as controlled vs 
uncontrolled (invited interference), (l) treatment as the stable and controlled 
cause of an effect vs anti-treatment or at best antecedent in time, but unstable and 
variant over time, (m) the scope of inquiry as limited and narrow, e.g., molecular, 
vs broadly considering any variables, e.g., molar, and (n) inquiry methods 
emphasizing objective inter-subject agreement between two competent, neutral 
observers vs confirmability as agreement among a variety of information 
sources. 
First discussion of "middle range methodological" issues/questions. Three core 
middle range problems, or methodological issues, of naturalistic inquiry are 
discussed. These are (a) Boundary problems, (b) Focusing problems, and (c) 




First presentation of problem syllogism. 
First presentation of specific criteria of quality for convention and naturalist 
inquiry. 
Guba (1979) 1979 
First presentation of specific foundational assumptions for scientistic and 
naturalistic paradigms. 
The three basic assumptions of the "scientistic" model are presented as (a) the 
assumption of singular reality, (b) the assumption of subject-object duality [e.g., 
the inquirer will have no effect on the phenomena being studied], and (c) the 
assumption of generalizability. The three basic assumptions of the naturalist 
paradigm are presented as (a) the assumption of multiple realities, (b) the 
assumption of subject-object inter-relatedness, and (c) the assumption of 
contextuality. 




First discussion and definition of merit versus worth in evaluation, which closely 
parallels scientistic judgments of merit and naturalistic judgments of worth. 
Merit and Worth are referenced numerous times throughout the future 
publications. 
“While merit decisions reinforce decisions of worth, and vice versa, they are 
separate decisions, made on separate criteria, and they require different 
methodological approaches to be established” (p. 67).  





Not necessarily seminal (as was Guba [1978b]), but, in the least, first fully 
unpacked representation of ideas. 4 relevant chapters: 
Chapter 3: Much of chapter 3 echoes the content of Lincoln & Guba (1980) on 
the concepts of merit and worth. Authors highlight that “…while merit remains 
more or less constant, at least in the sense that it is not unreasonable to expect 
that consensus about an entity’s merit can be reached, worth can and does change 
dramatically: change the context and you change the worth” (p. 43).  
Chapter 4: Extensive discussion of three basic (noted as “simplistic and 
inadequate”, p. 56) axioms for the scientific and naturalistic paradigms of 
inquiry: (a) Assumptions About Reality, (b) Assumptions About the Inquirer-
Subject Relationship and, (c) Assumptions About the Nature of "Truth" 
Statements. Seven general postures of the scientific and naturalistic paradigms 
are described: (a) Preferred Techniques, (b) Quality Criterion, (c) Source of 
Theory, (d) Questions of Causality, (e) Knowledge Types Used, (f) Stance, and 
(g) Inquiry Purpose. Eight specific methodological postures are described: (a) 
Instrument (b) Timing of the Specification of Data Collection and Analysis 
Rules, (c) Design, (d) Style, (e) Setting, (f) Treatment, (g) Analytic Units, and (h) 
Contextual Elements. Another references to 2x2 table of inquirer constraints: 
“inquiry based on the extent to which the investigator places constraints upon 
two dimensions: antecedent conditions and outputs.” (p. 79). 
Chapter 5: Extensive discussion and description of the three classes of problems: 
problems of bounding, problems of focusing, and problems of rigor. Early 
presentation and discussion of four fundamental issues for inquiry, later to be 
expressed as quality criteria: “The four terms naming these concerns within the 
scientific paradigm are, of course, internal validity for truth value, external 
validity or generalizability for applicability, reliability for consistency, and 
objectivity for neutrality. We propose certain analogous terms as more 
appropriate to the naturalistic paradigm: credibility for truth value, fittingness for 
applicability, "auditability" for consistency, and confirmability for neutrality” (p. 
104). 
Chapter 6: Early reference to the human or inquirer instrument, i.e., “human 
beings as instruments” (p. 72). Extensive discussion about seven characteristics 
of the human instrument: (a) Responsiveness, (b) Adaptability, (c) Holistic 




Opportunities for Clarification and Summarization, and (g) Opportunity to 
Explore Atypical or Idiosyncratic Responses. 
Guba (1981b) 1981 
Discusses the process of formalizing a logic-in-use into a reconstructed logic 
with regard to models of inquiry. The author notes both the costs, i.e., developing 
a sterile, rote orthodoxy, and the benefits, i.e., guide the novice, offer 
benchmarks or relative standards for the expert, provide a language for 
communication and conceptualization. Includes discussion of the adaptation of 
naturalistic methodology to the field of evaluation. 
Guba (1981a) 1981 
Early refined side-by-side presentation of key assumptions and positions for the 
naturalistic versus rationalistic paradigms. Of particular importance is the 
specification of a general subject (e.g., axiom subject) and paradigmatic position 
on each subject (e.g., axiom position). Also an early presentation of axiom-like 
subjects for quality, or “trustworthiness” and expanded discussion on the specific 
quality criteria, as axiom-like positions, for naturalistic and rationalistic 
paradigms; the four concerns are (a) Truth value – “How can one establish 
confidence in the “truth” of the findings of a particular inquiry for the subjects 
(respondents) with which and the context in which the inquiry was carried out?” 
(p. 79); (b) Applicability – “How can one determine the degree to which the 
findings of a particular inquiry may have applicability in other contexts or with 
other subjects (respondents)?” (pp. 79-80); (c) Consistency – “How can one 
determine whether the findings of an inquiry would be consistently repeated if 
the inquiry were replicated with the same (or similar) subjects (respondents) in 
the same (or similar) context?” (p. 80); and (d) Neutrality – “How can one 
establish the degree to which the findings of an inquiry are a function solely of 
subjects (respondents) and conditions of the inquiry and not of the biases, 
motivations, interests, perspectives, and so on of the inquirer?” (p. 80).  
Ten key assumptions are discussed upon which rationalistic and naturalistic 
inquiries differ: (a) The nature of reality: singular versus multiple, (b) The nature 
of the inquirer/object relationship: the inquirer and object are independent versus 
the inquirer and respondent/object are interrelated, (c) The nature of truth 
statements: context free generalizations aimed at nomothetic knowledge versus 
context dependent working hypotheses aimed at idiographic knowledge, (d) 
Preference (although not singular reliance upon) of methods: quantitative versus 
qualitative, (e) Quality criterion: rigor versus relevance, (f) Source of theory for 
inquiry: a priori, hypothetico-deductive type of theory versus emergent, 
grounded theory, (g) Knowledge types used: propositional only versus tacit and 
propositional, (h) Instruments: objective neutral instruments versus use of the 
self as instrument, (i) Design: preordinate design versus emergent, and (j) 
Setting: controlled laboratory setting versus natural real world setting. 
A table is presented that generalizes the ways that rationalists handle issues of 
trustworthiness in their inquiries. The table has five columns with the following 
headings: (a) Inquiry can be affected by…, (b) Which produce effects of…, (c) 
To guard against which we…, (d) In hope this action will lead to…, (e) And 
produce findings that are...; together the headings with the specific statements 
from each row (four) can be combined to create four statements for how 
rationalists handle issues of trustworthiness in inquiry. A second table is 
presented that generalizes the ways that naturalists handle issues of 
trustworthiness in their inquiries. The table has five columns with the following 
headings: (a) Inquiry can be affected by…, (b) Which produce effects of…, (c) 
To guard against which we… during/after the study, (d) In hope these actions 
will lead to…, (e) And produce findings that are...; together the headings with the 
specific statements from each row (four) can also be combined to create four 
statements, as with the rationalist table, for how naturalists handle issues of 








Focuses on needs assessment and the fit of naturalistic inquiry. Need is defined 
as: “A need is a requisite or desideratum generated as a discrepancy between a 
target state and an actual state, if and only if the presence of the conditions 
defined by the target state can be shown significantly to benefit an S and the 
absence of those conditions can be shown significantly to harm, indispose, or 





Early presentation of paradigms as axiomatic systems (first inclusion of values). 
On the choice of paradigms: “A decision about which of several alternative 
axiom systems to use in a given case is made by testing the "fit" between each 
system and the case, a process analogous to (although not nearly as well 
understood as) testing data for fit to assumptions before deciding on which 
statistic to use in analyzing them. Hence, the axioms to be described in this 
section should not be judged on the grounds of their self-evident truth, their 
common-sense qualities, or their familiarity to the inquirer, but in terms of their 
fit to the phenomena into which one proposes to inquire” (p. 237). Axioms are 
defined “as the set of undemonstrated (and undemonstrable) propositions 
accepted by convention (even if only intuitively) or established by practice as the 
basic building blocks of some conceptual or theoretical structure or system” (p. 
236). These rules, propositions, or ‘theorems’, may be proven as “by showing 
them to be logical derivatives from some simple and basic set of ‘self-evident 
truths’” (p. 236) or axioms.  
Distinguishes rationalist from naturalist paradigms on (a) five basic axioms and 
(b) six postures taken by practitioners. Suggests a number of methods for 
responding to the four basic trustworthiness criteria. Axioms: (a) The nature of 
reality, (b) The inquirer-object relationship, (c) The nature of truth statements, 
(d) Attribution/explanation of action, and (e) The role of values in inquiry. 
Postures: (a) preferred methods, (b) source of theory, (c) knowledge types used, 
(d) instruments, (e) design, and (f) setting. A number of methods for meeting the 
four basic trustworthiness criteria are discussed; each criterion addresses truth 
value, applicability, consistency, and neutrality. The four quality criteria are (a) 
credibility, (b) transferability, (c) dependability, and (d) confirmability. 
Guba (1984) 1984 
Eight different definitions of policy analysis are considered. For a number of 
different policy types and definitions, Guba walks through the implications of 
each upon questions, data types, data sources, methodology, and outputs. The 
variation in definitions highlights the connection of the paradigm to features of 
inquiry that are separate features of the inquiry from the methodology. Here, the 
features listed included: 
- The kinds of questions that are asked. 
- The kinds of phenomenon-relevant data that are collected. 
- The sources of data that are collected. 
- The methodology that is used. 




Important in-depth treatment of a number of critical issues and concepts, but not 
necessarily the “first” time the ideas are presented. 
Extensive discussion of paradigms, axiom systems, and the axiom systems of 
naturalism and positivism; includes extensive treatment of (a) The nature of 
reality, (b) The relationship of knower to known, (c) The possibility of 
generalization, (d) The possibility of causal linkages, and (e) The role of values. 
Defines characteristics of operationalized axiom systems and presents 14 
operational characteristics of naturalistic inquiry. 
Disciplined inquiry is defined and discussed. Presented in the context of the 
“twin criteria of inspectable and verifiable process and product”. 
Extensive discussion of naturalistic methodology and research design, including 
proposal of ten naturalistic research design elements. 
Extensive discussion of the details of establishing trustworthiness and the special 




and naturalistic paradigms; four quality subjects: (a) Truth value, (b) 




Discusses paradigms as the foundations that guide action: “most of us carry out 
our work, whatever that might be, without reflecting about the epistemological 
foundations (value assumptions) undergirding action. We have internalized a set 
of beliefs, and we act upon them without much thought.” (p. 137) 
Presents inquiry in a means-ends relationship, where, “By means and ends I 
mean what researchers do to gather information and what formats they use to 
finally report what they found. The argument can be mounted here that these 
means and ends are synergistic, that they are mutually reinforcing, and that they 
exhibit value resonance with the axioms… What is suggested is that means and 
ends, like the axioms that undergird them, have not been considered as a logical 
set. It is to the means and ends-for most inquirers, the substance of their 
activities-that this argument is directed.” (p. 140) 
Fourteen derivatives of the naturalistic axioms are presented and discussed. 




Reviews the standards for evaluation proposed by the (ERS Standards 
Committee, 1982) and discusses the value assumptions underlying the standards. 
Five assumptions are discussed: (a) evaluation as a linear process, (b) a priori 
design, (c) identifying cause and effect relations, (d) formal authority vs 
audience, and (e) value and methodology independence. Early extension of the 




Discusses the metaphor of paradigms as numerous teams all playing on the same 
field but by different rules and not everybody recognizes that different games are 
being played simultaneously to different ends. Author discusses personal 
frustration associated with trying to articulate what the different paradigms were 




Discusses the nature of paradigms and further describes disciplined inquiry: “The 
other is a paradigm of disciplined inquiry, concerned with how we explore the 
world, how it is we come to systematize or order knowledge about the world, and 
what methods might be most appropriate for accomplishing that end.” (p. 31)  
Discusses the relationship of axiomatic systems and paradigms. 
Early quote for as we think, so do we act: “Paradigm sets the context of 
assumptions for the inquiry (these are often implicit; but as we think, so do we 
act)” (p. 36). 




Positions the text as a description of a new paradigm. Comments on the time of 
change occurring: “Guba argues that definitions of what it is we know, what it is 
that we think we can know, and how we will come to know it can change, and 
furthermore, are changing. The old rules that governed the conduct of disciplined 
substantive inquiry are undergoing stress and the structures are unsafe, if not 
indeed collapse” (pp. 221-222). 
Describes the nature of creating language to not only describe, but also create. 
Similar to Weick’s idea of talking a phenomenon into existence: “Some of the 
battle, however, goes on at the construct level also. In earlier work (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985) the example of Orwell's 1984 was used to remind the reader that 
when words do not exist for concepts and constructs, there is no recognition that 
such states are possible… Without words to shape the concepts, the drive for 
human freedom, for liberty of thought and action slowly disappears.” (p. 222) 
Guba (1985) 1985 
Early introduction of the critical realist axiom position as something in between 
the naïve realism of positivism and the multiple, constructed reality of 
naturalism. 
Early introduction of a three paradigm framework for positivist, postpositivist, 
and constructivist paradigms even though termed the “positivist view (normal 
orthodoxy)”, the “transitional view (retrenchment neo-orthodoxy)”, and the 




Describes five axioms of the positivist and naturalist paradigms: (a) Axiom 1: 
The nature of reality (ontology), (b) Axiom 2: The inquirer-respondent 
relationship (subject-object dualism), (c) Axiom 3: The purpose of inquiry 
(generalization), (d) Axiom 4: The nature of explanation (causality), and (e) 




Disciplined inquiry defined: “That is, to qualify as disciplined, the report of an 
inquiry must inform the reader, in ways that are publicly confirmable, what the 
nature of the ‘raw” data is, the sources of those data, and the context in which 
they were collected (for example, a laboratory, the respondents’ work places, and 
the like). At the same time, the processes for transforming the data into 
information—interpretations, conclusions, extrapolations, recommendations—
must also be apparent to the reader; they too must be publicly confirmable so that 
their logic and coherence can be tested.” (p. 447). Three questions are listed that 
every inquirer should be able to answer about their inquiries if they are to be 
considered disciplined: “[1] Are the raw materials clearly displayed? [2] Do I 
understand the logic by which the data were reorganized into the argument? [3] 
Does the argument exhibit logic and coherence?” (pp. 547-548). Here the authors 
define and distinguish research, evaluation, and policy analysis as three forms of 




Five axiomatic subjects are discussed: (a) Axiom concerned with the nature of 
reality, (b) Axiom concerned with the nature of "truth" statements, (c) Axiom 
concerned with explanation, (d) Axiom concerned with the nature of the 
inquirer-respondent relationship, and (e) Axiom concerned with the role of 
values in inquiry. 
Issues of inquiry quality are discussed relevant to four basic questions: “These 
criteria are intended to respond to four basic questions (roughly, those concerned 
with truth value, applicability, consistency, and neutrality)” (p. 76). The four 
basic issues for quality represent the concept of rigor in the conventional 
paradigm, i.e., truth value (internal validity), applicability (external validity or 
generalizabilitv), consistency (reliability or replicability), and neutrality 
(objectivity), and trustworthiness in the naturalistic paradigm, i.e., “thus, we have 
suggested credibility as an analog to internal validity, transferability as an analog 
to external validity, dependability as an analog to reliability, and confirmability 
as an analog to objectivity. We shall refer to these criteria as criteria of 
trustworthiness (itself a parallel to the term rigor).” (pp. 76-77). In addition, five 
authenticity criteria are discussed: (a) Fairness, (b) Ontological Authenticity, (c) 




Discusses the trustworthiness criteria of positivism as “internal and external 
validity, reliability, and objectivity” (p. 3), and the trustworthiness criteria for 
naturalism, defined in terms that parallel those of positivism, were listed as 
“credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability” (p. 4).  
Five authenticity criteria are also discussed: (a) Fairness, (b) Ontological 
Authenticity, (c) Educative Authenticity, (d) Catalytic Authenticity, and (e) 
Tactical Authenticity. 
On the advantage of naturalism over positivism through the presence of 
authenticity criteria: “In positivism, procedural and methodological criteria alone 
determine the rigor, whereas ethical and authenticity criteria enter in determining 





Merit and Worth are discussed as intrinsic and extrinsic characteristics of the 
evaluand. 
Eight distinctive features of fourth-generation are discussed: (a) Evaluation is a 
social-political process, (b) Evaluation is a learning/teaching process, (c) 
Evaluation is a continuous, recursive, and divergent process, (d) Evaluation is a 
process that creates "reality," (e) Evaluation is an emergent process, (f) 
Evaluation is a process with unpredictable outcomes, (g) Evaluation is a 




case-study format, with items requiring negotiation being spelled out in relation 
to the particulars of the case. 
Criteria of technical adequacy in evaluations for the conventional scientific 
paradigm are listed as internal validity, external validity (or generalizability), 
reliability, and objectivity. 
Criteria of technical adequacy in evaluations for fourth generation evaluation are 
listed as credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. 
Five additional criteria of adequacy for the fourth generation evaluation are 
proposed: “We propose five additional criteria that are applicable to fourth 
generation evaluation on the grounds that they "fit" the new style: openness, 
relevance, fairness, ethicality, and increased understanding. 
Guba (1987b) 1987 
Discusses the difference between naturalistic methods and worldview as one of 
qualitative techniques versus “thinking naturalistically” that “inevitably changes 
both the meaning and practice of evaluation in similarly revolutionary ways.” (p. 
26). A framework is presented for five types of uses for naturalistic inquiry: a) 
exploration with its goals of discovery and generation, b) description with its 
goals of contextualization and process monitoring, c) illustration with its goals of 
insight and exemplification, d) realization with its goal of vicarious experience, 
and e) testing. 
Discusses the appropriateness of mixing methods, both naturalistic and 
conventional paradigm accommodate both quantitative and qualitative methods; 
however, with regard to mixing paradigms “no possibility exists that there can be 
an accommodation at the paradigm level” (p. 30) 
Extensive discussion of axioms systems, using opposite assumptions to derive 
proofs of axioms, the test of fit of axioms with the real world, theorems as logical 
derivatives of axioms (versus logical proofs). Three axiom subjects are discussed 
(Ontology, Epistemology, and Methodology) and the three specific axiom 
positions to each subject are discussed for the conventional and naturalistic 
paradigms. (a) Ontology – Realist vs Relativist, (b) Epistemology – Dualist, 
Objectivist vs Monist, Subjectivist, and (c) Methodology – Interventionist vs 
Hermeneutic. 
Early presentation of 13 derivative "theorems" for both positivist and naturalist 
paradigms; no theorem headings/subjects are provided here, but are provided 
later in Guba & Lincoln, 1989. 
High level discussion on criteria of quality.  
Guba (1987a) 1987 
This source is nearly identical in content to 1987b. All discussion in 1987b 




The criteria of quality process in disciplined inquiry are discussed: the “truth 
value” (internal validity vs credibility), applicability (external validity vs 
transferability), consistency (reliability vs dependability) and neutrality 
(objectivity vs confirmability). In addition, the five authenticity criteria are 
discussed: fairness, ontological authenticity, educative authenticity, catalytic 
authenticity and tactical authenticity 
First presentation of quality criteria for the products of inquiry to complement 
criteria for the process of inquiry. (a) axiomatic criteria, (b) rhetorical criteria, (c) 





Presents a five axiom framework for the conventional and naturalistic paradigms. 
Authors critique distinguishing paradigms at the methods level rather than 
philosophical paradigm level. 
Analogy to methodology in reference to differences between method and 
methodology: “Leaving aside the counterargument that could be made against 
this advice because of its know-nothing nature, we find a more compelling 
reason to reject it: that this position confuses methodology with method. It may 
very well be the case that there is no immediate connection discernible between 
the methods-the tools and techniques-that an investigator uses and the inquiry 




tell -whether he is operating as a carpenter, an electrician, or a plumber. What we 
be quite sure of, however, is that the way the hammer is used will greatly depend 
on whether the user construes himself or herself as a carpenter, electrician, or 
plumber. The hammer may be a method, but using it in the service of carpentry is 
an instance of methodology. One can mix and match, or blend, hammers, saws, 
wrenches, levels, and the like, but one cannot mix and match or blend carpentry 
with, say, plumbing.” (p. 91) 
First articulation of differentiating characteristics of methodology: (a) what each 
is directed towards, (b) what each holds inviolable, (c) their posture as systems, 
(d) their posture as processes, (e) their posture on control, (f) the test for 
believability, and (g) anticipated outcomes. Extensive discussion of the contexts 
of discovery and verification. Full models of the methodologies of the 
conventional and naturalistic paradigms provided graphically and discussed in 
detail 
Interesting discussion of the “set of entry conditions or essentials that must be 
satisfied to warrant beginning… [an] inquiry” (p. 103).  
Describes four interacting elements of naturalistic research design: sampling, 
data analysis, theory development, and design development 





Early discussion of the role of ethics in research design. Differentiates ethical 





Early reference to “constructivist paradigm” as analog to naturalistic paradigm. 
Early reference to modern day postpositivism as modified positivism rather than 
postpositivism as analog to the emerging relativist alternative paradigms. 
Discusses the history of evaluation as four generations of evaluation: First 
Generation: Measurement, Second Generation: Description, Third Generation: 
Description, Fourth Generation: Responsive Constructivist Evaluation. 
Contrasts methodological implications on evaluation for the postpositivist and 
constructivist paradigms on what might be characterized as postures towards: (a) 
entry conditions for inquiry, (b) relationship to hypotheses, (c) relationship of 
meaning and context, (d) nature of inquiry outcome, and 5) the nature of intent 
driving outcomes. 
Three further philosophical issues of the two paradigms are discussed: (a) theory-
ladenness of facts and the factual underdetermination of theory, (b) value 
ladenness of facts, and (c) interactive nature of the knower-known dyad. 
Early discussion of a paradigm as "a basic belief system" that answers "three 
basic questions": What is there that can be known? (b) What is the relationship of 
the knower to the known (or the knowable)?, and (c) What are the ways of 
finding out knowledge? 
Extensive discussion of each subject/basic question and axiom position/answer 
for conventional vs constructivist paradigms. Presentation of 14 theorems for 
conventional and constructivist paradigms; the only difference between the 13 
theorems proposed in by Guba in 1987 and the 14 theorems proposed by Guba 
and Lincoln in 1989 was the addition of a theorem for the independence of facts 
and theories (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, p. 105). 
Methodology defined and full models of the methodology of the conventional 
paradigm and the naturalistic paradigm are provided graphically and discussed in 
detail. Further discussion about the “entry conditions” for inquiry. 
Further discussion on mixing methods versus mixing paradigms. 
Discussion on convention criteria for rigor and parallel, foundational criteria for 
trustworthiness in the constructivist paradigm. Discussion on research design 
techniques for achieving the parallel trustworthiness criteria of constructivism. 
Discussion of 5 authenticity criteria for the constructivist paradigm and early 
discussion about differentiation of rigor/trustworthiness as criteria of 








Continued discussion on the distinction between criteria of quality process and 
quality product. Four quality criteria of product are presented: (a) resonance, (b) 
rhetoric, (c) empowerment, and (d) applicability. Possibly modified from Lincoln 
& Guba, 1988. Extensive discussion of the process and criteria of judging quality 
product/output; highlights the difference between the process-product 
relationship for conventional and constructivist paradigm. In the conventional 
paradigm, rigor in process ensures quality of product, while in the naturalistic 
paradigm trustworthiness of process only ensures quality process but not 





Discussion of ethical issues in quantitative versus qualitative research (and under 
different metaphysical belief systems as well), e.g., privacy, confidentiality, 
anonymity, co-construction, inquiry means-ends, etc. 
Discusses ontological, epistemological, and methodological belief systems of 
constructivist and positivist paradigms and their relationship to ethical issues 
such as deception and anonymity and contamination of data. 
Discusses the need to have adequacy judgments, similar to those for inquiry 
quality, driving ethical decisions and judgments as well as. 
Discussion of the manner that ethics should be incorporated into the many 
decision points in research design. 
Compares the paradigm shift from conventional to constructivist paradigms to 
the thinking about the embedded rules for disciplined inquiry within each and 
calls for a “rethinking of the rules lodged in the old paradigm” (p. 289).  
Presentation of a categorical imperative and a practical imperative as ethical 
principles for inquiry. 




A reflection of Yvonna Lincoln’s history with paradigms. Discusses the 
movement from three to five and back to three axioms. Discussion of parallel or 
foundational criteria of quality. Discussion on developing authenticity criteria in 
Lincoln & Guba, 1986a. Discussion on the distinction between process and data 
in inquiries. Discussion on the focus on criteria of products and those of the 
constructivist paradigm. Discussion on the major differences are between 
paradigms and methodologies. Discussion on the three forms of disciplined 
inquiry sorted out in Lincoln & Guba, 1986b; Research, evaluation, and policy 
analysis. Discussion on mixing paradigms and methodologies. Discussion on 
knowledge accumulation. 
Guba (1990c) 1990 
The nature and definition of paradigms are discussed. Paradigms are presented as 
basic belief systems comprising three basic questions: the ontological, the 
epistemological, and the methodological questions. The positions, or answers to 
basic questions, are discussed for four paradigms that “guide disciplined inquiry” 
(p. 18) are discussed: positivist, postpositivist, critical, and constructivist. 
Discussion on the definition and nature of methodology, and, the relationship to 
disciplinary training. Discussion on quality criteria of process and product in 
disciplined inquiries. Extensive discussion on knowledge and knowledge 
accumulation across postpositivist, critical, and constructivist paradigms. 
Extensive discussion on regulative ideas in the postpositivist, critical, and 
constructivist paradigms. 
Guba (1990b) 1990 
Detailed discussion on objectivity and subjectivity, both definitionally from 
different paradigms, but also positionally as a product of knowledge under 
different fundamental belief systems. Discusses five ways to approach 
objectivity for postpositivists: (a) by focusing on the inquirer with reflexivity and 
openness, i.e., coming clean, (b) by a focus on the inquiry and its context by 
emphasis on method, i.e., methodological processes as safeguards, (c) the critical 
tradition or critical history, (d) critical community, and (e) by aggregating or 




The fundamental questions of basic philosophical belief systems are discussed: 
(a) the ontological question – “What is there that can be known-what is 
knowable? This question has conventionally been called the ontological 
question; essentially it deals with the assumptions one is willing to make about 
the nature of reality.” (p. 86), (b) the epistemological question – “What is the 
relationship of the knower to the known? This question has conventionally been 
called the epistemological question; obviously the assumptions one makes about 
this process aspect depend heavily on what one is willing to assume 
ontologically” (p. 86), and (c) the methodological question – “How can one go 
about finding out things? This question is conventionally called the 
methodological question; how one answers depends heavily on what one has 
decided earlier at the ontological and the epistemological levels” (p. 86). 
The idea of the questions asked creating the data discovered is discussed. Quality 
criteria of new paradigm inquiry products are discussed. Early detailed 
discussion of the critical realism of postpositivism. The distinction of objectivity 
as an achievable criterion versus a regulative ideal is discussed. 
Table of axioms and axiom positions for postpositivism, materialist feminist 
ethnography, and constructivism. For postpositivism: Ontology – Realist, 
Epistemology – Dualist, objectivist, Methodology – Descriptive, verificatory. 
For materialist feminist ethnography: Ontology – Realist, Epistemology – 
Interactive, subjective, Methodology – Dialogic, transformative. For 
constructivist: Ontology – Relativist, consensual, Epistemology – Interactive, 
subjective, Methodology – hermeneutic/dialectic, reconstructive. 
Guba (1992) 1992 
Relativism is defined in the context of disciplined inquiry. Brief review of 
relativism as an assumption of the constructivist paradigm around metaphysical 
assumptions, truth vs more informed and sophisticated constructions, 




Presents a discussion of quality criteria for critical inquiries, or into those with 
silenced lives. Early discussion of criteria for the critical paradigm include: (a) 
persuasiveness, (b) correspondence with the lives of the researched, (c) 
conveying vicarious experience or feeling tone, (d) provides an auditable 
methodological and analytic trail, (e) describes the interactive roles of researcher 
and researched in creating the narratives; (f) by providing texts thick description; 
(g) and by directing attention to inquiry’s role in the creation of social realities 
(just and unjust) and in redressing injustice. Discusses the role of the researched 





Provides a review of the history of qualitative inquiry, i.e., the “moments”, and 
focuses discussion on the fifth moment as the future vision of qualitative inquiry. 
Six issues are described that characterize the fifth moment: (a) critique of 
positivism and postpositivism that is coupled with ongoing self-critique and self-
appraisal, (b and c) the crises of representation and legitimation, (d) voice – 
agenda issues, (e) blurring of boarders between science and religion, and (f) the 
influencing role of technology in qualitative inquiry. Provides discussion of the 





Extensive review and discussion of paradigms. Paradigm defined as basic belief 
system that answers three fundamental questions: Ontological, Epistemological, 
and Methodological. Table of metaphysical positions for positivism, 
postpositivism, critical theory, and constructivism with detailed descriptions of 
specific axiom positions for each paradigm. 
Early presentation of ten “consequences for the practical conduct of inquiry, as 
well as for the interpretation of findings and policy Choices”: (a) inquiry aim, (b) 
nature of knowledge, (c) knowledge accumulation, (d) goodness or quality 
criteria, (e) value, (f) ethics, (g) voice, (h) training, (i) accommodation, and (i) 
hegemony. 








Early discussion of the five moments in the history of qualitative research. 
Extensive discussion on the nature of qualitative inquiry in general, versus 
quantitative, in different paradigms.  
Presents a model of five phases of qualitative inquiry. 
Paradigms as ontological, epistemological, and methodological belief systems 
are discussed and expanded upon for the positivist and postpositivist, 
constructivist-interpretive, critical (Marxist, emancipatory), and feminist-
poststructural paradigms. 




Reviews the first five moments of qualitative inquiry and proposes a new 
moment, the sixth moment: A time of confronting several issues. The sixth 
moment is characterized by 6 issues: (a) The role of politics, (b) Spirituality and 
Sacredness, (c) The Brewing Crisis in Ethics, (d) Authorship and Intellectual 
Property, (e) Problems with Voice, and (f) Whither Discourse. Discusses the 
nature of the “paradigm wars” and the acknowledgment of the different forms of 




A novel definition of disciplined inquiry offered: “Others of my colleagues seem 
to be less concerned with method, but disciplined inquiry is still characterized in 
my mind by thoughtful decisions about design strategies, including methods” 
(pp. 276-277).  
The basic question when it comes to quality for those seeking to do, understand, 
and use research: “…how do we separate good research from poor research 
across disciplines and traditions? That question still engages many scholars, both 
those seeking to do such research and those seeking to understand and to use it.” 
(p. 276). Presentation and discussion of foundational and parallel foundational 
quality criteria in addition to antifoundational intrinsic authenticity criteria. Eight 
emerging criteria of quality for interpretive research are discussed: (a) Standards 
for judging quality in the inquiry community, (b) Positionality, or standpoint 
judgments, (c) Community as arbiter of quality, (d) Voice, (e) Critical 
subjectivity, (f) Reciprocity, (g) Sacredness, and (h) Sharing the prerequisites of 
privilege. 
Guba (1996) 1996 
Paper offers an important complementary dialog by Guba to Lincoln’s chapter in 
the Paradigm Dialog on the making of a constructivist. Describes Guba’s shift 
from positivism to constructivism. A timeline of relevant experiences from the 




Notably reinforces the differences between methodological criteria on 
process/method and criteria more focused on product. Discussion of the 
difference between foundational criteria and nonfoundational or antifoundational 
criteria. Discusses the role of methodological criteria and disciplined inquiry. 
Presents scientific/conventional criteria for rigor (“methodological criteria” that 
rely upon method as means of guaranteeing quality): Internal validity 
(coherence), External validity (isomorphism), Reliability (replicability), and 
Objectivity (value-freedom). Presents constructivist criteria for trustworthiness 
(extrinsic “parallel methodological criteria” that rely upon data found in context 
to guarantee quality): Credibility (plausibility), Transferability (context 
embeddedness), Dependability (stability), and Confirmability (value explication). 
Presents constructivist authenticity criteria (intrinsic “authenticity/ethical 
criteria” that rely upon an internal ethical system and prompt to action to 
guarantee quality and fidelity in inquiry effort): Fairness, Ontological 
authenticity, Educative authenticity, Catalytic authenticity, and Tactical 
authenticity. 
Discusses the eight emerging criteria of constructivist inquiry that were 
discussed in Lincoln, 1995a, plus two additional criteria: caring and yearning. (a) 
Standards for judging quality in the inquiry community, (b) Positionality, or 




subjectivity, (f) Reciprocity, (g) Sacredness, (h) Sharing the prerequisites of 
privilege, (i) Caring, and (j) Yearning. 
Poses the question of why have criteria of quality? It is not because we know 
exactly how things should be; rather, it is quite the opposite, it is because we do 




Presents a new conversation both on validity itself, verisimilitude / isomorphism, 
and teaching disciplined inquiry from the perspective of validity as a regulative 
ideal. Validity defined and discussed: “At its heart, validity questions the 
congruence between some representation of an object, context, situation, event, 
or person and the object that is “signified” by the verbal representation. 
Validity’s logic and justification reside in verisimilitude or isomorphism, the 
extent to which some signifier’s referent can be recognized in a physical or social 
world. Validity is critical to researchers and research consumers because another 
question is important to us: What is the “truth” of these findings, and thus, how 
far can we trust the reported findings to guide action? The purported 
verisimilitude is what permits “trustworthiness”, or the judgments that findings 
from a given study are worthy of our confidence in their close relationship to 
some reality on which we have received an account” (p. 161). 
On the philosophical importance of validity in social inquiry: “…Because the 
arguments about validity are so critical to the larger debate surrounding usable 
knowledge of the social world – whose knowledge, generated by whom, for 
whom, and for what purpose – validity itself may appear the most convincing 




Considerable discussion about ethics in inquiry. While some of the discussion is 
relevant to ethical criteria for interpretive inquiry, largely the discussion was 




New discussion of emerging criteria and skills for constructivist inquiry. New 
discussion on shifts that occurred from positivist lenses to constructivist lenses 
(i.e., the shift from prediction and control to understanding). The nature of social 
knowledge, conventional knowledge, and constructivist knowledge are reviewed. 
The criteria for quality in the constructivist paradigm are reviewed. 
Six skills are discussed for new paradigm inquiry that help inquirers achieve the 
call to action of new paradigm inquiry: (a) Facilitation and Group Dynamics, (b) 
Mediation, (c) Collaboration and Cooperation, (d) Orchestration, (e) 




Revised chapter in the 2nd edition of the handbook; revision includes ongoing 
discussion of many of the same topics, i.e., belief systems of paradigms, 
legitimacy, hegemony, etc. New conversation on topics such as 
commensurability and mixing methodologies. 
Authors expand paradigmatic framework of axiom subjects and axiom positions 
to include participatory/cooperative paradigm, totaling five paradigms to date: 
“the paradigms of positivism, postpositivism, critical theory, and constructivism, 
and the participatory paradigm. Additional supporting tables are updated or 
provided: "Voice" in the 1994 version of Table 6.2 has been renamed "inquirer 
posture," and a redefined "voice" has been inserted in the current Table 6.5.” (p. 
167) 
Paradigmatic positions on seven practical issues for inquiry are discussed for 
each of the five paradigms (Positivism, Postpositivism, Critical Theory, 
Constructivist, and Participatory): (a) Nature of knowledge, (b) Knowledge 
accumulation, (c) Goodness or quality criteria, (d) Values, (e) Ethics, (f) Inquirer 
posture, and (g) Training. 
First presentation of Critical Issues of the time: (a) Axiology, (b) 
Accommodation and commensurability, (c) Action, (d) Control, (e) Relationship 
to foundations of truth and knowledge, (f) Extended considerations of validity 





Early discussion of rigor in method and rigor in interpretation. On method versus 
interpretation, two considerations of validity: “…Thus we have two arguments 
proceeding simultaneously. The first borrowed from positivism, argues for a kind 
of rigor in the application of method, whereas the second argues for both a 
community consent and a form of rigor-defensible reasoning, plausible alongside 
some other reality that is known to author and reader-in ascribing salience to one 
interpretation over another and for framing and bounding an interpretive study 
itself. Prior to our understanding that there were, indeed, two forms of rigor, we 
assembled a set of methodological criteria, largely borrowed from an earlier 
generation of thoughtful anthropological and sociological methodological 
theorists. Those methodological criteria are still useful for a variety of reasons, 
not the least of which is that they ensure that such issues as prolonged 
engagement and persistent observation are attended to with some seriousness. It 
is the second kind of rigor, however, that has received the most attention in 
recent writings. Are we interpretively rigorous? Can our cocreated constructions 
be trusted to provide some purchase on some important phenomenon?” (pp. 178-
179). New discussion of several new validity concepts under extended 
considerations of validity: Validity as authenticity; Validity as Resistance, 
Validity as Poststructural Transgression, also called crystalline validity; and 





Extensive discussion about the current and future moments in the history of 
qualitative inquiry. Discusses qualitative inquiry’s emphasis on studying the 
world from the perspective of the human.  
Presents the themes that characterize the sixth (i.e., current) and seventh (i.e., 
future) moments of qualitative research: “In charting this future, we group our 
discussion about the following themes, or issues: text and voice; the existential, 
sacred performance text; the return to narrative as a political act; text, reflexivity, 
and being vulnerable in the text; and inquiry as a moral act, ethics, and critical 
moral consciousness. These are the hallmarks of the sixth and seventh moments.” 
(p. 1048). 
Presents six fundamental issues that are embedded the tensions of the seventh 
moment: (a) the collapse of foundationalism, (b) the crises of representation, (c) 
the crisis of legitimation, (d) continued emergence of multi-voice 
representations, (e) continuing shift in scientific, moral, sacred, and religious 
discourses, and (f) inquiry as a moral act returns our dialogue to the topics of 
ethics, vulnerability, and truth. 
Detailed discussion about the basic questions of representation and 
legitimization: “The basic issue is simple: How best to describe and interpret the 
experiences of other peoples and cultures? The problems of representation and 





Expands the discussion of the history of qualitative research to seven moments, 
including the five moment history presented in the 1st edition of the handbook, 
the six moment published in Symbolic Interaction Review Annual the following 
year, and a new presentation of the seventh moment. 
The nature of qualitative research is discussed, e.g., definition, commitments, 
differences from quantitative research, relationship to paradigms, the process of 
qualitative research. 
Discusses the idea that all researchers are philosophers and all research is 
interpretive. 
Research design defined and related to issues such as representation and 
legitimization. 
Research strategy is also defined; described as a means to “put paradigms of 




Discussion of the central question of knowledge creation: “No question is more 
central to a discipline than how its knowledge is created or constituted. How we 




think we do not know, and how we approach the vast un known of what we don’t 
know that we do not know—is a central epistemological question, not only of 
formal academic inquiry but of life” (p. 222). Discusses the idea that different 
forms of knowledge represent snapshots of a phenomenon. 
Defines theory: “They “explain” some reality and consequently permit sense 
making around that reality. They “stand for” some reality until a smart aleck 
finds the black swan—or postulates one. If physics is the queen of the hard 
sciences, then theoreticians are the kings of their disciplines.” (p. 227); and 
different forms of paradigmatic theory are described. 
The method versus philosophy distinction is discussed. Presents a discussion of 
the choice of methodology and research design given analysis of the fit between 











Provides a review of applied theory and applied theory building. The first 4 of 
the eventual 5 new interpretive criteria (2011) for evaluating quality of theory are 






Extended discussion on the indigenous paradigm. Indigenous knowledge defined 
and issues raised concerning intellectual property, copyright, patents, and other 
legal tools. Indigenous paradigm/knowledge highlights issues of ethics: “Both of 
the foregoing issues-who speaks for whom and who owns the past -are, in their 




Reflective work of Lincoln; covers topics of paradigms, foundation versus non- 
or anti-foundational criteria, knowledge accumulation, commensurability and 
mixing methods, and the field of qualitative research. Lincoln outlines three 
points about the work remaining following 25 years of development in the 
interpretive, ethnographic, and critical communities: (a) the Self–Other 
conjunction, (b) Cumulation of knowledge, and (c) Commensurability Versus the 
Incommensurability Thesis on “mixing”. 
Lincoln et al. 
(2011) 
2011 
Continues ongoing discussion of 1st, 2nd, and 3rd editions, e.g., legitimacy and 
hegemony, methodology, Accommodation and commensurability relative to 
mixed methods or mixing methodologies, the call to action, control, foundations 
of truth and knowledge in paradigms, validity, and voice, reflexivity, and 
postmodern textual representation. 
Tables of metaphysical subjects & positions, practical issues, and critical issues 
of the time are updated with extended definitions and references. Axiology is 
again argued (as with the 3rd edition) to be a fourth metaphysical subject in a 
basic belief system or paradigm, although it again is not listed in the table of 





First presentation of table of metaphysical subjects and positions expanded to 
include axiology and teleology for four paradigms covered (positivism, 
postpositivism, critical, and interpretive paradigms). 
Discusses the definition, nature, purpose, and quality criteria of theory across 
positivist, postpositivist, critical, and interpretive paradigms. Somewhat 
significantly, criteria and associated discussions are presented unique to each of 
the paradigms covered. 
Patterson’s eight criteria for good theory are reformulated for interpretive 
paradigms. The 4 criteria presented in Lincoln & Lynham 2007 are expanded to 
include the criterion of transferability/transportability: 13 reformulated and new 
criteria for assessing theory from the interpretive perspective (meaningfulness, 
thick description and applicability, narrative elegance, transferability, empirical 
verifiability, fruitfulness, insightfulness and usefulness, compellingness, 




The process of summarizing sampled sources represented a back-to-front, past-to-present 
movement through time and analysis of information. Starting with the oldest source sampled and 
then moving to the next source temporally published, each source was reviewed and summarized 
in detail. The past-to-preset review process allowed the authors’ thinking to unfold and first-time 
expressions of ideas to become initially apparent. Understanding when ideas began emerging in 
the literature was important for determining milestones later during analysis and overall 
synthesis of the historical account. The review and summarizing process of each individual 
source sampled also helped familiarization with the body of literature and helped embed the 
present inquirer’s thinking within its content.  
Data Coding 
Coding the literature was an emergent, inductive-deductive process of generating coding 
categories and then applying the codes to the literature. The purpose of coding was to allow 
categorical discrimination of relevant chunks of text from each source as a whole (but not an 
attempt to understand each chunk outside the context of the entire text). Coding text facilitated 
mining of information such that individual ideas could be deconstructed from each source and 
then later reconstructed across the set of sources that discussed each idea thread. Even though 
coding was specific to a finite excerpt of text from a source, the codes served as means to 
indexing the sets of sources that discussed a common idea within their overall topics, with added 
reference to the specific portions of dialog relevant to each individual idea being traced across 
the sources. Analysis of coded literature relied upon the connection of ideas (i.e., their 




The coding structure that was eventually applied to sources emerged in parallel with the 
review and summarization process of data collection. Code development and coding of text were 
of an inductive-deductive nature. During review and summarization of sources, both new and 
recurrent ideas were continuously compared and contrasted (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Guba, 
1978b; Guba & Lincoln, 1981). Iteratively, ideas that were similar enough to be considered of 
the same category were conceptually binned together. Binning represented a process within 
which each excerpt that captured an idea was considered an example of a larger idea.  
Establishing a conceptual bin and then adding ideas to it worked in the tension between 
heterogeneity and homogeneity of ideas represented in the text; excerpts were grouped by their 
homogeneity to a larger idea, and the idea categories were delimited by their heterogeneity from 
each other (Guba, 1978b; Guba & Lincoln, 1981). Each category represented a collection of 
ideas sufficiently homogeneous to warrant distinct binning. Eventually, the homogeneity and 
heterogeneity crystalized as a coding scheme in which the set of idea categories emerged as the 
coding structure shown in Table 17.  
Table 17 
Coding Scheme Developed for Organizing Text 
Coding category Coded characteristics 
Discussion disciplined inquiry No, Yes 
Relevant details of disciplined inquiry discussed Excerpt and free text  
Number of paradigms discussed 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
Specific paradigms discussed Excerpt and free text  
Axiomatic subjects No, Yes 
Specific axiom subjects discussed Excerpt and free text  
Axiomatic positions No, Yes 
Specific axiom positions discussed Excerpt and free text  
Axiomatic extensions into inquiry No, Yes 
Specific axiomatic extensions discussed Excerpt and free text  




Specific questions/positions on quality discussed Excerpt and free text  
Criteria of quality for paradigms No, Yes 
Specific criteria of quality discussed Excerpt and free text  
New ideas Excerpt and free text  
Reinforced ideas Excerpt and free text  
Comments and/or miscellaneous information  Excerpt and free text  
The coding scheme was organized such that the presence of the idea was usually coded as 
present or not (recall that coding was a means to index the entire source as well as reference a 
specific excerpt of text from the source), and then free text information was collected that 
typically included summary notes, quotations, and citation information. In addition, if any 
information in the excerpt was new, then the specific novel contribution was noted; likewise, if 
reinforcing previously coded information, that was noted. Lastly, a comment field was added to 
capture any inquirer comments on the extracted information. The coding scheme was applied to 
all included sources. Results of coding provided the source indexing shown in Table 18. 
Table 18 
Coding Scheme Applied to Included Sources 
Coding category Number of sources indexed 
Disciplined inquiry 10 
Paradigms 48 
Axiomatic subjects 21 
Axiomatic positions 30 
Axiomatic extensions into inquiry 15 
Basic questions/positions on quality 17 
Criteria of quality for paradigms 32 
It is important to be explicit that the ideas of interest captured in the coding scheme were 
ones that stood out as being particularly informative toward an improved understanding of 
disciplined inquiry. Consequently, the coding scheme should neither be considered exhaustive of 
all topics discussed in the body of literature reviewed, nor salient outside the context of the 




text. Many ideas overlapped in the texts of the authors’ writings; when ideas coincided textually, 
the texts were coded with all applicable categories.  
Strategy for Analyzing Coded Literature 
Reconstructing the literature on the paradigm theory by Lincoln et al. (2011; Lincoln & 
Lynham, 2011) first involved critically analyzing each category of idea in the coded literature. 
The entire set of sources included in the review was sorted by coded category to identify the 
subsets of indexed sources pertinent to each idea. The indexed sources and data excerpts were 
analyzed within each subset of sources, and the ideas represented in each subset were traced over 
time. Idea threads were reconstructed and summarized by relevant publications, time periods, 
milestones, and so on. Separate analyses were conducted for disciplined inquiry, paradigms, 
axiom subjects and positions, axiom extensions, and basic questions and positions on inquiry 
quality. 
Data Synthesis Strategy 
The critically analyzed idea threads were aligned by date to compare concurrent 
evolutions of the set of coded idea categories. The examination across the analyzed coded 
categories within time period allowed for identification of larger milestone developments in the 
paradigm theory by Lincoln et al. (2011; Lincoln & Lynham, 2011). Each milestone identified in 
the synthesis was judged pertinent to the extent that it captured a landmark in the evolution of the 
authors’ theoretical thinking.  
Using the set of paradigm theory milestones as an organizational scheme, a narrative 
historical account of the development of the inquiry paradigm phenomenon was synthesized. 




and how each milestone changed the paradigm landscape of the time. The synthesis connected 
the set of ideas examined in the literature within the holistic context of the paradigm theory 
central to the integrative literature review. Synthesis was concluded by revisiting the current state 
of the paradigm theory and focusing on the next inquiry steps, given the learning from the 
current review. 
The overall process of the historical analysis can be situated as an incremental piece of 
work within an ongoing body of research on disciplined inquiry. The intended output of the 
synthesis strategy was a historical reconstruction of the development of paradigm theory. The 
intended outcomes of the research were to better understand paradigm theory as an exemplar so 






CHAPTER 4:  SYNTHESIS OF HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF LINCOLN, LYNHAM, AND 
GUBA’S PARADIGM THEORY 
Chapter 4 Preface 
Chapter 4 presents the outputs of the historical analysis of the paradigm phenomenon. 
Two levels of results from the historical analysis are described. First, within category analyses 
are presented for paradigms, axiom subjects and axiom positions, axiomatic extensions into 
inquiry, and basic questions and positions on inquiry quality. Within each coded category the 
progression of ideas overtime was documented. Next, an overall synthesis across coded 
categories is presented. Nine milestone time periods in the historical evolution of the paradigm 
phenomenon were identified from the cross category synthesis spanning an early two-approach 
model (e.g., Guba, 1978b) to its current five-paradigm, five-axiom subject form (e.g., Lincoln & 
Lynham, 2011; Lincoln et al., 2011). 
The output of the historical analysis characterized the milestone time periods in the 
paradigm phenomenon’s development and further captured the salient features of the fully 
developed phenomenon. Within the larger research agenda, the outcome of the historical analysis 
was a deeper understanding of the exemplar’s varied and changing states overtime from to 
primitive to sophisticated conceptualization. New contributions made to knowledge about 
paradigms of inquiry include a comprehensive historical account of Lincoln, Lynham, and 
Guba’s incremental thinking on paradigms of inquiry, as well as, individual documentation of 
the evolution of ideas related specifically to paradigms, axiom subjects and axiom positions, 




Analysis of Coded Text 
Due to the density of the ideas within each coded category of text, analyses focused 
separately on the coded categories for paradigms, axiom subjects and positions, axiom 
extensions, and basic questions and positions on inquiry quality over time, by providing a 
narrative of the unfolding ideas. Review of text coded for disciplined inquiry is covered in the 
data synthesis section of this chapter. 
Paradigms  
The concept of the paradigm emerged and evolved considerably over the 40-plus years of 
literature reviewed. Analysis of the literature indexed for paradigms revealed several pertinent 
categories of information important to understanding the evolution of the paradigm concept. 
These categories were organized into seven themes that captured significant changes in the 
paradigm concept over time; these themes were:  
 Two paradigms emerged 
 Paradigms as axiom systems 
 Basic belief systems 
 Metaphysical assumptions 
 Expanding the paradigm framework 
 The nature of knowledge and knowledge accumulation across different paradigms 
 The nature of theory and theoretical accumulation across different paradigms 
Two paradigms emerge. Early works of the late 1960s to the mid 1970s highlighted a 




traditional approaches to evaluating educational impacts. The critique drew attention to 
methodological issues, such as whether a lack of statistically significant differences should 
equate with conclusions of no program improvements/differences (Guba, 1969) and what 
standards should be used to judge the goodness of inquiries (i.e., “criteria of good evaluation” 
[Guba, 1975, p. 44]). In response to the identified tension in the field of education evaluation, in 
1978 naturalistic inquiry, or the alternative extended view, was first proposed as a structured, 
disciplined, and systematic approach to inquiry that stood in contrast with and as alternative to 
experimental or conventional models of inquiry. The two approaches to inquiry were contrasted 
by their location relative to two intersecting dimensions: high-to-low control over antecedent 
conditions and high-to-low control over outcomes or responses of interest. Naturalistic inquiry 
was positioned in the low-low control space, while experimental inquiry was positioned in the 
high-high control space (Guba, 1978b). 
The transition in the early 1980s was marked by several notable advances in paradigm-
relevant thinking. Around the turn of the decade, the language describing the two paradigms was 
refined to naturalistic versus scientistic or rationalistic approaches (Guba, 1979, 1981a; Lincoln 
& Guba, 1980). Lincoln and Guba also began a parallel discussion about the value concepts in 
evaluation of merit and worth and cited distinctions in the outcome and methodology of 
scientistic compared with naturalistic approaches. The former value concept was defined as an 
extrinsic context-free value characteristic, and the latter as an intrinsic context-dependent value 
characteristic (Guba, 1978b; Lincoln & Guba, 1980). The early 1980s also represented a shift in 
the conversation about inquiry from contrasting inquiry approaches to contrasting paradigms for 




Paradigms as axiom systems. Work in the early 1980s placed more emphasis on what 
was meant by the term paradigm and how a paradigm could be conceptually framed. During this 
time, the idea of a paradigm was aligned with the idea of an axiom system, such that the 
paradigm’s assumptions were discussed as a system of axioms (Guba & Lincoln, 1981, 1982a). 
Axioms were defined “as the set of undemonstrated (and undemonstrable) propositions accepted 
by convention (even if only intuitively) or established by practice as the basic building blocks of 
some conceptual or theoretical structure or system” (Guba & Lincoln, 1982a, p. 236). The 
axiomatic nature of paradigms provided a convenient way to conceptualize alternative paradigms 
of inquiry within a framework of axiom subjects; each axiom held by a paradigm was a specific 
axiom position on an axiom subject. Altogether, the set of axiom positions held by a paradigm 
comprised a complete philosophical system underlying different paradigms of inquiry. Even 
though paradigms differed on the specific axiom positions held, the axiom subjects provided a 
common underlying structure with which to understand the fundamental components of any 
paradigm defined within the axiomatic structure.  
With the new emphasis on paradigms as axiomatic systems of reality also came further 
positioning of the inquiry conducted within each paradigm as forms of disciplined inquiry, or as 
forms “aimed at disciplined inquiry” (Guba & Lincoln, 1982a, p. 234). The alignment of 
paradigms with axiomatic systems and the inquiry conducted within paradigms with disciplined 
inquiry grounded the conceptualization and practice of alternative forms of inquiry in explicit 
belief systems about the reality inquired into. This grounding of inquiry in explicit belief systems 
laid the foundation for future dialog about two important questions: “What is true? and What is 
good?” (Lincoln, 1995b, pp. 40–41). Explicit recognition that changing the commitment 




conversation to also change away from evaluating inquiry against a single universal standard 
toward what may be considered good within each belief system. 
Basic belief systems. The work in the mid 1980s was marked by the beginning of a 
subtle rebranding of the axiom nature of paradigms to presentation of paradigms as foundational, 
basic belief systems that guide action: “Most of us carry out our work, whatever that might be, 
without reflecting about the epistemological foundations (value assumptions) undergirding 
action. We have internalized a set of beliefs, and we act upon them without much thought” 
(Lincoln, 1985e, p. 137). Re-presentation of paradigms as basic belief systems (although still 
based on a set of axioms) afforded additional key arguments to be built about the role of beliefs 
and inquiry. First, basic beliefs were argued as implicit assumptions that guide ideas and actions 
about inquiry (Guba, 1985; Lincoln, 1985b, 1985e; Lincoln & Guba, 1985b); for example, our 
“paradigm sets the context of assumptions for the inquiry (these are often implicit; but as we 
think, so do we act)” (Lincoln, 1985b, p. 36). Second, new (alternative or emergent) forms of 
inquiry represented not just different methods (Guba, 1985), but whole shifts in thinking (or 
“world view” [Lincoln, 1985b, p. 2]) at the paradigm level (Lincoln, 1985a, 1985b, 1985c, 
1986). Once these arguments were established, further attention was given to more fully 
developing the different assumptions of paradigms (Lincoln & Guba, 1985b), and in doing so, 
the paradigm framework was also more fully developed horizontally across paradigms—for 
example, “[the] positivist view (normal orthodoxy) [, the] transitional view (retrenchment neo-
orthodoxy) [, and the] postpositivist view (emergent nonorthodoxy)” (Guba, 1985, p. 98). The 
authors were continuously creating new language that was effectively talking the new worlds 
into existence: “When words do not exist for concepts and constructs, there is no recognition that 




Metaphysical assumptions. From about 1990 up through the present (e.g., 2015) the 
language about paradigms again shifted; here, specifically away from the axiomatic foundations 
of the basic belief systems and toward reference to metaphysical assumptions of the basic belief 
systems (Guba, 1990c; Guba & Lincoln, 1989, 1994, 2005; Lincoln, 2010; Lincoln & Guba, 
2000; Lincoln & Lynham, 2011; Lincoln et al., 2011). At first, the shift was made only in 
reference to the ontological assumption (e.g., Guba, 1990c; Guba & Lincoln, 1989). However, by 
the mid 1990s, the entire set of assumptions undergirding a paradigm almost exclusively referred 
to the metaphysical assumptions of the paradigm (e.g., Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Even though 
linguistic emphasis about underlying assumptions shifted away from axioms, axioms still 
remained at least a small part of the core conversation up through the final source reviewed (e.g., 
Guba, 1978b, through Lincoln & Lynham, 2011).  
The common semantic threads throughout the four-decade discussion of paradigms were 
the relationship to a set of foundational assumptions and the assumptions that represented 
different positions on common philosophical and methodological issues. Taken together, these 
themes further represented “a complete epistemological and philosophical inquiry system” 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1988, p. 3). The complete metaphysical systems conceptually defined different 
worlds of inquiry, but alone they did not stand in an ordinal or superiority hierarchy; rather, the 
decision about which paradigm was best for any given situation was determined by its fit. 
However, consideration of fit was not a determination of the fit of a paradigm to reality (because 
the paradigms by definition determined the believed in nature of reality); instead, fit was a 
judgment of alignment of paradigm with phenomenon and problem (Guba & Lincoln, 1982a). 




[The paradigm] set out very different options among which the investigator must 
choose… How is he or she to make those choices? In the final analysis, that is a value 
choice as well. We suggest that the choice ought to be made on the basis of the fit of the 
paradigm axioms to the presentational phenomenon to be studied. (p. 96). 
Expanding the paradigm framework. A period of axiom framework expansion and 
label shifts spans from approximately 1985 to the present. During these 25-plus years, at least 
three significant evolutions should be noted. First, a shift occurred in the paradigm labels used 
for the naturalistic paradigm and the re-envisioned, neo-positivist paradigm (i.e., postpositivism). 
Second, the meta-framework encompassing each paradigm was expanded horizontally to include 
complete paradigmatic systems of inquiry for the postpositivist paradigm (Denzin & Lincoln, 
1994, 2000; Guba, 1990b, 1990c, 1992; Guba & Lincoln, 1989, 1994, 2005; Lincoln, 1995b, 
1997a; Lincoln & Denzin, 1994, 2000; Lincoln & Guba, 1989, 1990, 2000; Lincoln & Lynham, 
2011; Lincoln et al., 2011); critical paradigm (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, 2000; Guba, 1990b, 
1990c, 1992; Guba & Lincoln, 1994, 2005; Lincoln, 1993a, 1995b, 1997b, 1998b, 2010; Lincoln 
& Denzin, 1994, 2000; Lincoln & Guba, 2000; Lincoln & Lynham, 2011; Lincoln et al., 2011); 
constructivist paradigm (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, 2000; Guba, 1990b, 1990c, 1992, 1996; Guba 
& Lincoln, 1989, 1994, 2005; Lincoln, 1990a, 1990b, 1995a, 1995b, 1997b, 1998b; Lincoln & 
Denzin, 1994, 2000; Lincoln & Guba, 1989, 1990, 2000; Lincoln & Lynham, 2007, 2011; 
Lincoln et al., 2011); and participatory paradigm (Guba & Lincoln, 2005; Heron, 1996; Heron & 
Reason, 1997; Lincoln, 1990b, 1998b; Lincoln & Guba, 2000; Lincoln & Denzin, 2000; Lincoln 
et al., 2011; Reason, 1994). Third, the meta-framework was expanded vertically to include more 
assumptions (i.e., axiom subjects and positions). Only the first two evolutions will be discussed 
presently; the third (i.e., vertical expansion) will be encompassed under unfolding ideas about 




The emergence of the postpositivist and constructivist paradigms. Up to this point in 
time, postpositivism has been the label associated with the alternative, emergent, or naturalistic 
paradigm (Guba, 1985; Guba & Lincoln, 1988). However, work in 1989 and 1990 solidified (at 
least) two important shifts (Guba, 1990c; Guba & Lincoln, 1989). These two significant 
publications established paradigms as belief systems based on the way that inquirers respond to a 
set of basic questions that get at an inquirer’s foundational assumptions. However, of further 
significance in these 2 years was a shift in labels for the two paradigms encompassed by the 
paradigm meta-framework (i.e., naturalism and positivism). Here, the postpositivist and 
constructivist paradigms took on their modern day usage.  
As a paradigm label, postpositivism not only shifted from reference as the “emergent 
nonorthodoxy” (Guba, 1985, p. 98), which had been associated with naturalism, but became its 
own paradigm with unique assumptions (i.e., critical realism and modified objectivism) (Denzin 
& Lincoln, 1994; Guba, 1990b, 1990c, 1992; Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Lincoln & Denzin, 1994; 
Lincoln & Guba, 1990, 1994). By doing so, postpositivism transcended its prior status that, on 
the one hand, had at best been considered a modified form of positivism—for example, 
“transitional view (retrenchment neo-orthodoxy)” (Guba, 1985, p. 98)—or much more simply, 
the “near cousin” (Lincoln & Guba, 1990, p. 53) of positivism on the other.  
The constructivist label for naturalism was introduced in by Guba and Lincoln (1989) as 
the paradigm of fourth generation evaluation (i.e., responsive constructivist evaluation) and was 
further articulated in by Guba (1990c). Even though Fourth Generation Evaluation (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1989) and The Paradigm Dialog (Guba, 1990c) firmly established the constructivist 




interpretivism (e.g., “constructivist-interpretive” [Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, p. 13]), through 
present day. Although the constructivist label was new in 1989, shades of it were becoming 
apparent in prior publications; for instance,  
The alternative paradigm rests on a relativist ontology. Reality is multiple; those multiple 
realities are the constructions made by the human actors involved, and there are as many 
realities as there are actors. 'Those realities exist only in the minds of their constructors; 
thus they cannot be broken apart but must be examined holistically. (Guba & Lincoln, 
1988, p. 93) 
As labels shifted for the postpositivist and constructivist paradigms, the contrast between 
them remained a center point in much of the ongoing dialog focusing on the complete shift in 
paradigm (e.g., a “rethinking of the rules lodged in the old paradigm,” [Lincoln, 1990b, p. 289]). 
One of the key issues at the center of the contrast was divergence versus convergence; that is, 
does knowledge converge onto an objective reality or does knowledge diverge as more 
sophisticated understandings are formed? The way in which divergence is addressed for the 
constructivist has notable connections to Best-JB (Jacquette, 2012). For example, 
The construction to be “believed” is that one which, in the opinion of those best able to 
make such a judgment, is the most informed and sophisticated. All constructions, even 
under perfect consensus, thus remain problematic and may be refined, or even totally 
abandoned, in the light of new information or heightened sophistication. And I stress 
again that the successor construction cannot be seen as more true than the one it replaces, 
but simply as more informed and sophisticated. (Guba, 1992, p. 20) 
Inclusion of the critical paradigm. The critical paradigm was introduced within the 
paradigm meta-framework in the early 1990s (i.e., Guba, 1990c), but was by no means a new 
paradigm (e.g., Habermas, 1971). Over the next 20-plus years, the critical paradigm took on a 




 Critical theory (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, 2000; Guba, 1990c, 1992; Guba & Lincoln, 
1994, 2005; Lincoln, 1993a, 1995b, 1997b, 1998b; Lincoln & Denzin, 1994, 2000; 
Lincoln & Guba, 2000; Lincoln & Lynham, 2007, 2011; Lincoln et al., 2011) 
 Material feminist ethnography (Guba, 1990b) 
 Ideologically oriented paradigms (Guba, 1992; Guba & Lincoln, 1994) 
 Neo-Marxism (Guba, 1992) 
 Feminist theory (Guba, 1992; Lincoln, 1995b; Lincoln et al., 2011) 
 Marxist (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994) 
 Emancipatory (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994) 
 Feminist-poststructural (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994) 
 Standpoint epistemologists (Lincoln, 1995b) 
 Critical community (Lincoln, 2010) 
 Race theory (Lincoln et al., 2011) 
Although different contexts of application defined the specific instances of the critical 
paradigm, they all shared a common basis in power dynamics and emancipation from the false 
consciousness created by those in power. In other words, the critical paradigm was routed in the 
intention to “create change, to the benefit of those opposed by power” (Lincoln et al., 2011, p. 
102). 
Inclusion of the participatory, or cooperative, paradigm. The participatory paradigm 
(Lincoln & Guba, 2000), much like the critical paradigm, had been previously defined elsewhere 
under such names as human inquiry (Reason, 1994b, 1996; Reason & Rowan, 1981); 




inquiry (Reason, 1994a). Early writings by Lincoln eluded to the burgeoning paradigm as forms 
of “action research” (1998b) and “cooperative inquiry” (1990b); however, it was not until 2000 
(Lincoln & Guba, 2000; see also Guba & Lincoln, 2005; Lincoln & Denzin, 2000; Lincoln et al., 
2011) that participatory inquiries were fully articulated by the authors as a complete 
philosophical belief system rather than a mere style of inquiry. Although first presented by 
Lincoln and Guba (2000) within their paradigm meta-framework, articulation of the form of 
inquiry as a paradigm was initiated 3 years earlier with a specific positioning of participatory 
inquiries within the work of Lincoln and Guba by Heron and Reason (1997; for more detail see 
also Heron, 1996; Reason, 1994a, 1994b; Reason & Heron, 1995; Reason & Rowan, 1981). 
The nature of knowledge and knowledge accumulation across different paradigms. 
By the 1990s, the concept of a paradigm of inquiry had been established in the authors’ work as 
“a basic set of beliefs, a set of assumptions we are willing to make, which serve as touchstones in 
guiding our activities” (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, p. 80); that is, “a basic set of beliefs that guides 
action, whether of the everyday garden variety or action taken in connection with a disciplined 
inquiry” (Guba, 1990c, p. 17). Once the what question regarding paradigms had been sufficiently 
addressed, the question of to what end was more fully addressed with in-depth conversation 
about the output of inquiries; that is, what is the nature of what inquirers know, given disciplined 
paradigmatic inquiries, and how does that knowing accumulate? 
More than a decade before 1990, the distinctions of what could be known within different 
paradigms had been initially tackled. As early as the 1970s, the authors had made contrasts 
between a believed-in singular objective reality in which “truth is truth” (Guba, 1978b, p. 15) 




and depends heavily on their separate perceptions” (p. 15). In the former, truth is an assertion 
that is isomorphic with the singular reality; the assertion “stands in a one-to-one relationship to 
objective reality” (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, p. 86) in a context-free, generalizable manner. In the 
latter, truth is locally determined in a context-embedded assertion that is the “most informed and 
sophisticated construction on which there is consensus among individuals most competent (not 
necessarily most powerful) to form such a construction” (p. 86). However, by the 1990s, the 
conversation about what could be known came full circle to central issues of truth, knowledge, 
and how knowledge might accumulate. Of particular note within this part of the paradigm 
conversation was the eventual addition to the dialog of the role of theory in knowledge 
accumulation and judgments of quality knowledge descriptions within each paradigm.  
Although each paradigm ontologically defined the assumed nature of reality, claims of 
knowledge were more practically tied to Dewey’s position on warranted assertability: 
It is salutary to remember that Dewey preferred not to use the term truth but, instead, the 
term warranted assertibility, and he recognized that different types of assertions required 
different warrants. Furthermore, this change of language highlighted the fact that a 
warrant is not forever; today’s warrant can be rescinded tomorrow, following further 
inquiry. (Guba, 1990c, pp. 31–32) 
The view of knowledge claims as warranted assertions stressed both that what may be 
considered warranted needs to be tied to assumptions about the nature of what can be known and 
that assertions may change over time, given new knowledge. In other words, a warranted 
assertion requires asking “what is the nature of knowledge in each paradigm?” and “how does 
knowledge accumulate in each paradigm?” Although these may be philosophically oriented 




are philosophers and all research is interpretive. That is, philosophical beliefs, even when 
implicit, shape how the researcher perceives and inquires into to the world. 
All research is interpretive; it is guided by a set of beliefs and feelings about the world 
and how it should be understood and studied. Some beliefs may be taken for granted, 
invisible, only assumed, whereas others are highly problematic and controversial. Each 
interpretive paradigm makes particular demands on the researcher, including the 
questions he or she asks and the interpretations the researcher brings to them. (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2000, p. 19) 
Lincoln (2005) further reminded readers that knowledge creation should be the central question 
for all inquirers across all disciplines: 
No question is more central to a discipline than how its knowledge is created or 
constituted. How we get what we think we know—as well as how we go about getting 
what it is we think we do not know, and how we approach the vast unknown of what we 
don’t know that we do not know—is a central epistemological question, not only of 
formal academic inquiry but of life. (pp. 222–223) 
What we know might further be considered mere snapshots of phenomena over time and over 
paradigms. What is known from one epistemology should not be elevated over what is known 
from others; however, knowing (as a warranted assertion) must situationally map back to both 
what we think we can know and what we think is the appropriate means for acquiring that 
knowledge (Lincoln, 2005).  
The question of accumulation of knowledge asks, “How do the outputs of our inquiries 
build upon each other and build up over time?” The answer is not universal for all paradigms; 
accumulation of knowledge depends on the nature of the knowledge being accumulated. Key to 
understanding knowledge accumulation is distinguishing what is actually accumulating: 
information, knowledge, or truth. With regard to accumulation of truth from inquiries, Guba 




[The] problem is that confusion exists over distinctions among information, knowledge, 
and truth. The question at issue is this: How can we verify the truth of research results we 
have generated? My response: Although we can generate and accumulate knowledge in 
any scientific tradition, we will have a very hard time generating and accumulating truth. 
(p. 250) 
West and Scafetta (2010) concisely captured the general process for how knowledge is 
generated; note that they made no reference to the production of truth: “Data, as the nineteenth 
century empiricists discussed, is the raw sensory material that processing transforms into 
information and, finally, the interpretation of the information produces our knowledge about 
specific phenomena” (p. 9). 
At this point, two things should be clear regarding the production of knowledge (or 
warranted assertions). First, what might be considered valid data, information, and knowledge 
can drastically differ across different paradigms. “The question of cumulation revolves about 
how we know what we know with the knowledge we generate, what that knowledge means when 
we add it up, and for what purposes it will be used?” (Lincoln, 2010, p. 5). Yet, second, what 
might be considered appropriate processing of data and interpretation of information to produce 
knowledge can differ drastically, as well. To help clarify these differences within the context of 
the paradigms discussed in their paradigm meta-framework, the authors specifically addressed 
the nature of knowledge and knowledge accumulation for the postpositivist, critical, 
constructivist, and participatory paradigms (Guba, 1990c; Guba & Lincoln, 1994, 2005; Lincoln 
& Guba, 2000; Lincoln et al., 2011). 
The nature of knowledge and knowledge accumulation in the postpositivist paradigm. 
Guba (1990c) characterized postpositivist knowledge as theories of “complex, mutually 




postpositivists believe that human phenomena can best be explained in terms of causal 
relationships” (p. 230). However, Guba cautioned that postpositivist knowledge as theory is not 
overarching grand theory, but rather more modest attempts at time- and context-free 
generalizations (i.e., small theory, in which ultimate truth is unknowable). Postpositivists accept 
that a correct single truth about a natural world exists “out there” (p. 230) and that their task as 
inquirers is to attempt to know it in order to explain and predict it; however, “truth remains a 
regulative ideal” (p. 230) with “multiple hidden values and variables that prevent ever fully 
knowing the answer” (Lincoln et al., 2011, p. 107).  
As a consequence of the approximate nature of postpositivist knowledge, claims of 
knowledge (e.g., warranted assertions) in postpositivism are claims of “established regularities or 
probabilities about human phenomena rather than as universal laws that govern human 
behavior.” (Guba, 1990c, p. 231). Postpositivists rely upon “statistics and other techniques to get 
as close as possible to reality. Although it can never be attained, approximations of reality can be 
made to develop further understanding” (Lincoln et al., 2011, p. 108). Postpositivist knowledge 
is thought to accumulate in building-block fashion; the task of the postpositivist is “adding a 
verifiable “brick” to the wall” (Lincoln, 1998b, p. 14). However, a verifiable brick only becomes 
verified through replication and criticism.  
Thus knowledge in postpositivism is accumulated or small theory developed not via the 
single definitive study but from programs or traditions of empirical research, and past 
research serves less as the foundation and more as the catalyst for future inquiry. (Guba, 
1990c, p. 232) 
The nature of knowledge and knowledge accumulation in the critical paradigm. Guba 
(1990c) characterized the nature of knowledge in the critical paradigm with “three key 




its own ideology, as revealed in the meaning of critical; and its dialectical synthesis of historical 
dualism” (p. 240). Critical knowledge emphasizes the historical, social, power, and value bases 
of knowing, as well as the resulting contradictions and distortions around truth. Consequently, 
two types of knowledge claims exist in tension in the critical paradigm: claims based on a false 
consciousness and claims based on an emancipated, more informed consciousness (Guba, 1990c; 
Lincoln et al., 2011). 
Key to critical knowledge is the change, emancipation, and transformation of both 
knowers and society; critical knowledge is enlightened knowing and is intended to act as a 
catalyst to political and social change.  
Critical knowledge enlightens an audience by revealing the structural conditions of their 
existence, specifically, how these conditions came about and what distortions or 
injustices they currently represent. Such enlightenment carries within it an enabling, 
motivating force to stimulate action, a catalyst for self-reflection toward greater 
autonomy and responsibility and for strategic political action toward emancipation. 
(Guba, 1990c, p. 242) 
Therefore, the accumulation of critical knowledge is “based on historical perspective and 
revision of how history is viewed so that it no longer serves as an oppressive tool by those with 
structural power” (Lincoln et al., 2011, p. 108). 
The nature of knowledge and knowledge accumulation in the constructivist paradigm. 
In the constructivist paradigm, “the constructed meanings of actors are the foundation of 
knowledge” (Lincoln et al., 2011, p. 107). Constructed meaning is a form of verstehen, “deep 
knowing, thoughtful and empathetic understanding of social phenomena” (Lincoln, 1998b, p. 




[The output] comprises the reconstruction of intersubjective meanings, the interpretive 
understanding of the meanings humans construct in a given context and how these 
meanings interrelate to form a whole. Any given interpretive reconstruction is 
idiographic, time- and place-bound; multiple reconstructions are pluralistic, divergent, 
even conflictual. Hence, interpretivist knowledge resembles more context-specific 
working hypotheses than generalizable propositions warranting certainty or even 
probability. (Guba, 1990c, p. 235) 
Constructivist claims of knowledge are a posteriori because constructivist inquiry “generates 
working hypotheses that are connected not to a priori theory but to a context-specific, often 
emergent inquiry problem, which may or may not be informed by existing knowledge” (p. 236). 
In other words, there is neither requirement for nor exclusion of prior knowing in order for 
constructivist knowledge to accumulate. In both cases, the cumulative output of constructivist 
inquiry is “more informed and sophisticated reconstructions; vicarious experience” (Lincoln et 
al., 2011, p. 108).  
The nature of knowledge and knowledge accumulation in the participatory paradigm. 
Knowledge in the participatory paradigm was characterized as “living knowledge” (Lincoln & 
Guba, 2000, p. 170); that is, it has its practical grounding in human flourishing (Heron & 
Reason, 1997; Lincoln & Guba, 2000). More specifically, Heron and Reason described the 
nature of participatory knowledge as a fourfold knowing: experiential knowing, presentational 
knowing, propositional knowing, and practical knowing. The former three culminate in the 
fourth form of knowing. “Practical knowing is knowing how to do something, demonstrated in a 
skill or competence… It fulfills the three prior forms of knowing, brings them to fruition in 
purposive deeds, and consummates them with its autonomous celebration of excellent 
accomplishment” (p. 281). Participatory knowledge is very much a social knowledge known by 
the knower, with a shared awareness of the knowledge by the community of inquirers; that is, 




requirement of mutual awareness, participatory knowledge accumulates in “communities of 
[participative] inquiry embedded in communities of practice” (Lincoln & Guba, 2000, p. 170). 
The nature of theory and theoretical accumulation across different paradigms. Early 
on, the authors (e.g., Guba, 1990c) positioned postpositivist knowledge as theory. Lynham 
(2002b) more generally (that is, not paradigmatically) defined theories as types of knowledge 
containers; a theory “encapsulates and ‘contains’ the explanation of the phenomenon, issue, or 
problem that is the focus of the theory” (p. 229). In other words, theory is one mechanism by 
which knowledge accumulates. Just as paradigms differ in the nature and accumulation of 
knowledge, they also fundamentally differ in the theories that contain the knowledge. The final 
shift noted in the literature coded for paradigms was the shift to more explicit paradigmatic focus 
on the types of theories associated with knowledge in different paradigms (Lincoln, 2010; 
Lincoln & Lynham, 2007, 2011; Lynham, 2000a, 2002b; Lynham & Torraco, 2001). 
The nature of postpositivist theory and theoretical accumulation. Postpositivist 
knowledge has been described as being as close in approximation of time- and context- free 
generalizations as is possible to apprehend human or social phenomena. The purpose of theory in 
positivism and postpositivism is “to develop grand to mid-range theories, preferably in the form 
of generalizable laws and explanations that are taken to be true until proven otherwise, and 
which enable prediction and control of phenomena across multiple settings” (Lincoln & Lynham, 
2011, p. 8). Generalized theoretical explanations in postpositivism typically take the form of 
propositional knowledge claims. Verified knowledge claims are how theoretical knowledge 




Cumulation of knowledge in the positivist paradigm is fairly straightforward. As the 
format for propositional knowledge is virtually always theory (or a set of testable 
hypotheses) and the object of knowledge seeking and knowledge generation is theory 
development, additions to the knowledge base are accessible and assessable, and the 
terminus of the intellectual project is frequently a theory that provides for both prediction 
and control. (Lincoln, 2010, p. 5) 
The inquiry process involved in generating, verifying, refining, and applying grand-to-middle 
range postpositivist theories comprises the work of inquiry in the postpositivist paradigm. 
Theories are developed, tested, and refined through empirical research. So, research is 
intentionally cumulative, and hallmarks of good research studies include clearly defined 
hypotheses derived from existing theory and results that take the form of generalizable 
theoretical propositions. The task of the scientist is thus to develop theory. Once 
developed, scientific theories can be used to address problems or advance life quality in 
the world of practice. (Guba, 1990c, pp. 227–228) 
The nature of critical theories and theoretical accumulation. The nature of knowledge 
in the critical paradigm was characterized as a change-oriented form of knowing embedded in 
historical and ideological knowledge and power structures (Guba, 1990c). Critical theories are 
descriptions of existing power structures that explain who benefits and who is marginalized, 
silenced, or does not benefit so that awareness can act as a catalyst to change of the status quo. 
The nature of critical theories was further described as follows: 
Local, historically and socially contextual—Theory is primarily inductively driven and 
reflexively critiqued; can be formal and informal; results from and is grounded in 
historical and sociocultural contextual experience of the researcher and the researched, 
and results in locally situated descriptions and explanations of how phenomena are 
experienced and thus explained in terms of pre-existing, entrenched historical, social and 
cultural practices and intent. (Lincoln & Lynham, 2011, p. 8) 
The purpose for unveiling the historical, social, and political nature of knowledge in the critical 
paradigm is to emancipate knowers from the belief that what they know is actually how things 
are. Therefore, the purpose of theory in the critical paradigm is to “develop critical, co-




operate within integrated historical, social and cultural contexts, so as to illuminate oppression, 
and enable empowered and transformed action” (p. 8). 
The nature of constructivist theory and theoretical accumulation. The nature of 
knowledge in the constructivist paradigm was characterized as local and specific co-constructed 
reconstructions of reality aimed at understanding meaning in human experiences (Lincoln et al., 
2011). In constructivism, meaning is assembled in emergent patterns from data rather than mined 
from data given a priori assumptions about the patterns that should exist (Lincoln, 2010, p. 5).  
[Constructivist theories] long to answer why. They often come with stories, stories that 
help listeners understand what the theory means to flesh and blood people. 
[Constructivist] theories are fat with the juice of human endeavor, human decision 
making, zaftig with human contradiction, human emotion, human frailty. They are rarely 
purely rational, as any good economist will tell you. In fact, they are often “a-rational” 
(Lincoln, 1985); that is, they do not appeal to pure reason or statistical logic but rather are 
derived from pure lived experience. (p. 6) 
Constructivist theory is described as local and specific, meaning that it  
[It] proceeds from experience and results a posteriori, that is, it results from and is 
grounded in experience with the co-constructed and co-understood world; is primarily 
inductively driven, resulting in locally situated descriptions of how phenomena are 
experienced and thus explained. (Lincoln & Lynham, 2011, p. 8) 
The purpose of theory in the interpretive paradigm is to develop “descriptive local to mid-range 
explanations of what a phenomenon means and how it works in the co-constructed world of joint 
and shared experience and perception, which enable and inform co-action towards improved 





Axiomatic Subjects and Positions 
Before axioms were introduced into the paradigm writings of Guba, Lincoln, and 
Lynham, the points of difference between paradigms were discussed as conceptual differences 
(Guba, 1978b) and differences in basic assumptions (Guba, 1979, 1981a; Guba & Lincoln). 
Introduction of the axiom system helped delineate basic beliefs from other assumptions and 
characteristics of paradigms. However, over time, even post axiom introduction, some of the key 
assumptions of paradigms shifted with respect to basic beliefs, general assumptions, derivative 
postures, and operational characteristics of inquiry. 
The axiomatic structure of paradigms emerged and evolved in an expanding and 
contracting fashion as assumptions were added and removed over time. Several significant time 
periods were pulled forward through analysis of literature coded for axiom subjects and positions 
to characterize the axiom evolution; these were: 
 The pre-axiom, two-paradigm period. 
 The two-paradigm, five-axiom subject period 
 The three-paradigm, five-axiom subject period 
 The two-paradigm, three-axiom subject period (methodology) 
 The four-paradigm, three-axiom subject period 
 The five-paradigm, three-axiom subject period 
 The four-paradigm, five-axiom subject period 
The pre-axiom, two paradigm period. Originally, in 1978, 14 differences (the first 




the naturalistic lens from the experimental lens. For experimental and naturalistic inquiry, 
respectively, these included (see also Table 1 in Guba, 1978b, p. 18):  
1. Philosophical base of logical positivism (understanding facts or causes of social 
phenomena) versus phenomenological (describing and understanding social 
phenomena from the actor's own frame of reference) 
2. Inquiry paradigm (experimental versus ethnographic) 
3. Inquiry purpose (verification through hypothesis testing versus “the discovery of 
phenomena whose empirical elaboration and testing would be worthwhile” (Guba, 
1978b, p. 13) 
4. Stance of the inquirer as reductionist (through a priori hypotheses and constraints on 
antecedent conditions and outputs/responses, focusing specifically on addressing the 
questions posed) versus expansionist (through description and understanding of 
phenomena in its holistic complex form, focused on open-minded exploration and 
explanation) 
5. Framework/design using either preordinate, fixed design versus emergent, variable 
design 
6. The style of coming upon the elements to be studied as intervention (manipulation of 
independent and dependent variables) versus selection (“less a stage manager [as with 
interventionist] than a member of the audience. He watches the entire play and then 
selects from it those aspects which he considers critical for his purposes” [Guba, 
1978b, p. 14]) 
7. Reality manifold as a singular, objective reality “which he believes to exist and which 




subjective reality that “exists only in the minds of individual people and depends 
heavily on their separate perceptions” (Guba, 1978b, p. 15) 
8. Value structure of value free neutrality versus advocacy of multiple values 
9. The setting of inquiry such that it is contrived versus a natural, non-contrived 
environment 
10. Context, as in the role of context inquiry, wherein inquiry is either context free or 
context embedded 
11. Conditions of study as controlled versus uncontrolled (invited interference) 
12. Treatment as the stable and controlled cause of an effect versus anti-treatment or at 
best antecedent in time, but unstable and variant over time 
13. The scope of inquiry as limited and narrow (e.g., molecular) versus broadly 
considering any variables (e.g., molar) 
14. Inquiry methods emphasizing objective inter-subject agreement between two 
competent, neutral observers versus confirmability as agreement among a variety of 
information sources 
In 1979–1981, the underlying assumptions of paradigms began to emerge in the authors’ 
writings as positions. In 1979, three specific sets of positions for scientistic and naturalistic 
inquiry were proposed (Guba, 1979). These two sets of three positions included: 
For scientistic inquiries: 
 The assumption of singular reality; for example, phenomena are real, inquiry can 
converge on their discovery, and that reality is “fragmentable into subsystems, which, 




 The assumption of subject-object duality; for example, “the inquirer will have no 
effect on the phenomena being studied” (Guba, 1979, p. 269). 
 The assumption of generalizability; for example, inquiries can produce nomothetic 
statements or “enduring truth statements that are essentially unchanged from context 
to context” (Guba, 1979, p. 269) 
For naturalistic inquiries: 
 The assumption of multiple realities; for example, “inquiry diverges onto many 
realities, no one of which is any more ‘true’ than any other … [phenomena] cannot be 
described or understood in terms of separate variables” (Guba, 1979, pp. 269-270) 
 The assumption of subject-object inter-relatedness; for example, “inquirers and the 
objects or entities they investigate are inter-related” (Guba, 1979, p. 270) 
 The assumption of contextuality; for example, inquiry produces idiographic 
understandings or “working hypotheses in a context and thick description of that 
context to be able to appreciate the way in which it impacts inquiry” (Guba, 1979, p. 
270) 
By 1981, the organizing subjects upon which inquirers took the positions defined in 1979 
were presented explicitly (the 14 organizing subjects were made implicit by Guba [1978b]); the 
specific positions on each subject for the two paradigms were also further articulated. These 
three basic assumptions were (a) assumption about reality, (b) assumption about the inquirer-
subject/object relationship, and (c) assumption about the nature of truth statements (Guba, 1981a; 
Guba & Lincoln, 1981). Similar to Guba (1978b), a number of additional operational 




and Lincoln (1981). However, Guba (1981a) made no distinctions, rather, all 10 subjects were 
equally presented as key assumptions.  
The two-paradigm, five-axiom subject period. By 1982, the basic assumptions of 
paradigms were more formally presented as axiom systems (Guba & Lincoln, 1982a). Upon the 
introduction, axioms were defined “as the set of undemonstrated (and undemonstrable) 
propositions accepted by convention (even if only intuitively) or established by practice as the 
basic building blocks of some conceptual or theoretical structure or system” (p. 236). 
Furthermore, the rules, propositions, and theorems of the axiom systems, could be proven “by 
showing them to be logical derivatives from some simple and basic set of ‘self-evident truths’” 
(p. 236).  
As conceptual analogy, the authors used the axioms and theorems of Euclidean geometry 
to help explain their paradigm axiom structure (Guba, 1987a, 1987b; Guba & Lincoln, 1982a, 
1989; Lincoln & Guba, 1985b). An important emphasis in the paradigm structure was the 
hierarchical and logically consistent relationship of axiom subject and axiom position in relation 
to the philosophically congruent system of axiom positions, and subsequently to the 
interdependent, theorem-like, inquirer postures on inquiry that were “reinforcing to the practice 
of the paradigms” (Guba & Lincoln, 1982a, p. 244). The paradigm structure is graphically 





Figure 2. Axiom structure for paradigms of inquiry. 
Because the Euclidean geometry analogy implied a formal, logical derivative nature 
between axiom and theorem, Guba and Lincoln (1989) were careful to point out that the axiom 
position–inquirer posture relationship was not of the same formal derivative nature. Rather, the 
postures were more simply consistent ways of acting in alignment with the underlying belief 
system.  
We must again stress that our use of the term theorem is different from that of Euclidean 
geometry. The latter theorems have all been shown, by a formal deductive process, to be 
logically derivable from, and dependent on, the axioms. The theorems we propose here 
have not undergone such a rigorous test; we hope, however, that they will appear to be 
consistent with their respective paradigms on their face. (p. 103) 
Whether conceived as formal theory or more simply metaphor for the paradigm 
construct, introduction of the axiom system began to provide conceptual organization and 
alignment to the assumption structure fundamental to paradigms, as well as to the 
operationalized consequences of a complete set of assumption positions bearing on an inquiry. 
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This relationship between the fundamental assumption structure of a paradigm and the 
operationalized consequences of a paradigm reflects the idea that: 
Naturalistic inquiry is a paradigm of inquiry, that is, a pattern or model for how inquiry 
may be conducted. It is frequently asserted that its distinguishing features are that it is 
carried out in a natural setting (hence the term naturalistic), that it uses a case study 
format, and that it relies heavily on qualitative rather than quantitative methods; however, 
none of these features is naturalistic inquiry. All of these assertions are essentially 
correct, but no one of them, nor indeed all of them together, captures the full significance 
of the term paradigm. Paradigms differ from one another on matters much more 
fundamental than the locale in which the inquiry is conducted, the format of the inquiry 
report, or the nature of the methods used-namely, they differ on the basic axioms on 
which they rest. Paradigms are axiomatic systems characterized essentially by their 
differing sets of assumptions about the phenomena into which they are designed to 
inquire. (Guba & Lincoln, 1982a, p. 233) 
The presentation of the basic assumptions of paradigms as axiom systems was significant 
not only as an introduction to the axiomatic structure of paradigms, but also because this period 
expanded the core set of basic assumptions to include attribution/explanation of action and the 
role of values in inquiry as the fourth and fifth axioms (Guba & Lincoln, 1982a). Six derivative-
like postures taken by practitioners of a paradigm were also presented. For the rationalist and 
naturalist paradigms, respectively, attribution/explanation of action defined two positions: “every 
action can be explained as the result (effect) of a real cause or causes that precede the effect 
temporally (or are at least simultaneous with it)” (p. 238) and  
An action may be explainable in terms of multiple interacting factors, events, and 
processes that shape it and are part of it; inquirers can, at best, establish plausible 
inferences about the patterns and webs of such shaping in any given case. (p. 238).  
Two positions were also defined for the role of values in inquiry. For the rationalist position, 
“inquiry is value-free and can be guaranteed to be so by virtue of the objective methodology 
employed. These methods guarantee inquirer neutrality and inquiry rigor and produce data that 




bound” (p. 238). Five corollaries were offered to show how naturalistic inquiries are value 
bound: 
Corollary 1: Inquiries are value-bound by inquirer values, “especially as those values are 
expressed in the choice of a problem and the framing, bounding, and focusing of that 
problem” (p. 238). 
Corollary 2: Inquiries are value-bound by the “paradigm selected to investigate the 
problem” (p. 238).  
Corollary 3: Inquiries are value-bound by the “choice of substantive theory and methods 
used to guide the collection and analysis of data relevant to the problem selected and in 
the interpretation of findings” (p. 238). 
Corollary 4: Inquiries are value-bound by the “values inherent in the context…not those 
that characterize individuals, but those that specifically characterize socio-behavioral, 
human, organizational phenomena” (p. 238). 
Corollary 5: Inquiries are value-bound by the problem, paradigm, method(s), and context 
resonance or dissonance such that they “must exhibit internal coherence, value fit, and 
congruence (value resonance) for the inquiry to be deemed appropriate and fitting and to 
produce meaningful findings” (p. 238). 
The three-paradigm, five-axiom subject period. In 1985, the five-axiom structure was 
further explained for the positivist and naturalistic paradigms. This year marked (a) the first 




paradigm (Guba, 1985; Lincoln & Guba, 1985b, 1986a); (b) the first reference to epistemology 
as the axiom subject for the subject-object relationship (i.e., “the relationship of knower to 
known (epistemology)” [Lincoln & Guba, 1985b, p. 37]); (c) the introduction to the “critical 
realist” (Guba, 1985, p. 98) axiom position; and (d) the initial representation of three distinct 
axiom systems: the “positivist view (normal orthodoxy)”, the “transitional view (retrenchment 
neo-orthodoxy)”, and the “postpositivist view (emergent nonorthodoxy)” (p. 98). 
The critical realist axiom was defined as the position somewhere between the naïve 
realism of the positivist and the multiple constructed realities of the naturalist (Guba, 1985) in 
the context of Kuhn’s (1996) paradigm crisis, in which existing paradigms are modified to 
accommodate the things they cannot explain. With reference to the earlier writings of Cook and 
Campbell (1979), Guba (1985) described the critical realist position on reality as one that dually 
acknowledged the imperfect, subjective human capacities used to perceive causal relationships 
about the world, without forgetting that the perceived relations were assertions about presumed 
real phenomena external to the human mind. For this transitional view, the positions on the five 
axioms were: 
Axiom 1: The nature of reality (ontology): critical realism, real reality “out there” (p. 98) 
and external to the mind remains at the core of the position, but acknowledges that “these 
valid causal relationships cannot be perceived with total accuracy” (p. 97) due to 
imperfect human sensory capacities. 
Axiom 2: The inquirer-respondent relationship (subject-object dualism [epistemology]): 




manipulated and require reactive methods of study, e.g., quasi-experimental designs and 
other unobtrusive measures. 
Axiom 3: The purpose of inquiry (generalization): statistical abstraction with multiple 
orders of interactions and controlling variables can be used to account for contextual 
complexities; and therefore, permit nomothetic conclusions threatened by the “technical 
problems” (p. 99) of time or context confounds. 
Axiom 4: The nature of explanation (causality): “activity theory” (p. 98), the reliability of 
causal assertions maybe improved by following a recipe with specific procedures and 
ingredients for inquiry. 
Axiom 5: The role of values in inquiry (axiology): “values influence selection of problem 
theory, method, and analysis” (p. 98) in contrast to the complete value freedom of 
positivism and the complete value boundedness of naturalism. 
The two-paradigm, three-axiom subject period. Guba (1987a, 1987b) revamped the 
axiom structure to have three axioms, or basic beliefs. Significant to the new paradigm axiom 
system was the exclusion of what had been axioms three through five and the inclusion of 
methodology as the new third and final axiom. Methodology was presented as the question of 
“how can the knower go about knowing” (1987a, p. 34). For the conventional paradigm, the 
axiom position on the methodological subject was that of interventionist, answering the question 
of how can a knower go about knowing? by responding “the context is stripped of its 
contaminating (confounding) influences so that the inquiry can converge on truth, explaining 




paradigm, the methodological axiom stated that “the context is construed as giving meaning and 
existence to the inquired-into, the methodology involves a dialectic of iteration, analysis, 
critique, reiteration, reanalysis, and so on, leading to the emergence of a joint (combined 
emic/etic) understanding of a case” (p. 34). 
In 1988, the old five-axiom structure reemerged (Guba & Lincoln, 1988) for a year, but 
in 1989, the five-axiom structure was replaced by the three-axiom (i.e., ontology, epistemology, 
methodology) structure (Guba, 1990b, 1990c; Guba & Lincoln, 1989). The five-axiom structure 
was not seen again for another 22 years (i.e., Lincoln & Lynham, 2011). While still considered 
an axiomatic structure, during this temporary shift from five to three axioms, the paradigm 
structure was also more accessibly referred to as the way inquirers respond to three basic 
questions (Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Guba, 1990b, 1990c):  
[Paradigms] can be characterized by the way their proponents respond to three basic 
questions, which can be characterized as the ontological, the epistemological, and the 
methodological questions… The answers that are given to these questions may be 
termed, as sets, the basic belief systems or paradigms that might be adopted. They are the 
starting points or givens that determine what inquiry is and how it is to be practiced. 
(Guba, 1990c, p. 18) 
Specifically, the three basic questions of a paradigm ask: 
[1] What is there that can be known-what is knowable? This question has conventionally 
been called the ontological question; essentially it deals with the assumptions one is 
willing to make about the nature of reality. [2] What is the relationship of the knower to 
the known? This question has conventionally been called the epistemological question; 
obviously the assumptions one makes about this process aspect depend heavily on what 
one is willing to assume ontologically. [3] How can one go about finding out things? This 
question is conventionally called the methodological question; how one answers depends 
heavily on what one has decided earlier at the ontological and the epistemological levels. 




With its reintroduction in 1989–1990, methodology was given further definition than 
originally provided in 1987 (Guba, 1987a, 1987b). The basic question regarding the 
methodological belief was defined to task: 
What are the ways of finding out knowledge? This is usually called the methodological 
question. Methodology is a more practical branch of philosophy (especially of philosophy 
of science) that deals with methods, systems, and rules for the conduct of inquiry. 
Another way to phrase the question is: "How can we go about finding out things?" It 
must be clear that there is no way to answer these questions in an unambiguous and 
certain way or in a way that is capable of proof. The set of answers one gives is the basic 
belief system or paradigm. (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, p. 83) 
The four-paradigm, three-axiom subject period. Work in 1989–1990 not only 
grounded the axiom systems around three basic questions, but also formally reintroduced the 
postpositivist paradigm; introduced the critical paradigm; and fully articulated axiom systems for 
the positivist (Guba, 1990c; Guba & Lincoln, 1989), postpositivist (Guba, 1990b, 1990c; Guba & 
Lincoln, 1989), critical (Guba, 1990b, 1990c), and constructivist (Guba, 1990b, 1990c; Guba & 
Lincoln, 1989) paradigms. These four axiom systems were presented as follows: 
The basic beliefs of positivism: 
1. Ontology: Realist—reality exists “out there” and is driven by immutable natural laws 
and mechanisms. Knowledge of these entities, laws, and mechanisms is conventionally 
summarized in the form of time- and context-free generalizations. Some of these latter 
generalizations take the form of cause-effect laws. 
2. Epistemology: Dualist/objectivist—it is both possible and essential for the inquirer to 
adopt a distant, noninteractive posture. Values and other biasing and confounding factors 




3. Methodology: Experimental/manipulative—questions and/or hypotheses are stated in 
advance in propositional form and subjected to empirical tests (falsification) under 
carefully controlled conditions (Guba, 1990c, p. 20). 
The basic beliefs of postpositivism: 
1. Ontology: Critical realist—reality exists but can never be fully apprehended. It is 
driven by natural laws that can be only incompletely understood.  
2. Epistemology: Modified objectivist—objectivity remains a regulatory ideal, but it can 
only be approximated, with special emphasis placed on external guardians, such as the 
critical tradition and the critical community. 
3. Methodology: Modified experimental/manipulative—methods emphasize critical 
multiplism. Imbalances are redressed by doing inquiry in more natural settings, using 
more qualitative methods, depending more on grounded theory, and reintroducing 
discovery into the inquiry process (Guba, 1990c, p. 23). 
The basic beliefs of critical theory (Guba, 1990c): 
1. Ontology: Critical realist—reality exists as in the case of postpositivism, but as a more 
informed real state than the status quo. 
2. Epistemology: Subjectivist—knowing, as in the case of constructivism is the product 




3. Methodology: Dialogic, transformative—the goal is to eliminate false consciousness 
and energize and facilitate transformation. 
The basic beliefs of constructivism: 
1. Ontology: Relativist—realities exist in the form of multiple mental constructions, are 
socially and experientially based, are local and specific, and depend for their form and 
content on the persons who hold them. 
2. Epistemology: Subjectivist—the inquirer and inquired are fused into a single 
(monistic) entity. Findings are literally the creation of the process of interaction between 
the two. 
3. Methodology: Hermeneutic, dialectic—individual constructions are elicited and 
refined hermeneutically, and compared and contrasted dialectically, with the aim of 
generating one (or a few) constructions on which there is substantial consensus (Guba, 
1990c, p. 27). 
Throughout the 1990s, little changed with regard to new axioms, but the set of four 
axiom systems was further detailed and described (e.g., Denzin & Lincoln, 1994; Guba, 1992; 
Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Lincoln, 1993a, 1997b). In addition to the further axiom detail, 10 
“consequences for the practical conduct of inquiry, as well as for the interpretation of findings 





Other details added during the 1990s included further specification of the critical realist 
axiom position (Guba, 1990b) and extensions of the different paradigm systems into both their 
respective methodological strategies and criteria of quality (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994; Guba & 
Lincoln, 1994). 
The five-paradigm, three-axiom subject period. In 2000, the axiom structure further 
expanded with the inclusion of a complete set of axiom positions for the participatory paradigm 
(Lincoln & Guba, 2000). Over the next 10 years, the new five-paradigm framework was further 
detailed, including additional description of the axiom positions, seven paradigm positions on 
select practical issues, and seven critical issues of the time (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Guba & 
Lincoln, 2005; Lincoln, 2005, 2010; Lincoln & Guba, 2000). As originally presented in 2000, the 
participatory axioms for the ontological, epistemological, and methodological axiom subjects, 
respectively, included: 
1. Ontology: “Participative reality—subjective-objective reality, cocreated by mind and 
given cosmos” (Lincoln & Guba, 2000, p. 195). 
2. Epistemology: “Critical subjectivity in participatory transaction with cosmos; 
extended epistemology of experiential, propositional, and practical knowing; 
cocreated findings” (Lincoln & Guba, 2000, p. 195). 
3. Methodology: “Political participation in collaborative action inquiry; primacy of the 
practical; use of language grounded in shared experiential context” (Lincoln & Guba, 
2000, p. 195). 
Other ongoing refinements and subtle distinctions were made during this period 




the dualist versus monist epistemological positions. Dualism was defined to position the inquirer 
(i.e., knower) and the subject (i.e., the to-be-known) in distinct and independent dualistic 
relation. However, monism “further specifies that the knower and the to-be-known do not exist 
in dualistic relation—that is, separate from one another—but rather exist as a monistic unit, both 
teaching and learning from each other in active exchange, or intersubjectively” (Lincoln, 2005, 
p. 224). 
The four-paradigm, five-axiom subject period. By 2011, two final publications in the 
ancestry sample (again) built upon and synthesized the axiom subjects, positions, and 
implications on inquiry presented across more than four decades of publications. Lincoln et al. 
(2011) expanded the original seven paradigm positions on select practical issues (Lincoln & 
Guba, 2000; Guba & Lincoln, 2005) to include 11 positions, along with the same seven critical 
issues of the time. 
Lincoln and Lynham (2011) expanded the axiom subjects from three to five, including 
axiology and teleology as two additional axiom subjects. Axiom subjects were only defined for 
the positivist, postpositivist, critical, and constructivist/interpretivist paradigms. Axiology was 
defined as “the values that should guide the choices made by the researcher/s in selection, 
conduct, and dissemination of inquiry and its outcomes” (p. 7). The specific axiom positions 
defined for the axiological axiom subject were: 
 Position for positivism: “The disinterested scientist—‘Researchers should remain 
distant from the subject so that their actions do not have an influence on the 




Propositional knowing about the world is an end in itself, and is intrinsically valued’ 
(Guba and Lincoln 2005, 198).” (Lincoln & Lynham, 2011, p. 7) 
 Position for postpositivism: “The disinterested scientist—Researchers should attempt 
to gain a better understanding of reality and as close as possible to truth through the 
use of statistics that explain and describe what is known as reality. Like positivism, 
propositional knowing about the world is an end in itself, and is intrinsically valued.” 
(p. 7) 
 Position for the critical paradigm: “Engaged participant—‘Researchers seek to 
change existing social and other conditions, policies and practice. Propositional, 
transactional knowing is instrumentally valuable as a means to social emancipation, 
which is an end in itself, and taken to be intrinsically valuable’ (Guba and Lincoln 
2005, p. 198).” (p. 7) 
 Position for the interpretive paradigm: “Passionate participant—‘As with critical 
inquiry, propositional, transactional knowing is instrumentally valuable as a means to 
social emancipation, which is an end in itself, and taken to be intrinsically valuable’ 
(Guba and Lincoln 2005, 198)” (p. 7). 
Teleology was defined as “the end to which the knowledge gained through inquiry ought 
to be applied” (Lincoln & Lynham, 2011, p. 8). The specific axiom positions defined for the 
teleological axiom subject were: 
 Positions for positivism and postpositivism: “Technical—To explain, in order to 




 Position for the critical paradigm: “Critically informed praxis—‘. . .to critique and 
transform, restitute and emancipate. Thus, to enlighten and emancipate through the 
process of critique and identifying potential’ (Guba and Lincoln 2005, 194), in order 
‘to develop more critically informed practice’” (Lincoln & Lynham, 2011, p. 8). 
 Position for the interpretive paradigm: “Improved praxis—‘To make sense of, 
understand and interpret. To understand and interpret through meaning of phenomena 
(obtained from the joint construction/reconstruction of meaning of lived experience); 
such understanding is sought to inform praxis (improved practice)’” (p. 8). 
Axiomatic Extensions into Inquiry  
Axiom extensions are defined here as logical implications of a set of axiom positions into 
the practice of inquiry. These logical implications of axioms suggest ways of acting that are 
aligned with basic beliefs about the to-be-attained knowledge. From a theoretical perspective, 
axiom extensions can be thought of analogously to propositional statements of a theory; that is, 
given the assumptions of the theory that are presumed to be true, these derived propositional 
statements must also be true within the conceptual scope of the theory.  
For example, within communities of postpositivist researchers engaged in accepted 
practices, it could be tempting to view empirical procedures as the right way to conduct inquiry. 
However, absent of right/wrong judgments, the procedures can alternatively be understood as the 
behavioral consequences of a belief system based on an approximate view of an external reality 
and a desire to come to know that reality as objectively as possible; therefore, carefully planned, 
executed, and replicated procedures are adhered to that simultaneously control and manipulate a 




underlying set of axiom positions is changed (i.e., a different set of theoretical assumptions is 
operating in concert about reality), then the behavioral consequences that logically extend from 
those axioms must also change to remain as congruent as possible with the assumptions that, by 
logical extension, can be judged as inquiry behaviors that make sense in practice. 
The majority of the extensions of axioms presented in the literature followed the 
development of the axioms themselves; however, prior to formal presentation of inquiry axioms, 
the idea that conceptual and operational characteristics of paradigms were at play in inquiries 
was already apparent (Guba, 1978b). Out of the 14 points of difference presented by Guba that 
distinguished naturalistic from experimental inquiry, eight were explicitly described as 
“conceptual” (p. 18) differences, and six were explicitly described as “operational” (p. 18) 
differences. The conceptual differences were: 
1. Philosophical base 
2. Inquiry paradigm 
3. Inquiry purpose 
4. Stance of the inquirer 
5. Framework/design 
6. The style of coming upon the elements to be studied 
7. Reality manifold 
8. Value structure 




1. The setting of inquiry, such that it is contrived, versus a natural, non-contrived 
environment 
2. Context, as in the role of context inquiry, wherein inquiry is context free, versus 
context embedded 
3. Conditions of study as controlled, versus uncontrolled (invited interference) 
4. Treatment as the stable and controlled cause of an effect, versus anti-treatment, or at 
best antecedent in time, but unstable and variant over time 
5. The scope of inquiry as limited and narrow (e.g., molecular), versus broadly 
considering any variables (e.g., molar) 
6. Inquiry methods emphasizing objective inter-subject agreement between two 
competent, neutral observers, versus confirmability as agreement among a variety of 
information sources 
After Guba’s original presentation of inquiry characteristics in 1978, it is important to 
note that Guba (1979) began to present operational characteristics as distinct from a set of three 
basic assumptions. This distinction between basic assumptions and the extensions of those 
assumptions remained a consistent division in the features of inquiry approaches discussed from 
this time period to the present. One exception to this distinction was Guba (1981a).  
In 1979, 11 characteristics that differentiated naturalistic from scientistic inquiries were 
presented. Even though explicitly labeled as operational characteristics, the 11-characteristic set 
(Guba, 1979) overlapped with the combined 14 conceptual and operational characteristics 
presented 1 year prior (Guba, 1978b). Unique to this set of 11 operational characteristics (plus 




characteristics lacked organizing subjects. For scientistic versus naturalistic approaches, 
respectively, these five included (Guba, 1979): 
 Use of quantitative versus qualitative methods 
 An emphasis on rigor versus relevance 
 Use of a priori versus grounded theories 
 An examination of whether x can cause y or if x causes y in nature 
 A goal of propositional versus tacit knowledge 
 In the early 1980s Guba and Lincoln (1981; Guba, 1981a) synthesized the assumptions 
of inquiry approaches from prior years and more fully organized them in a general subject-
paradigm position hierarchy. Inquiry characteristics were organized by three basic assumptions, 
seven general postures, and eight methodological postures. Organization by subject provided a 
significant conceptual gain over prior years’ discussions. Several new subjects were introduced 
for previously proposed positions, and a couple of entire new subject-position hierarchies were 
also proposed.  
New subjects for previously proposed positions included: 
 The “quality criterion” subject for the positions an emphasis on rigor versus 
relevance 
 The “sources of theory” subject for the positions use of a prior versus grounded 
theories 
 The “questions of causality” subject for the positions examination of whether x can 




 The “knowledge types used” subject for the positions goal of proposition versus tacit 
knowledge 
In addition, two new subjects and associated positions were added in 1981.  
 The “timing of the specification of data collection and analysis rules” subject for the 
positions specifying all rules for data collection and analysis in advance of the 
inquiry versus accruing raw naturalistic data first and then unitizing and 
categorizing it after the fact 
 The “analytic units” subject for the positions “the variable, and all relationships are 
expressed as between variables (or systems of variables)” (Guba & Lincoln, 1981, p. 
75) versus  emphasizing “the complex patternings that are observed in nature” (Guba 
& Lincoln, 1981, p. 75) 
Also further distinguished in 1981 was instrumentation from method. Here, the two 
subjects defined were: 
 The “preferred methods/techniques” subject for the positions quantitative emphasis 
versus qualitative emphasis 
 The “instruments subject” for the positions use of objective, neutral instruments 
versus the use of the self as instrument 
The same year the paradigms were formally presented as axiom systems comprising five 
axioms, Guba and Lincoln (1982a) presented the characteristics (i.e., postures) in quasi-analogy 




These postures are not compelled by the axioms, in the sense that they are necessary, 
logical derivatives (like the theorems of a geometry), yet they are congenial or 
reinforcing to the practice of the paradigms and probably would be insisted on by each 
paradigm's followers. (p. 244) 
Although no new postures were introduced in 1982, of note is the greatly reduced set of six 
postures reinforcing to the practice of the paradigms; these were: 
 Preferred methods 
 Source of theory 




Three years later, Lincoln and Guba (1985b; Lincoln, 1985e) expanded the postures to a 
list of 14 derivative, means-ends implications. Two additions to the axiom extensions in 1985 are 
important to highlight: the addition of seven new general posture subjects with associated 
positions for the naturalistic paradigm (positions for the scientific paradigm were not defined for 
another two years), and an expanded discussion on synergism of the postures logically extended 
from the axiom systems. The seven new general posture subjects and specific positions for the 






Table of Seven New Naturalistic Postures Added in the Mid 1980s 
Posture subject Posture position 
Logic of analysis Inductive data analysis: Given the emergent design, inductive analysis is “capable of 
reflecting multiple realities constructed out of environments” (Lincoln, 1985e, p. 145) 
Sampling strategy Purposive sampling: “grants the naturalist the ability to take account of local context 
situations, as not everyone on a site will see, or be privy to, the same circumstances. 
Maximizing the range of perspectives concomitantly maximizes the ability to take 
account of local conditions, to take account of local influences, and to trace in situ 
value patterns from one respondent to the next. Naturalists who wish to represent the 
infinite realities will seek those out, wherever the perspectives are held, regardless of 
the social caste or class of the respondent” (Lincoln, 1985e, p. 147) 
Determining inquiry 
boundaries 
Problem/Focus-determined boundaries: “let the inquiry bound itself as the problem 
emerges from time on site, rather than to bound it by prior theoretical formulations. In 
this manner, the problem is defined by participants, actors, and respondents equally 
with the inquirer, a position supported in the interest of negotiated research... As 
inquirers come to know what is important to residents and actors, they will come 
equally to know when the inquiry should stop. At that point the inquiry is bounded, as 
it has been defined and identified, and data collected have become redundant and 
duplicative.” (Lincoln, 1985e, pp. 147-148) 
The nature of 
interpretation 
Idiographic interpretation: “the particulars of any given context or site shape their 
data interpretations and conclusions.” (Lincoln, 1985e, p. 148) 
Application of findings Tentative application: “Naturalists tend to be much more modest and reluctant about 
making sweeping application of their findings, simply because they understand the 
extent to which local conditions shape and influence those findings… The best 
naturalists can do is caution about the acquisition of description sufficiently thick to 
enable similarity of judgments between contexts.” (Lincoln, 1985e, pp. 148-149) 
Reporting mode Case study reporting mode: “case reports are inevitably grounded in the particulars of 
a given context, because they focus on individual and therefore multiple realities (in 
seeking interpretations that people attach to their own experiences), because they 
force the inquirer to take account of and render experiences, because they focus on 
description and processes, and because they provide vicarious experience to readers. 
In addition, case studies are peculiarly suited to providing thick description” 
(Lincoln, 1985e, pp. 149-150) 
Research results Negotiated results: Respondents “contribute directly to hypothesis making, to 
formulation of final conclusions, and to whatever interactions and processes go on in 
between... [and] the results of research are shared, bartered, exchanged, or 
negotiated” (Lincoln, 1985e, p. 151) 
Discussion of the synergism of the axiom extensions further characterized the necessary 
relationships between the postures derived from axioms. Up to this point, the emphasis on axiom 
extensions had been primarily on the logical dependence to their derived axiom system. 




as well (Lincoln, 1985e; Lincoln & Guba, 1985b). On the synergism among and between the 
axiom extensions, Lincoln (1985e) commented that 
One cannot easily pick and choose from among them, substituting in their places 
characteristics of method and setting that fit within the conventional paradigm. To do so 
forces violence on the epistemological and methodological system, and creates value 
dissonance inside the inquiry. Together, they form a circular support system, and no 
matter where one begins, one is led inevitably to other choices from among the 
characteristics. (Lincoln, 1985e, pp. 153–154) 
Toward the end of the 1980s, the set of axiom extensions underwent another revision 
(Guba, 1987a/b; Guba & Lincoln, 1989), both of general subjects and with explicit reference as 
theorems of the underlying axiom systems. The theorems were cautiously presented as such and 
emphasized as ways of acting consistent with the axioms; however, even though the distinction 
was drawn differentiating the axioms theorems of paradigms from the axiom theorems of 
geometry, Guba (1987a, 1987b) noted having “every confidence and dare assert, however, that 
each theorem could be shown to be a logical derivative from the ontological, epistemological, 
and methodological axioms of its particular root paradigm” (p. 33).  
The newly formulated theorems are shown in Table 20 (adapted from Guba [1987] and 
Guba & Lincoln [1989]). The only difference between the 13 theorems proposed by Guba in 
1987 and the 14 theorems proposed by Guba and Lincoln in 1989 was the addition of a theorem 
for the “independence of facts and theories” (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, p. 105). This theorem is 






Theorems of the Axiomatic Systems for Convention and Naturalistic 
Theorem 
subject 
Theorem for the conventional inquiry 
paradigm 




Conventional inquiry is not problematic, 
because it is the natural way to determine the 
definitive and enduring truth about states of 
affairs. 
Naturalistic inquiry is problematic, because it 
is the humanly devised way to entertain 
constructions about states of affairs that are 
subject to continuous refinement, revision, 
and, if necessary, replacement. 
The nature of 
truth 
The truth of any proposition (its factual 
quality) can be determined by testing it 
empirically in the natural world. Any 
proposition that has withstood such a test is 
true; such truth is absolute. 
The “truth” of any proposition (its 
credibility) can be determined by submitting 
it semiotically to the judgment of a group of 
informed and sophisticated holders of 
(initially) different constructions. 
Limits of truth A proposition that has not been tested 
empirically cannot be known to be true. 
Likewise, a proposition incapable of 
empirical test can never be confirmed to be 
true. 
A proposition is neither tested nor untested; 
it can only be known to be “true” (credible) 
in relation to the constructions of informed 
and sophisticated constructors and groups of 
constructors. 
Measurability Whatever exists does so in some measurable 
amount. If it cannot be measured it does not 
exist. 
Constructions exist only in the minds of 
constructors and cannot be divided into 
measureable entities; if it can be measured it 




Facts are aspects of the natural world that do 
not depend on the theories that happen to 
guide any given inquiry. Observational and 
theoretical languages are independent. 
"Facts" are always theory-laden, that is, they 
have no independent meaning except within 
some theoretical framework. There can be no 
separate observational and theoretical 
languages. 
Independence of 
facts and values 
Facts and values are independent. Facts can 
be uncovered and arrayed independently of 
the values that may later be brought to bear 
to interpret or give meaning to them. There 
are separate factual and valuational 
languages, the former describing "isness" 
and the latter "oughtness". 
“Facts” and “values” are interdependent; 
“facts” have no meaning except within some 
“value” framework; there can be no separate 
observational and theoretical languages. (The 
distinction between “facts” and “values” is 
irrelevant to the naturalist paradigm). 
Causation Every observed action (effect) has a cause, and 
every cause has an effect. 
Any observed action is the instantaneous 
resolution of a large number of mutual and 
simultaneous shapers, each of which is 
constantly shaping, and being shaped, by 
every other shaper. 
Root causes It is always possible, in principle, to determine 
the root cause of any observed action (although 
that may prove to be virtually intractable in 
practice). 
A “predominant” or “operational” shaper of 
any observed action may be singled out 
arbitrarily for some specific purpose, as for 
example, the form of a new curriculum (the 
evaluand, say) may be taken to be the 
dominant shaper of learning by a curriculum 
developer, while a school ethnographer may 







The determination of root causes is the basis for 
scientific prediction and control. The success of a 
science can be judged on whether it displays 
ever-increasing ability to predict and control its 
phenomena (the ultimate pragmatic criterion for 
scientific inquiry, Hesse, 1980). 
The positing of “predominant” or 
“operational” shapers provides a basis for 
purposefully simplifying an otherwise very 
complex phenomenal field. The success of 
naturalistic inquiry can be judged by its 
increasing understanding of its phenomena 
(the ultimate constructivist criterion for 
naturalistic inquiry). 
The genesis of 
problems 
Phenomena, including problems, scientifically 
identified are real and have widespread 
significance, that is, they will be noted in many 
contexts, and they are generalizable. 
Phenomena—including problems—identified 
through naturalistic inquiry are constructions 
(as are the realities within which they 
putatively exist) and have no meaning except 




Scientifically devised problem solutions have 
widespread applicability. 
Problem solutions devised through 





Problem solutions are stable; when these 
solutions are introduced into specific contexts 
they will maintain their characteristics over time. 
Problem solutions are variable; when these 
solutions are introduced into specific 
contexts they will be at least as much 
affected (changed by those contexts as they 
are likely to affect them). 
The change 
process 
Change is a process that must be stimulated 
by outside forces. The natural state of affairs 
is at best to maintain the status quo and at 
worst to disintegrate to the lowest 
organizational/energy level possible 
(entropy). Change is a process that must be 
managed. 
Change is a continuously ongoing process 
which requires neither outside stimulation 
nor direction, even though at times such 
intervention may be useful. Outside 
management may often impede change rather 
than promote it. 
Implementing the 
change process 
Change is a linear process that moves 
through stages from research (basic inquiry) 
through development (applied inquiry) 
through diffusion to adoption. Each stage 
looks to the preceding one for its inputs and 
provides output to the following stage. 
Change is a non-linear process which 
involves the infusion of new information and 
increased sophistication in its use into the 
constructions of the involved human 
constructors; the infusion derived from 
naturalistic inquiry is but one kind of 
information that will be (and probably should 
be) taken into account. 
Following the significant revisions (i.e., Guba & Lincoln, 1994, 2005; Lincoln & Guba, 
2000; Lincoln et al., 2011) to the axiomatic systems of paradigms published in the four editions 
of The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, 2000, 2005, 2011), the 
associated axiom extensions were also revised accordingly and expanded to accommodate the 
additional paradigms of inquiry defined across subsequent editions of the handbook.  
Guba and Lincoln (1994) again rethought the axiom extensions and termed them 




and policy choices” (p. 112). Ten consequences were presented and set the framework for 
continued discussion of axiom extensions over the next 15 years: 
1. Inquiry aim 
2. Nature of knowledge 
3. Knowledge accumulation 







For the first time, the authors also discussed the differential importance each paradigm puts on 
the axiom extensions.  
The first four issues (inquiry aim, nature of knowledge, knowledge accumulation, and 
quality criteria) are among those deemed especially important by positivists and 
postpositivists; they are therefore the issues on which alternative paradigms are most 
frequently attacked. The fifth and sixth (values and ethics) are issues taken seriously by 
all paradigms, although conventional and emergent responses are quite different. Finally, 
the last four issues (voice, training, accommodation, and hegemony) are those deemed 
especially important by alternative proponents; they represent areas on which the 
received view is considered particularly vulnerable. (pp. 112–113) 
In the second and third editions of The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research (Denzin 
& Lincoln, 2000, 2005), the axiom consequences were elaborated upon; expanded to include 




participatory); and re-presented as positions on practical issues and critical issues of the time. In 
addition to the reorganization into two categories of axiom extensions, the post-millennium 
period offered several newly advanced positions on practical issues over the 10 presented by 
Guba and Lincoln (1994). These included a reconceptualization of voice (Guba & Lincoln, 1994) 
into inquirer posture (Guba & Lincoln, 2005; Lincoln & Guba, 2000) and redefinition of the 
voice implication treated under critical issues of the time (Guba & Lincoln, 2005; Lincoln & 
Guba, 2000). Previously, voice represented the manner in which the inquirer’s position was 
manifest in the inquiry (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Voice was re-labeled as inquirer posture, but 
retained voice’s definition (Guba & Lincoln, 2005; Lincoln & Guba, 2000). Voice was redefined 
to represent the narrative position reflected in the finished inquiry product (Guba & Lincoln, 
2005; Lincoln & Guba, 2000).  
Seven positions on practical issues of inquiry were also defined in the post-millennium 
time period (Guba & Lincoln, 2005; Lincoln & Guba, 2000). The positions were defined as the 
consequence of axiom acceptance. These seven consequences included (see Table 6.5 in Lincoln 
& Guba, 2000, pp. 172–173): 
1. Nature of knowledge 
2. Knowledge accumulation 
3. Goodness or quality criteria 
4. Values 
5. Ethics 





The seven critical issues of the time included: 
1. Axiology 
2. Accommodation and commensurability 
3. Action 
4. Control 
5. Foundations of truth and knowledge 
6. Extended considerations of validity (goodness criteria) 
7. Voice, reflexivity, and postmodern textual representation 
Lincoln et al. (2011) updated the positions on practical issues and synthesized the axiom 
extensions across previous publications. Specifically, the axiom extensions were expanded from 
the previous seven positions on practical issues of inquiry to 11, and additional detailed 
definitions were added throughout. The paradigm positions on select practical issues included the 
subjects distinguishing between inquirer posture and voice, and subjects were added for inquiry 
aim, accommodation, and hegemony. The revised set of 11 positions on practical issues were: 
1. Inquiry aim: “The goals of research and the reason why inquiry is conducted. What 
are the goals and knowledge we seek?” (Lincoln et al., 2011, p. 106) 
2. Nature of knowledge: “How researchers view the knowledge that is generated 
through inquiry research” (p. 106) 
3. Knowledge accumulation: “How does knowledge build off prior knowledge to 
develop a better understanding of the subject or field?” (p. 108) 




5. Values: “What do researchers seek as important products within inquiry research?” 
(p. 109) 
6. Ethics: “The interaction and relationship between the researcher and the subject as 
well as the effect inquiry research has on populations” (p. 109) 
7. Voice: “Who narrates the research that is produced?” (p. 110) 
8. Training: “How are researchers prepared to conduct inquiry research” (p. 110) 
9. Inquirer posture: “The point of view in which the researcher operates. How does the 
researcher approach the inquiry process” (p. 110) 
10. Accommodation: “What needs are provided by the inquiry research?” (p. 111) 
11. Hegemony: “The influence researchers have on others. Who has the power in inquiry 
and what is inquired” (p. 111) 
The same seven critical issues of the time presented in 2000 and 2005 were again offered 
by Lincoln et al. in the fourth edition of The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2011), but more detailed definitions were provided: 
1. Axiology: “How researchers act based on the research they produce also the criteria 
of values and value judgments especially in ethics” (Lincoln et al., 2011, p. 111) 
2. Accommodation and commensurability: “Can the paradigm accommodate other types 
of inquiry… Can the results of inquiry accommodate each other… Can the paradigms 
be merged together to make an overarching paradigm?” (p. 112) 
3. Action: “What is produced as a result of the inquiry process beyond the data? How 
does society use the knowledge generated?” (p. 113) 




5. Relationship to foundations of truth and knowledge: “Helps make meaning and 
significance of components explicit” (p. 114) 
6. Extended considerations of validity (goodness criteria): “Bringing ethics and 
epistemology together (the moral trajectory)” (p. 114) 
7. Voice, reflexivity, and postmodern textual representation: Voice – “Can include the 
voice of the author, the voice of the respondents (subjects), and the voice of the 
researcher through their inquiry” (p. 115); reflexivity – “The process of reflecting 
critical on the self as researcher, the ‘human instrument’” (p. 115); postmodern 
textual representation – “The approach researchers take in understanding how social 
science is written and presented to avoid “dangerous illusion” which may exist in the 
text” (p. 115). 
Basic Questions and Positions on Inquiry Quality 
As early as 1975, before introducing naturalistic inquiry as an alternative to conventional 
inquiry, Guba (1975) was writing about the criteria of good evaluation. Eleven criteria of good 
evaluation were discussed without making any distinctions among inquiry paradigms for the 
quality criteria; these included:  
1. Internal validity 













From these 11 general criteria of quality, the criteria evolved into parallel sets of quality 
criteria conventional and naturalistic inquiries, and then further evolved into distinct criteria for 
both the outcomes of inquiry as well as the process of inquiry. In the 1990s, the conversation on 
quality criteria exploded with several new proposal of criteria, expansion to paradigms not 
previously encompassed by the old criteria, inclusion of ethical criteria, and criteria for issues of 
representation and legitimation. The quality conversation continued to evolve into questions of 
validity and rigor, and lastly, to criteria of quality for the theories that contained the knowledge 
produced by the various paradigms of inquiry. 
Parallel criteria emerge. Guba (1978b) made distinctions between the general criteria of 
scientific adequacy for the naturalist and conventional paradigms. Although no organizing 
subjects for quality were presented, four analogously paired criteria for adequacy were presented 
for both paradigms. These four included, for scientific and naturalistic inquiries, respectively: 
“intrinsic adequacy in lieu of internal validity, extrinsic adequacy in lieu of external validity or 
generalization, replicability in lieu of reliability, and impartiality in lieu of objectivity” (p. 62). 
The analogous naturalistic criteria were defined as: 





 Extrinsic adequacy – The degree of isomorphism between the study findings and the 
natural world, whether the nature world is viewed as a context free generalization or a 
context laden special instance of the real world (e.g., the specific situation studied) 
 Replicability – The degree of reproducibility of findings through an audit trail or 
other methods  
 Neutrality/Impartiality – The degree of reliable and confirmable data, a case 
demonstrated for single subject subjective responses as well as multiple subject 
intersubjective responses; both were also demonstrated as potentially unreliable and 
biased (see 2x2 figure, p. 74). 
By 1981 the criterial subjects for quality emerged as organizing subjects for the quality 
criteria of the two paradigms (Guba, 1981a, Guba & Lincoln, 1981). These four criteria subjects 
for quality set the foundation for all discussions of quality that followed in the next 30-plus years 
of literature. The four criteria subjects, or basic concerns, for quality were: 
1. Truth value: How can one establish confidence in the "truth" of the findings of a 
particular inquiry for the subjects with which and the context within which-the 
inquiry was carried out? 
2. Applicability: How can one determine the degree to which the findings of a particular 
inquiry may have applicability in other contexts or with other subjects'? 
3. Consistency: How can one determine whether the findings of an inquiry would be 
consistently repeated if the inquiry were replicated with the same (or similar) subjects 




4. Neutrality: How can one establish the degree to which the findings of an inquiry are a 
function solely of the subjects and conditions of the inquiry and not of the biases, 
motives, interests, perspectives, and so on of the inquirer? (Guba & Lincoln, 1981, p. 
104) 
Somewhat interesting was that two slightly different sets of naturalistic positions were 
presented by Guba (1981a) and Guba and Lincoln (1981). The two paradigm positions on quality 
are presented together in Table 21. The set presented in Guba (1981a) won out and remained the 
standard in the proceeding 30-plus years of literature (e.g., Guba & Lincoln, 1982a; Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985b, 1986a; Lincoln, 1986; Lincoln et al., 2011). 
Table 21 
Criteria of Quality Subjects and Positions for Scientific and Naturalistic Approaches 
Subject Scientific position Naturalistic position 
 Guba (1981a) Guba & Lincoln 
(1981) 
Guba (1981a) Guba & Lincoln 
(1981) 
Truth value Internal validity Internal validity Credibility Credibility 
Applicability External validity External validity Transferability Fittingness 
Consistency Reliability Reliability Dependability Auditability 
Neutrality Objectivity Objectivity Confirmability Confirmability 
For the scientific paradigm, the four criteria of quality were defined as: 
 Internal validity – “internal validity is logically determinable by demonstrating 
isomorphism or verisimilitude between the data of an inquiry and the phenomena 
those data represent” (Guba, 1981a, p. 80) 
 External validity or Generalizability – “requires that the inquiry be conducted in ways 




condition can be met, the findings obviously will have relevance in any context” (p. 
80) 
 Reliability – “instruments must produce stable results if those results are to be 
meaningful. Validity is a direct function of reliability… Reliability is thus not so 
much essential in its own right as it is a precondition for validity” (p. 81) 
 Objectivity – “Objectivity is presumably guaranteed by methodology; If the methods 
are explicated, open to public scrutiny, replicable, and at least one step removed from 
direct investigator-subject contact, then objectivity is assured (that is, the biases of the 
investigator are effectively screened out)” (p. 81)  
For the naturalistic paradigm, the four criteria of quality were defined as: 
 Credibility – “naturalistic inquirers are most concerned with testing the credibility of 
their findings and interpretations with the various sources (audiences or groups) from 
which data were drawn” (p. 80) 
 Transferability – “which is itself dependent upon the degree of similarity (fittingness) 
between two contexts. The naturalist does not attempt to form generalizations that 
will hold in all times and in all places, but to form working hypotheses that may be 
transferred from one context to another depending upon the degree of "fit" between 
the contexts” (p. 81) 
 Dependability – “the concept of consistency implies not invariance (except by 
chance) but trackable variance-variance that can be ascribed to sources: so much for 
error, so much for reality shifts, so much for increased instrumental proficiency 




 Confirmability – “naturalists shift the burden of neutrality from the investigator to the 
data, requiring evidence not of the certifiability of the investigator or his or her 
methods but of the confirmability of the data produced” (pp. 81-82). 
The proposal of authenticity criteria for naturalism. Lincoln (1986) and Lincoln and 
Guba (1986a) created two new conversations in the ongoing dialog about the quality of inquiries: 
(a) discussion of parallel criteria, which set the stage for future dialog on foundational versus 
anti- or non- foundational criteria and (b) introduction of a new set of quality criteria rooted in 
the naturalistic paradigm. The distinction between conventional criteria and “parallel” (Guba, 
1987a, 1987b; Guba & Lincoln, 1987; Lincoln, 1986; Lincoln & Guba, 1986a) criteria drew 
attention to the basis of the four naturalistic criteria of quality; that is, the conventional/scientific 
paradigm. This was early reference to what eventually became discussed as foundational and 
anti- or non- foundational criteria (e.g., Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Lincoln, 1995a, 2010). The 
criteria of quality for scientific inquiries had been established long before naturalism itself was 
formally defined by Guba (1978b). Positioning of naturalistic criteria as parallel criteria 
highlighted that they were by design intended to satisfy those wanting an analogous set for both 
paradigms. However, authenticity criteria (Lincoln, 1986; Lincoln & Guba, 1986a) were 
presented as “new criteria rooted in naturalism rather than simply paralleling those rooted in 
positivism” (Lincoln & Guba, 1986a, p. 78).  
Regarding authenticity criteria, Lincoln (1986) posed the following question: “Supposing 
that one had never heard of positivism and the conventional paradigm of inquiry, but worked 




from that paradigm?” (p. 4). Lincoln (see also Lincoln & Guba [1986a]) answered the question 
by proposing five authenticity criteria:  
1. Fairness 
2. Ontological authenticity 
3. Educative authenticity 
4. Catalytic authenticity 
5. Tactical authenticity 
The five authenticity criteria were defined as follows: 
1. Fairness: Given the reality, value, and belief interactions of the naturalist axioms…  
What can a researcher do to assure that these several (or multiple) constructions are 
presented and honored in a balanced, even-handed way, a way in which the several belief 
system parties or groups would agree is balanced and even-handed? How can—or 
should—the inquirer go about his or her tasks in ways which, while not guaranteeing 
balance (since nothing can provide such certainty), can at least enhance the probability 
that balance will emerge? If every inquiry serves to social or political agenda (as it must 
if inquiry is value-mediated), how can a person conduct the inquiry to avoid (at least 
probabilistically), the possibility that certain values will be diminished, and their holders 
exploited, while other values will be enhanced, and their holders advantaged? (pp. 5-6). 
2. Ontological authenticity:  
If each person’s reality is constructed and reconstructed as that person gains experience, 
interacts with others, and deals with the consequences of various personal actions and 
beliefs (the relativist ontology), an appropriate criterion to apply is that of improvement 
in the conscious experiencing of the world. What have sometimes been termed “false 
consciousness” (by the Marxists) and “divided consciousness” (by the feminists) are part 
of this concept… A given inquiry (whether it is research, evaluation, or policy analysis) 
ought to have as one of its objectives consciousness-raising or the “uniting of divided 




By improvement Lincoln distinguished the implication of improving an individual’s life and 
improving an individual construction such that it “will be both richer and broader” (p. 7). 
3. Educative authenticity:  
It is not enough that the individual actors (or groups) in some inquiry situation achieve, 
individually, more sophisticated constructions of their world. It is also essential that they 
come to appreciate (acknowledge, recognize, credit), although not necessarily like or 
agree with, the constructions which are created by others, and to understand how those 
constructions are rooted in the differing values systems of those others. By this, it is 
meant that individuals (or groups) come to understand and appreciate the particular value 
and belief systems of others, and how those value systems give rise to particular social 
strategies for ameliorating problems (or for failing to ameliorate them). (p. 7).  
4. Catalytic authenticity: “Reaching new constructions and achieving increased 
understandings is still not enough. Inquiry—whether research, evaluation or policy analyses—
must also make possible a different form of action than before. Inquiry must also facilitate and 
stimulate action” (p. 8). 
5. Tactical authenticity:  
Stimulating to action via catalytic authenticity is in itself no assurance that the action 
taken will be effective. The inquiry will need other attributes to serve this latter goal. 
Chief among them is the matter of whether the inquiry is empowering. The first step 
toward empowering is taken by providing all persons at risk (or with something at stake) 
in the inquiry with the opportunity to control it as well (collaborative, or joint, inquiry), 
and provides practice of that power through the negotiation of constructions (joint 
emic/etic elaborations). (p. 9) 
Guba and Lincoln (1987) proposed five new criteria specific to fourth-generation 
evaluation (a naturalist form of evaluation); however, the five criteria closely align with the five 
authenticity criteria of naturalism. These five were openness, relevance, fairness, ethicality, and 
increased understanding. Openness was defined as a type of transparency in collecting and 




focusing on and collecting information that is responsive to the voice of the stakeholders. 
Fairness was defined as presentation of stakeholder perspectives in a balanced manner. Ethicality 
was defined as subjecting stakeholders to a little risk as possible through participation and 
making every effort to protect their right to confidentiality. Increased understanding was defined 
to include improved understanding individually by each stakeholder, but also improved 
understanding for the perspectives held by other stakeholders involved (Guba & Lincoln, 1987). 
Although not an exact one-to-one match with the authenticity criteria of naturalism, it is clear 
that the fourth-generation evaluation criteria were equally rooted in a value system inherent to 
naturalism and incommensurable with conventional perspectives. 
Distinct criteria for process and product. Significant to the development and 
presentation of quality criteria was the conceptual organization of the criteria in 1988 into two 
groups distinguishing quality criteria for process (i.e., methodological criteria) from quality 
criteria for product (i.e., outcome criteria) (Lincoln & Guba, 1988). Lincoln and Guba 
commented that the criteria of quality discussed to date spoke more to quality of process for 
arriving at conclusions than did the criteria for what makes for good conclusions (i.e., criteria for 
the “form and content”) (p. 4) of inquiry outcomes. In the context of naturalistic inquiries and the 
associated case study reporting mode, the authors noted, 
Judging the process, while critical in understanding the premises under which the 
research was carried out and in understanding why the case study takes on the form it 
does… is a very different activity from judging the quality of the product of an inquiry, 
prototypically a case study in this type of research. Process judgments tell the reader 
something about the trustworthiness and authenticity of a given study, but they say little 
about the quality of the narrative which is presented. Since the ability of a given case 
study to evoke a vicarious response is directly related to its quality as a narrative, criteria 
for judging the goodness of the product (case study) are coequally critical with criteria for 




In response to the identified lack of quality criteria for the products of inquiry, Lincoln 
and Guba (1988) proposed four classes of criteria for addressing the goodness of products of 
naturalistic inquiries: (a) axiomatic criteria, (b) rhetorical criteria, (c) action criteria, and (d) 
application or transferability criteria. 
Axiomatic criteria were defined as “the criteria that demonstrate the resonance between 
the [reporting mode] and the axioms that characterize the basic belief system” (Lincoln & Guba, 
1988, p. 10) of the paradigm. The belief system with which resonance of the reporting mode 
should be shown was defined as a twofold grouping of (a) the stance toward reality, the 
outcomes of inquiry, and the dynamics of action and (b) the stance toward the relationship of the 
knower to the known and the role of values in inquiry. Six axiomatic positions for naturalistic 
inquiries were described. Given naturalistic axioms, the case study reporting mode must: 
[1] reflect the multiple realities constructed by the respondents to such research; [2] 
demonstrate in what ways it has taken account of the mutual shaping of phenomenal 
elements on the site, relying on pattern theories rather than on conventional formulations 
of cause and effect; [3] reject generalizability and the drawing of nomothetic conclusions 
and avoid making recommendations which look like or which can be interpreted as 
generalizations; [4] must display and openly take account of the value influences that 
impinge on the research, including the values which dictated that choice of a problem, the 
values which impelled the choice of theoretical formulation or framework (if any), the 
values dictating the choice of paradigm, and the values inherent in the research site 
(including those of all stakeholder groups), and those of the investigator himself or 
herself; [5] and finally, must reflect the investigator’s involvement in such a way as to 
make clear that objectivity, being unachievable in any event, is not the aim of inquiry… 
[6] With respect to the latter five, a portion of the case study probably ought to be given 
over to considerations of conscious reflexivity. That is, some portion of the 
methodological treatment ought to comprise reflections on the investigator’s own 
personal experience of the fieldwork. (pp. 10-11) 
Rhetorical criteria were defined as criteria “relating to the form and structure, or the 
presentational characteristics, of the case study” (Lincoln & Guba, 1988, p. 11). Furthermore, 




or clarity, and (d) craftsmanship. The criterion of unity suggests that the report should exhibit 
structural coherence and logical corroboration: “In short, there ought not to be loose ends, stories 
left dangling, or characters from the cast who disappear” (p. 12). Overall organization suggests 
that the report ought to flow and fit together like the overall structure of a novel and its plot. 
Simplicity and clarity suggest that the report exhibit “accessibility to many persons who could 
not comprehend a typical scientific report” (p. 12) through the use of natural language or the 
language, terms, and meanings of respondents/stakeholders/audience. Craftsmanship holds that 
the report demonstrate carefully written, elegant, creative, courageous, egalitarian writing: 
“writing, rewriting, and writing again and again are probably the only techniques for advancing 
the art of craftsmanship. But it is evident when we see it” (p. 13).  
Action criteria were defined simply as “the ability of the case study to evoke and 
facilitate action on the part of readers… The actionability criterion might also be thought of as 
the empowerment criterion” (Lincoln & Guba, 1988, p. 17). 
Application or transferability criteria mandated thick description and was defined as 
the extent to which the case study facilitates the drawing of inferences by the reader that 
may have applicability in his or her own context or situation… transference can take 
place between contexts A and B if B is sufficiently like A on those elements or factors or 
circumstances that the A inquiry found to be significant (and those salience factors will 
vary from inquiry to inquiry). (p. 18) 
The quality criteria boom of the 1990s. The transition into the 1990s was marked by a 
big year regarding the development of criteria for quality. Guba (1990c) continued the discussion 
about parallel methodological criteria in detail; however, new to the conversation was further 
positioning of authenticity criteria distinct from methodological trustworthiness criteria and a 




of the criterion. Also new this year was the presentation of 20 common criteria of quality (Guba, 
1990c), new nonconventional criteria for judging the goodness of inquiries (Guba, 1990b), 
categorical and a practical imperative as ethical principles for inquiry (Lincoln, 1990b), and 
revision of the quality criteria of inquiry products (Lincoln & Guba, 1990). 
Prior to 1990, the authenticity criteria of naturalism had been made distinct from the 
parallel trustworthiness criteria by the grounding of authenticity criteria in naturalism and the 
grounding of trustworthiness criteria in response to the four quality criteria of the conventional 
paradigm (i.e., internal validity, external validity, reliability, and objectivity). However, Guba 
(1990c) further positioned authenticity criteria as “states of being” (p. 70) unique to the 
stakeholders of naturalistic inquiries. The authenticity criteria, or states of being, were intended 
to be 
particularly for respondents, participants, and stakeholders, which were not expected (or 
warranted) in conventional inquiry, and one additional criterion, which recognized and 
attended to the need for such inquiries to express multiple, socially constructed, and often 
conflicting realities... They related both to (a) levels of understanding and sophistication 
and to (b) the enhanced ability of participants and stakeholders to take action during and 
after an inquiry and to negotiate on behalf of themselves and their own interests in the 
political arena. (pp. 71-72) 
Also highlighted in 1990 was the larger philosophical context surrounding the need for 
criteria of quality process and product for inquiries. Guba (1990c) framed the discussion of 
quality within Chisholm’s (1973) circular criterion: 
To know whether things really are as they seem to be, we must have a procedure for 
distinguishing appearances that are true from appearances that are false. But to know 
whether our procedure is a good procedure, we have to know whether it really succeeds 
in distinguishing appearances that are true from appearances that are false. And we 
cannot know whether it does really succeed unless we already know which appearances 




As a consequence of the circular criterion, Guba pointed out the questions inquirers are left to 
ask: “What can we do so that our research will yield an accurate (objective) as opposed to a 
distorted (biased) depiction of reality? What criteria can we apply to distinguish valid from 
invalid research?” (p. 168). Thus, we have the need for criteria against which we can judge 
quality process and quality process for our inquiries. 
Guba (1990c) drew further contrast with what made for valid inquiries between 
conventional and naturalistic paradigms and emphasized that “the conventional inquirer’s 
assertion that ‘the data speak for themselves’ was erroneous. In conventional inquiry, actually, 
the methods attest to the strength of the conclusions. And in parallel fashion, in constructivist 
fashion, the data are what speak for themselves.” (p. 72). Consequently, an important distinction 
was made regarding judgments of quality process versus quality product; that is,  
could the methodological strategy be good, could the inquirer be an honest and faithful 
servant to the inquiry question and still turn out a product that fell short of the mark? The 
answer, of course, was yes. We needed criteria by which we might judge products.” (p. 
73) 
Therefore, if the quality of our methodology can only speak to the extent of upholding an honest 
and faithful alignment with the underlying belief system in the conduct of inquiry, and not 
unilaterally to the extent of the production of a quality product, then we need unique criteria with 
which to make distinct judgments about the quality of our inquiry outputs.  
Looking beyond the differences in quality across qualitative approaches to inquiry, Guba 
(1990c) noted that if we instead focused on similarities in quality inquiry “that we would agree 
on common criteria (although different paradigms would weight each criterion differently)” (p. 




1. The method is explicated in detail with rationale for all design choices 
2. Assumptions are stated explicitly 
3. The research guards against value judgments and value laden researcher language 
4. Evidence is clearly presented that connects inquiry findings to real world knowledge 
claims 
5. The research questions are stated and connected to findings and further questions 
6. The current study is explicitly connected to previous studies and findings; the current 
phenomenon explored is explicitly defined and connected to previously identified 
phenomena 
7. The study is reported in a timely manner and format accessible to researchers, 
practitioners, and policymakers 
8. Evidence is presented demonstrating negative case analysis, alternative explanations, 
and triangulation of findings 
9. The report acknowledges the limitations of generalizability while assisting the readers 
in seeing the transferability of findings 
10. The inquiry problem was generated from, or connected to, a real-world experience 
rather than mere connection of new data to old theories and or theory-only problems 
11. Observations span multiple time points and daily contexts 
12. Raw data are available for inspection 
13. Methods of member checking are utilized 
14. All analysis is documented 
15. Meaning is derived from multiple constructions/perspectives 




17. Benefit to participants/co-researchers/stakeholders is demonstrated 
18. The researcher demonstrates sophistication and efficacy in selection of 
methodological strategies 
19. The individual study connects back to the big picture 
20. Historical context is explored 
Guba (1990b) also spoke to rejection of the criteria for quality that stem from 
conventional, positivist methodologies. Further emphasis was given to the criteria of judging the 
quality of the products of new paradigm inquiries with his proposal of seven criteria grounded in 
the new paradigm methodology. These seven were: 
1. The report must resonate with the subjects' actual lived experiences. 
2. The report must enable the subjects to comprehend their experiences of 
subordination. 
3. The report must lessen the “structural divide” between academics and actors. 
4. The report must not be pretentious or condescending-interpretations and concepts 
must be generally accessible. 
5. Subjects must find the report demystifying and clarifying,  
6. The researcher's prior theoretical understandings must also be modified. 
7. The inquirer must take ethical and political issues seriously-no intellectual tourism is 
allowed. (p. 84) 
In 1990, ethical principles and concerns were also part of the conversation about criteria 
for quality in inquiries, with the shifting of discussion to the ethical criteria driving inquiry 
decisions. Lincoln (1990b) proposed a categorical imperative and a practical imperative as 
ethical principles for inquiry. Lincoln defined the categorical imperative as a do unto others rule 
of inquiry. More specifically: 
The categorical imperative is often deemed the "golden rule" of philosophical systems, 
since its sense is very like the dictum to do unto others as one would have them do unto 
oneself. The ethical criterion here, again in simplistic form, is judged by whether one 




the actions of others toward him or her. Is what you are doing now something you would 
wish done to yourself? Your spouse? Your minor children? Your aging parents? Your 
best friend? If it is not, then it is probably something you ought not to be doing; it is a 
principle that you cannot, ethically, support. (p. 291) 
Lincoln defined the practical imperative as an ethical treatment of participants in such a way that 
involving them in the research provides them with some benefit. The inquiry should not only 
benefit the inquirer. 
The practical imperative is a corollary to the categorical imperative. Briefly stated, it is, 
“Treat every man as an end in himself, and never as a means only. In other words, never 
use another as an instrument” (Reese, 1980, p. 279; emphasis in original). Were we to 
legislate the practical imperative today, clearly half or more of the social science projects 
currently underway would fail the standard and lose their funding. Since ethical 
principles are inevitably human principles, all systems are “flawed” in some sense; they 
are social constructions that allow given societies to retain some sense of public and 
private civility while ensuring that rights rest with individuals the society deems 
responsible enough to handle them. (p. 292) 
The last significant event for the criteria of quality in 1990s was a revision of the criteria 
of quality products. As originally proposed, these criteria included axiomatic criteria, rhetorical 
criteria, action criteria, and application or transferability criteria. However, Lincoln and Guba 
(1990) revised and expanded the original four criteria into:  
1. Resonance criteria 
2. Rhetorical criteria 
i. Unity 
ii. Overall organization 
iii. Simplicity or clarity 
iv. Craftsmanship 
3. Empowerment criteria 





ii. Vicarious experience 
iii. Metaphor 
iv. Reexamination of constructions 
The resonance criteria was the new label given to the previously labeled axiomatic criteria; 
however, the definition remained similar. Resonance criteria were defined as “criteria that assess 
the degree of fit, overlap, or reinforcement between the case study report as written and the basic 
belief system undergirding that alternative paradigm [or other paradigm?] which the inquirer has 
chosen to follow” (p. 54). 
Rhetorical criteria (i.e., “those relevant to assessing the form, structure, and 
presentational characteristics of the case study”; Lincoln & Guba, 1990, p. 54) were expanded 
upon by defining four specific sub-criteria: (a) unity, (b) overall organization, (c) simplicity or 
clarity, and (d) craftsmanship. These were defined as: 
 The rhetorical criteria of unity: “the idea of unity goes beyond organization and the 
advancement of some central ideas. It encompasses structural characteristics such as 
coherence and corroboration… In short, there ought not be loose ends, stories left 
dangling, or characters who disappear from the cast.” (pp. 54-55) 
 The rhetorical criteria of overall organization: Similar to judging the structure of a 
novel, “Is there rising action, climax, falling action? From whose point of view is the 
story being told, first person, second person, or third person? Who is the narrator, and 




 The rhetorical criteria of simplicity or clarity: The report is written with natural 
language so it is accessible to people who could not comprehend a traditional 
scientific technical report (Lincoln & Guba, 1990). 
 The rhetorical criteria of craftsmanship: “Writing, rewriting, and writing again and 
again are probably the only techniques for advancing the art of craftsmanship. But it 
is evident when we see it.” (p. 55). 
The empowerment criteria was the new label given to the previously labeled action 
criteria. The definition remained similar, defined here as “the ability of the case study to evoke 
and facilitate action on the part of readers… At the least, empowerment implies consciousness-
raising.” (Lincoln & Guba, 1990, p. 57).  
Applicability criteria (i.e., “those which assess the extent to which the case study 
facilitates the drawing of inferences by the reader that may have applicability in his or her own 
context or situation” [p. 57]) were also expanded upon by defining four specific sub-criteria: (a) 
transference, (b) vicarious experience, (c) metaphor, and (d) reexamination of constructions. 
These four sub-criteria of applicability were defined as: 
 Transference: “transference can take place between contexts A and B if B is 
sufficiently like A on those elements or factors or circumstances that the A inquiry 
found to be significant” (Lincoln & Guba, 1990, p. 57). 
 The applicability criteria of vicarious experience: “whether or not vicarious 
experience [e.g., déjà vu] is enabled” (p. 57). 
 The applicability criteria of metaphor: The use of another term or concept to help 




 The applicability criteria of reexamination: New information may be leveraged for 
“re-examining and reconstructing one's own construction of a given phenomenon. 
The case may provide new (or better) information. It may raise the reader's level of 
sophistication. Or it may provide the interpretation critical to erasing false or divided 
consciousness” (p. 57). 
By the mid 1990s, quality criteria for critical inquiries began to catch up with the 
expanding paradigm constructions for positivist, postpositivist, critical, and constructivist 
inquiries. Shortly following the introduction of the critical paradigm into their paradigm 
framework, Guba and Lincoln (1994) proposed quality criteria for critical inquiries distinct from 
those for conventional and constructivist inquiries. Initially three criteria for critical inquiries 
were proposed: the criterion of persuasiveness, the criterion of internal validity and authenticity, 
and the criterion of resonance (Lincoln, 1993). However, by 1994 the three criteria were revised 
to include three new critical criteria of quality:  
[1] the historical situatedness of the inquiry…, [2] the extent to which the inquiry acts to 
erode ignorance and misapprehensions, and [3] the extent to which it provides a stimulus 
to action, that is, to the transformation of the existing structure” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, 
p. 114).  
These three criteria remained the foundation of the goodness criteria for critical inquiries through 
to the fourth edition of The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; 
see Guba & Lincoln, 2005; Lincoln & Guba, 2000; Lincoln et al., 2011), despite a brief 
deconstruction into criteria specific to feminist positions, ethnic positions, Marxist positions, and 




The mid 1990s also represented the explicit introduction of the conversation about 
representation and legitimation, and although not quality criteria per se, the criteria addressed the 
issues of “how best to describe and interpret the experiences of other peoples and cultures” 
(Lincoln & Denzin, 1994, p. 577)”. Representation and legitimation addressed the issues of the 
experiences of “the other” in different ways. The issue of representation asks “Who is the Other? 
Can we ever hope to speak authentically of the experience of the Other, or an Other? And if not, 
how do we create a social science that includes the Other?” (p. 577). The issue of legitimation 
addresses the authority given to knowledge claims made in the text produced by an inquiry. That 
is,  
the claim any text makes to being accurate, true, and complete. Is a text, that is, faithful to 
the context and the individuals it is supposed to represent? Does the text have the right to 
assert that it is a report to the larger world that addresses not only the researcher's 
interests, but also the interests of those studied? (p. 577) 
In 1995, Lincoln (1995a) built upon the dialog on methodological criteria (e.g., Guba, 
1990c), wherein Lincoln centered the conversation on the basic question of quality for those 
seeking to do, understand, and use research; that is, “how do we separate good research from 
poor research across disciplines and traditions? That question still engages many scholars, both 
those seeking to do such research and those seeking to understand and to use it” (p. 276). Lincoln 
drew attention to the distinction between the conventional paradigm’s methodological reliance 
on method (i.e., internal validity, external validity, reliability, and objectivity) and the 
constructivist paradigm’s methodological reliance extrinsically on data (i.e., the trustworthiness 
criteria of credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability) and intrinsically on an 
ethical system inherent to the paradigm, i.e., authenticity criteria. This distinction made by 




methodological emphasis on procedure to ensure rigor in conventional inquiries and the 
methodological emphasis on data and ethics in constructivist/naturalist inquiries. 
Lincoln (1995a) also initiated a discussion on emerging criteria of quality for interpretive 
research. Altogether, 10 emerging criteria of quality for interpretive inquiry were discussed (see 
also Lincoln, 1997b, 1998b). These criteria included: 
1. Standards for judging quality in the inquiry community (Lincoln, 1995a, 1997b) 
2. Positionality, or standpoint judgments (Lincoln, 1995a, 1997b, 1998b) 
3. Community as arbiter of quality (Lincoln, 1995a, 1997b, 1998b) 
4. Voice (Lincoln, 1995a, 1997b) 
5. Critical subjectivity (Lincoln, 1995a, 1997b) 
6. Reciprocity (Lincoln, 1995a, 1997b, 1998b) 
7. Sacredness (Lincoln, 1995a, 1997b) 
8. Sharing the prerequisites of privilege (Lincoln, 1995a, 1997b, 1998b) 
9. Caring (Lincoln, 1997b, 1998b) 
10. Yearning (Lincoln, 1997b) 
A return to issues of validity and rigor. By the late 1990s, validity was being given 
increased attention as a common concept for quality of inquiries and by the turn of the 
millennium, numerous conceptions of validity were introduced and discussed in detail (Guba & 
Lincoln, 2005; Lincoln & Guba, 2000; Lincoln et al., 2011). To frame the conversations around 





At its heart, validity questions the congruence between some representation of an object, 
context, situation, event, or person and the object that is “signified” by the verbal 
representation. Validity’s logic and justification reside in verisimilitude or isomorphism, 
the extent to which some signifier’s referent can be recognized in a physical or social 
world. Validity is critical to researchers and research consumers because another question 
is important to us: What is the “truth” of these findings [where truth is a construct of the 
inquiry paradigm], and thus, how far can we trust the reported findings to guide action? 
The purported verisimilitude is what permits “trustworthiness”, or the judgments that 
findings from a given study are worthy of our confidence in their close relationship to 
some reality on which we have received an account. (Lincoln, 1997a, p. 161) 
In other words, the authors suggested that the construct of validity was the answer to the 
question: “Are these findings sufficiently authentic (isomorphic to some reality, trustworthy, 
related to the way others construct their social worlds) that I may trust myself in acting on their 
implications?” (Lincoln & Guba, 2000, p. 178). Following suit to the expansion of their 
paradigm framework to include axiomatic systems for positivist, postpositivist, critical, 
constructivist, and participatory paradigms, the authors also expanded their discussion to include 
a number of extended considerations of validity. These extended considerations for the 
alternative paradigms included validity as authenticity, crystalline validity, transgressive 
validities, and validity as an ethical relationship. 
Validity as authenticity referenced the antifoundational quality criteria “rooted in the 
axioms and assumptions of the constructivist paradigm” (Lincoln & Guba, 2000, p. 180). These 
criteria were considered the hallmarks of authentic constructivist inquiry and included the criteria 
of fairness, ontological authenticity, educative authenticity, catalytic authenticity, and tactical 
authenticity. 
Crystalline validity referenced the multifaceted nature of constructed meaning, also given 
under the labels of validity as resistance and validity as poststructural transgression. Crystalline 




The metaphoric “solid object” (crystal/text), which can be turned many ways, which 
reflects and refracts light (light/multiple layers of meaning), through which we can see 
both “wave” (light wave/human currents) and “particle” (light as “chunks” of 
energy/elements of truth, feeling, connection, processes of the research that “flow” 
together) is an attractive metaphor for validity. The properties of the crystal-as-metaphor 
help writers and readers alike see the interweaving of processes in the research: 
discovery, seeing, telling, storying, re-presentation. (Lincoln & Guba, 2000, pp. 1821-
182) 
Transgressive forms of validity related strongly to critical conceptions of truth, where 
validity was viewed as “disruptive of the status quo… these form a way of interrupting, 
disrupting, and transforming "pure" presence into a disturbing, fluid, partial, and problematic 
presence” (Lincoln & Guba, 2000, p. 182). 
Validity as an ethical relationship positioned the referent reality isomorphism as one tied 
to the “ways in which the ethical intersected both the interpersonal and the epistemological (as a 
form of authentic or valid knowing)” (Lincoln & Guba, 2000, p. 182). The 10 criteria for validity 
as an ethical relationship were captured in the 10 emerging criteria of quality for interpretive 
inquiry (Lincoln, 1995a, 1997b, 1998b) previously discussed. 
In addition to the emphasis on validity and the different forms of validity, an important 
discussion about rigor began to emerge—of rigor in method versus rigor in interpretation, and 
how the two differed in importance across paradigms of inquiry. The millennium (Lincoln & 
Guba, 2000) saw the first discussion within the authors’ quality criteria writings that explicitly 
proposed a rigor unique to the process of conducting inquiry and a separate rigor unique to the 
interpretation of inquiry outputs. Furthermore, the differentiated conceptions of rigor were tied 
back to differences in process and product of quality inquiry within different paradigms of 
inquiry. The authors described rigor in the application of method and rigor in the interpretation 




One of the issues around validity is the contamination between method and interpretation. 
The postmodern turn suggests that no method can deliver on ultimate truth, and in fact 
“suspects all methods,” the more so the larger their claims to delivering on truth 
(Richardson, 1994). Thus, although one might argue that some methods are more suited 
than others for conducting research on human construction of social realities (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985), no one would argue that a single method-or collection of methods-is the 
royal road to ultimate knowledge. In new-paradigm inquiry, however, it is not merely 
method that promises to deliver on some set of local or context-grounded truths, it is also 
the processes of interpretation. Thus we have two arguments proceeding simultaneously. 
The first borrowed from positivism, argues for a kind of rigor in the application of 
method, whereas the second argues for both a community consent and a form of rigor-
defensible reasoning, plausible alongside some other reality that is known to author and 
reader-in ascribing salience to one interpretation over another and for framing and 
bounding an interpretive study itself. Prior to our understanding that there were, indeed, 
two forms of rigor, we assembled a set of methodological criteria, largely borrowed from 
an earlier generation of thoughtful anthropological and sociological methodological 
theorists. Those methodological criteria are still useful for a variety of reasons, not the 
least of which is that they ensure that such issues as prolonged engagement and persistent 
observation are attended to with some seriousness. It is the second kind of rigor, 
however, that has received the most attention in recent writings. Are we interpretively 
rigorous? Can our cocreated constructions be trusted to provide some purchase on some 
important phenomenon? (pp. 178-179) 
A shift to the quality criteria for theory. Toward the close of the first decade of the 
new millennium, the conversation about quality criteria shifted with the conversation about 
paradigm-specific forms of knowledge in relation to the theories guiding the inquiry of the 
respective paradigms (Lincoln & Lynham, 2007, 2011). The predominant emphasis, although not 
exclusive emphasis (e.g., Lincoln & Guba, 1990), in the discussion on quality criteria had been 
on the quality criteria for inquiry process; however, with the new focus on paradigm-specific 
forms of theory came increased attention to quality criteria of theory, and therefore the quality 
criteria of the outputs of inquiry. 
Using Patterson’s (1986) eight criteria of good theory as a starting point, Lincoln and 
Lynham (2007) initially began contrasting criteria of quality for conventional and interpretive 




presented a more fully developed set of quality criteria for interpretive theories than originally 
presented by Lincoln & Lynham (2007). These three sets of quality criteria are shown in Table 
22 (adapted from Lincoln & Lynham [2011] and Lincoln & Lynham [2007]).  
Table 22 
Criteria of Quality for Positivist, Postpositivist, Critical, and Interpretive Theories 
Paradigm of theory Quality criteria of theories 
Criteria of quality for applied conventional (positivist/post-
positivist) theories (Lincoln & Lynham, 2011, pp. 12-14) 
Importance 
Precision and clarity 
Parsimony and simplicity 
Comprehensiveness 
Operationality 
Empirical validation or verification 
Fruitfulness 
Practicality 
Criteria of quality for applied interpretive theories (Lincoln & 
Lynham, 2011, pp. 16-17) 
Meaningfulness and understandability 
Thick description and insightfulness 
Narrative elegance 
Transferability 
Mutuality of concepts and descriptive logic 
Empirical verifiability 
Fruitfulness and provocativeness 
Usefulness and applicability 
Compellingness 
Saturation 
Prompt to action 
Fittingness 
Transferability and transportability 
Criteria of quality for applied critical theories (Lincoln & 
Lynham, 2011, p. 11) 





















Data Synthesis  
Analysis across coded sources revealed a number of pertinent milestones in the self-cited 
history of the authors of paradigm theory. Each milestone was judged pertinent to the extent that 
it captured a landmark in the evolution of the authors’ paradigm thinking. The milestones can be 
summarized in the chunks of time shown in Table 23 and further visually represented in Figure 
3. In the following sections, each milestone time period is discussed in detail. However, before 
covering the nine milestone time periods, the coded literature on disciplined inquiry was 
synthesized upfront as contextual backdrop for the discussion of milestones in the development 
of the authors’ paradigm theory. 
Table 23 
Milestones in the Authors’ Paradigm Theory Development 
Milestone in conceptualization Date range Relevant publications 
Two approaches emerge 1975 - 1979 Guba, 1975; Guba, 1978b; 
Guba, 1979 
The early 1980s – Axiomatic theory enters the 
picture, the paradigm meta-framework was 
introduced as sets of axiom systems 
1981 -1982 Guba, 1981a; Guba & 
Lincoln, 1981; Guba & 
Lincoln, 1982a 
The mid 1980s – Basic belief systems were 
refined 
1985 - 1986 Guba, 1985; Lincoln, 1985e; 
Lincoln & Guba, 1985b; 
Lincoln, 1986; Lincoln & 
Guba, 1986a 
The late 1980s – Distinction of process from 
products 
1987 - 1989 Guba, 1987a/b; Lincoln & 
Guba, 1988; Guba & Lincoln, 
1988; Guba & Lincoln, 1989 
The turn of the decade 1989-1990 – Four 
axiom systems emerge, the theory and its 
operationalization is further refined 
1989 - 1990 Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Guba, 
1990b; Guba, 1990c; Lincoln, 
1990b; Lincoln & Guba, 1990 
The mid 1990s – The table of metaphysical 
assumptions and their practical consequences 
takes center stage 
1993 - 1995 Lincoln, 1993; Denzin & 
Lincoln, 1994; Guba & 
Lincoln, 1994; Lincoln, 1995a 
The late 1990s – The conversation around 
extended validity considerations is 
foreshadowed 
1995 - 1998 Lincoln, 1995a; Lincoln, 





The millennium period – The participatory 
paradigm was introduced and the meta-
framework continues to evolve and be refined 
2000 - 2005 Lincoln & Denzin, 2000; 
Lincoln & Guba, 2000; Guba 
& Lincoln, 2005; see also 
Reason & Rowan, 1981; 
Reason, 1994a; Reason, 
1994b; Reason & Heron, 
1995; Heron, 1996; Heron & 
Reason, 1997 
2011 – The most recent paradigm meta-
framework evolution 
2007 - 2011 Lincoln & Lynham, 2007; 
Lincoln et al., 2011; Lincoln 










Disciplined Inquiry Revisited  
One of the important framing ideas that emerged from analysis of the authors’ work was 
the explicit positioning of disciplined inquiry in connection with fully articulated, foundational 
belief systems aimed at guiding disciplined inquiry (Guba, 1990c; Guba & Lincoln, 1982a). 
Different forms of inquiry were distinguished (e.g., those of the “everyday garden variety or 
action taken in connection with a disciplined inquiry”; Guba, 1990c, p. 17). Disciplined inquiries 
are “concerned with how we explore the world, how it is we come to systematize or order 
knowledge about the world, and what methods might be most appropriate for accomplishing that 
end” (Lincoln, 1985b, p. 31); that is, they are concerned with the “disciplined acquisition of 
knowledge” (Guba, 1992, p. 18). 
The production of disciplined knowledge requires judgments of the veracity of the claims 
of knowledge made as a consequence or output of the disciplined inquiries. These judgments 
must be done in connection with a belief system that guides what might be considered 
knowledge and how that knowledge might be acquired; in other words, judgment must be 
performed in connection with an understanding of quality inquiry process and quality inquiry 
product. The feature of disciplined inquiries that make them distinct from other forms of inquiry, 
(i.e., garden variety inquiries) is that disciplined inquiries must be “conducted (the process) and 
reported (the product) in such a way that all of its aspects can be examined publicly… the twin 
criteria of inspectable and verifiable process and product” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985b, pp. 49–50). 
That is, to qualify as disciplined, the report of an inquiry must inform the reader, in ways 
that are publicly confirmable, what the nature of the “raw” data is, the sources of those 
data, and the context in which they were collected (for example, a laboratory, the 
respondents’ work places, and the like). At the same time, the processes for transforming 




recommendations—must also be apparent to the reader; they too must be publicly 
confirmable so that their logic and coherence can be tested. (Lincoln & Guba, 1986b, p. 
547)  
The authors identify three questions that every inquirer should be able to answer about their 
inquiries if they are to be considered disciplined: “[1] Are the raw materials clearly displayed? 
[2] Do I understand the logic by which the data were reorganized into the argument? [3] Does 
the argument exhibit logic and coherence?” (pp. 547–548). These three questions guide the 
design, execution, and presentation of disciplined inquiries and effectively define what was done 
against the quality judgments of process and product. Methodologically, the emphasis on quality 
is on process, while paradigmatically the emphasis is on product, but the two remain important 
co-components of the overall judgment of an inquiry’s quality. 
Judging the quality of process, while critical in understanding the premises under which 
an inquiry was undertaken and why the case report takes the form that it does, as Smith 
(1987) suggests, is very different from judging the quality of the product of an inquiry. 
Process judgments can tell the reader something about the trustworthiness and 
authenticity of a given study, but they say little about the quality of the narrative 
presented. (Lincoln & Guba, 1990, p. 53). 
As a brief point of departure, it may be a useful contrast to extend discussion beyond 
definition of what disciplined inquiry is and attempt to define what disciplined is may not be. For 
the initial departure, the review turns back to Kaplan’s (2009) writing on the four uses of the 
term methodology: techniques, methods, honorifics, and epistemology. As described by Kaplan, 
techniques, methods, and honorifics have no explicit acknowledgment for the underlying belief 
system that encapsulates the knowledge to be produced, nor do they acknowledge the criteria and 
observable indicators of quality process and product that guide “the ways of doing the work of 





Kaplan (1990) emphasized that appropriate application of a technique or method does not 
make an inquiry disciplined. For example, the use of random selection and assignment in 
experimental inquiries is desirable. Appropriate random selection and assignment can be taught 
or practiced without any epistemological acknowledgment of why they might be a desirable 
feature of quality experimentation; rather, it can simply be understood as the agreed-upon right 
way to do the work of experimentation. Similarly, detailed articulation of specific experimental 
procedures can be practiced because it is the agreed-upon format for publication without further 
epistemological acknowledgment. In the former, there is no mapping of randomization to 
external validity, and external validity to objective epistemology, and objective epistemology to 
a form of realist ontology. In the latter, there is no mapping of detailed procedures to 
replicability, replicability to consistency and reliability, and consistency and reliability to 
generalizable knowledge claims.  
In the current working example, randomization and detailed procedures are forms of what 
Kaplan (2009) called honorifics, or ritualistic descriptions of a type of research to position the 
work in a particular area. However, neither honorifics nor appropriate application of technique or 
method warrants the inquiries disciplined. Disciplined inquiries connect “consideration of 
systematic, thorough, conscious choice of method, and overall design strategy” (Lincoln, 1997b, 
p. 56) to explicit assumptions and criteria of quality associated with an articulated belief system. 
Disciplined inquiries explicitly link “thoughtful decisions about design strategies, including 
methods” (Lincoln, 1995a, pp. 276–277) to “the most basic questions that can be raised 
concerning the pursuit of truth” (Kaplan, 2009, p. 20). Examples of these connections in 
operation can be found in Guba’s (1981a) framework of design decisions, actions, and desired 




naturalistic paradigms. In Guba’s framework, the threats to quality are explicitly linked to the 
knowledge outcomes of the forms of inquiry, thus enabling the inquirer to make thoughtful 
decisions about action in direct relation to the basic questions concerned with knowing. 
A great deal of the literature related to disciplined inquiry addressed how disciplined 
inquiry can be defined. Less prevalent in this sample of literature were discussions addressing 
why and how disciplined inquiry can be different from what scientists and practitioners already 
do. An extended section of text in The Paradigm Dialog (Guba, 1990c, pp. 51–52) captured the 
essence of these latter two issues. According to Guba, some practice of research has the tendency 
to ignore epistemological, social, and historical issues that have formally guided the formation of 
the procedures, rules, and customs adhered to in the conduct of inquiry. For example, Guba 
pointed to training programs whose methodological emphasis focused principally on methods 
and techniques of data collection and data analysis; however, the technical training alone did a 
disservice to the foundational conceptual issues at play that legitimize the methods and 
techniques as viable means to interacting with data. So why do disciplined inquiry (i.e., inquiry 
that makes explicit its underlying system of assumptions and its relation to both the process of 
conducting inquiry and the types of knowledge products taken as the ends of inquiry)? Because 
method practices do not stand alone; they stand in dependent relation with foundational 
questions regarding the knowledge inquiries seek to produce. In other words, according to Guba, 
methods are not simply independent right or wrong means to producing knowledge; rather, 
methods are the consequences of the forms of knowledge sought. Method is not prior to knowing 
but determined a priori by what one seeks to know: “What seems logical about inquiry is made 
so because of systems of meanings and relations that make things’ [i.e., methods, techniques, and 




to given procedures may warrant judgments of rigor, but need not qualify the inquiries as 
disciplined. 
Two Approaches Emerge 
The late 1970s was a seminal time period in writings on paradigms of inquiry (Guba, 
1975, 1978b, 1979). One of the more significant works of the self-cited sample of literature was 
Guba’s (1978b) monograph on naturalistic evaluation, in which naturalistic inquiry was formally 
proposed and contrasted with experimental inquiry, given eight conceptual distinctions, six 
operational distinctions, and distinctions among four general criteria of scientific adequacy. 
Although 11 criteria of good evaluation had been proposed in (Guba, 1975), Guba’s (1978b) 
monograph was the first time he had distinguished quality criteria for the naturalistic and 
conventional inquiry approaches.  
Naturalistic and experimental inquiries were conceptualized along two dimensions of 
control: (a) high-to-low control over antecedent conditions and (b) high-to-low control over 
noted outcomes or responses of interest. Experimental inquiry was fit into the high-high space in 
which both antecedent conditions and potential outputs were highly controlled. Naturalistic 
inquiry was fit into the low-low space, in which neither the dependent nor independent variables 
were controlled by the inquirer (Guba, 1978b). 
Guba (1979) further refined and extended the operational and conceptual distinctions of 
naturalistic and experimental inquiries. However, of greater significance was the presentation of 






Basic Assumptions of Naturalistic and Experimental Inquiries 
The scientistic model of inquiry The naturalist model of inquiry 
The assumption of singular reality. 
 E.g., phenomena are real, inquiry can 
converge on their discovery, and that reality 
is “fragmentable into subsystems, which, at 
the extreme, may be conceptualized as 
variables” (Guba, 1979, p. 269) 
The assumption of multiple realities 
 E.g., “inquiry diverges onto many realities, no 
one of which is any more “true” than any other 
… [; phenomena] cannot be described or 
understood in terms of separate variables” 
(Guba, 1979, pp. 269-270). 
The assumption of subject-object duality. 
 E.g., “the inquirer will have no effect on the 
phenomena being studied” (Guba, 1979, p. 
269). 
The assumption of subject-object inter-relatedness. 
 E.g., “inquirers and the objects or entities they 
investigate are inter-related” (Guba, 1979, p. 
270). 
The assumption of generalizability. 
 E.g., inquiries can produce nomothetic 
statements or “enduring truth statements that 
are essentially unchanged from context to 
context” (Guba, 1979, p. 269).  
The assumption of contextuality. 
 E.g., inquiry produces idiographic 
understandings or “working hypotheses in a 
context and thick description of that context to 
be able to appreciate the way in which it 
impacts inquiry” (Guba, 1979, p. 270). 
The formal articulation of the inquiry systems for both naturalistic and scientific inquiries 
in the late 1970s set the stage for the paradigm conversation over the ensuing 40-plus years of 
literature. What had essentially been accomplished was an initial positioning of naturalistic 
inquiry as its own form of inquiry, as opposed to some lesser or, at best, modified form of 
conventional scientific inquiry. Conceptually and practically, Guba (1978b, 1979) had set the 
foundations of the conversation around underlying assumptions, methodological issues, and 
issues of interpretation and outcome for completely independent frameworks of inquiry. 
Axiomatic Theory Enters the Picture 
The early 1980s was the dawn of axiomatic theory, and thus the dawn of opposing 
paradigms of inquiry. The axiomatic connection of Guba and Lincoln’s (e.g., 1982a) work with 
that of Habermas (1971) was made explicit. Similarities in the language used by Habermas, such 




the apprehension of reality (p. 309) was also carried over in ideas to demonstrate in a few 
instances.  
Of additional significance during the period of emerging axiomatic theory was 
conceptualization of the framework of inquiry systems embedded in the axiomatic theoretical 
form. The framework of frameworks was achieved through a subject-position axiom structure. 
Prior to the axiomatic theory, inquiry approaches were contrasted by the different sets of 
assumptions comprising the inquiry systems (e.g., Guba, 1978b). However, the advent of the 
axiom theory offered conceptualization of independent inquiry systems through the holistic set of 
differing positions on common category-like subjects of fundamental assumptions about reality 
and the process of coming to know it (Guba, 1981a; Guba & Lincoln, 1981, 1982a). The five 
axiom subjects and specific positions of the rationalistic and naturalistic paradigms proposed in 
this time period are shown in Table 25 (adapted from Guba & Lincoln, [1982a]). 
Table 25 
Subject-Position Axiom Theory 
Axiom subject Rationalistic position Naturalistic position 
Axiom #1: The 
nature of reality 
Single and tangible Multiple and intangible 
Axiom #2: The 
inquirer-object 
relationship 
“The inquirer is able to maintain a discrete 
and inviolable distance between 
himself/herself and the object of inquiry” 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1982a, p. 238). 
"The inquirer and the object interact to 
influence one another; especially is this 
mutual interaction present when the object 
of inquiry is another human being 
(respondent)” (Guba & Lincoln, 1982a, p. 
238). 
Axiom #3: The 
nature of truth 
statements 
Nomothetic body of knowledge, e.g., 
context-free truth statements 
Idiographic body of knowledge, e.g., time 
and context-bound working hypotheses 




on of action 
“Every action can be explained as the 
result (effect) of a real cause or causes that 
precede the effect temporally (or are at 
“An action may be explainable in terms of 
multiple interacting factors, events, and 
processes that shape it and are part of it; 




least simultaneous with it)” (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1982a, p. 238) 
inferences about the patterns and webs of 
such shaping in any given case” (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1982a, p. 238) 
Axiom #5: The role 
of values in inquiry 
“Inquiry is value-free and can be 
guaranteed to be so by virtue of the 
objective methodology employed. These 
methods guarantee inquirer neutrality and 
inquiry rigor and produce data that ‘speak 
for themselves’” (Guba & Lincoln, 1982a, 
p. 238) 
Inquiry is always value-bound in at least 
four ways: a) by inquirer values, b) by the 
paradigm selected to investigate the 
problem, c) “by the choice of substantive 
theory and methods used to guide the 
collection and analysis of data relevant to 
the problem selected and in the 
interpretation of findings” (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1982a, p. 238), d) by the values 
inherent in the context. The “…problem, 
paradigm, method(s), and context must 
exhibit internal coherence, value fit, and 
congruence (value resonance) for the 
inquiry to be deemed appropriate and 
fitting and to produce meaningful 
findings” (Guba & Lincoln, 1982a, p. 
243). 
In addition to significant conceptual organization of the fundamental assumptions guiding 
inquiry that was accomplished through the subject-position axiom structure, operational clarity 
and organization were enhanced through the application of the same subject-position hierarchy to 
derivative postures (i.e., axiom extensions into the process of inquiry) and quality criteria. Table 
26 (adapted from Guba [1981a]; Guba & Lincoln [1981, 1982a]) shows the derivative postures, 
and Table 27 (adapted from Guba [1981a]; Guba & Lincoln [1981, 1982a]) the quality criteria. 
Table 26 
Subject-Position Hierarchy of Postures Taken by Practitioners 
Posture 
subject 
Rationalistic position Naturalistic position 
Preferred 
techniques 
Preference for quantitative methods Preference for qualitative methods 
Quality 
criterion 
Almost exclusively on the criteria of rigor: 
internal validity, external validity, 
reliability, and objectivity 
Emphasis, although not exclusively, on relevance: 




A priori theory derived from deductive 
reasoning; emphasis placed on verification 
of hypotheses generated from the a priori 
theory. 
A posteriori, grounded, theory derived 







"Scientific inquirers typically pose the 
question in the form, Can x cause y?, and 
demonstrate in the laboratory that y can 
indeed be caused by x.” (Guba & Lincoln, 
1981, p. 68) 
"Naturalistic inquirers are less interested in what 
can be made to happen in a contrived situation 
than in what does happen in a natural setting” 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1981, p. 68) 
Knowledge 
types used 
Propositional only Tacit and propositional 
Stance Reductionist stance Expansionist stance 
The purpose of 
inquiry 
Verification of a priori hypotheses 
“…the discovery of elements or insights not yet 
included in existing theories.” (Guba & Lincoln, 
1981, p. 71) 
Instrument Objective neutral instruments 
Use of the self as instrument, i.e., the “human 
being as an instrument” (Guba & Lincoln, 1981, 
p. 72) 





All rules for data collection and analysis 
specified in advance. 
Flexible process that emerges with and 
throughout data collection, e.g. “data accrue in 
the "rawest" possible fashion and must be 
unitized and categorized after the fact” (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1981, p. 73) 
Design Preordinate design Emergent design 
Style 
Intervention, emphasis on rigor: 
“independent and dependent variables are 
isolated and the context is arranged so that 
these variables and only these variables 
can account for whatever findings emerge” 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1981, p. 74). 
Selection, balance of rigor and relevance: study 
of “naturally occurring events… in which nature 
has arranged the experiment without benefit of 
man's intervention” (Guba & Lincoln, 1981, p. 
74) 
Setting 
Context-free, laboratory-like environments 
for managing interventions. 
Context-rich, natural environments reflecting the 
phenomenon’s natural and complex environment. 
Treatment The controlled manipulation of a variable. 
Not inherent to naturalistic inquiry, yet does not 
prevent consideration of “some naturally 
occurring phenomenon as a "treatment," that is, 
as a likely cause for some [situation specific] 
observable effect” (Guba & Lincoln, 1981, p. 75) 
Analytic units 
“The variable, and all relationships are 
expressed as between variables (or systems 
of variables).” (Guba & Lincoln, 1981, p. 
75) 
Emphasis on “the complex patternings that are 
observed in nature… While it is useful to analyze 
variables, too little attention has been paid to the 
more complex interrelationships that can only be 
described as patterns. And it is dubious whether 
conventional modes for analyzing data can catch 
these often kaleidoscopic patterns.” (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1981, p. 75) 
Contextual 
elements 
Control all extraneous elements that might 
confound the effects of the central 
phenomenon of interest. 
Invited interference includes all real world 
complexity; “the concept of "invited interference" 
is of great importance to the evaluator, who 
generally does not wish to know how the entity 
being evaluated works in the best of all possible 








Subject-Position Hierarchy for Criteria of Quality 
Subject Rationalistic position Naturalistic position 
Truth value Internal validity Credibility 
Applicability External validity or generalizability Transferability* 
Consistency Reliability Dependability** 
Neutrality Objectivity Confirmability 
* termed “fittingness” in Guba & Lincoln, 1981  
** termed “auditability” in Guba & Lincoln, 1981 
Basic Beliefs Systems Refined 
The mid 1980s was a period of refined discussion about the paradigms defined by the 
axiom theory proposed at the beginning of the decade Guba, 1985; Lincoln, 1985e, 1986; 
Lincoln & Guba, 1985b, 1986a); however, the emphasis was clearly on further articulating the 
naturalistic paradigm (e.g., Lincoln, 1985e; Lincoln & Guba, 1985b). During this time period, 
the conversation also shifted subtly to a focus on the basic belief system of a paradigm, rather 
than an exclusive (theoretical) reference to its underlying axioms. The shift in focus to a 
paradigm’s basic belief system facilitated extended discussion of the holistic and systematic 
nature of the collective set of assumptions defining a paradigm, as well as the synergism of the 
postures logically extended from the basic belief system. The postures, or operational 
characteristics in the work of Lincoln and Guba (1985b) represented the most detailed exposition 





The refined discussion of this time period not only included further detailed attention to 
the basic assumptions of the conventional/positivist and naturalistic paradigms, but it also 
included presentation of a new set of derivative postures, including several new posture subjects 
and specific positions for the naturalistic paradigm (Lincoln, 1985e; Lincoln & Guba, 1985b), as 
well as expansion of the quality criteria of naturalism to include a set of non-foundational 
authenticity criteria (Lincoln, 1986; Lincoln & Guba, 1986a). The new set of derivative postures 
included 14 subjects (Lincoln, 1985e; Lincoln & Guba, 1985b):  
1. Setting  
2. Instruments 
3. Knowledge types used 
4. Preferred methods 
5. Sampling strategy 
6. Logic of analysis 
7. Source of theory 
8. Design 
9. Research results 
10. Reporting mode 
11. The nature of interpretation 
12. Application of findings 
13. Determining inquiry boundaries 




Seven of these 14 postures were novel presentations. The positions on each were defined for 
naturalism but not positivism. These naturalistic positions were (Lincoln, 1985e; Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985b): 
 Logic of analysis – inductive data analysis 
 Sampling strategy – purposive sampling 
 Determining inquiry boundaries – problem-determined boundaries 
 Application of findings – tentative application 
 Reporting mode – case study reporting mode 
 Criteria of quality – special criteria for trustworthiness (i.e., credibility, 
transferability, dependability, and confirmability) 
 Research results – negotiated results 
The presentation of authenticity criteria was a further assertion of the independence of the 
naturalistic paradigm from the shadow of positivism. The parallel authenticity criteria were 
grounded in the naturalistic paradigm itself, rather than representing a set of criteria developed to 
parallel those quality criteria of positivism. That is, authenticity criteria fit into a parallel subject-
position framework within which the subjects (i.e., truth value, applicability, consistency, and 
neutrality) were conceptualized in relation to the positions of positivism (i.e., internal validity, 
external validity, reliability, and objectivity; Lincoln, 1985e; Lincoln & Guba, 1985b). These 
new authenticity criteria included: 
 Fairness 
 Ontological authenticity 




 Catalytic authenticity 
 Tactical authenticity 
Distinction of Process From Product 
By late the 1980s, writings on paradigms of inquiry began to focus more heavily on 
methodological process differences between the conventional and naturalistic paradigms. Guba 
(1987a, 1987b; and later Guba & Lincoln, [1989]) wrote the first introduction to methodology as 
an axiom subject in the theory. Methodology was retained as a fundamental assumption through 
to the current day theory (e.g., Lincoln & Lynham, 2011; Lincoln et al., 2011). Full models of 
the methodologies for the conventional and naturalistic paradigms were proposed in 1988; 
furthermore, the paradigms’ methodological processes were distinguished from their respective 
qualitative and quantitative tools and techniques (i.e., the methods of their methodologies) (Guba 
& Lincoln, 1988, pp. 100-110). 
In addition to the added methodological emphasis of the late 1980s, the paradigm 
discourse more closely aligned with the definition of disciplined inquiry through explicit 
distinction of the process of inquiry from the product of inquiry. The alignment of the paradigm 
development with disciplined inquiry had two significant implications. First, the alignment 
influenced positioning of the axiom extensions (e.g., the 14 formal theorems of conventional and 
constructivist paradigms) (Guba, 1987a, 1987b; Guba & Lincoln, 1989). Second, the alignment 
resulted in a reconceptualization of quality criteria into two groups distinguishing the quality 
criteria for process (i.e., rigor/trustworthiness criteria and authenticity criteria as methodological 
criteria, although later authenticity criteria were repositioned as states of being by Guba [1990c]) 




1988]). New to this reconceptualization of quality criteria for process and product was proposal 
of four classes of criteria for addressing the goodness of products of naturalistic inquiries 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1988): 
1. Axiomatic criteria 
2. Rhetorical criteria 
3. Action criteria 
4. Application or transferability criteria 
Four Axiom Systems Emerge  
At the turn of the decade (i.e., 1989–1990), the constructivist label was introduced for the 
naturalistic paradigm, and four complete axiomatic systems of inquiry were proposed that 
detailed specific axiom positions on the ontological, epistemological, and methodological 
subjects for the positivist, postpositivist, constructivist, and critical paradigms (Table 28). At this 
point in time, the primary focus shifted from axioms to metaphysical assumptions of paradigms; 
ontology, epistemology, and methodology were defined as the three basic questions of an 
inquirer’s (metaphysical) belief system. The critical realist ontological position also received 
greater attention, given the explicit place in the frameworks for postpositivist and critical 






Table of Four Axiom Systems Emerging in 1989–1990 
Subject Positivist position Postpositivist position Critical position 
Constructivist 
position 














In addition to expansion of the paradigm meta-framework, two other notable milestones 
marked the transition from the 1980s to the 1990s: a significant modification and extension of 
the quality criteria, and the beginning of an extensive discussion on knowledge accumulation 
across paradigms (Guba, 1990b, 1990c; Lincoln, 1990b; Lincoln & Guba, 1990). The 
progression of the quality criteria can be characterized by several key developments. 
First, further contextualization of the concepts of quality criteria for process and product 
was provided within the larger quality criteria philosophical dialog of Chisholm’s (1973) 
problem of the criterion (Guba, 1990c). The problem of the criterion argues that the credibility of 
knowledge claims can be evaluated by the process used to arrive at them. However, to know 
which processes have merit in producing credible results, one must also know what credible 
results are. Thus, circularity is present in the evaluation of credible knowledge claims. Therefore, 
separate criteria are needed to judge the quality of the inquiry process and of the inquiry product. 
Another key development was the distinction of authenticity criteria from methodological 
trustworthiness criteria (i.e., credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability). 
Authenticity criteria were repositioned as “states of being” (Guba, 1990c, p. 70) unique to the 




criteria as something unique to and rooted in, naturalism, rather than more simply paralleling the 
explicit methodological (process) criteria of positivism (i.e., internal and external validity, 
reliability, and objectivity). 
New nonconventional criteria for judging the goodness of naturalistic reports were 
proposed (Guba, 1990b), along with 20 general criteria of quality for naturalistic inquiries (Guba, 
1990c). Although not formal criteria in the sense of an axiomatic structure, the criteria filled an 
important gap in practice by contextualizing the more esoteric components of quality for 
naturalistic inquiries. For example, rather than discussing resonance criteria, Guba (1990b) more 
directly asked whether the report resonates with the participants’ actual lived experiences from 
the perspective of participant. 
Building upon the contextualized conversation of quality criteria in the practice of 
naturalistic inquiries, Lincoln (e.g., 1990b) began discussing how ethics should be incorporated 
into the many decision points in research design. Here, ethics was not discussed in the 
conventional sense of the ethical treatment of human subjects that may be part of an internal 
review board (IRB) proposal to work with human subjects, but rather, the ethical and moral 
considerations of doing research with co-participants and working to co-construct and re-present 
understandings of their experiences. Given the humanistic nature of naturalistic inquiry, a robust 
discussion emerged about the ethics of doing research on, with, and about humans. To this end, 
the categorical and practical imperatives were introduced as ethical principles for inquiry 
(Lincoln, 1990b). Although not criteria of quality per se, they were presented in close relation to 




that participants should both be treated as one would want to be treated and as a benefactor of 
inquiry rather than mere means for inquiries. 
Another key development in the conversation on quality criteria was the revision of the 
criteria specific to addressing the goodness of products of naturalistic inquiries (Lincoln & Guba, 
1990). The axiomatic criteria (Guba, 1990c; Lincoln & Guba, 1988) was relabeled with the 
category of resonance criteria (Lincoln & Guba, 1990), and the action criteria (Guba, 1990c; 
Lincoln & Guba, 1988) was relabeled as the category of empowerment criteria (Lincoln & Guba, 
1990). In addition, the full set of criteria categories was more fully unpacked into the following 
hierarchy (Lincoln & Guba, 1990): 
1. Resonance criteria 
2. Rhetorical criteria 
i. Unity 
ii. Overall organization 
iii. Simplicity or clarity 
iv. Craftsmanship 
3. Empowerment criteria 
4. Applicability criteria 
i. Transference 
ii. Vicarious experience 
iii. Metaphor 




The Paradigm Dialog (Guba, 1990c) was one of the most comprehensive syntheses of the 
work on paradigm theory to date. Among its many contributions to the development of the 
paradigm framework, as well as to the development of five specific paradigm frameworks, was 
its foundational dialog on knowledge accumulation across different paradigms of inquiry. In 
addition to opening the conversation to acknowledge that different types of knowledge can 
accumulate differently (e.g., not all are building blocks in the wall of knowledge), the 
conversation on knowledge accumulation also set the stage for the conceptualization of theories 
as ways knowledge can accumulate, a concept that continued for the next two decades. 
Metaphysical Assumptions and Their Practical Consequences Take Center Stage  
A milestone of the mid 1990s was publication of the first edition of the Handbook of 
Qualitative Research (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). Even though the handbook emphasized 
qualitative inquiry, the text was a comprehensive presentation of philosophy to practice for 
different styles and approaches of qualitative inquiry. The table of three metaphysical 
assumptions (i.e., ontology, epistemology, and methodology) undergirding paradigms played a 
central role in the inquiry discussion; here again, the specific metaphysical positions for 
positivism, postpositivism, critical theory, and constructivism were presented (Guba & Lincoln, 
1994). The axiom extensions were rethought, built upon, and now termed “consequences for the 
practical conduct of inquiry, as well as for the interpretation of findings and policy choices” (p. 









In addition to discussion of the axiom subjects, positions, and extensions into practice for 
positivism, postpositivism, critical theory, and constructivism, the text opened the door for 
discussion of the issues of representation and legitimation (i.e., the presentation of others’ 
voices/experiences and the authority given to texts, respectively) and continued to advance the 
sophistication of the conversation around quality criteria for inquiries. Quality criteria for critical 
inquiries were presented distinct from those for conventional and constructivist inquiries (Guba 
& Lincoln, 1994; Lincoln, 1993). Paradigm-specific emphasis/importance was distinguished 
among the set of axiom extensions (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). The distinction was made for 
thinking about the quality of inquiries, given the extrinsic methodological emphasis on procedure 
to ensure rigor in conventional inquiries and the intrinsic methodological emphasis on data and 
ethics to ensure rigor in constructivist/naturalist inquiries (Lincoln, 1995a). 
The Conversation About Extended Validity Considerations Is Foreshadowed 
In the late 1990s, 10 emerging criteria of quality for interpretive inquiry were presented 
(Lincoln, 1995a, 1997b, 1998b): (a) standards for judging quality in the inquiry community, (b) 
positionality, or standpoint judgments, (c) community as arbiter of quality, (d) voice, (e) critical 
subjectivity, (f) reciprocity, (g) sacredness, (h) sharing the prerequisites of privilege, (i) caring, 
and (j) yearning. Later, these 10 emerging criteria became the specific criteria for validity as a 
form of ethical criteria when extended validity considerations were presented by Lincoln and 




The emerging criteria represented an early swell in the spotlight being put on the concept 
of validity and how judgments of verisimilitude were being made about inquiry products (e.g., 
judgments of “the congruence between some representation of an object, context, situation, 
event, or person and the object that is “signified” by the verbal representation”; Lincoln, 1997a, 
p. 161). The singularity of objective isomorphism as the only validity criterion was being 
challenged, given the ethical and moral considerations of doing research with co-participants for 
their own betterment in addition to improved understanding (e.g., issues of representation and 
legitimation). 
The Participatory Paradigm Is Introduced 
During the early millennium time period, both the second and third editions of the Sage 
Handbook of Qualitative Inquiry (2000 and 2005, respectively) were published. The most 
significant new addition to the second edition was the introduction of the participatory paradigm 
within the paradigm meta-framework as an independent system of inquiry alongside the 
positivist, postpositivist, critical, and constructivist systems of inquiry (Guba & Lincoln, 2005; 
Lincoln & Denzin, 2000; Lincoln & Guba, 2000). The authors built upon prior writings of Heron 
and Reason (e.g., 1997) to fully articulate the newly introduced participatory paradigm within 
their meta-framework of axiom subjects, positions, and axiom extensions into practice. 
Throughout the second and third editions (2000 and 2005, respectively) of the handbook, 
the authors continued to evolve the axiom extensions and refine the discussion around validity 
and rigor (Guba & Lincoln, 2005; Lincoln & Guba, 2000). The second and third editions took 
another look at the working set of axiom extensions. Here, axiom consequences (Guba & 




critical issues of the time was highlighted. Eleven positions on practical issues of inquiry and 
seven critical issues of the time were discussed for the five paradigms (i.e., positivism, 
postpositivism, critical, constructivism, and participatory) (Guba & Lincoln, 2005; Lincoln & 
Guba, 2000). 
Validity was given increased attention as a common theoretical construct for the quality 
of inquiries. Discussion of validity as relevant to all paradigms was achieved by demonstrating 
that the validity construct could be operationalized drastically different depending upon the 
assumption of reality with which verisimilitude, i.e., isomorphism, was the ideal. A number of 
operationalized validity concepts were discussed for alternative paradigms (i.e., extended 
validity considerations). The extended validity considerations included validity as authenticity, 
crystalline validity, transgressive validities, and validity as an ethical relationship (Guba & 
Lincoln, 2005; Lincoln & Guba, 2000). 
A bold stance on rigor on rigor was also taken during this early millennium time period; 
however, it was a stance that aligned with the writings on disciplined inquiry. Traditionally, rigor 
had been a construct of conventional positivist or postpositivist inquiries, within which the rigor 
ideal implied attention to the method of inquiry in order to ensure objective findings. Up to this 
point in time, the tendency in the paradigm literature was to discuss the rigor of conventional 
methodology, the trustworthiness of naturalistic methodology, and the authenticity of naturalistic 
results. However, the dialog further opened during the early millennium time period to the idea 
of rigor in method versus rigor in interpretation; that is, the questions of whether inquirers are 
being disciplined in the process of inquiry, as well as disciplined in the interpretation of the 




The Most Recent Paradigm Framework Evolution 
At the end of the first decade of the new millennium, three significant publications 
converged on the latest evolution of the authors’ paradigm meta-framework (Lincoln & Lynham, 
2007, 2011; Lincoln et al., 2011). This most recent paradigm evolution (i.e., 2007–2011) 
included the addition of axiology and teleology as two metaphysical subjects, more explicit 
paradigmatic focus on the form of theories produced from paradigmatically different inquiries, 
and presentation of a set of quality criteria for the different paradigms’ theories. 
The addition of axiology and teleology to the meta-framework as two metaphysical 
subjects at the end of the first decade of the millennium represented a formal reintroduction of 
the two assumptions into the meta-framework. Note that the conceptual basis of axiology was 
initially presented by Guba (1978b) as the value structure of an inquiry approach, and then 
explicitly introduced as an axiom by Guba and Lincoln (1982a). There was a gap, however, in 
representation of axiology as an explicit metaphysical subject from about the time that 
methodology was introduced (circa 1989–1990) as part of the three basics questions of an 
inquirer’s belief system. Throughout the second, third, and fourth editions of the handbook 
(Lincoln & Guba, 2000; Guba & Lincoln, 2005; Lincoln et al., 2011; respectively), the authors 
noted that “axiology should be grouped with basic beliefs” (e.g., Lincoln & Guba, 2000, p. 169), 
yet it failed to formally enter the meta-framework as a metaphysical assumption until Lincoln 
and Lynham (2011) added it.  
Teleology, although never explicitly included in any framework prior to 2011, was 
conceptually included early (e.g., the purpose of inquiry, according to Guba [1978b]), and the 




first explicit presentation of teleology as a metaphysical assumption. Given the introduction of 
the two additional metaphysical subjects, the meta-framework received yet another expansion as 
the five axiom meta-framework was fully articulated with axiom positions for the positivist, 
postpositivist, critical, and interpretive paradigms (note that neither the constructivist nor 
participatory paradigm was individually included). 
Of significance to the writing on inquiry outputs (e.g., knowledge claims and 
accumulation of knowledge) was the emphasis on different paradigmatic forms of theory and 
their respective criteria of quality (Lincoln & Lynham, 2007, 2011). Within the most recent 
paradigm evolution, the conversation about the theoretical outputs of paradigmatically based 
inquiries came full circle from its earlier roots in the 1990s (i.e., Guba, 1990c). Lincoln and 
Lynham (2011) described both the nature and purpose of theory generated from positivist, 
postpositivist, critical, and interpretive paradigms. Twenty years earlier, Guba (1990c) had 
described the nature of knowledge and knowledge accumulation produced from positivist, 
postpositivist, critical, and constructivist paradigms. Since then (i.e., approximately 1990 to 
2011), Lynham (2000a, 2000b) and others also furthered the conversation in the literature on the 
nature of theory and theory building.  
Given the framing of theory as a type of knowledge container within an ongoing cycle of 
continuous refinement and development (Lynham, 2002b), the description of the nature and 
purpose of paradigmatically oriented theories (Lincoln & Lynham, 2007, 2011) offered a strong 
connection to and advancement of the underlying idea of knowledge accumulation in the 
authors’ writing on paradigms. The writing on the nature of knowledge, accumulation, and 





Summary of the Nature of Knowledge, Accumulation, and Theory 
 Paradigm 
 Positivist Postpositivist Critical Constructivist / 
interpretivist 
Participatory 
The purpose of 
theory 
Development of grand to middle 
range explanations and predictions  
Development of 



















Verified theoretical propositions 





































Conclusion of Historical Analysis of the Paradigm Theory 
Although at its core an axiomatic theory, paradigm theory defined the phenomenon 
primarily through the set of meta-characteristics articulated as the basic beliefs or metaphysical 
assumptions of a paradigm (i.e., axioms) (Table 13, modified from Guba & Lincoln [1994, 
2005]; Lincoln & Guba [2000]; Lincoln & Lynham [2011]; Lincoln et al. [2011]). The meta-
framework was further elaborated through the positions on practical issues and several additional 
relevant critical issues of the time (i.e., axiom extensions). All paradigms were presented in a 




upon which all defined paradigms must have positions, and the specific positions detailed the 
defining set of assumptions that characterized each individual paradigm.  
Table 30 



































































knowing… as a 
means to social 
emancipation” 
(Guba & Lincoln, 
2005, p. 198). 
“Practical 
knowing about 
how to flourish 
with a balance of 
autonomy, 
cooperation, and 
hierarchy in a 
culture is an end 
in itself” (Guba & 
Lincoln, 2005, p. 
198). 
Teleology The aim of inquiry is to explain in 
order to predict 
The aim of 






The aim of 
inquiry is to 
describe, make 




order to improve 
practice 
Not yet defined 
At least two significant contributions to the paradigm of inquiry construct emerged 
through organization into the framework represented in Table 13. First, individual philosophical 




underlying set of axiom positions and theorems that were expressed as a specific combination of 
positions on metaphysical assumptions and their logical extensions into practice. Each paradigm 
was organized into a specific framework of ideals, and the specific lens, or world view, of each 
paradigm was made more explicit through each paradigm’s specific framework of ideals.   
The second significant contribution that emerged through the meta-framework 
organization was the connectivity of different paradigms of inquiry at a meta level, which 
facilitated understanding between paradigms. Previously, attempts to understand one paradigm 
from the perspective of another were still burdened by issues of commensurability and 
accommodation, somewhat akin to a form of ethnocentric philosophy science (e.g., Guba & 
Lincoln, 1994; Lincoln & Guba, 2000). The authors offered a framework of inquiry frameworks. 
Given the meta-framework organization, cross-paradigm comparisons were achieved with the set 
of axiomatic subjects systematized into a framework of each paradigm’s basic beliefs. Even 
though similarly achieved previously by Habermas (1971), it had not been achieved with the 
added sophistication of Lincoln et al., nor had it been achieved for the breadth of paradigm 
frameworks and depth of operational characteristics articulated within the sophisticated subject-
position formulation of basic assumptions, postures, and quality criteria.  
With its unifying organization, the paradigm of inquiry meta-framework (Lincoln et al., 
2011) defined the general structure, or meta-structure, of a paradigm of inquiry outside the 
context of any particular paradigm of inquiry. That is, all paradigms of inquiry could be 
understood within the paradigm meta-framework of axiomatic subjects, even though 
understanding any particular paradigm of inquiry was accomplished by first substituting a 




position pieces within their unified gestalt context. As articulated by Guba (1990c) regarding 
ontology, epistemology, and methodology, “all these past paradigms, as well as emergent 
contenders, can be characterized by the way their proponents respond to three basic questions” 
(p. 18); however, it is the set of basic assumption subjects themselves, not the specific positions, 
that can be used to more generally understand the general structure of any paradigm of inquiry. 
Next Steps 
The historical analysis provided improved understanding of the paradigm theory within 
its historical and developmental context. Given the larger goal of using the understanding of the 
theory as an exemplar against which to conceptualize an analogous model for methodology for 
its complementary juxtaposition with the paradigm theory in the process of disciplined inquiry, 
the axiomatic form of paradigm theory should be further understood as a theoretical product and 
theoretical process. Even though the current historical analysis presented a contextualized 
understanding of the exemplar theory’s development, it did not provide detailed understanding of 
paradigm through the lens of a theory.  
Reverse engineering, although typically associated with physical systems in the discipline 
of engineering, provides a meaningful framework for examining the axiomatic theory from a 
process/product perspective. The reverse engineering process facilitates deconstruction of the 
theory into its formative process. The outcome of reverse engineering is the production of a 
reproducible surrogate process and product of the subject system. Consequently, a reverse 
engineering analysis, as described in the following chapter, should be considered as means to 





CHAPTER 5:  METHOD FOR REVERSE ENGINEERING THE PARADIGM THEORY 
Chapter 5 Preface 
Chapter 5 describes the method of reverse engineering analysis used to advance the 
historical understanding of the paradigm phenomenon developed in the fourth chapter towards 
understanding the phenomenon as both a form of theory and part of an ongoing theory-building 
process. The method of reverse engineering analysis describes how the inquiry into the paradigm 
phenomenon was conducted that led to characterization of the key theoretical features of the 
subject system, systematic process, and initial conditions. Even though the process of reverse 
engineering analysis specifically targeted understanding and characterizing the theory-building 
process associated with the development of paradigm theory, within the larger research agenda 
the reverse engineering analysis represented the next significant step towards understanding the 
theoretical exemplar and distilling the actionable theoretical knowledge necessary to define a 
starting point in the theory-building work on the phenomenon of methodology.  
The process described in chapter 5 follows the integrative literature review research 
design framework of Appendix A. First, the method chapter specifically positions the reverse 
engineering analysis in the context of its purpose, conceptual frame, research problem, need, and 
research questions. Next, the method chapter includes details on the process of sampling, 
collecting, and analyzing data in support of the four foci of a reverse engineering analysis: (a) 
consideration of indirect influences, (b) analysis of subject system, (c) analysis of systematic 
process, and (d) analysis of initial conditions. The novelty of the methodological approach 




analysis coupled with a theoretical coding scheme (Appendices B and C) has been used to 
theoretically analyze a phenomenon. 
Background Information 
Reverse engineering can be defined as “the practice of deciphering designs from finished 
products” (Chikofsky & Cross, 1990, p. 13), performed “by someone other than the original 
designers” (Rekoff, 1985, p. 244). That is, reverse engineering takes as its starting point a 
finished product, and then systematically and deductively analyzes the “subject system to 
identify the system’s components and their interrelationships and create representations of the 
system in another form or at a higher level of abstraction” (Chikofsky & Cross, 1990, p. 15). The 
purpose of reverse engineering is to identify and document an actionable set of specifications 
that can be used to reproduce the process and/or product of interest (Rekoff, 1985). Thus, the 
purpose of applying the reverse engineering practice to paradigm theory was to identify and 
document the theoretical characteristics of the theory (e.g., theory building processes and 
theoretical form) for use in the reproduction of the theoretical process for the phenomenon of 
methodology. 
The reproduced process and product of reverse engineering can both be re-envisioned as 
a clone of the original or a surrogate of the original. A cloned process would be an exact 
replicate of the original design process, and a cloned product would be an exact replicate of the 
original design output, whereby both must exhibit “the same form, fit, function, and mechanism-
of-operation as does the original item” (Rekoff, 1985, p. 244). A surrogate functions similarly to 
the original subject system and has a similar physical or conceptual structure, but is not an exact 




improvements, and modifications to either the process or product, whereas clones are intended to 
be exact copies of the original process and the original product of the original designers 
(Chikofsky & Cross, 1990; Rekoff, 1985). 
As a style of thinking, “it should be recognized that the business of reverse engineering is 
not really greatly different from that of detective work in a criminal investigation or of 
conducting military intelligence operations” (Rekoff, 1985, p. 245). As a first step in the 
detective work of reverse engineering, it is important to build up a background understanding of 
both the subject system and the indirect influences of the original designers. Indirect influences 
might include the designer’s technical culture, disciplinary background training, intended users 
and uses, methodological conventions, and other influences intuitively known by the designers. 
“The designer’s mind set comes about from his/her basic method of education and prior 
experience… Standard practices used in the designer’s environment (in its largest sense) provide 
distinctive ‘finger prints’” (p. 246). 
Three main assumptions about the original design and designers undergird the detective-
like thought process of reverse engineering: (a) the presence of a subject system, (b) the 
existence of a life-cycle model, and (c) the identification of abstraction levels. The first 
assumption simply implies that to reverse engineer an existing product, one must have access to 
the subject system. The second assumption implies that the subject system was produced through 
some sort of systematic design and development process. This second assumption is necessary so 
that one is not re-envisioning an orderly process out of an originally chaotic process. The last 
assumption implies that the design process can be specified in high-level, abstract design stages 




One of the tools leveraged during reverse engineering is representation of the 
deconstructed subject system abstractly in a configuration document. A configuration document 
generally maps out all the identified system elements, sub-elements, various ways elements are 
interconnected, and various system states of the subject system. The configuration document 
both reveals all the components normally unexposed and reveals how those components fit 
together hierarchically and functionally (Rekoff, 1985). An example of a configuration document 
modeled in the general axiomatic form (i.e., axiomatic subject and axiomatic position) is shown 
in Figure 4. 
  
Figure 4. Example configuration document. 
The goal of the current reverse engineering was to conceptually re-envision a surrogate 
research design similar to that of the axiomatic method of Lincoln et al. (e.g., Guba, 1987, 
1990c, Guba & Lincoln, 1982a, 1988, 1989; Guba & Lincoln, 1994, 2005; Lincoln & Guba, 
1985b, 2000; Lincoln & Lynham, 2011; Lincoln et al., 2011), the surrogate flow of ideas through 

























original research design. To accomplish the conceptual recreation, a representative set of 
research design decisions must be deduced from the existing system. The current reverse 
engineering process took the paradigm theory of Lincoln et al. (2011) as its subject system for 
analysis. Leveraging insights from the historical analysis, first the indirect influences of the 
original design and the designers were factored into the analysis. Second, the theoretical product 
serving as subject system was deconstructed and represented in a configuration document. Next, 
because a systematic design process led to the axiomatic output of the subject system, the 
elements identified in the configuration document were further abstracted into sub-products of 
representative research design phases. Lastly, initial conditions and premises for the re-
envisioned research design were considered. 
Positioning 
The purpose of the proposed reverse engineering analysis of the exemplar paradigm 
theory of Lincoln et al. (2011) was to better understand the theory-building process(es) that the 
authors may have gone through (both formally and informally) in the development of the theory. 
To do so is to see the subject system as a theoretical form, conceptually re-envision a surrogate 
research design, the flow of ideas through that research design, and premises that would result in 
a similarly structured output of the original research design. As noted before, paradigm theory is 
a mature topic existing in a single body of literature. The most comprehensive documentation of 
the theory’s development exists in the authors’ published journal articles, conference papers, and 
text books from approximately 1980 to present day. Consequently, a process-oriented (i.e., 
theory-building research) integrative literature review, leveraging additional literature on theory-
building research for its coding paradigm (Appendix B and Appendix C), was selected as an 




Using Cooper’s (1988; Randolph, 2009) taxonomy, the following typological positioning 
of the reverse engineering analysis was suggested:  
 Focus: Research methods (surrogate process for developing paradigmatic theory) 
 Goal: Criticism and identification of central issues (influence and process) 
 Perspective: Neutral (no espoused position, neutral) 
 Coverage: Purposive central or pivotal (select key pieces that illuminate process) 
 Organization: Methodological (Influences, outcome, process, inputs)  
 Audience: Specialized scholars and practitioners 
Conceptual Frame 
The current reverse engineering analysis took the paradigm theory of Lincoln et al. 
(2011) as the subject system for analysis. Framing the analyses were two analytical perspectives. 
The first perspective used a structural lens modified from the concepts of reverse engineering 
analysis (Chikofsky & Cross, 1990; Rekoff, 1985) that focused examination of the phenomenon 
on (a) the indirect influences of the original design and designers, (b) the structural configuration 
of the subject system, (c) the potential design phases contributing to the subject system, and (d) 
the initial conditions and premises that may have led to the subject system. The second 
perspective used a coding paradigm developed from key concepts of theoretical products and 
theoretical processes (Appendix B and Appendix C, respectively) that focused examination of 
the phenomenon on its theoretical basis.  
Analysis of indirect influences specifically targeted emic and etic concepts in the history 




theory-building process (i.e., systematic process); and requirements of theory (i.e., initial 
conditions) specifically examined the process of paradigm theory through a theoretical lens. 
Table 31 displays the key concepts leveraged from Appendix B and Appendix C for the reverse 
engineering analysis. 
Table 31 
Key Concepts of the Reverse Engineering Analysis 
 Phase of reverse engineering analysis 






Review of theoretical processes 
(Appendix C) 
Review of the requirement of 





roles in inquiry, and 
specific forms. 
The theory-building research process, 
theorizing versus application, research 
strategies, phases of theory-building 
research, specific theory-building 
processes and methods. 
Requirements of the theory-
building process and 
requirements of the theorist 
engaged in theory-building 
research 
Research Problem and Proposed Solution 
Given that the subject system, i.e., the paradigm theory of Lincoln et al. (2011),  served 
as an exemplar theoretical formulation, it stands to reason that an analogous process for 
theoretically formulating a framework for the phenomenon of methodology would benefit from a 
deep understanding of the subject system’s theoretical process. Even though a number of 
products of the authors’ thinking are available in nearly 40 years of publications, little work has 
been done in an attempt to systematically identify, document, and theoretically analyze the 
theoretical process of the authors’ thinking juxtaposed with their theoretical products. As a 
consequence, the lack of process understanding remains an obstacle to any claims toward 




Reverse engineering provided a systematic process for conceptually re-envisioning an 
actionable set of specifications that can be used to reproduce the process and/or product of an 
existing system (Rekoff, 1985). Taking the paradigm theory of Lincoln et al. (2011) as a subject 
system, reverse engineering offered a suitable methodological shell for generating the 
prerequisite understanding necessary for developing an analogous process for theoretically 
formulating a framework for the phenomenon of methodology. 
Need 
Given the widespread reference of the Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research ([Denzin 
& Lincoln, 1994, 2000, 2005, 2011] a far reaching text that, over four editions, presented the 
authors’ cutting edge thinking on paradigm theory), it can be argued that the current state of 
paradigm theory is not only widely accessible, but widely accessed. However, despite the 
accessibility of paradigm theory, the heavy emphasis on the metaphysical assumptions and 
implications on inquiry falls short of adequately representing to readers the theoretical basis of 
the information presented in the handbook. That is, the writings on paradigm theory are not the 
proselytizing final words on what all inquiry is and should be. Instead, the writings present a 
sophisticated explanation of systems of inquiry (i.e., a theory) as well as a presentation of what 
five such systems of inquiry (i.e., system states) look like within the boundaries of their 
axiomatic theory.  
Because the work of paradigm theory has not been emphasized as a theory-building 
process and axiomatic theoretical product, knowledge about the phenomenon as a theory remains 
inadequate. Thus, the need addressed by the reverse engineering analysis served the actionable 




analogous theoretical processes. Consequently, it was important for the current specific research 
agenda, as well as for more generally improving upon understanding of the body of paradigm 
work, to deconstruct the exemplar into its formative theoretical processes. 
Research Questions 
The general research question guiding the reverse engineering analysis was What 
surrogate theoretical research process can be inferred about the development of the exemplar 
subject system? In addition, the following more specific research questions guided the reverse 
engineering analysis of the paradigm theory of Lincoln et al. (2011): 
1. What indirect influences on the authors’ can be identified relevant to development of 
the subject system? 
2. What features are characteristic of the subject system as a theoretical output? 
3. What features are characteristic of the subject system as a theoretical process? 
4. What features are characteristic of the initial theoretical conditions that led to the 
development of the subject system? 
Sampling and Data Collection 
Sampling and data collection were an interactive process involving review of the 
historical analysis, further critical case sampling where warranted, and organization of the 
information reviewed for its foci specific analysis. The sampling and data collection techniques 
used in support of the analysis of indirect influences and analyses of subject system, systematic 
process, and initial conditions varied considerably. Consequently, techniques are described 




Despite differences, the sampling and data collection techniques for all four foci of the 
reverse engineering analysis (i.e., consideration of indirect influences on the subject system, 
analysis of the subject system, analysis of systematic process, and analysis of initial conditions) 
shared some common overarching features. In general, sampling and retrieval of sources 
involved less retrieval of new information than might be typical for a review; this was due to the 
piggybacking of the reverse engineering analysis on the historical analysis of the subject system. 
Instead, sampling more heavily involved review of the historical analysis for insights informing 
the reverse engineering analysis. 
Review of the historical analysis for insights involved a purposive sampling strategy. 
Specifically, critical case sampling was used to select sources from the synthesized writing that 
described the context of development; the developmental process; and/or the events, 
circumstances, and influences that served as inputs to the authors’ thinking. In this context, 
critical case sampling was a form of purposive sampling that permitted maximum application of 
information to other cases, under the assumption that if the information was valid for critical 
cases, it was also likely to be true of all other cases (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Patton, 1980, 
1990, 2002).  
Each source identified from the critical case sampling had to meet two broad conditions 
for inclusion in the reverse engineering analysis. These inclusion criteria were: 
 The source must have discussed or described one of the following: 
1. The contextual backdrop during the development of paradigm theory,  
2. The characteristics of the subject system, 




4. The events, circumstances, and influences that served as inputs to the theoretical 
process. 
 The sampled source must have been reasonably accessible by means of electronic 
databases, university libraries, or internet searches. 
Sample and Data Collection for Consideration of Indirect Influences 
For consideration of indirect influences, critical case sampling and information 
organization involved an emergent process of developing categories from the literature and 
purposively sampling additional literature to further inform the emerging categories. Sampling 
primarily relied on prior synthesis and samples from the historical analysis, but further focused 
data collection on events that may have had indirect (or direct when explicitly called out) 
influences on the authors’ development of paradigm theory. 
Although the consideration of indirect influences sampled from the same sources 
included in the ancestry sample of the historical analysis, new data were collected from the 
sources examined. In addition to leveraging the literature synthesis in the historical analysis of 
paradigm theory, literature related to the moments in the history of qualitative inquiry was 
reviewed. One particular thread within the sample of the literature reviewed discussed the history 
of qualitative inquiry as nine moments (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, 2000, 2005, 2011; Guba & 
Lincoln, 1987, 1989; Lincoln, 1995b). The nine moments presented a review of the history of 
qualitative inquiry from the authors’ perspectives. These nine moments in qualitative history 
included: 




 Second moment: The modernist phase or golden age (1950-1970) 
 Third moment: The moment of blurred genres (1970-1986) 
 Fourth moment: The crisis of representation (1986-1990) 
 Fifth moment: The postmodern modern period (1990-1995) 
 Sixth moment: The period of postexperimental inquiry (1995-2000) 
 Seventh moment: The methodologically contested moment(2000-2010) 
 Eighth moment: The methodologically contested moment within qualitative research 
(2005-2010) 
 Ninth moment: The fractured future (2010- ) 
Although the nine moments did inform the analysis of indirect influences, the literature 
on historical moments only represented an external account of potential influences. To 
complement the external perspective, an addition insider account of the work was also needed. 
For the insider perspective, several narrative works, prefaces, forewords, and epilogues of pivotal 
works were reviewed to sample and collect information from the authors’ own words on their 
work. The sources reviewed for an insider perspective included: 
 The preface of Naturalistic Inquiry (Lincoln & Guba, 1985b) 
 The foreword of Fourth Generation Evaluation (Guba & Lincoln, 1989) 
 The foreword of The Paradigm Dialog (Guba, 1990c) 
 Lincoln’s chapter on the making of a constructivist in The Paradigm Dialog (Guba, 
1990c) 
 The prefaces and epilogues of all four editions of The Sage Handbook of Qualitative 




 Guba, E. G. (1996). What happened to me on the road to Damascus? In L. Heshusius 
& K. Ballard (Eds.), From positivism to interpretivism and beyond: Tales of 
transformation in education and social research (pp. 43-49). New York, NY: 
Teachers College Press. 
 Lincoln, Y. S. (2010). What a long, strange trip it's been: Twenty-five years of 
qualitative and new paradigm research. Qualitative Inquiry, 16(1), 3-9. 
Each included source was reviewed in its entirety. Next, sources were summarized with 
citation information and a brief synopsis of any information relevant to indirect influences. 
Sample and Data Collection for Analyses of the Subject System, Systematic Process, and 
Initial Conditions 
For the analyses of the subject system, systematic process, and initial conditions, 
sampling and data collection leveraged a theoretical coding paradigm developed a priori from 
two supplemental reviews of theory-building literature (Appendix B and Appendix C). The 
review of the historical analysis and further purposive samples then deductively followed to 
retrieve information specific to populating the categories of the coding paradigm. Although only 
relying upon three sources (i.e., historical analysis [chapter 4], supplemental review of 
theoretical products [Appendix B], and supplemental review of theoretical processes [Appendix 
C]), the three sources were assembled explicitly for the current body of inquiry and altogether 
reviewed and synthesized the work of nearly 100 different sources. A summary of the a priori 
theoretical coding paradigm is shown in Table 32. Table 32 expands upon the key theoretical 






Theoretical Coding Paradigm Used for Analysis of Subject System, Systematic Process, and 
Initial Conditions 
Phase of reverse 
engineering analysis 
Theory-building concept of 
coding paradigm 
Specific theoretical characteristics considered 
Analysis of subject 
system 
Theoretical products of theory 
building research 
Theory as answers to questions of why 
Theoretical anatomy 
Theoretical range 
The roles of theory in inquiry 
Specific forms of theory 
Analysis of systematic 
process 
Theoretical processes of 
theory building research 
Justification of the research as a theory-building 
process 
Accumulation of interim and full-blown theoretical 
products 
The theorizing half and the practice half of the 
theory-building process 
The theory-then-research and research-then-theory 
theory-building research strategies 
The phases of theory-building research 
The processes of theory-building research 
The methods of theory-building research 
Analysis of initial 
conditions 
Requirements of theory 
building research 
The theoretical need 
The entry point into the theory build cycle 
The theoretical solution to the problem 
The logic of analysis 
Operationalization of theory 
Ongoing theoretical needs 
Practical knowledge of theory-building research 
methods 
Practical knowledge of theory 
Practical knowledge of the phenomenon and topic 
of theory 
Conceptual knowledge of theory-building research 
methods 
Conceptual knowledge of the elements and 
structures of theory 
Conceptual knowledge of the phenomenon and 
topic of theory 
Recoding and reanalysis of the historical synthesis with the theoretical coding paradigm 
allowed the content and history of the paradigm phenomenon to be viewed and understood as a 
theory-building process. Sampling and data collection performed through the analytical lens of 




identified knowledge gap in theoretical understanding of paradigm theory. One body of literature 
represented the historical content of the development of paradigm theory. The other body of 
literature represented methodological knowledge of the processes and products of theory 
building. The two bodies of literature provided the information necessary to understand the 
development of the subject system as a specific form of theory. Applied together through the 
analytical framework of reverse engineering analysis, the two bodies of literature were able to 
yield an actionable understanding of the process of the phenomena as a theory that can be used to 
reproduce a surrogate theoretical process and theoretical product. 
Data Analysis Strategies 
Data analysis was a process of examining the information sampled and collected for each 
of the four foci of the reverse engineering analysis. Data analyses were conducted separately for 
each of the four foci of the reverse engineering analysis: (a) consideration of indirect influences, 
(b) analysis of subject system, (c) analysis of systematic process, and (d) analysis of initial 
conditions. Each analysis is described individually in the following sections. 
Consideration of Indirect Influences on the Subject System 
For analysis of indirect influences, two types of literature were reviewed: literature 
providing an emic insider perspective and literature providing an etic outsider perspective. 
Forewords, prefaces, and epilogues were reviewed for the emic perspective; literature on the nine 
moments in the history of qualitative inquiry were reviewed for the etic perspective. The emic 
and etic literature was reviewed and analyzed for recurring and/or salient ideas and events 




chapter 4 was iteratively and interactively reviewed alongside the emic and etic literature. 
Interaction with the historical analysis was necessary to contextualize emergent influences within 
the timeline and states of historical development. From the analysis across literature with the 
authors’ own words, literature on moments in the history of qualitative inquiry, and the historical 
analysis of chapter 4, several potential categories of influence on the development of paradigm 
theory were identified, including (a) an embedded historical context, (b) a time of change, (c) a 
rejection of traditional perspectives, (d) acting in an advocacy role, and (e) wrestling with 
commensurability. 
Analysis of Subject System 
The first step in the analysis of the subject system was mapping out paradigm theory in a 
configuration document (Figure 4). Next, the subject system was reviewed against numerous 
characteristics of theoretical products. Review of the literature on the purpose, structure, and 
form of theory (see Appendix B for a review of theoretical products) revealed several pertinent 
theoretical categories of information important to understanding the subject system. These 
categories included: 
 Contextualization of paradigm theory as specific answers to questions of why 
 Understanding the theoretical anatomy 
 Considering the theoretical range 
 Understanding the role of paradigm theory in inquiry 
 Understanding the paradigm theory as an axiomatic form of theory 




Analysis of the subject system was deductively guided with each of these characteristics 
of theoretical products. Both the literature informing the historical analysis and the synthesis of 
the historical analysis were reviewed for information relevant to each theoretical characteristic.  
Hierarchical abstraction of the subject system. Rekoff (1985) described the 
configuration document as a tool of reverse engineering used to reveal the components normally 
unexposed and how those components fit together hierarchically and functionally. Hierarchical 
abstraction of paradigm theory used the concept of the configuration document (Figure 4) to 
facilitate understanding of the subject system. Leveraging the historical analysis of paradigm 
theory in chapter 4, hierarchical abstraction focused on identification and graphical 
representation of: 
 System elements 
 Sub-elements 
 Interrelationships of elements 
 System states 
Understanding paradigm theory to answer questions of why. Sutton and Staw (1995) 
and Whetten (2002) suggested that theories are the answers to questions of why. Kaplan (2009) 
likened theory to conjectures about the rules of the game that can explain why certain empirical 
patterns might be observed. Therefore, key to understanding any theory is explicating both the 
why questions asked and the answers to those why questions, which the theory explains. 
Consequently, an understanding of paradigm theory as a means to answer questions of why 
focused on positioning and contextualizing the theory according the specific questions of why 




Understanding the theoretical anatomy of the theory. Understanding the theoretical 
anatomy of paradigm theory was accomplished by considering several components of a theory. 
Specifically, these components were (a) the theoretical units, or basic building blocks; (b) the 
laws of interaction, or relationships among units; (c) the boundaries or scope of the theory, and 
(d) the system states, or various conditions of the whole theory when all elements and structures 
are active together; (e) the propositions; (f) the empirical indicators; and (g) the hypotheses. 
Analysis of the paradigm theory’s theoretical units involved identifying seven properties 
of the theoretical units: 
1. Concept versus construct 
2. Unit versus event 
3. Attribute versus variable 
4. Real versus nominal 
5. Primitive versus sophisticated 
6. Collective versus member 
7. Type of theoretical unit 
Analysis of the laws of interaction identified which of three categories of theoretical laws 







Analysis of the theoretical boundary of paradigm theory involved identifying the portion 
of the world that was intended to be explained by the theory and distinguishing it from those 
portions it did not intend to explain. Furthermore, a number of additional properties of the 
theoretical boundary were identified, including: 
 Reach: bound in time versus unbound in time 
 Reach: bound in space versus unbound in space 
 Type of boundary: open versus closed 
 Theoretical origins of boundary: internal versus external 
Analysis of the system states of paradigm theory involved description and identification 
of all system states of the paradigm theory. The system states of the paradigm theory were then 
presented using the general format for presentation and statement of a theory’s system states, 
based on the type of theoretical law of interaction (Dubin, 1978; see Appendix B). 
Analysis of the paradigm theory’s propositions involved classification into one of three 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive types of propositional statements (Dubin, 1978; see Appendix 
B). These three classes included: 
1. Statements about the value of a unit, given its relation to the values of other units in 
the theory and the defined nature of their interactions 
2. Statements about the continuity of a system state of the theory and the values of the 
cohesive set of units for the system state 
3. Statements about changes in the theoretical system across its various system states 




Analysis of the empirical indicators and hypotheses of the paradigm theory involved 
identifying the means to measurement (i.e., instrumentation); the act of measurement; and 
resulting value of measurement for the theory in operation. Further identification of the 
hypothesis of the paradigm theory involved identifying the statement(s) of values for units of the 
theory, given the operation associated with the identified empirical indicators. 
Considering the theoretical range of the theory. Consideration of the theoretical range 
of paradigm theory involved identifying a number of characteristics of paradigm theory pertinent 
to understanding its theoretical range (Appendix B). These characteristics included: 
 The size of the explanatory shell or theoretical boundary 
 The implied level of analysis 
 The extent of the direct connection of theory with the empirical world 
 The accuracy versus generalizability of the theory (i.e., the possibility of being 
general, accurate, and simple simultaneously) 
 The level of abstraction or contextualization 
 The time-boundedness of the theory 
 The forms of knowledge that the theory represents 
 Driven theoretically versus driven empirically 
Understanding the role of paradigm theory in inquiry. Numerous roles of theory in 
inquiry were reviewed (see Appendix B). Six general roles of theory were pulled forward in 
summary: 




 Theory as means to identifying/prioritizing research issues 
 Theory as means to identifying research problems 
 Theory as means to prescribing and evaluating solutions to research problems 
 Theory as means to framing data for interpretation 
 Theory as means to generate and shape method 
Table 45 in Appendix B further details each of the six roles of theory in inquiry, with 
specific examples taken from the literature on theoretical products. To analyze the roles of the 
paradigm theory of Lincoln et al. (2011) in inquiry, each of the six roles of theory summarized in 
Table 45 of Appendix B were examined for the relationship between paradigm theory and 
inquiry. Where applicable, the examples taken from the literature on theoretical products for 
each role of theory were further highlighted as specific examples of the role of paradigm theory 
in inquiry. 
Understanding the paradigm theory as an axiomatic form of theory. The axiomatic 
form of theory was reviewed (see Appendix B). Seven key features of the axiomatic form of 
theory were pulled forward in summary: 
 The theory includes: 
o Theoretical concepts or constructs 
o Scope conditions 
o Axiom statements 
o Propositions derived from axiom combinations 





 The theory is capable of being evaluated with: 
o Value judgments of justification 
o Value judgments of fit with reality 
To analyze the paradigm theory of Lincoln et al. (2011) as a form of axiomatic theory, 
each of the seven key features of axiom theories summarized in Appendix B was examined for 
the paradigm theory. 
Understanding the paradigm theory as a typological form of theory. The typological 
form of theory was reviewed (see Appendix B). Eleven key features of the typological form of 
theory were pulled forward in summary: 
 Taxonomic characteristics:  
o Division of elements into semantically heterogeneous categories 
o Inclusion of within category attributes 
o Simplification of all unique elements in an aggregate classification scheme 
o Decision rules for classification 
 Typological characteristics: 
o First-order constructs 
o Ideal types comprising first-order constructs 
o Holistic organization of category attributes into ideal types and ideal types into 
typologies 
 Minimum criteria as typological theory: 





o Ideal types comprising first-order constructs (not redundantly discussed given 
availability as a typological characteristic) 
o Unique Gestalt-like pattern for each ideal type 
o Complex hierarchical organization of grand theory and several middle-range 
theories 
o Judgments regarding ideal type internal consistency 
o Judgment regarding the degree of empirical fit or normative influence on practice 
To analyze the paradigm theory of Lincoln et al. (2011) as a form of typological theory, 
each of the 11 key features of typological theories summarized in Appendix B was examined for 
the paradigm theory. 
Analysis of Systematic Process 
The theoretical processes of theory-building research was reviewed (see Appendix C). 
Several key considerations of theory-building research were pulled forward: 
 Justification of the research as a theory-building process (e.g., why can the systematic 
process be considered a theory-building process?) 
 Review and understanding of the theoretical products produced and evidence of 
becoming full-blown theory 
 Positioning of the research in at least half of the theory-building process (i.e., the 
theorizing half or the practice half) (Chermack, 2006; Lynham, 2002a, 2000b; 




 Mapping of the inquiry process to a theory-building research strategy (i.e., 
positioning the general method within two common theory-building research 
strategies, theorizing to practice and practice to theorizing; Lynham, 2002b; 
Reynolds, 1971) 
 Mapping of the theory-building research to phases of theory-building process 
 Mapping of the theory-building research to specific theoretical processes 
 Mapping of the theory-building research to specific theoretical methods 
To analyze the systematic process leading to development of the paradigm theory of 
Lincoln et al. (2011) as a theory-building process, each of the key considerations of theory-
building research summarized in Appendix C was examined for the paradigm theory. 
Analysis of Initial Conditions 
The theoretical requirements of theory-building research were reviewed (see Appendix 
C). Numerous key requirements of theory-building research were pulled forward, six for the 
theory-building process and six for the theorist to be engaged in the theory building.  
The requirements of the theory-building process outlined in Appendix C included: 
 Clear demonstration of a theoretical gap in knowledge in the form of (a) a theoretical 
need and (b) the entry point into the theory-building cycle 
 Explicit linkage of theoretical problem to theoretical solution through description of 




 Extension of the theoretical framework into empirical practice through (e) 
operationalization of the theoretical framework and (f) definition of further theoretical 
research to be done 
The requirements of the theorist to be engaged in the theory-building process outlined in 
Appendix C included: 
 Practical knowledge of (a) theory-building research methods from experience 
attempting to build theory, (b) theory from experience attempting to apply theory in 
practice, and (c) the phenomenon and topic of theory from experience with the 
phenomenon in practice 
 Conceptual knowledge of (d) theory-building research methods from intensive study 
of theory-building processes, (e) the elements and structures of theory from intensive 
study of theory itself, and (f) the phenomenon and topic of theory from intensive 
study of the phenomenon itself 
Analysis of the initial conditions leading to the theory development work of the paradigm 
theory of Lincoln et al. (2011) was performed against the requirements for theory building 
synthesized in Appendix C.  
Data Synthesis Strategy 
The process of data synthesis sequentially stepped through each phase of reverse 
engineering analysis, beginning with consideration of indirect influences and then moving 
through analyses of the subject system, systematic process, and initial conditions. For synthesis 




influence on the development of paradigm theory was used to organize the narrative. For 
syntheses of the literature on the subject system, systematic process, and initial conditions, the a 
priori coding paradigm on theory building was used to organize the narratives. The synthesis was 
concluded by revisiting understanding of the paradigm phenomenon as a form of theory and as 
part of a theory-building process, and then focusing on the next inquiry steps, given the learning 
from the current analysis. 
The overall process of the reverse engineering analysis can be situated as an incremental 
piece of work within a larger, ongoing research agenda on disciplined inquiry. The intended 
output of the synthesis strategy was a theoretical understanding of the paradigm phenomenon as 
an exemplar form of theory. The intended outcome of the research was actionable theoretical 
knowledge that could be used to define a starting point in theory-building work on the 





CHAPTER 6:  SYNTHESIS OF REVERSE ENGINEERING ANALYSIS 
Chapter 6 Preface 
Chapter 6 presents the outputs of the reverse engineering analysis of paradigm theory. 
Four data syntheses are described: (a) consideration of indirect influences, (b) analysis of subject 
system, (c) analysis of systematic process, and (d) analysis of initial conditions. Synthesis of the 
consideration of indirect influences identified five factors potentially influencing the 
development of paradigm theory. Synthesis of theoretical coding of the subject system identified 
paradigm theory as a form of axiom theory and further characterized the theoretical components 
in operation in the theory. Synthesis of theoretical coding of the systematic process identified the 
relevant theory building phases and research strategy involved in theory-building work of 
paradigm theory. Synthesis of theoretical coding of initial conditions revealed how an initial 
need for theory development was established and in response the axiomatic form was identified 
as a potential theoretical solution. 
The output of the reverse engineering analysis was a characterization of the key 
theoretical features of the theory product, theory-building process, and requirements for theory-
building associated with the development of paradigm theory. Within the larger research agenda, 
the outcome of the reverse engineering analysis was the actionable theoretical knowledge 
necessary to begin theorizing about the phenomenon of methodology. New contributions made 
to knowledge about paradigms of inquiry include an understanding the paradigm phenomenon as 
both a form of theory and part of an ongoing theory-building process that was not previously 




Data Synthesis: Consideration of Indirect Influences on the Subject System 
Numerous forewords and prefaces provided by the authors of paradigm theory, in 
addition to review of the nine historical moments in qualitative inquiry, offered some insights 
into the indirect influences that may have guided the authors’ work on the subject system. The 
commentaries and writings embedded in the authors’ published works offered a narrative, 
espoused position and insider view of the development of their work. The nine moments in the 
history of qualitative inquiry provided an external perspective on the influences that may have 
come to bear on the authors’ work. Across both internal (the authors’ own words) and external 
(writings on the moments of qualitative inquiry) sources, several potential influences on the 
development of paradigm theory were identified: (a) an embedded historical context, (b) a time 
of change, (c) a rejection of traditional perspectives, (d) acting in an advocacy role, and (e) 
wrestling with commensurability. 
Historically Situated Context 
In addition to positioning the work narratively in the writing on the subject system, 
Lincoln (1990) provided a biographical sketch of the paradigm-building process for the 
constructivist paradigm that she framed as The Early Years, The Middle Years, and Rites of 
Passage. Lincoln described the personal context of her work on the subject system as “not only 
intellectual but also personal, social, and possibly political transformation” (p. 69). Within her 
biographical sketch, in addition to positioning the work within a formative time period of a 
couple decades, Lincoln also positioned the evolution of ideas more broadly within a larger 




captured the lack of consistency to traditional positivist views and the fit of her personal journey 
within the positivist gaps. 
A Time of Change 
A change theme was consistent throughout Guba and Lincoln’s work on the subject 
system. In example, Guba (1990c) explicitly placed their work in a Kuhnian context. The 
positioning implied a time of change in which current paradigms can no long be applied to solve 
the problems of a community of inquirers, and as a result, new paradigms are sought (Kuhn, 
1996). The change theme as a backdrop to their work was also prevalent in the language used 
throughout the decade to establish a time of unrest and revolution in how inquirers were thinking 
about paradigms of inquiry. For example, the following language was used in conjunction with 
the paradigm term: 
 “Competing paradigm” (Guba & Lincoln, 1982a, p. 234) 
 “Alternative paradigms” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985b, p. 7) 
 “Paradigm revolution” (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, p. 16) 
 “Paradigm wars” (Guba, 1990c, p. 370) 
 “Emergent paradigms” (p. 9) 





Rejection of the Traditional Perspective 
Both Guba and Lincoln (1989) positioned themselves as constructivists during the 
development of the subject system. Their positioning implied a constructed reality rather than an 
external reality.  
Outcomes are not descriptions of the “way things really are” or “really work” or of some 
“true” state of affairs, but instead represent meaningful constructions that individual 
actors or groups of actors form to “make sense” of the situations in which they find 
themselves. (p. 8) 
It seems important to recognize their inquiry perspective (i.e., belief system) during the 
development of the paradigm meta-framework. Their work not only occurred during a time 
period of changing or expanding paradigm perspectives, but also occurred as a result of their 
“rejection of convention assumptions” (Lincoln, 1990, p. 69). They talked not only about the 
“heresy” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985b, p. 9) of positivism, but also about the failure of conventional 
inquiry to influence practice (Guba & Lincoln, 1982a). Their work was heavily oriented toward 
practice, something evident in their proposed authenticity criteria for naturalist inquiry (e.g., 
Lincoln, 1986; Lincoln & Guba, 1986a). 
Serving in an Advocacy Role 
Given the historical position in a time of questioning of positivism, exploration of 
alternative paradigms, and rejection of positivist impact on practice, it should be noted that the 
work of Lincoln and Guba was less against positivism and more in favor of a naturalist (or 
constructivist) perspective. That is, the role that emerged for them was not one of the voice to 
speak out against positivist ways; rather, their voice was very much one of advocate and 




“challenges are being mounted from the perspective of alternative paradigms that suggest new 
and different answers. This book is about such a challenge” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985b, p. 7). It is 
important to note that as advocates (even though they did have their own personal stances), they 
supported the legitimacy of the naturalist perspective without trying to pit it against, and defeat, 
the positivist perspective. Rather, their advocacy was “about options for inquiry: options among 
the paradigms” (Guba, 1990c, p. 9). 
Wrestling with Commensurability 
The last indirect influence identified from the literature was the authors’ ongoing struggle 
with issues of commensurability between the axiomatic systems defined with their paradigm 
theory. The commensurability question asks, “Is it possible to blend elements of one paradigm 
into another, so that one is engaging in research that represents the best of both worldviews?” 
(Lincoln & Guba, 2000, p. 174). The issue at hand for commensurability resides at the 
philosophical level, whether or not two paradigms are commensurable across the axiom 
positions. The authors’ position was when axioms are not similar enough to resonate, paradigms 
are not commensurable, and therefore blending elements of the two paradigms should not be 
possible. However, if similar enough, then blending can cautiously be done (Lincoln et al., 
2011). “Commensurability is an issue only when researchers want to “pick and choose” among 
the axioms of [different paradigms]… because the axioms are contradictory and mutually 
exclusive” (Lincoln & Guba, 2000, p. 174).  
Contention about commensurability can be traced from the earliest proposal of scientistic 
and naturalistic paradigms, circa 1978 (Guba, 1996), to reflections on the paradigmatic work that 




discussions of mixed-methods approaches to inquiry; specifically, mixing methods versus 
mixing methodologies. The authors reflected that unfortunately the issue of commensurability 
had been ignored, misrepresented, or simply confused at the methods level (i.e., quantitative or 
qualitative methods and data). Commensurability takes no position on whether quantitative or 
qualitative methods of data collection, analysis, or data can be used within the same inquiry 
approach. However, commensurability does take a position on combining the methodological 
approaches of incommensurable paradigms, whereby incommensurability can be isolated to 
incompatibilities in the basic underlying philosophical assumptions (i.e., axioms) (Lincoln et al., 
2011). 
Lincoln (2010) noted that some modern-day mixed-method proponents have been explicit 
that they are not confusing the level at which they are mixing (i.e., methodologies of paradigms 
versus specific method techniques); rather, those proponents are simply choosing to ignore the 
issue. Ignoring the commensurability issue when mixing the methodologies of incommensurable 
paradigms takes the position that “there is no necessary connection between knowing and how 
we know” (pp. 6-7). Despite their best efforts, the authors’ acknowledged the debate goes on; 
however, particular to disciplined inquiry, mixing matters and remains a topic to be addressed. 
“Paradigms and metaphysics do matter… They tell us something about what the researcher 
thinks counts as knowledge, and who can deliver the most valuable slice of this knowledge” (p. 
7). 
Data Synthesis: Analysis of Subject System as a Theory Product 
Data synthesis for the subject system initially focused on representation of paradigm 




diagram, given the frame of reference for theory in Appendix B, the subject system was analyzed 
for a number of theoretical characteristics. The following synthesis sections also explore the 
paradigm meta-framework of Lincoln et al. (2011) as a theory with a relationship to reality, 
specific theoretical components, a theoretical range, and alignment with each of the axiomatic 
and typological forms of theory. 
Hierarchical Abstraction of the Paradigm Theory 
Leveraging the historical analysis in chapter 4, the following elements (Figure 5) of the 
paradigm theory of Lincoln et al. (2011) were considered for abstraction of the theory into a 
configuration document: 
 Axiom subjects: The axiomatic subjects of the paradigm meta-framework consist of 
the meta-physical categories of ontology, epistemology, methodology, axiology, and 
teleology. 
 Ontological axiom positions: The ontology category consists of the following axiom 
positions: naïve realism, critical realism, historical realism, relativism, and 
participative reality. 
 Epistemological axiom positions: The epistemology category consists of the 
following axiom positions: objectivist, modified objectivist, transactional subjectivist, 
and critical subjectivist. 
 Methodological axiom positions: The methodology category consists of the following 
axiom positions: experimental, modified experimental, dialogic/dialectic, 




 Axiological axiom positions: The axiology category consists of the following axiom 
positions: law-like propositional knowledge, approximations of reality, advocate for 
social change, transactional knowledge to improved praxis, and practical knowing 
about how to flourish. 
 Teleological axiom positions: The teleology category consists of the following axiom 
positions: technical, critically informed praxis, and improved praxis. 
 The six axiom systems (i.e., paradigms) defined under paradigm theory: 
o The positivist axiomatic system consists of a naïve realist ontological position, 
objectivist epistemological position, experimental methodological position, 
propositional axiological position, and technical teleological position. 
o The postpositivist axiomatic system consists of a critical realist ontological 
position, modified objectivist epistemological position, modified experimental 
methodological position, an approximate propositional axiological position, and 
technical teleological position. 
o The critical axiomatic system consists of a historical realist ontological position, 
transactional subjectivist epistemological position, dialogic/dialectic 
methodological position, an advocate for social change axiological position, and 
critically informed praxis teleological position. 
o The constructivist axiomatic system consists of a relativist ontological position, 
transactional subjectivist epistemological position, hermeneutic/dialectic 
methodological position, transactional knowledge to improved praxis axiological 




o The participatory axiomatic system consists of a participative reality ontological 
position, critical subjectivist epistemological position, collaborative action inquiry 
methodological position, practical knowing about how to flourish axiological 
position, and improved praxis teleological position. 
Figure 5 maps all identified system elements, sub-elements, interrelationships of 
elements, and the six system states of the subject system. The first-level headings represent 
axiom subjects; the second-level headings represent axiom positions; and the interconnected 
arrows represent system states (i.e., paradigms of disciplined inquiry). 
  

















































Positioning as a Theory 
In the present case, what questions of why does the paradigm theory of Lincoln et al. 
(2011) address? In the game of inquiry (Kaplan, 2009), observable empirical patterns can be 
described with data and conjectures about the rules of the game that explain why certain 
empirical patterns of inquiry might be observed; that is, the story that makes the observable 
inquiry patterns intelligible. 
Lincoln et al. (2011) described the empirical processes and products specifically 
associated with disciplined inquiry and knowledge claims. They explained why those inquiry 
patterns can be observed in two ways: fundamentally through a set of metaphysical assumptions 
that define the underlying belief system of any paradigm of inquiry, and holistically through a set 
of metaphysical positions that taken together synergistically pattern in such a way as to extend 
into the practice of inquiries as postures inquirers would take toward relevant issues in the 
conduct of disciplined inquiries. That is, the framework of metaphysical assumptions (or axiom 
subjects) explains what the basic belief system of a paradigm is and answers the question of why 
different paradigms of inquiry exist. The framework is essentially a theory of paradigms of 
inquiry. The specific set of internally consistent metaphysical positions (or axiom positions) of 
any specific paradigm explain why inquiry looks like it does within the given paradigm; each 
paradigm is an individual theory of inquiry. 
The Anatomy of Paradigm Theory 
Seven components of the paradigm theory of Lincoln et al. (2011) were examined in 




basic building blocks; (b) the laws of interaction, or relationships among units; (c) the boundaries 
or scope of the theory; (d) the system states or various conditions of the whole theory when all 
elements and structures are active together; (e) the propositions; (f) the empirical indicators; and 
(g) the hypotheses. Only the first four components are necessary for consideration as a complete 
theory (Lynham, 2002b). 
Theoretical units. The theoretical units of the paradigm theory of Lincoln et al. (2011) 
included the major axiomatic subjects, or metaphysical assumptions, upon which inquirers can 
take positions. The theoretical units can be further defined relative to status as concepts or 
constructs (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000); five distinguishing characteristics of theoretical units 
(Dubin, 1978); and the type of theoretical unit (Dubin, 1978). Classification of the theoretical 
units of the paradigm theory of Lincoln et al. are shown in Table 33. 
Table 33 







Construct Axioms are abstractions invented for the purpose of relating to other 
axioms in the paradigm theory; not formed as generalizations from 
particulars (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000) 
Unit versus event Unit Axioms are properties of belief system whenever they exist and under all 
circumstances of their existence (Dubin, 1978) 
Attribute versus 
variable 
Attribute The axioms have the properties of their specific positions or they do not; 




Nominal No empirical indicator exists for the axiom subjects (Dubin, 1978) 
Primitive versus 
sophisticated 
Sophisticated The axiom subjects are well defined units with a name, definition, and 
some properties associated with the theory (Dubin, 1978) 
Collective versus 
member 
Collective The high level, abstract axioms are not part of a classification of units, 
rather they define the classes of units at lower levels, i.e., the sets of 




Type of theoretical 
unit 
Enumerative There exist no conditions under which any axiom may take on a null 
value or one in which the property does not exist, e.g., all paradigms hold 
some ontological position on reality; the reality axiom cannot take on a 
null value (Dubin, 1978) 
Laws of interaction. With regard to the relationships that exist between axioms of the 
paradigm theory of Lincoln et al. (2011), the theoretical laws of interaction can be considered 
categoric. The relationships among axioms fit the categoric category of relationship because no 
intended order or sequence exists between the units, and no implied or explicit directional quality 
exists in the relation between axioms. The specific axiomatic positions taken on each axiom 
subject within a specific paradigm of inquiry are only associated with regard to the collective 
presence or absence of position values; one axiom position neither causally nor serially 
determines the other. Rather, the set of axiom positions represents a symbiotic, congruent, and 
cohesive whole instead of any serial or determinant relation (Dubin, 1978; Lynham, 2002a). 
Theoretical boundaries. The theoretical boundary of the paradigm theory of Lincoln et 
al. (2011) defined the portion of the empirical world of inquiry intended to be explained by the 
theory (Chermack, 2004; Dubin, 1978; Lynham, 2002a). The world of inquiry (Crotty, 2007) 
included in the paradigm theory encapsulates those worlds of disciplined inquiry that can be 
characterized by a commitment of the inquirer to a system of inquiry defined by: 
 assumptions about reality,  
 what can be known about that reality,  
 how one comes to know something about that reality,  
 the role of values in coming to know, and  




Furthermore, the paradigm theory of Lincoln et al. (2011) can be positioned according to a 
number of additional properties of the theoretical boundary shown in Table 34 These properties 
of the theoretical boundary include its reach in time and space, the type of boundary, and the 
origins of the boundary. 
Table 34 






Reach: bound in 
time versus 
unbound in time 
Unbound in 
time 
The theory is not limited to forms of disciplined inquiry historically tied to 
any point in time (Bacharach, 1989; Freese, 1980). 
Reach: bound in 
space versus 
unbound in space 
Bound in 
space 
The paradigm theory may arguably be extended to all forms of inquiry; 
however, the current analysis considers the theoretical boundary to include 
only those forms of disciplined inquiry that may be characterized by a 
commitment to the five basic assumptions of the theories axioms. Any 
form of inquiry that may take a null position on an axiom, perhaps some 
forms of formal pragmatism, are beyond the explanatory reach of the 




Closed system The theoretical boundary is closed such that it is an idealization of the 
world of inquiry, informed by, yet independent of context and 
environment. That is, the units and laws of interaction drive the world of 
experience rather than serve as generalizations of the empirical world 





Internal The boundary of the theory is determined by the cohesive whole inherent 
the axiomatic system resulting from five axiom positions. The net result is 
an empirical world of inquiry, although still only hypothetical, determined 
by the units and the relationships; nothing external to the theory imposes 
its boundaries (Dubin, 1978). 
System states. As highlighted by Torraco (1997), the system states of a theory can be 
considered the “conditions under which the theory is operative” (p. 129). In the paradigm theory 
of Lincoln et al. (2011), each constellation of axiomatic positions on the five axiomatic subjects 
can be considered a system state of the theory in operation. In other words, each inquiry 




five enumerative theoretical units (i.e., axiom subjects) are active in a manner such that the 
defined type of unit is active; each unit has one of the attribute values (i.e., axiom positions); and 
all units are interacting in the collective gestalt manner that the categoric laws of interaction 
define. A paradigm of disciplined inquiry is, therefore, a state of the theory as a whole defined by 
the unique combination of cohesive axiom positions (Dubin, 1978).  
While a specific paradigm of disciplined inquiry (comprising the whole product of five 
interacting positions on axiom subjects) can be considered a system state of the paradigm theory 
of Lincoln et al. (2011), the theoretical outcomes of the paradigm theory point to something less 
complete. A theoretical outcome was defined as either a single or subset of theoretical unit 
values that provide distinctive character to the theory (Dubin, 1978). Two candidates emerged as 
likely state coordinates for each paradigm of disciplined inquiry: the ontological and 
epistemological positions or the methodological position. Both potential state coordinates of a 
paradigm typify the paradigmatic system state in different ways. The former state coordinates 
(i.e., ontological and epistemological positions) typify the knowledge possible for the paradigm. 
The latter state coordinate (i.e., methodological position) typifies the means to which the 
knowledge assumed to be possible might be gained. 
Based on the types of theoretical laws of interaction that were defined for the units of a 
theory, Dubin (1978) defined three general formats for presentation and statement of a theory’s 
system states, based on the types of theoretical laws of interaction that were defined for the units. 
The general format for presenting a “a system state characterized by a categoric law of 




Therefore, for the paradigm theory of Lincoln et al. (2011), the following general structure can 
be assumed for presenting each paradigm of disciplined inquiry. 
If the ontological position is…, the epistemological position is…, the methodological 
position is…, the axiological position is…, and the teleological position is…, then the paradigm 
of disciplined inquiry is…, under conditions of disciplined inquiry explicitly aligned with an 
underlying belief system. For example, if the ontological position is critical realist, the 
epistemological position is modified dualist/objectivist, the methodological position is modified 
experimental/manipulative, the axiological position is to leverage triangulation in inquiry to 
produce propositional knowing that approximates truth as close as possible, and the teleological 
position is to explain in order to predict, then the paradigm of disciplined inquiry defined under 
the paradigm theory of Lincoln et al. (2011) is postpositivist, under conditions of disciplined 
inquiry explicitly aligned with the underlying belief system defined by those five axiom 
positions (Lincoln & Lynham, 2011). 
Propositions. The paradigm theory’s units, laws of interaction, boundaries, and system 
states define a theoretical framework from which propositions can be derived (Lynham, 2002a, 
2002b). The theorems or operational characteristics (i.e., axiom extensions into practice) for each 
system state (i.e., inquiry paradigm) can be considered the theoretical propositions of the 
paradigm theory (e.g., Guba, 1987a, 1987b; Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Lincoln et al., 2011). As 
covered in Appendix B, the content of a theoretical proposition is a truth statement about the 
values taken by theoretical units within the overall theoretical system of units, interactions, 
boundaries, and states; that is, theoretical propositions are truth statements about the theoretical 




propositional truth of the axiom extensions represents an internal truth value only true to the 
extent that derivation from the theoretical framework is correct and the theoretical framework of 
the paradigm theory is cohesive and logically not false.  
Dubin (1978) identified three mutually exclusive and exhaustive types of propositional 
statements. For the paradigm theory of Lincoln et al. (2011), the axiom extensions can be 
considered propositional statements about “the continuity of a system state that in turn involves a 
prediction about the conjoined values of all units in the system” (Dubin, 1978, p. 166). In other 
words, the cohesive conjoined set of axiom positions of an inquiry paradigm (i.e., a system state 
of the paradigm theory) suggests logical implications on ways of acting for the inquirer engaged 
in disciplined inquiry. Although the theoretical framework of the paradigm theory of Lincoln et 
al. is made complete by specification of the axiom extensions into inquiry, the theory remains 
only conceptual without specification (or consideration) of empirical indicators and hypotheses 
(Torraco, 1994, 1997, 2005a). To assess the fit of the paradigm with reality, the axiom theory’s 
propositions had to be operationalized, or extended into the world of the practice of disciplined 
inquiry, with empirical indicators and hypotheses.   
Empirical indicators and hypotheses. As an operation, empirical indicators have been 
defined to include means to measurement (i.e., instrumentation), the act of measurement, and 
resulting value of measurement (Dubin 1978; Lynham, 2002a). In the case of the paradigm 
theory of Lincoln et al. (2011), the analog to empirical indicators as complete operation of 
means, act, and result would be the research design as means; the strategies of inquiry as acts 
(e.g. the activities and techniques aimed at achieving quality criteria, see Lincoln & Guba, 




naturalistic inquiries); and knowledge claims as inquiry results (e.g., see Denzin & Lincoln, 2005 
for discussion of research design and embedded research strategies). The means, act, and result 
are all assembled in accordance with the quality criteria for process and product appropriate to 
the paradigm (e.g., Guba, 1990c). 
A hypothesis was defined as a statement of values for units of a theory, given the 
operation associated with the identified empirical indicators (Cohen, 1989; Dubin 1978; Torraco, 
1997). Given the axiom extensions (e.g., derived theorems), of disciplined inquiry, hypotheses 
associated with the paradigm theory of Lincoln et al. (2011) can predict that if an inquirer 
leverages a particular form of research design and engages in specific activities aimed at 
achieving quality criteria, then a commensurate form of knowledge will result. The hypotheses 
of paradigm theory make predictions about quality process and product, given empirical 
indicators and propositions. This same formulation of proposition, empirical indicator, and 
hypothesis reflects the frameworks outlined for how rationalists and naturalists handle issues of 
trustworthiness presented by Guba (1981a).  
For example, the table for rationalists has five columns with the following headings 
(Guba, 1981a, p. 83): 
1. Inquiry can be affected by…,  
2. Which produce effects of…,  
3. To guard against which we…,  




5. And produce findings that are... (Guba, 1981a, p. 83).  
Likewise, the table for naturalists has five columns with the following headings (p. 88):  
1. Inquiry can be affected by…,  
2. Which produce effects of…,  
3a/b. To guard against which we… during/after the study,  
4. In hope these actions will lead to…,  
5. And produce findings that are...  
The third heading in both tables highlights the activities and strategies in which inquirers can 
engage. These activities and strategies are a direct operationalization of the paradigm’s theorems, 
which are derived from the collective set of axioms active in the theory. The fourth heading 
highlights the regulative nature of quality criteria in the process of disciplined inquiry under the 
paradigm theory. The fifth heading highlights the regulative nature of quality criteria in the 
products of disciplined inquiry under the paradigm theory. 
The Theoretical Range of Paradigm Theory 
The paradigm theory of Lincoln et al. (2011) is a theory that explains paradigms of 
disciplined inquiry. Each specific paradigm of disciplined inquiry further explains the inquiry of 
the paradigm. Therefore, the paradigm theory can be considered a meta-theory, with each system 
state (i.e., paradigm of disciplined inquiry) as a grand theory of inquiry. Table 35 further 





Characteristics of the Theoretical Range of the Paradigm Theory of Lincoln et al. (2011) 
Characteristics of theoretical 
range 
Specific position Explanation 
The size of the explanatory shell or 
theoretical boundary 
Large, abstract shell Few boundary determining criteria. 
The implied level of analysis Possibility of experience The implied level of analysis is 
much larger than an organization; 
rather, it applies to the entire 
possibility of experience and the 
entire collective of inquirers that 
commit to a reality within which to 
inquiry and generate knowledge. 
The extent of the direct connection 
of theory with the empirical world 
Indirect connection The meta theory is the most distant 
from the empirical world, the 
specific paradigms next, then 
research designs and strategies of 
inquiry, with the specific 
techniques having the strongest 
direct connection to the empirical 
world. Each layer is informed and 
made legitimate by its prior more 
abstract layer. 
The accuracy versus 
generalizability of the theory, i.e., 
the possibility of being general, 
accurate, and simple simultaneously 
General and simple Generalizable to all forms of 
disciplined inquiry. The basic belief 
system and theoretical framework is 
theoretically elegant. However, the 
theory may not directly align with 
inquiry as experienced by the 
inquirer. 
The level of abstraction or 
contextualization 
Abstract with limited context The meta level theory is abstract in 
its application to philosophical 
issues of experience. 
The time-boundedness of the theory Unbound in time Not tied to any single inquiry event. 
There are no periods of time that 
are inapplicable. 
The forms of knowledge that the 
theory represents 
Meta knowledge of process and 
product 
Each grand theory defined by the 
meta theory positions the specific 
paradigmatic knowledge. 
Driven theoretically versus Driven 
empirically 
Theoretically driven Top down theory of inquiry that 
normatively shapes experience and 
behavior. 
The Role of Paradigm Theory in Inquiry 
The numerous roles of theory in inquiry summarized in Appendix B were examined for 




that each of the six roles of the theory in inquiry captured a portion of the relationship of 
paradigm theory with inquiry. Table 36 summarizes the relationships examined for paradigm 
theory with inquiry. 
Table 36 
Table of Roles of Paradigm Theory in Inquiry 
Role of paradigm theory in inquiry Examples of theoretical role 
Paradigm theory as means to organizing 
what is known and what is not known 
“A theory organizes ideas and, in so doing, may uncover hidden 
assumptions” (Cohen, 1989, p. 189) 
 
Paradigm theory make explicit the philosophical assumptions of 
inquirers engaging in paradigmatically different forms of inquiry by 
organizing the specific axiom positions on more general axiom 
subjects that are typically, at best, an implicit part of the inquiry 
process. The theory organizes what is known and what is not known 
from an ontological and epistemological perspective rather than from 
a knowledge accumulation perspective. 
“A theory may display the complexities of a problem” (Cohen, 1989, 
p. 189) 
 
Paradigm theory underscores the complexity of making and 
evaluating knowledge claims. What counts as being both 
methodologically and interpretively rigorous greatly depends upon 
the specific paradigm of inquiry from which the inquiry was 
conducted.  
“A theory may relate what on the surface are different problems” 
(Cohen, 1989, p. 189) 
 
Different inquiry paradigms are different theory problems on the 
surface that are connected and made uniform at the meta-theoretical 
level of the common axiom subjects that define the basic questions of 
each paradigm’s belief system. Paradigm theory relates otherwise 
disparate paradigms of inquiry. 
Paradigm theory as means to 
identifying/prioritizing research issues 
“Theories tell us that certain facts among the accumulated knowledge 
are important, and others are not” (Campbell, 1990, p. 65; also cited 
in Lynham, 2000, 2002b; Torraco, 1994, 1997, 2002), e.g., theories 
help prioritize important research issues. 
 
Teleologically and axiologically, paradigm theory helps inquirers see 
the “facts” that are important as means and ends in their inquiries 
(e.g., the aggregate commonalities that allow for generalizations, vs 
the contextualized thick descriptions that help us understand lived 
experience, vs the compelling evidence that allows us to see the other 
perspective, and so forth). 
“Theory provides members of a professional discipline with a 




their profession” (Torraco, 1997, p. 119; similar notion also 
referenced in Cohen, 1989; Lynham, 2000b, 2002b) 
 
Through the paradigm-specific axiom positions on the paradigm 
neutral axiom subject, the idea of appropriate knowledge (e.g., 
subjective vs objective (see 2x2 table in Guba, 1978b, p. 74)), the 
language of research design (samples as exhaustive, representative, 
critical cases, or saturated), the idea of methods (instruments as the 
Archimedean lever vs the human), or analysis as an a priori 
procedure versus an in process hermeneutic decision or 
interpretation. Without these sorts of common terms and frame of 
reference for them, scholars cannot have critical discourse from the 
same point of understanding. 
Paradigm theory as means to identifying 
research problems 
“Theories identify important new issues and prescribe the most 
critical research questions that need to be answered to maximize 
understanding of the issue” (Campbell, 1990, p. 65; also cited in 
Lynham, 2000, 2002b; Torraco, 1994, 1997, 2004; similar notion 
referenced in Van de Ven, 1989), e.g., theories highlight gaps in our 
knowledge. 
 
Knowledge gaps drive research problems and paradigms interact 
with what counts as an important type of problem (e.g., Clark and 
Guba’s problem syllogism; Guba, 1978b; Guba & Lincoln, 1981; 
Lincoln & Guba, 1985b). Understanding what truly represents a gap 
in knowledge depends heavily upon what counts for knowledge; thus, 
paradigm theory provides the theoretical means to identifying what is 
a warranted problem to work on through inquiry. 
“Theories provide a means for identifying and defining applied 
problems” (Campbell, 1990, p. 65; also cited in Lynham, 2000b, 
2002b; Torraco, 1994, 1997, 2002), e.g., issues in practice can be 
highlighted by the explanatory power of theories, or conversely, 
issues in practice can highlight the need for theory. 
 
Pure applied empiricism without any explanation is simply a process 
of describing what was observed; however, theory is needed to 
explain why those data were observed (Sutton & Staw, 1995). 
Paradigm theory extends descriptions of inquiry processes and 
procedures by further explaining why those inquiry behaviors are 
important, i.e., what we are about when we engage in inquiry; “as we 
think, so do we act” (Lincoln, 1985b, p. 36). 
Paradigm theory as means to prescribing 
and evaluating solutions to research 
problems 
“Theories provide a means for prescribing or evaluating solutions to 
applied problems” (Campbell, 1990, p. 65; also cited in Lynham, 
2000, 2002b; Torraco, 1994, 1997, 2002), e.g., because theories can 
help highlight the research problem, they can also help researchers 
define appropriate solutions both a priori (prescription) and a 
posteriori (evaluation). 
 
Paradigm theory provides both the language and concept of quality 
methodological process, and, the language and concept of quality 
interpretive process. Paradigm theory further articulates the types of 
knowledge produced from inquiries within each paradigm, how that 
knowledge accumulates, and what the nature of the theoretical 
products for the paradigm are. Altogether, the language concepts, 
and knowledge descriptions provided by paradigm theory help 




and how well an inquiry product measures up to the ideal of a 
paradigm’s outputs after the fact. 
Paradigm theory as means to framing 
data for interpretation 
“Theories can give old data new interpretations and new meaning” 
(Campbell, 1990, p. 65; also cited in Lynham, 2002b; Torraco, 1994, 
1997, 2002), e.g., old data can be reinterpreted within new 
explanatory frameworks. 
 
Paradigm theory frames what is important to know from data 
analysis; and therefore, what questions are important to ask of the 
data from the lens of the paradigm inquiry. For example, how reliable 
are these data in postpositivism, or, how fair are these data with 
regard to empowering all perspectives and representing all 
ideologies in constructivism? 
Paradigm theory as means to generate 
and shape method 
Theory may generate and shape method through “its level of 
analysis” (Van Maanen, et al, 2007, p. 1147) by defining the size of 
the system of relations of interest: individual, group, organization, etc. 
 
The level of analysis prescribed by theory is related to the theoretical 
range of the theory. The paradigms of inquiry defined under 
paradigm theory accommodate different theoretical ranges. The 
theoretical range accommodated by a paradigm, in part, shapes the 
unit of analysis and level (or not) of aggregation targeted with 
method. 
Theory may generate and shape method through “its stage of 
articulation” (Van Maanen, et al, 2007, p. 1147) depending upon the 
maturity of the theory-building development cycle. 
 
The paradigms defined under paradigm theory prescriptively, 
descriptively, and evaluatively shape the methods of each paradigm. 
As the paradigm theory evolved and was further articulated with 
additional axioms, extensions of the axioms into inquiry, 
operationalized statements of inquiry activities associated with 
achieving quality criteria, and even with the addition of new 
paradigms (i.e., participatory paradigm in 2000), method of each 
paradigm was further and further generated and shaped through the 
stages of articulation of paradigm theory. 
Theory may generate and shape method through “the types of 
constructs it proposes” (Van Maanen, et al, 2007, p. 1147); as 
described in Appendix B on the nature of the theoretical units. 
 
The constructs of paradigm theory, i.e., the theoretical units defined 
by each axiom subject, as well as the specific values taken on within 
each system state, i.e., the axiom positions of each paradigm, not only 
serve to generate and shape method of the paradigm, but also shape 
the assumed nature of reality and world being inquired into by the 
inquirer. 
Theory may generate and shape method through “its descriptive or 
prescriptive nature” (Van Maanen, et al, 2007, p. 1147) given an 
emphasis on describing the way things are versus the way things 
should be, could be, or ought to be given some criteria. 
 
The paradigms defined under paradigm theory result in the regulative 




assumptions and criteria of quality, the paradigms drive inquiry 
conceptions of what inquiry ought to be like given the assumption of 
what knowledge under the paradigm ought to be like. 
Theory can inform “research design” (Van Maanen, et al, 2007, p. 
1147) choices given a set of “state coordinates” (Dubin, 1978, p. 151) 
serving as independent variables. 
 
The methodological state coordinate of paradigm theory informs 
research design decisions through typifying the means to which the 
knowledge assumed to be possible under the paradigm might be 
gained through systematic, disciplined inquiry. 
Theory can inform “choice of measures” (Van Maanen, et al, 2007, p. 
1147) given empirical indicators. 
 
The paradigm theory analogs to empirical indicators, understood to 
include means to measurement, the act of measurement, and resulting 
value of measurement were given as the research design as means, 
the strategies of inquiry as acts, and knowledge claims as inquiry 
results. In this sense of empirical indicators, the measures 
appropriate under paradigm theory are as much logical consequence 
as they are “choice” of inquirer; that is, paradigm theory guides 
what is even worthy of empirical measure in inquiries. 
Theory can inform selection of “samples” (Van Maanen, et al, 2007, 
p. 1147) given theoretical boundaries. 
 
Methods of sampling address issues such as: who and what counts as 
valid data, or, what counts as enough data. Paradigms guide what to 
attend to and what not to attend to in inquiries given process and 
product criteria of quality guiding knowledge claims; and therefore, 
inform appropriate methods of sampling.  
Paradigm Theory as a Form of Axiomatic Theory 
The key features of the axiomatic form of theory summarized in Appendix B were 
examined for the paradigm theory of Lincoln et al. (2011). Given the authors’ explicit 
positioning of their paradigm theory as a form of axiomatic theory (e.g., Guba & Lincoln, 
1982a), it should not be surprising that analysis suggested strong alignment of paradigm theory 
with the seven key features of the axiomatic form. Table 37 shows the mapping of axiom 






Mapping of Key Features of the Axiomatic Form of Theory to the Paradigm Theory of Lincoln et 
al. (2011) 
Key features of axiomatic theories Axiom features mapped to paradigm theory 
Theoretical concepts or constructs The metaphysical assumptions (i.e., axiomatic subjects or basic 
questions) of ontology, epistemology, methodology, axiology, and 
teleology may be considered the theoretical constructs. 
Scope conditions The scope conditions are limited to the world of inquiry within which 
the inquirer engages; this need not be, but is not excluded from, the 
everyday world the inquirer experiences (Crotty, 2007).  
Axiom statements The specific metaphysical positions, or answers to each of the basic 
questions may be considered the axiom statements (Guba & Lincoln, 
1982a).  
Propositions derived from axiom 
combinations 
The postures inquirers take towards inquiry (i.e., axiom extensions or 
operational characteristics) may be considered the derived propositions 
or theorems (Lincoln & Guba, 1985b). 
A logical system within which to 
relate the theoretical concepts and 
derive propositions 
The meta-framework of axiom subjects, or theoretical constructs, 
defines the set of basic questions that inquirers must answer to engage 
in a disciplined inquiry. All questions must be addressed and the 
answers form the bounding system of what can be known and how an 
inquirer might go about attaining some of that knowledge. It is that 
bounding system helps define the types of propositions that would 
meaningfully, and logically, be derived about what the inquiry may look 
like for each paradigm, or system state, in practice. 
Value judgments of justification The theorems, or axiom extensions, of each paradigm defined under 
paradigm theory are judged as justified given the paradigm’s axioms 
and its logical bounding system. That is, justification of a set of axiom 
extensions is a judgment based on demonstration of logical dependence 
upon the axiom system and the extent that the set of axiom extensions 
further exhibit synergistic coherence and interdependence. There is; 
however, no requirement that the axiom extensions fit any portion of 
reality for judgment of their justification under the axiomatic form of 
theory (Lincoln & Guba, 1985b; Reynolds, 1971). 
Value judgments of fit with reality Judgment of the fit of a paradigm’s set of axiom extensions is an 
evaluation of their utility for not only informing and guiding inquiries in 
practice (i.e., serving as a regulative ideal), but for successfully 
governing a process of inquiry that yields knowledge claims valued as 
ends in a world of practice (Guba, 1987a/b).  
Consideration of Paradigm Theory as a Form of Typological Theory 
The key features of the typological form of theory summarized in Appendix B were 
examined for the paradigm theory of Lincoln et al. (2011). Although never explicitly discussed 




seven key features of the typological form. The alignment of paradigm theory under both the 
axiomatic and typological forms is justifiable given the strong structural similarities between the 
two forms of theory. Table 38 shows the mapping of typological features to paradigm theory. 
Table 38 
Mapping of Key Features of the Typological Form of Theory to the Paradigm Theory of Lincoln 
et al. (2011) 
Key features of typological theories 
Typological features mapped to paradigm theory 
Taxonomic characteristics:  
Division of elements into semantically 
heterogeneous categories 
Each axiom subject serves as semantically different category of 
basic assumption. 
Inclusion of within category attributes Each axiom position under an axiom subject serves as within 
category attribute. 
Simplification of all unique elements in 
an aggregate classification scheme 
The full five axiom subject meta-framework organizes a large 
number of assumptions about the possibility of experience into a set 
of basic questions undergirding an inquirer’s belief system. 
Decision rules for classification The basic questions articulated for each axiom subject, e.g., “what 
is there that can be known” (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, p. 83) for the 
ontological axiom subject, along with the definitions provided for 
each axiom position, e.g., “virtual reality shaped by social , 
political, cultural, economic, ethnic, and gender values; crystallized 
over time” (Guba & Lincoln, 2005, p. 195) for the historical realist 
axiom position under the ontological subject, together form 
decision rules for classification. For example, if the inquirer 
believes X about the nature of what can be known, then the 
ontological position is Xn. 
Typological characteristics:  
First-order constructs The first-order constructs are analogous to the axiom positions 
defined under each axiom subject in the meta-framework. 
Ideal types comprising first-order 
constructs 
Each paradigm of inquiry, or system state of the overarching 
theory, is analogous to an ideal type; each paradigm (or ideal type) 
is comprising the holistic set of axiom positions on each of the five 
axiom subjects. 
Holistic organization of category 
attributes into ideal types and ideal 
types into typologies 
A unique, synergistic, and coherent organization of axiom positions 
are defined for each ideal type / paradigm of inquiry. Further, each 
ideal type is organized into a typology of paradigms of inquiry 
(positivist, postpositivist, critical, constructivist, participatory). For 
example, the vertical typologies of axiom positions under an ideal 
type and horizontal ordering of axiom positions under axiom 
subjects in Table 6.5 in pages 102 through 115 in Lincoln et al. 
(2011). 
Minimum criteria as typological theory*:  
Unique Gestalt-like pattern for each 
ideal type 
Each paradigm, i.e., each ideal type defined under the paradigm 




the level of paradigm definition, this greater than the sum of its 
parts effect may not be apparent as a set of five belief statements. 
However, as a belief system from which axiom extensions are 
derived, the Gestalt pattern of the belief system becomes more 
apparent as its manifest inquiry behaviors, e.g., the set of fourteen 
theorems (Guba & Lincoln, 1989) or the eighteen positions on 
practical issues of inquiry (Lincoln et al., 2011). 
Complex hierarchical organization of 
grand theory and several middle range 
theories 
The meta-framework of interacting axiom subjects form what can 
be mapped to a grand theory within which the axiom subjects 
themselves are the theoretical units. At a lower level of abstraction, 
each paradigm / ideal type of the grand theory also serves as more 
specific middle range theory within which he specific interacting 
axiom positions, i.e., first-order constructs, are the theoretical units. 
However, due to the high level of its abstraction, the meta-
framework and lower level ideal types of paradigm theory likely 
better fit the range of meta-theory and grand theory, respectively, 
given the range descriptions summarized in Figure 9 of Appendix 
B. 
Judgments regarding ideal type internal 
consistency 
Judgment regarding the internal consistency of an ideal type is 
similar to the value judgment of justification of an axiomatic 
theory; however, the internal consistency of typological theory is 
examined not at the analogous theorem level of the typological 
form, but at the first-order constructs (analogous to axiom 
positions). The group of five first-order constructs within an ideal 
type, one from each of the five categories of construct, are not 
simple combinations of constructs (simple in the sense of mere 
exhaustive permutations of five sets of five unique positions taken 
five at a time, one from each set). Rather, the set of five first-order 
constructs are a smaller subset that must hang together in a 
synergistic and holistic manner.  
Judgment regarding the degree of 
empirical fit or normative influence on 
practice  
Here again, judgment of the empirical fit of an ideal type is similar 
in concept to the judgment of the fit of the theorems of the axiom 
form with the empirical world. However, the typological form of 
theory also makes explicit the regulative influence ideal types may 
have on practice. That is, instead of assuming and judging fit with 
reality, the typological form may be understood to represent a more 
perfect, ideal form of experience. As a consequence, rather than 
descriptively fit the practice of inquiry, the ideal type may exert 
normative force on the practice of inquiry as a regulative ideal. 
Note. Minimum criteria as typological theory does not include mapping for first-order constructs 
or ideal types because they were covered as typological characteristics.  
Data Synthesis: Analysis of Systematic Process as Theory Building 
Analysis of the systematic process leading to development of the paradigm theory of 
Lincoln et al. (2011) was conducted by examining several of the key considerations of theory-




theoretical work of paradigm theory using the key considerations of theory-building research to 
frame the analysis. The following sections discuss each consideration of theory-building research 
in further detail. 
Table 39 
Analysis of the Systematic Process Leading to Development of the Paradigm Theory of Lincoln 
et al. (2011) 
Key considerations of theory-
building research 
Examination of the systematic process of paradigm theory 
Justification of the research as a 
theory-building process 
The inquiry represented an ongoing and iterative process of describing, 
explaining, and representing the possibility of experience. 
Understanding of the theoretical 
products 
Numerous components of theory (i.e., seven anatomical components of 
theory) were identified both prior to, and in the decades that followed, 
emergence as complete theory. 
Theoretical positioning The theorizing half of the overall theory-building process best positions 
the nonlinear, generative process of sensemaking engaged in by the 
authors across the four decades of theory development. 
Theory-building research strategy The research strategy associated with the development of paradigm theory 
may be best associated with the Theory to practice research strategy of 
theory building. 
Phase(s) of the theory-building 
process 
The theorizing primary occupied the conceptual development, 
operationalization, and continuous refinement and development phases of 
the theory-building research process. 
Theoretical processes The authors not only developed a framework for conceptualizing the 
possibility of experience but also defined an entire vocabulary with which 
to talk the phenomenon into existence. 
Theoretical methods The authors present the theoretical product of paradigm theory in the 
axiomatic form, thus, the axiomatic form of theory building is justified as 
best fitting theoretical method. 
Justification of the Research as a Theory-building Process 
Analysis of the subject system provided evidence of the “descriptions, explanations, and 
representations” (Lynham, 2000, p. 161) provided for the possibility of experience from 
paradigm theory. The “ongoing process of producing, confirming, applying, and adapting” 
(Lynham, 2002b, p. 222) evident in the history of the theory’s development suggests justification 




and constructs were posited for independent systems of inquiry; these outputs represented 
interim theoretical products of theorizing about different realities that may be inquired into 
(Weick, 1995).  
The initial theoretical framework for paradigm theory was presented in early 1980 (Guba 
& Lincoln, 1981, 1982a) and continued to be refined and operationalized throughout the 1980s 
(e.g., Guba, 1987a, 1987b; Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Lincoln & Guba, 1985b). Over the next 
decade, the theory was further refined and expanded upon with new system states (e.g., Guba, 
1990c; Lincoln & Guba, 2000). The following decade produced still more refinements, further 
operationalization of the theory, expansion of the theoretical units of each system state, and new 
articulation of the outcomes of each system state (e.g., Lincoln & Lynham, 2011; Lincoln et al., 
2011). Although paradigm theory can be argued to have achieved status as full-blown theory by 
the mid 1980s, its ongoing adaptation and development over the subsequent 25 years justifies 
positioning of the developmental process as a form of dynamic theory-building research that was 
subject to revision and refinement over time (Weick, 2005). 
Understanding of Theoretical Products 
A portion of the analysis of the subject system focused on understanding the anatomy 
paradigm theory. The seven basic anatomical components of theory examined for paradigm 
theory were (a) the theoretical units, or basic building blocks; (b) the laws of interaction, or 
relationships among units; (c) the boundaries or scope of the theory; (d) the system states or 
various conditions of the whole theory when all elements and structures are active together; (e) 
the propositions; (f) the empirical indicators; and (g) the hypotheses. All seven of these 




research process. Some interim products were prior to initial status as full-blown theory, some 
were necessary to be considered full-blown theory, and some were theoretical refinements or 
revisions to the working theoretical framework over time. 
Although unorganized into an overarching theoretical framework prior to the early 1980s, 
the basic assumptions, operational distinctions, and general criteria of scientific adequacy 
presented in the 1970s represented significant early interim theoretical products of the theorizing 
process before the full theoretical framework for paradigm theory had come to fruition (Guba, 
1975, 1978b, 1979). The basic assumptions of naturalistic and scientific inquiry were early 
theoretical ruminations that later became the values taken by the theoretical units of paradigm 
theory when it transitioned from one system state to another. The naturalistic and scientific 
approaches defined were early statements of the two system states of the emerging paradigm 
theory. The operational distinctions were early formulations of the theory in practice and later 
became the theorems or propositions of paradigm theory. The criteria of scientific adequacy 
served as pre-theory formulations of the empirical indicators of quality process within each 
system state. 
Given the criteria assumed for full-blown theory (i.e., full theoretical framework 
[Lynham, 2002b] or fully operationalized theoretical framework [Torraco, 2005a]), the initial 
axiom theory developed throughout the first 5 years of the 1980s was arguably the point in the 
ongoing theory-building process that the first necessary pieces to be considered full-blown 
theory were proposed for paradigm theory. Although a complete framework of assumptions, 
positions, and postures was presented in 1981 (Guba & Lincoln, 1981), it was not until 1982 that 




This fully operationalized theoretical framework included five axiom subjects (i.e., theoretical 
units); axiom positions for rationalistic and naturalistic inquiry (i.e., values of the theoretical 
units under each system state); derivative postures taken by practitioners (i.e., theorems or 
theoretical propositions); trustworthiness criteria; and even methods for achieving 
trustworthiness criteria (i.e., operationalized propositions). The subsequent theory-building work 
that continued throughout the next three decades built upon and refined this foundational 
framework, but its early conceptualization remained at the core of paradigm theory through to 
current thinking. 
Further examples of theoretical products generated from the continuous refinement and 
development of paradigm theory over the next 30 years were detailed in the analyses of the 
coded categories for paradigms, axiom subjects and positions, axiom extensions, and basic 
questions and positions on inquiry quality over time. The new paradigms added to the 
overarching theory were proposals of new system states, ideal types of inquiry, and middle-range 
theories (see chapter 4). The new axiom subjects and positions were definitions of new 
theoretical units and possible unit values (see chapter 4). The new axiom extensions were 
formulations of new theoretical propositions for each system state, ideal types of inquiry, and 
middle-range theory encompassed by paradigm theory (see chapter 4). The basic questions of 
quality and different paradigmatically oriented positions on quality were further 
operationalizations of the theoretical framework with refined empirical indicators (see chapter 4). 
Theoretical Positioning 
The theoretical work contributing to the development of paradigm theory was a 




continuously generated and/or refined various theoretical components of paradigm theory. 
Although the theoretical outputs were intentionally aligned with the axiomatic form of theory, 
rather than definition of products within a stepwise linear process, the theoretical outputs were 
incrementally talked into existence in a nonlinear creative process of idealization and 
sensemaking of the possibility of experience as it related to disciplined inquiries. 
As described by Weick (1989), theorizing can be thought of as the set of mental activities 
intentionally engaged in for the purpose of imagining coherent descriptions of constructs, their 
interrelationships, and the circumstances they provide for explanation or representation. The 
practice of theorizing aligns with the type of nonlinear theoretical thinking (Mintzberg, 2005) 
that must occur within the process of generating theoretical ideas, whereby “the process of 
theorizing consists of [ongoing] activities like abstracting, generalizing, relating, selecting, 
explaining, synthesizing, and idealizing” (Weick, 1995, p. 389). Given that the literature 
reviewed on paradigm theory exemplified a process of theory development rather than 
theoretical application and operation, the systematic process can be positioned primarily within 
the theorizing half (e.g., the theorizing half versus the practice half) of the whole theory-building 
research process. 
Theory-building Research Strategy 
Lynham (2002b) positioned the general method of applied theory building within two 
common theory-building research strategies: theorizing to practice and practice to theorizing (see 
also Reynolds, 1971). Even though the theoretical process of paradigm theory was iterative over 
multiple phases of the theory-building process, the theorizing process represented a recurrent 




emphasis on first generating a theoretical framework and theoretical propositions, the research 
strategy associated with the development of paradigm theory may be best associated with the 
“theory-then-research strategy” (Reynolds, 1971, p. 96) of theory building.  
Phase(s) of the Theory-Building Process 
Thus far, the systematic process of paradigm theory has been positioned in the theorizing 
half of the theory-building research process. The systematic process was also aligned within the 
theory-then-practice theory-building strategy. It can be further argued that much of the 
theoretical process of paradigm theory iteratively, and perhaps even simultaneously, occupied 
the conceptual development, operationalization, and continuous refinement and development 
phases of theory-building research (Lynham, 2002b). 
Within the theorizing half of theory building and the theory-then-research strategy, 
intense emphasis was placed on the development and operationalization of a theoretical 
framework. Lynham (2002b) proposed the conceptual development and operationalization 
phases of theory-building research as the two theory-building research phases that “dominate the 
theorizing component of theory-building research” (p. 232). The conceptual development phase 
produces the theoretical framework as its theoretical output, and operationalization translates the 
theoretical framework into concrete language with the theoretical propositions, empirical 
indicators, and hypotheses. These two phases of theory-building research can occur serially or 
parallel, linearly or nonlinearly. However, due of the iterative nature of theorizing, the 
conceptual development and operationalization phases often are accompanied by the continuous 





Six heuristics of the process of theorizing are summarized in Appendix C: (a) talk and 
write the phenomenon into existence; (b) understand where you are coming from; (c) be explicit 
about and own your own style of thinking; (d) write (i.e., tell the story); (e) be your own toughest 
critic; and (f) iterate until you have a theory. The first (i.e., talk and write the phenomenon into 
existence) bears notably on the theoretical process of paradigm theory. 
One of the more significant processes that the authors engaged in during conceptual 
development of the paradigm theory was the writing of the phenomenon into existence. More 
specifically, the evolving theoretical framework of paradigm theory effectively created an entire 
language with which to characterize and describe the possibility of experience. Much of the 
language of the positivist and critical paradigms had existed long before paradigm theory 
emerged (e.g., Habermas, 1971). However, the language of those two paradigms existed as 
largely unrelated systems outside the context of the overarching meta-framework (and language) 
of paradigm theory (e.g., axiom subjects). Prior to the work of the paradigm, the naturalistic 
paradigm did not exist conversationally, theoretically, or in practice, except for maybe in 
reference to hermeneutic science. Much of the language of the naturalistic (or constructivist) 
paradigm was explicitly formed as part of the development of the paradigm theory. The authors 
wrote the naturalistic paradigm into existence by both defining its system of axiom positions and 






Given the explicit presentation of paradigm theory in axiomatic form (e.g., Guba & 
Lincoln, 1982a), the axiomatic form of theory building is clearly implied. Furthermore, Reynolds 
(1971) recommended the axiomatic form of theory as most efficient for a “theory-then-research 
strategy” p. 96). Details of the axiomatic theoretical product are provided in Appendix B, details 
of axiom theories as a theoretical process are provided in Appendix C, and review of paradigm 
theory as an axiomatic form of theory was performed in this chapter. 
Data Synthesis: Analysis of Initial Conditions 
Analysis of the initial conditions for theoretical work leading to development of the 
paradigm theory of Lincoln et al. (2011) was conducted by examining the requirements of the 
theory-building process and the requirements for the theorist(s) to be engaged in the theory-
building process. Six requirements of the theory-building process and six requirements of the 
theorist framed analysis of initial conditions were outlined in Appendix C. Table 40 summarizes 
the results of analysis of the requirements of the theory-building process for the theoretical work 
leading to development of the paradigm theory of Lincoln et al. and Table 41 summarizes the 






Analysis of the Paradigm Theory of Lincoln et al. (2011) for the Requirements of the Theory-
building Process 
Requirements of the theory-building process Examination of requirements for paradigm theory 
Clear demonstration of a 
theoretical gap in 
knowledge in the form of: 
(1) a theoretical need The failure of conventional modes of inquiry to 
respond to, and produce, contextualized knowledge 
was thoroughly argued by the authors. 
(2) the entry point into the 
theory-building cycle 
In response to the need for a new model of inquiry, 
the authors entered the theory-building process in the 
conceptual development phase of theory building. 
Explicit linkage of 
theoretical problem to 
theoretical solution 
through description of: 
(3) the theoretical solution The axiomatic form of theory was proposed as 
theoretical solution to the need for a new model of 
inquiry. 
(4) the theoretical logic The theoretical logic relied upon the derivative truth 
based logic analogous to that used in the axiomatic 
system of Euclidean geometry. 
Extension of the 
theoretical framework 
into empirical practice 
through: 
(5) operationalization of 
the theoretical framework 
Operationalization of the axiomatic framework was 
achieved through extension of the axioms into 
practice with operationalized theoretical propositions. 
(6) definition of further 
theoretical research to be 
done 
Definition of further theoretical research needed was 
continually redefined through the addition of new 
paradigms of inquiry to the meta-framework and 
ongoing extension of the work into theoretical 
accumulation within each paradigm. 
Table 41 
Analysis of the Paradigm Theory of Lincoln et al. (2011) for the Requirements of the Theorist 
Engaged in Theory Building 
Requirements of the theorist engaged in theory 
building  
Examination of requirements for paradigm theory 
Practical knowledge of: (1) theory-building 
research methods from 
experience attempting to 
build theory 
The more than four decades of theory development on 
paradigm theory represented in the body on literature 
reviewed is testament to the authors’ practical 
experience with the axiomatic theory-building 
research method. 
(2) theory from 
experience attempting to 
apply theory in practice 
Same as 1 
(3) the phenomenon and 
topic of theory from 
experience with the 
phenomenon in practice 
Early publications in the sample of literature reviewed 
provide evidence of the authors’ practical experience 




Conceptual knowledge of: (4) theory-building 
research methods from 
intensive study of theory-
building processes 
Knowledge of the axiomatic form found in the 
analogies to axiom process of Euclidean Geometry. 
(5) the elements and 
structures of theory from 
intensive study of theory 
itself 
Knowledge of theoretical axiom structures evident in 
the tensions highlighted between the use of theorems 
in paradigm theory and the form of theorems in the 
analog of Euclidean Geometry. 
(6) the phenomenon and 
topic of theory from 
intensive study of the 
phenomenon itself 
Numerous pivotal works of the authors focused 
primarily on analysis of the paradigm topic itself. 
Demonstration of a Theoretical Gap in Knowledge 
The theoretical need for definition of alternative paradigms of inquiry to inform practice 
was argued by the authors over multiple decades. Arguments of need included, for example, the 
failure of convention inquiry to effectively evaluate programs when focused on significance 
(Guba, 1969); the failure of the dualist objectivist/subjectivist lens (Guba, 1978b); the need to 
focus on intrinsic context dependent value characteristics in addition to extrinsic context-free 
characteristics of programs (Lincoln & Guba, 1980); the numerous roles values play in needs 
assessment (Guba & Lincoln, 1982b); the interactive nature of ethics, research design, and the 
underlying belief system (Lincoln & Guba, 1987; Lincoln & Guba, 1989); and the categorical 
and practical imperatives for interacting with research participants (Lincoln, 1988a). Early in the 
theory-building process, Guba (1978b) explicitly offered eight reasons a model for naturalistic 
inquiry was needed. The need for an alternative model to convention inquiry had been well 
establishing in the theoretical work of paradigm theory. 
A conceptualization (e.g., model) and methodology was needed not to just accommodate 
contextualize knowledge, but to produce it. Guba (1978b) proposed naturalism as a new, 
alternative model of inquiry analogous to the accepted model of conventional inquiry. Guba’s 




conceptualization of the parallel assumptions of the naturalistic model of inquiry as means to the 
production of contextualize knowledge. Given the conceptualization (and later 
operationalization), the entry point in the theoretical work of paradigm theory can justifiably be 
assumed as the conceptual development and operationalization phases of theory-building 
research. 
Explicit Linkage of Theoretical Problem to Theoretical Solution 
Guba initially responded to the defined theoretical need (i.e., an alternative model of 
inquiry for the production of contextualized knowledge) by proposing the naturalist model in 
analogous form to the conventional model (1978b). A few years later, the authors explicitly 
linked the theoretical need for an alternative model with the axiomatic form of theory as a 
theoretical solution to the theoretical need (e.g., Guba & Lincoln, 1982a; Lincoln & Guba, 
1985b). The axiomatic form was proposed for both naturalistic and conventional approaches to 
inquiry as sets of different positions on a common set of axiomatic subjects. This proposed 
axiomatic solution included a complete theoretical framework in additional to numerous 
theorems offered as derivative postures and implications of the axiomatic systems on the practice 
of inquiry (“implied by accepting the axioms” [Guba, 1990c, p. 69]). 
The theoretical logic used to identify axiom positions and then derive the associated 
postures practitioners would take toward inquiry was likened to that used in the formulation of 
Euclidean geometry (e.g., Guba & Lincoln, 1981, 1982a, 1989; Lincoln, 1985b; Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985b). The axiomatic logic included identifying basic untestable truths specific to the 
phenomenon upon which conjecture is based, then from the system comprising those basic truth 




axiomatic system in operation. The derived operational system is considered true, given its 
relational nature to a set of fundamental untested basic truths. In other words, the theoretical 
logic was based on the rationale: 
Truth is whatever can be demonstrated to be consistent with the basic axioms and 
definitions of the system, as a geometry theorem is “proved” by showing it to follow 
logically from other proved theorems and, ultimately, from the basic axioms and 
definitions. (Guba & Lincoln, 1981, p. 53) 
Extension of the Theoretical Framework Into Empirical Practice 
Operationalizing a theoretical framework requires developing truth statements about the 
theory in operation across its system states (i.e., propositions), and contextualization of those 
theoretical propositions with empirical indicators and hypotheses. With regard to 
operationalization of the theoretical framework of paradigm theory, the historical analysis of 
paradigm theory in chapter 4 extensively documented the numerous axiom extensions (e.g., 
theorems, propositions, postures, implications) of the axiomatic theoretical framework. 
Furthermore, the current chapter details the nature of the axiom extensions as forms of 
operationalized theoretical propositions.  
The present chapter also describes the various theoretical products produced throughout 
the theoretical work on paradigm theory. The theoretical products included early ruminations 
about assumptions of different inquiry approaches, a full-blown theoretical framework, and 
ongoing refinements and additions to the theoretical framework over time. The historical 
analysis of the paradigm theory of Lincoln et al. (2011) in chapter 4 described the continuous 
addition and revision of those theoretical products from the present back to the earliest available 




taxonomy of theoretical components. Each time a new paradigm was proposed, or a new set of 
axiomatic subjects was presented, or a revised set of implications on practice was offered, or a 
novel set of quality criteria was suggested, further theoretical research was demanded for all 
system states of paradigm theory. For example, defining a new set of axiom subject demanded 
further theoretical work defining the axiom positions on each subject for each paradigm, and 
defining a new system of axiom subjects demanded revisiting the theorems derived from the new 
axiomatic system. Each addition of a theoretical product to paradigm theory both defined and 
demanded the systemic revision of the entire operationalized theoretical framework as further 
research needed in response. 
The Theorists’ Practical and Conceptual Knowledge 
The sample of literature reviewed shed little light on the practical experiences the authors 
may have had prior to entering into the theory-building process for paradigm theory. However, 
the body of work reviewed was itself a testament to the practical experiences of the authors with 
continuously building, presumably applying, and refining paradigm theory for more than four 
decades of inquiry (requirements #1 and #2). In addition, the literature reviewed implied 
experience with the paradigm topic in practice as educational evaluators (e.g., Guba, 1967, 1969, 
1975, 1977; Lincoln, 1978; Lincoln & Guba, 1978 [requirement #3]). 
The authors’ conceptual understanding of axiomatic theory and axiomatic processes was 
evident through the analogies to Euclidean geometry (e.g., Guba & Lincoln, 1981, 1982a; 
Lincoln, 1985b; Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Lincoln & Guba, 1985b [requirement #4]). The authors 
demonstrated further depth of understanding of the elements and structures of axiomatic theory 




theorems of paradigm theory (requirement #5). Early proposals of the axiomatic theory 
cautioned against interpretation of the postures as logical derivatives in the same sense as the 
logically derived theorems of mathematics (e.g. Guba & Lincoln, 1982a). Instead, the authors 
suggested that the theorem-like postures should be understood as stances practitioners take 
toward the practice of inquiry that are in agreement with the underlying axiom system. They later 
argued that the postures could be shown as logical derivatives (Guba, 1987), but seemed to 
finally concede and later explain the postures as implications on the practice of inquiry from 
acceptance of the underlying axiomatic system (e.g., Guba, 1990c; Guba & Lincoln, 1994).  
The literature review contained a multitude of publications focusing primarily on the 
analysis of the paradigm topic itself. Numerous pivotal works served as examples of the authors’ 
conceptual knowledge of the paradigm phenomenon from intensive study of paradigms 
(requirement #6). For example, Effective Evaluation (Guba & Lincoln, 1981); Naturalistic 
Inquiry (Lincoln & Guba, 1985b); Fourth Generation Evaluation (Guba & Lincoln, 1989); The 
Paradigm Dialog (Guba, 1990c); and all four revisions of their chapter on paradigms in The 
Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, 2005; Lincoln & Guba, 2000; 
Lincoln et al., 2011). 
Conclusions of Reverse Engineering Analysis 
As an entry point into the theoretical work of paradigm theory, the authors established the 
need for a model and methodology to accommodate and produce contextualized knowledge. In 
response to the need, the authors linked the axiomatic form of theory as a theoretical solution to 
the theoretical need for an alternative model (e.g., Guba & Lincoln, 1982a; Lincoln & Guba, 




inquiry as sets of different positions on a common set of axiomatic subjects. The proposed 
solution was likened by analogy to the theoretical form of Euclidean geometry and provided a 
similar operationalization of paradigm theory through theorem-like extensions of the theory’s 






Figure 6. Theoretical evolution of the axiomatic system of paradigm theory shown through 




The theory-building process engaged in by the authors was understood as a continuous 
process of refinement of the initially developed theoretical framework and its operationalization 
into the practice of inquiry. More specifically, the theory building engaged in was a process of 
ongoing theorizing through the conceptual development, operationalization, and continuous 
refinement and development phases of theory-building research, with a theory-then-research 
theorizing strategy. Through the axiomatic method of building theory, the authors essentially 
wrote the paradigm phenomenon into existence. Even more significantly, the authors effectively 
created an entire language with which to have cross-disciplinary conversations about the 
possibility of experience through the development of paradigm theory. 
As a form of theoretical output, the authors developed an axiomatic form of theory that 
provided explanation of what makes for good disciplined knowledge. The axiomatic theory was 
analyzed for its theoretical units, laws of interaction, boundaries, system states, propositions, 
empirical indicators, and hypotheses. The theoretical range of paradigm theory was further 
explored and the theory’s roles in inquiry were defined.  
As a backdrop to the landscape of the authors’ work, a number of indirect influences 
were identified. One influence on the theoretical work was an embedded historical context of 
intellectual, personal, social, and political transformation. Other influences included theory 
building during a time of change in the landscape of accepted forms of inquiry, a personal 
rejection of traditional scientific perspectives for understanding the human condition, acting in 
an advocacy role for the merit and utility of paradigm theory, and ongoing wrestling with issues 
of commensurability regarding the methodologies and methods of different paradigms used by 




A somewhat antagonistic statement was made in definition of the need for the reverse 
engineering analysis; that was, paradigm theory is not the proselytizing final word on what all 
inquiry is and should be. The term proselytizing was quite intentionally used due to its history in 
Becker’s (1970) writing on who owns the responsibility of methodology—the idealist-
methodologist preaching to the practitioner, or the practitioner who is methodologist as well in 
his or her own right. A proselytizing tension was evident within the writings of the authors 
between their advocacy and the positivists and their advocacy and the mixed-methods camps. 
The reverse engineering analysis offered a resolution to the proselytizing tension by changing the 
conversation about the authors’ writing on paradigms of inquiry. 
The theoretical understanding of paradigm theory gained from reverse engineering 
analysis underscores one obvious characteristic of paradigm theory: it is no more or less than a 
theory. The authors were clear to emphasize that the paradigms they proposed were their own 
constructions; however, the conversations that existed in the proselytizing tensions failed to 
emphasize strongly enough the nature of their writing as theory and the nature of their advocacy 
as one of arguing utility and fit with the world of inquiry, as opposed to arguing the trueness of 
their constructions. At their core, valid theories must be internally true with regard to the 
statements made by the theoretical propositions and the applicable scope of the theory, and the 
consistency of the propositional statements with the defined units, relationships, and system 
states of the theory. No external truth requirement comes to bear on theories.  
The notion and requirements of a theory’s truth are highlighted by a number of authors in 




forward for emphasis in Appendix B, Mintzberg’s words are pulled forward here as well in 
emphasis of the same truth bearing point: 
It is important to realize, at the outset, that all theories are false. They are, after all, just 
words and symbols on pieces of paper, about the reality they purport to describe; they are 
not that reality. So they simplify it. This means we must choose our theories according to 
how useful they are [for making the moves of nature more intelligible], not how true they 
are. (p. 356) 
Paradigm theory is not different. It is an axiomatic form of theory. Paradigm theory is 
words on paper about systems of reality that inform disciplined inquiries. It is not the entirety of 
reality, rather a simplification of reality. Paradigm theory need not be externally true, but only 
internally consistent. Paradigm theory should not be extended beyond its theoretical boundaries 
or explanatory shell. Paradigm theory should only cautiously be used as an instrument of 
sensemaking when discussed with respect to any systems of inquiry not assumed under one of 
the five systems states of the theory (i.e., the positivist, postpositivist, critical, constructivist, and 
participatory paradigms). Outside its five system states, no axiomatic system currently has 
articulated how the theory may operate, and therefore be congruent (or not) with other 
forms/systems of inquiry. Paradigm theory attempts to explain the possibility of experience 
within disciplined inquiries; however, the explanations only extend to the inquiry circumstances 
within which its assumptions hold. Consequently, engaging in disciplined inquiries requires a 
commitment of the inquirer to the assumptions of paradigm theory in operation. 
Changing the conversation about paradigm theory to one centered on its theoretical 
applicability may help resolve the (interpreted) proselytizing tensions. Tensions with positivists 
become conversations about paradigm theory in operation under different system states. 




theory for informing mixed practices aimed at the specific knowledge ends predicted by 
paradigm theory. If mixed-method practitioners choose to view their world of practice through 
the lens of paradigm theory, then issues of commensurability with what is mixed, within the 
limits of paradigm theory, are highlighted for conversation. If mixed-method practitioners 
choose not to view the world through the lens of paradigm theory, then the conversation between 
its advocates is no more productive than one critiquing the practices of one system state from the 
perspective of the other. 
In addition to the conceptual theoretical understanding of the paradigm phenomenon and 
actionable understanding of theory building that were gained through the reverse engineering 
analysis, reflection upon the requirements of theory building revealed an unanticipated outcome 
of the analyses. That is, a couple of requirements of the theorist engaged in theory building were 
initially satisfied through both the reverse engineering analysis and the historical analysis. The 
initially satisfied requirements are shown in Table 42. 
Table 42 
Reflection Upon the Requirements of the Theorist Satisfied From the Present Research 
Requirements of the theorist engaged in theory 
building  
Examination of the requirements of the theorist 
initially satisfied 
Practical knowledge of: 
(1) theory-building 
research methods from 
experience attempting to 
build theory 
 
(2) theory from 
experience attempting to 
apply theory in practice 
 
(3) the phenomenon and 
topic of theory from 
experience with the 
phenomenon in practice 
 
Conceptual knowledge of: 
(4) theory-building 
research methods from 
Adequate conceptual knowledge of theory-building 




intensive study of theory-
building processes 
supplemental review of theoretical processes in 
Appendix B, the historical analysis, and the reverse 
engineering analysis. 
(5) the elements and 
structures of theory from 
intensive study of theory 
itself 
Adequate conceptual knowledge of theory-building 
research methods gained from conducting the 
supplemental review of theoretical products in 
Appendix C, the historical analysis, and the reverse 
engineering analysis. 
(6) the phenomenon and 
topic of theory from 
intensive study of the 
phenomenon itself 
Preliminary conceptual knowledge the methodology 
phenomenon gained from review of the literature on 
methodology from chapter 2 and historical analysis. 
Further knowledge would be gained through future 
analysis of literature on methodological concepts as 
part of the theory-building process. 
Next Steps 
The reverse engineering analysis provided improved understanding of paradigm theory 
within its theory-building context. Given the larger goal of using the understanding of paradigm 
theory as an exemplar against which to conceptualize an analogous model for methodology, the 
axiomatic method of theory should next be applied to explaining the phenomenon of 
methodology. At a minimum, the theory building should begin by stating the questions of why 
intended to be answered by theorizing: explicitly articulating (a) the theoretical need, (b) how an 
axiomatic form of methodology could fill that knowledge gap, and (c) what incremental 
theoretical products serve as the intended outcomes of each iteration of the theory. The 
conceptualization phase would be the appropriate entry point into the theorizing half of the 
overall theory-building process, and a theory-then-research theorizing strategy should be 
followed. 
Regarding development of the theoretical framework for an axiomatic theory of 
phenomenon of methodology, a number of key parallels between the seven general anatomical 
characteristics of theory and the specific structural characteristics of axiom theories should be 




 Understanding axiom subjects as a type of theoretical unit 
 Understanding axiom positions as specific theoretical values of each axiom subject 
 Understanding the system of relations between axioms as the laws of interaction 
 Distinguishing the explained from the irrelevant unexplained as determination of the 
theoretical boundary 
 Understanding the holistic configuration of axiom positions (i.e., ideal types) as 
system states of the axiom theory, potentially aligning development of systems states 
as different approaches/strategies of inquiry 
 Understanding the theorems or axiom extensions into practice as the theoretical 
propositions of the axiom theory 
Lastly, although the exemplar laid the foundations for axiomatic theory, a number of 
similarities between the axiomatic form of paradigm theory and the typological form of theory 
were drawn. As theorizing on methodology progresses, explicit caution should be taken not to 
force fit evolving theoretical ideas into the axiomatic form. Theorizing should avoid being closed 
to typological theory if the alternative form turns out to be better suited when the theoretical 





CHAPTER 7:  CONCLUSIONS AND NEXT STEPS 
The Research Problem and Proposed Solution 
The research problem presented in chapter 1 and developed from the literature in chapter 
2 called attention to a gap in knowledge on disciplined inquiry. Specifically, when 
conceptualized with the phenomena of methodology and inquiry paradigms, the latter was shown 
to exist in the literature as a well-developed sophisticated theory, while the former to exist more 
primitively (and often inconsistently) as a broad range of possible ideas, principles, and 
processes. The argued consequence of the underdeveloped half of the conceptualization of 
disciplined inquiry was both a knowledge gap in conceptual understanding of disciplined 
inquiry, as well as an applied cost in the ability to methodically practice disciplined inquiry. 
To better understand the process of disciplined inquiry conceptually as well as inform the 
improved practice of disciplined inquiry, the proposed solution for closing the gap in knowledge 
in disciplined inquiry was development of an underlying theoretical framework for the 
phenomenon of methodology to complement the fully articulated theoretical framework for the 
phenomenon of inquiry paradigms. In response, incremental work was undertaken in attempt to 
advance conceptual understanding of the phenomenon of methodology from its primitive state to 
a more sophisticated state, and therefore advance knowledge of disciplined inquiry by more fully 
articulating the phenomena and interrelationships that define its conceptualization. 
Closing the Problem-Solution Gap 
As a starting point in the larger research agenda required to close the problem-solution 




the second was a reverse engineering analysis of paradigm theory. The historical analysis was 
judged an appropriate entry point because the desired methodological framework was both 
conceptualized as a complement to paradigm theory and intended to be modeled after the 
sophisticated fully articulated paradigm theory. The historical analysis was aimed at better 
understanding the foundations of the exemplar theory by tracing and reconstructing the inquiry 
paradigm’s theoretical evolution over time as it was represented in the authors’ published body 
of work. The reverse engineering analysis followed the historical reconstruction as a means to 
examine the theoretical form of paradigm theory. The aim of the reverse engineering analysis 
was to better understand the theory-building processes the authors engaged in throughout the 
development of paradigm theory. 
The Incremental Learning of the Historical Analysis 
The historical analysis uncovered the evolution in the authors’ thinking about paradigms 
of inquiry from early proposals of an alternative approach (e.g., Guba, 1978b) to the current 
evolutionary state defining five independent systems of inquiry based on positions to five 
metaphysical subjects (e.g., Lincoln & Guba, 2011; Lincoln et al., 2011). The middle work on 
paradigm theory, bookended by initial proposals and the current representation, demonstrated 
considerable new thinking and rethinking of the constructs that define paradigms of disciplined 
inquiry. The historical analysis was able to track over time the authors’ progression of thinking 
about what a paradigm of inquiry might be, the development of axiom subjects and positions, 
axiom extensions into inquiry, and basic questions about quality.  
Two significant contributions of paradigm theory to disciplined inquiries were 




improved understanding of what inquiry should look like within any one of the five paradigms of 
inquiry defined by the theory. In addition, the theory facilitated understanding of paradigms by 
providing a common ground between otherwise incommensurable systems of inquiry through its 
overarching axiom subject, or metaphysical subject, structure. That is, between-paradigm 
comparisons could move from contrasts in method practices to contrasts in positions on the 
common categories of basic assumptions that guided the method practices of each paradigm of 
inquiry. 
The Incremental Learning of the Reverse Engineering Analysis 
The reverse engineering analysis revealed paradigm theory in its axiomatic form and as a 
process of ongoing theory development. The theoretical coding paradigm applied to the 
milestones of the historical analysis allowed disaggregation of paradigm theory into its 
theoretical components and further facilitated understanding of the theory’s development through 
a specific theorizing process that continuously moved between the conceptual development and 
operationalization phases of theory-building research.  
Viewing the paradigm phenomenon as a theory, specifically as an axiomatic theory, 
provided greater understanding of its underlying structure and operation, as well as greater 
understanding of paradigm theory’s explanatory reach as a bounded theoretical model. As an 
axiomatic theory, paradigm theory was analyzed for its theoretical constructs, scope conditions, 
axiom statements, derived propositions, and logical systems of theoretical operation. The quality 
of the axiomatic theory was further understood as judgments of justification regarding the 
synergistic coherence of the derived theorems and their logical dependence upon the axioms of 




reality, wherein fit was qualified as the utility of the theorems for informing and guiding 
inquiries in practice and for successfully governing a process of inquiry that yields knowledge 
claims valued as ends in a world of practice. 
The Research Questions Addressed 
In chapter 1 three guiding questions were outlined for the developing research agenda on 
disciplined inquiry:  
1. How did the exemplar paradigm theory of Lincoln et al. (2011) evolve into its current 
theoretical state, and what features are characteristic of the paradigm theory? 
2. What surrogate theoretical research process can be inferred about the development of 
the exemplar subject system? 
3. Can understanding of disciplined inquiry be advanced given a more complete 
understanding of the phenomena of methodology and inquiry paradigms?  
The historical and reverse engineering analyses appropriately addressed the first two 
guiding research questions by unpacking the evolution in the authors’ thinking about paradigms 
of inquiry and revealing the full theoretical nature of paradigm theory in its axiomatic form and 
as a process of ongoing theory development. The symbiotic outputs of the two analyses are 





Figure 7. Side by side graphic of the outputs of the historical and reverse engineering analyses 




Whether or not understanding of disciplined inquiry can be advanced given a more 
complete understanding of the phenomena of methodology and paradigms of inquiry remains to 
be determined (I’m certainly hopeful). However, the problem space defined by Kant’s (2007) 
conception of how we interrogate the concepts of experience in order to form understanding 
remains underdeveloped. Fortunately, the knowledge of how to theoretically approach that 
problem space has been developed through the historical and reverse engineering analyses. 
The next step is to apply it. The literature on methodology needs to be further explored. 
The assumption that the regulative ideal concerning the process of combining the concepts of 
experience should be characterized with the methodological phenomenon should be critically 
reexamined. Is the regulative ideal for the process of combining the concepts of experience more, 
less, or perhaps entirely different than methodology?  It is this point of departure in the current 
work that future inquiry about disciplined inquiry will begin. 
Revisiting the Conceptualization of Disciplined Inquiry 
Chapter 2 proposed an initial conceptualization of disciplined inquiry to guide the inquiry 
about its constructs. The conceptualization situated disciplined inquiry at the intersecting space 
between the phenomena of methodology and paradigms of inquiry, such that the paradigm of 
inquiry phenomenon embodied Kant’s (2007) regulative ideal defining the possibility of 
experience and methodological phenomenon embodied in Kant’s principles of action for the 
application of rules, manifest in method, to the possibility of experience. Furthermore, skill with 
the process of disciplined inquiry in operation was positioned as Kant’s power of judgment (i.e., 





In the same spirit of the authors’ (e.g., Lincoln et al., 2011) comment regarding their 
position on axiology as a basic assumption (i.e., “We reserved for ourselves the right to either get 
smarter of just change our minds. We did both” [Lincoln & Guba, 2000, p. 169]), immersion in 
the present theoretical, methodological, and philosophical literature has left the initial conception 
of disciplined inquiry seeming somewhat more incomplete than initially anticipated. Specifically, 
the initial conceptualization seemed lacking with regard to how and where in the process Best-JB 
might be produced, how warranted assertions accumulate as knowledge, and how accumulated 
knowledge can inform future disciplined inquiries. New thinking about disciplined inquiry and a 
re-envisioned model are discussed next. 
New Thinking About Disciplined Inquiry 
Table 4 in chapter 2 captured the nature of the twin criteria of disciplined inquiries as the 
justifiers embedded in a disciplined inquiry necessary to meet the standards for the ex ante and 
ex post justification that come to bear on judgments of Best-JB. Unfortunately, the justifiers 
never found an explicit place in the initial conception of disciplined inquiry, and as a 
consequence, how and where in the process Best-JB might be produced were unclear. It seemed 
that the power of judgment needed a more prominent place in the developing model of 
disciplined inquiry so the relationship between the special talent for the practice of disciplined 
inquiry and the production of Best-JB could be directly represented within the model.  
After a knowledge claim achieves its status as Best-JB, the initial conceptualization of 
disciplined inquiry failed to recognize any mechanism for the accumulation of warranted 
assertions as knowledge. The significant efforts that went into the supplemental reviews of 




accumulation might occur within a model of the practice of disciplined inquiry. However, the 
thinking about the inadequate accumulation mechanism was catalyzed by the writings on 
accumulation within each paradigm by Guba (1990c) and Lincoln and Lynham (2011). Theory 
was a logical mechanism for how Best-JB might be received and accumulated as knowledge, 
particularly given the efforts of Guba, Lincoln, and Lynham in defining the nature of theory 
across different paradigms of inquiry. 
Lastly, the initial conceptualization of disciplined inquiry failed to address the two 
apparent roles of accumulated knowledge in the practice of disciplined inquiries. That is, the 
initial model needed representation of how accumulated knowledge serves as both the intended 
output of disciplined inquiries and as the input to disciplined inquiries. Definition of a problem 
warranting inquiry demands the juxtaposition of what is known against what is not known, and 
making a knowledge claim demands the juxtaposition of new knowledge against a previous less-
informed state. Disciplined inquiries should start and end with an understanding of accumulated 
knowledge. 
Re-thinking the Conceptualization of Disciplined Inquiry 
Figure 8 presents a re-envisioned conceptualization of disciplined inquiry. In addition to 
the inclusion of the power of judgment, theoretical accumulation of knowledge claims, and the 
connection of theoretically accumulated knowledge to the entry and exit points in disciplined 
inquiries described, Figure 8 also includes a relabeling of what was originally shown as the 
phenomena of methodology and paradigms to represent language more aligned with the Kantian 




The process labeled theoretical accumulation of knowledge in the disciplined inquiry 
process represented in Figure 8 serves as both entry and exit points in the inquiry cycle. 
Presumably, to begin any disciplined inquiry, the inquirer must first identify the knowledge 
known relative that knowledge believed to be unknown. The contrast of known with unknown 
guides the selection of a problem to work on, and assumptions about the possibility of what can 
come to be known about the problem’s solution. Understanding the tension between the known 
and unknown is informed by theoretically accumulated knowledge about the topics or 
phenomena of interest. Available theoretically accumulated knowledge then informs choices 
about both what concepts can be considered to define the possibility of experience about the 
phenomena and what processes are most appropriate for combining those concepts of experience 
so that knowledge, in the form of a solution to the problem, can be gained.  
Guided by commitments to the two regulative ideals (i.e., the concepts of the possibility 
of experience, and the processes for combining the concepts of experience) and the ex ante 
justifiers of process and product, the inquirer engages in the power of judgment by enacting 
elements of the commitments as means to the solution state. The resulting information 
interpreted by the inquirer is subject to scrutiny by those with appropriate hegemony, and 
judgments of Best-JB are made. If the interpreted information is judged to fall short of either 
process or product justifiers, then the cycle corrects and recurs in adapted fashion. If the 
interpreted information is judged as Best-JB, then the warranted assertion(s) theoretically 
accumulate as knowledge about the inquired into phenomenon or phenomena. Of note here is the 
assumption that theoretical knowledge takes on many forms with regard to type of theory; 




knowledge as interim theoretical product, full-blown theory, or refinement/extension of existing 
full-blown theory. The disciplined inquiry cycle repeats, ending and starting at the same place. 
 





Process not justified 
NO 





















Implications on Practice 
As a result of the research problem defined and developed in chapters 1 and 2, a 
consequence and cost were identified from the conceptual and action problems, respectively. The 
consequence was a gap in conceptual understanding of disciplined inquiry and the cost was a gap 
in knowing how to practice disciplined inquiry. For the practitioner, the cost in terms of the 
practice of disciplined inquiry is most important and extends well beyond limitations in knowing 
how to form justified beliefs through the practice of disciplined inquiry; the cost also includes 
the ability to recognize and acquire skill in its practice. 
The process of disciplined inquiry in practice was mapped to the third of Kant’s 
(1781/2007) mental powers of logic: the power of judgment. The power of judgment was 
positioned as skill in the practice of inquiry. The power of judgment is informed regulatively by 
the understanding and reason as the “special talent” (Kant, 1781/2007, p. 173) for applying the 
two regulative ideals in the real world practice of disciplined inquiry. However, as a skill of 
practice, it represents the rules in action rather than merely declarative know-how. As rules in 
action, not simply know-how, knowledge of disciplined inquiry may be mastered conceptually 
and even explained with precision, yet the inquirer may still exhibit shortcoming in the practice 
of disciplined inquiry. 
Skill in the practice of disciplined inquiry (or lack thereof) is the greatest potential cost of 
the gaps in knowledge in terms of practice. Carrying the ideals of disciplined inquiry into 
practice requires that the power of judgement be sufficiently trained and reinforced with practical 
experience. However, the practical experience must first come from a place of understanding 




degree of alignment between a concrete case in practice and the ideals against which it is to be 
compared.  
One element of skill in practice is being able to communicate to other inquirers key 
information about concrete cases. Inquirers must put their assumptions on the table if that 
conversation is happen with any sense of productivity. Conversations about examples of inquiry 
in practice involve questioning what makes the inquiry (regarding process and product) 
appropriate, credible, and valuable. To answer those questions, there needs to be shared and 
explicit understanding of what things are important for inquiry. The things that are important are 
precisely what is defined by the assumptions and belief system. If the assumptions and belief 
system are not made explicit upfront, there exists considerable risk of wasted effort producing 
and/or consuming knowledge. Those truly skilled in the practice of disciplined inquiry are able 
to both navigate degrees of fit between the concrete and the abstract, and, possess the flexibility 
to change the nature of the practical dialog when the nature of the belief system changes. 
Methodological Contributions to Theoretical Analysis 
In addition to the focused learning on the historical milestones and theoretical structure of 
paradigm theory, the two integrative literature reviews also resulted in an emerging approach to 
theoretical analysis. The use of the literature review approach for theoretical analysis was not 
novel (e.g., Cooper, 1988; Randolph, 2009), nor was the use of Dubin’s (1978) eight-step theory-
building approach novel for theoretical analysis of a phenomenon (e.g., Chermack, 2004). The 
theoretical coding paradigm applied to milestones in the history of theory did present a novel 
approach to disaggregation of a theory into its theoretical components and understanding the 




theory-building process (i.e., theory as a process) lens from which to code the theoretical 
elements and processes of a phenomenon, the approach to theoretical analysis also resulted in a 
situating of the analyzed phenomenon within the theory-building process, and therefore 
facilitated an agenda of ongoing theory-building research. 
More specifically, the coding paradigm expanded upon the use of Dubin’s (1978) theory-
building method (i.e., the anatomy of a theory) to include analysis of the theoretical positioning, 
theoretical range, theoretical roles in inquiry, and theoretical form. However, beyond simple 
expansion of elements outside the eight steps articulated by Dubin, the coding paradigm also 
included means for analysis of theoretical process with coding for features such as theoretical 
products (both interim and full blown), where in the theory-building process the work can be 
positioned, the research strategy used, the phases of theory building involved, and the theoretical 
processes and methods used. The coding paradigm further accommodated analysis of initial 
conditions leading to the theory’s development. Lastly, when applied to a historical analysis of 
the theory’s development, a more complete picture emerged from the coding paradigm with 
regard to what and when the components of the theory were conceptualized, in conjunction with 
what other theoretical elements or research, and how all the pieces incrementally fit together and 
evolved against a larger contextual backdrop over time. 
The Way Forward 
Much of the initial agenda holds the same (i.e., improved understanding of disciplined 
inquiry through development of a theoretical framework that explains the phenomenon of 
methodology); however, the conceptualization of disciplined inquiry has been further developed 




conceived as two intersecting constructs has been expanded to include additional constructs and 
assumptions “about sequence, about more and less determinate relationships, and about 
pathways of influence” (p. 389). Next steps include theorizing about methodology, theorizing 
about a model for theory and theoretical accumulation, and revisiting the model of disciplined 
inquiry. 
With further reference to Weick’s (1995) commentary on what should not be considered 
theory but incremental products of theorizing, the lists of variables that define the phenomena of 
methodology and theoretical knowledge need to be developed. Ironically, the work conducted for 
the supplemental reviews in Appendices B and C likely put the research closer to accomplishing 
the latter. From those lists of potential variables, additional theorizing is needed to imagine the 
possible values each variable can take on, the relationships among the variables, and system 
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APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGICAL REVIEW OF LITERATURE REVIEW RESEARCH 
METHODS 
Purpose and Organization 
Appendix A served as a methodological background literature review for the current 
research. Accordingly, the methodological literature on literature review research methods was 
reviewed. A general research design for the integrative literature review research method was 
synthesized from this literature and used to guide the works of the current dissertation.  
Appendix A was organized into two main sections. The first section provides an 
overview of the available literature on literature review research methods with a more specific 
emphasis on the integrative literature review research method. The second section presents a 
synthesized research design for integrative literature review research. 
Overview of Literature Review Research Methods 
The literature review may be defined as “a written argument that promotes a thesis 
position by building a case from credible evidence based on previous research” (Machi & 
McEvoy, 2009, p. 4). The literature review attempts “to integrate what others have done and 
said, to criticize previous scholarly works, to build bridges between related topic areas, to 
identify the central issues in a field” (Cooper, 1998, p. 2). Furthermore, critical to definition of 
the literature review is understanding that the systematic and rigorous forms of these reviews are 
research (Cooper, 1988, 1998). The systematic and rigorous form of literature-based research 




General Characteristics of Literature Review Research 
Cooper (1988) and Randolph (2009) present a view of the literature review that captures 
nuances in the research method from a taxonomy of six primary review categories and a number 
of sub characteristics for each primary category (Table 43). The six primary review categories 
were focus, goal, perspective, coverage, organization, and audience; where, 
 Focus was defined as the particular type of information targeted in the review. 
 Goal was defined as what the researcher intends to achieve with the research. 
 Perspective was defined as the researcher’s point of view, e.g., inquirer posture 
(Lincoln et al., 2011). 
 Coverage was defined as the manner of search and inclusion of literature. 
 Organization was defined as the scheme used structure and present findings. 
 Audience was defined as the intended consumers of the literature research. 
Table 43 
Cooper’s Taxonomy of Literature Reviews 
Categories Characteristic 
Focus Research outcomes 
Research methods 
Theories 
Practices or applications 
Goal Integration 
(a) Generalization 
(b) Conflict resolution 
(c) Linguistic bridge-building 
Criticism 
Identification of central issues 
Perspective Neutral representation 
Espousal of position 
Coverage Exhaustive 









Audience Specialized scholars 
General scholars 
Practitioners or policymakers 
General public 
Source: From Cooper, H.M. (1988). Organizing Knowledge Synthesis: A Taxonomy of Literature Reviews. Knowledge in 
Society, 1(1), p. 109. 
In Hart’s (1998) book on Doing a Literature Review, he defined 8 minimum requirements 
of doctoral dissertation research. These requirements were: 
1. Specialization in scholarship; 
2. Making a new contribution to an area of knowledge; 
3. Demonstrating a high level of scholarship; 
4. Demonstrating originality; 
5. The ability to write a coherent volume of intellectually demanding work of significant 
length; 
6. The ability to develop the capacity and personal character to intellectually manage the 
research, including the writing of the thesis; 
7. Showing in-depth understanding of the topic area and work related to the research; 
8. Defending orally what was produced in terms of the reason for doing the research and 
choices over the way it was done. 
Literature review research, if executed in a scholarly, systematic and methodical manner, 
may be shown to meet at least the first 7 of those requirements. For example, one of the more 
widely accepted literature review research methods, in postpostivistic circles, is the systematic 




Green, 2011 or http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/). Systematic reviews have an advantage 
over the qualitative realm of literature review research given the emphasis on quantitative 
synthesis of primary study evidence and perceived precision of quantitative analysis; however, 
the systematic review’s strength lies in its clearly specified and rigorously adhered to research 
protocol, not its quantitative subject. Although not exclusively oriented towards quantitative 
synthesis, integrative literature reviews also define, and adhere to, systematic and methodical 
research protocols. The integrative literature review was chosen as the most appropriate form 
literature review research for the current dissertation research and is detailed next. 
The Integrative Literature Review Research Method 
Although literature review research may be conceptually organized within the taxonomy 
of literature reviews provided by Cooper (1988) and Randolph (2009), a specific instance of 
literature review research method is the integrative literature review research method. 
Examination of the literature review methods literature revealed a number of relevant sources for 
the integrative review: Callahan (2010), Cooper (1982), Jackson (1980), Torraco (2005b), and 
Yorks (2008). 
Integrative literature reviews are “a form of research that reviews, critiques, and 
synthesizes representative literature on a topic in an integrated way such that new frameworks 
and perspectives on the topic are generated” (Torraco, 2005b, p. 356). They may also be 
considered seminal work audits or systematic reviews (Callahan, 2010). Integrative reviews may 
pull together disparate bodies of literature or explore one topical area in depth; however, critical 




systematic methodology that integrative literature reviews may be considered sophisticated 
forms of research (Callahan, 2010; Torraco, 2005b; Yorks, 2008). 
The purpose of an integrative literature review. Integrative reviews bring together and 
synthesize bodies of knowledge in the literature in new ways and result in new knowledge and 
understanding; however, they also serve to generate new research questions and direct future 
research (Callahan, 2010; Cooper 1982; Jackson, 1980; Torraco, 2005b). While the outcome of 
integrative reviews may by new understanding and new research questions, Torraco (2005b) 
identified four common types of output of the integrative literature review: (1) a research agenda, 
(2) a new conceptual organization, e.g., taxonomy, (3) a theoretical model or conceptual 
framework, and (4) meta-theory; the two most commonly paired being a new conceptual model 
and a research agenda. However, in all cases, a required output of an integrative literature review 
is something new as a product of the research synthesis; simple summaries fall short of new 
knowledge (Callahan, 2010). 
The content of an integrative literature review. Three sources on conducting 
integrative literature reviews stood out as complete process descriptions of integrative literature 
review research, both in the publications on conducting integrative literature reviews and in the 
methodological citations of integrative literature review dissertations; these were, Cooper (1982), 
Jackson (1980), and Torraco (2005b). In fact, Cooper (1982), Jackson (1980), and Torraco 
(2005b) were the most frequently cited methodological references for dissertations with 
“integrative literature review” in the title published in proquest dissertations and theses in the 
time spanning 2000 through 2012. As complete process descriptions of the integrative literature 




integrative literature review research: the content of the research method and issues of 
methodological quality. The former, the multi-stage process of the literature review method, is 
summarized in Table 44 for Cooper (1982), Jackson (1980), and Torraco (2005); however, “if 
one thing must be realized about conducting and reporting a literature review it is that the stages 
for conducting and reporting a literature review parallel the process for conducting primary 
research” (Randolph, 2009, p. 4).  
Table 44 
Table of Methodological Content for the Integrative Literature Review Research Method 
Cooper (1982) Jackson (1980) Torraco (2005) 
(1) Problem formulation (1) Select the Questions or 
Hypotheses 
(1) Identify an appropriate topic or 
issue 
(2) Data collection (2) Sample the literature (2) Establish the need for the 
review 
(3) Evaluation of data points (3) Represent the Characteristics of 
the Primary Studies 
(3) Conceptually frame the review 
(4) Data analysis and interpretation (4) Analyze the Primary Studies (4) Describe the methods used: 
collection, analysis, synthesis 
(5) Presentation of results (5) Interpret the Results (5) Critically analyze the literature 
 (6) Report the Review (6) Critique the literature 
  (7) Synthesize New Knowledge on 
the Topic 
Source: Cooper, 1982; Jackson, 1980; Torraco, 2005b. 
While not complete process descriptions, Callahan (2010) and Yorks (2008) further 
articulate and emphasize the significance of an explicit sampling process that defines the 
intended population of literature sampled from, the sampling strategy, criteria for inclusion in the 
review, where and when the sampling was conducted, and the outcome of each sampling 




Torraco (2005b), and Yorks (2008), a five component structure of methodological content for the 
integrative literature review surfaces. 
1. Begin with a clearly articulated research problem, from which research questions are 
generated, and for which the solution’s importance is established as a value-added 
contribution to understanding or practice.  
2. In addition to establishing the need for the review, the articulated problem must 
further justify why a review of the literature is an appropriate approach to generating 
a solution to the problem. That is, the researcher should conceptually frame the 
problem and proposed approach in the literature. 
3. The method should make explicit a data collection plan that includes (a) the sampling 
strategy, (b) the approach to evaluation of sources, and (c) the process for codifying 
the included literature. 
4. The method should further clearly articulate the process and logic for analyzing and 
interpreting the codified literature. 
5. Lastly, the integrative literature review method should propose the process, logic, and 
organization for synthesis and presentation of new ideas from the literature. 
The second important contribution of the complete process descriptions for the 
integrative literature review addressed issues of methodological quality of the research. 
Altogether, the integrative research review should address three high level, but basic, points 
(Yorks, 2008). First, what was understood that was not understood before? Second, why is it 
important to close the defined gap in understanding? Lastly, what makes the new understanding 




from works of Callahan (2010), Cooper (1982), Jackson (1980), Torraco (2005b), and Yorks 
(2008). These key indicators of quality include: 
 The importance and need of the research should be explicitly justified by the 
researcher. 
 The review’s purpose and conceptual framing should be presented upfront as an 
advanced organizer of the manuscript. 
 The researcher should present and make explicit the logic used to both filter 
information and draw conclusions. 
 Data collection should define both what literature was relevant to the research and 
what criteria were met for sources to be included in the research. 
 The overall emphasis in the integrative review is on synthesis not summary; the goal 
is generation of new understanding through either reframing existing ideas or creating 
new ones. 
 The new understanding generated from the review should serve as catalyst for further 
action through research or practice. 
 The integrative review should generate provocative research questions for future 
inquiry. 
 The integrative review should be presented and written in a coherent and clear writing 
style. 
As a heuristic guide for researchers engaging in integrative literature reviews, Torraco 




phases of the research process: (1) before writing the review, (2) organizing the review, and (3) 
writing the review. Torraco’s full nine step checklist is outlined below: 
Before writing the integrative review: 
1. Determine the maturity of the topic in the literature (i.e., new topic versus a mature 
topic) and justify why literature review research is an appropriate way to address the 
research problem. 
2. Define and justify the need for the research review as a value-added contribution to 
the audience. 
Organizing the integrative review: 
3. Structure the review manuscript around the conceptual framework defined for the 
topic.  
4. Explicitly and sufficiently describe the review method including: how/where 
literature was sampled, the criteria for evaluating sources, and the process for coding, 
critiquing, and synthesizing ideas. 
Writing the integrative review: 
5. Analyze and critique the existing literature. 
6. Synthesize new knowledge on the topic. 
7. Explicate the type of outcome (i.e., research agenda, conceptual classification, new 




8. Describe the logic and conceptual reasoning used to deconstruct and reconstruct the 
literature. 
9. Pose provocative questions to stimulate further research. 
A Research Design for Integrative Literature Review Research 
Given the prior review of Cooper’s (1988; Randolph, 2009) taxonomy of literature 
reviews, and, the methodological content of integrative literature review research by Callahan 
(2010), Cooper (1982), Jackson (1980), Torraco (2005b), and Yorks (2008), a twofold 
methodological framework for conducting integrative literature review research emerged as 
general framework for the current dissertation. The first part of the general framework for 
conducting integrative literature review research involves positioning the review descriptively as 
a set of literature review characteristics using the taxonomy discussed by Cooper (1988) and 
Randolph (2009). The second prescribes a methodological content and structure to the review 
report. It should be noted that no two reviews are identical in perspective, goal, etc. 
Consequently, the general framework attempts to capture most of the relevant ideas discussed in 
the literature on review research methods, but the framework should neither be consider 100% 
inclusive of all integrative review components nor prescriptive of exactly what an integrative 
literature review must include. The general framework is heuristic in quality. 
Integrative Literature Review Typological Positioning 
Upfront, the purpose of the research shall be made explicit, and given the purpose, 
justification shall be provided for why the integrative literature review is an appropriate research 




approach has been justified, the review shall be positioned as a set of review characteristics 
based on the taxonomy provided and discussed by Cooper (1988) and Randolph (2009). The six 
categories of review characteristics are: focus, goal, perspective, coverage, organization, and 
audience (Table 43). 
Integrative Literature Review Methodological Structure 
Given that the presence of a systematic methodology is one of the critical and distinctive 
features of integrative literature reviews that allows the type of review to be considered a 
sophisticated form of research (Callahan, 2010; Torraco, 2005b; Yorks, 2008), it is important to 
specify both the methodological content and structure of the proposed integrative literature 
review research method. This second piece of the general methodological framework proposes 
the following methodological content for the integrative literature review research method. 
Introduction: 
 Background information 
o Generally includes background information on the phenomena of interest in 
relation to the research problem. 
 Positioning 
o Place the topic in the literature, thus justifying the literature review as appropriate 
method, and future position with Cooper (1988) and Randolph’s (2009) taxonomy 
of literature reviews. 




o Provides a frame within which to relate the topics, phenomena, concepts of the 
problem. 
 The research problem 
o Establishes a state of not being able to explain or understand something from 
which research questions are generated and for which the proposed solution’s 
importance is established as a contribution to understanding or practice. 
 The need/importance 
o Establishes to whom resolution of the research problem is important. 
 Research questions 
o The specific questions that will focus the review and whose answers are explicitly 
aimed at closing the problem-solution gap. 
Method: 
 Sample description 
o Generally includes (a) the sampling strategy, i.e., where/how, (b) the approach to 
evaluation of sources, i.e., inclusion criteria, and (c) sampling results, e.g., how 
many sources were considered (and from where), how many sources were 
included, and relevant descriptive information on the final set of literature used in 
the review. 
 Data collection description 
o Generally includes (a) the process for codifying the included literature, e.g., the 
coding scheme and logic/reason, (b) the logic and conceptual reasoning used to 




any coding schemes or tables of coded data that meaningful organized the coded 
sources. 
 Data analysis description 
o Generally includes (a) a description of how the collected data was organized to 
facilitate the analysis, (b) a description of any analytical strategies used to 
examine the data, e.g., the logic or reasoning used to reconstruct ideas from the 
deconstructed literature sources, and (c) the analysis results, e.g., tables or graphs 
of integrated/analyzed data or any summary information that serves as important 
transition to synthesis. 
 Data synthesis strategy 
o Should include a description of intended forms of review outcome and how those 
outcomes were organized for presentation. 
Synthesis: 
 Narrative on new understanding 
o Should be tied to the outcome form(s) identified (Torraco, 2005b) and the review 
goal specified in the typological positioning of the review (i.e., Integration, 
Linguistic bridge-building, Criticism, Identification of central issues [Cooper, 
1988; Randolph, 2009]).  
Conclusions: 
 Review new understanding gained as solution state to problem state 










APPENDIX B. REVIEW OF THEORY PRODUCTS 
Theories 
A theory helps inquirers make sense of the explicit empirical world through conjecture 
about its implicit meaning (Dubin, 1978; Kaplan, 2009). Theory is the answer to questions of 
why (Sutton & Staw, 1995; Whetten, 2002). A theory is “more than a synopsis of the moves that 
have been played in the game of nature [i.e., the explicit empirical part]; it also sets forth some 
idea of the rules of the game [i.e., the implicit part], by which the moves become intelligible” 
(Kaplan, 2009, p. 302). That is, “data describe which empirical patterns were observed and 
theory explains why empirical patterns were observed or are expected to be observed” (Sutton & 
Staw, 1995, pp. 373-374). However, because inquirers are conjecturing about the underlying 
rules that make the observable moves intelligible, the conjectured meaning has a special, and 
important, quality. This quality is something that Kaplan further describes as “a symbolic 
construction” (Kaplan, 2009, p. 296). That is, theories are entirely conceived by man; theories 
“do not exist by themselves somewhere waiting to be discovered” (Patterson, 1986, p. xix). In 
fact, when wrestling with what a theory is … 
It is important to realize, at the outset, that all theories are false. They are, after all, just 
words and symbols on pieces of paper, about the reality they purport to describe; they are 
not that reality. So they simplify it. This means we must choose our theories according to 
how useful they are [for making the moves of nature more intelligible], not how true they 
are. (Mintzberg, 2005, p. 356) 
Mintzberg (2005) makes an important point: theories are sets of imagined concepts and 
with presumed connectedness (Kaplan, 2009) that are used to describe and simplify a portion of 
reality, but they are not that reality. If theories were the reality they described, then the focused 




(Dubin, 1978) and the theoretical phenomenon examined would just be the entirety of human 
experience. Theories provide an awareness “focused so that the object of attention comes to the 
foreground and other experiences become the background” (Dubin, 1978, p. 6). Theories cannot 
be true due to this divide between reality and theory. Arguments about a theory’s accuracy (e.g., 
Weick, 1995, 2005) and attempts to falsify a theory’s propositions (e.g., Popper, 2010) target the 
degree of agreement between the way a phenomenon has been contained by theory and the 
reality represented by theory; they do not however address whether or not a theory is true. 
Rather, theories are useful to varying degrees and ultimately “it is in the application of a theory 
that practice gets to judge and inform the usefulness and relevance of the theory for improved 
action and problem solving” (Lynham, 2002b, p. 233). 
To complicate the theoretical definition further, theories are intertwined with forms of 
knowledge. That is, a theory “encapsulates and ‘contains’ the explanation of the phenomenon, 
issue, or problem that is the focus of the theory” (Lynham, 2002b, p. 229); in other words, 
theories may be thought of as phenomenon-specific knowledge containers serving accumulation 
of phenomenon-specific knowing. Therefore, changing the nature of the knowing must change 
the nature of that which is contained by theory. In this regard, what it actually means to be a 
theory in terms of phenomenon-specific knowledge containment is the relational product of what 
it means to know and the nature of “knowledge accumulation” for that particular form (Guba, 
1990c, pp. 251-255), because neither knowing nor accumulation of that knowing are constant 
properties but rather are both always relationally present when contained in a theory. 
As a consequence of the relational quality of theory, most definitions of theory exist in 




from “explanations and predictions” (Patterson, 1986, p. xix) to “deep and widely accessible 
understanding… the ability to achieve a vicarious experience” (Lincoln & Lynham, 2011, p. 9). 
Others, such as Mintzberg, side step the labeling activity all together, “I am interested in 
explanation, and don’t much care what it’s called, theory or otherwise” (Mintzberg, 2005, 
p.360). As highlighted by Torraco (2002), the theory-theorist relationship is a reflection of the 
metaphysical assumptions (i.e., ontology, epistemology, axiology, etc) underlying the theorist’s 
paradigmatic perspective. Beliefs systems will factor into any representation of reality; reality 
itself manifests in a belief system dependency. Grappling with the diversity of what theory is or 
might be, as well as the exclusion of what it is not (Sutton & Staw, 1995; Weick, 1995; and 
DiMaggio, 1995) are important preludes to a definition of theory.  
However, much more generally (than paradigmatically specific) theories may be thought 
of as 
…informed knowledge frameworks about how to act on things in our world… put into 
practice or use precisely because they help us to understand, explain, anticipate, know, 
and act in the world in better and more informed ways, and to better ends and outcomes. 
(Lynham, 2002b, p. 222). 
As simply as it can be stated, a theory may be generally defined as “any coherent description, 
explanation, and representation of observed or experienced phenomena” (Gioia & Pitre, 1990, p. 
587); a theory “simply explains what a phenomenon is and how it works” (Torraco, 1997, p. 
115). 
The Anatomy of a Theory 
Understanding the anatomy of “full blown theory” (Weick, 1995, p. 385) becomes a 




building process; that is, when the various elements and structures manifest themselves within 
the systematic theory development process (e.g., Weick, 1995, 2005) and then how those 
elements and structures influence ongoing inquiry (Lynham, 2000, 2002a, 2002b). Even though 
the specific form and composition of theoretical output that is considered complete theory is, in 
part, dependent upon the specific sort of theory-building method used, more general descriptions 
of the anatomy of a theory may be considered (e.g., Chermack, 2006; DiMaggio, 1995; Dubin, 
1976, 1978; Lynham, 2002a, 2002b; Reynolds, 1971; Shoemaker, Tankard, & Lasorsa, 2004; 
Sutton & Staw, 1995; Weick, 1995).  
The anatomy of a theory is a reference to the elements and structures that comprise a full-
blown theory, similar to how a description of the anatomy of the heart might discuss where the 
heart is located within a larger human anatomical system, what other organs the heart connects 
to, the surface layers of the heart, the inner chambers and valves of the heart, and how all the 
elements and structures function together to circulate blood. However, defining the elements and 
structures of a theory must be understood as a somewhat less precise description than that of 
human organs given the abstract nature of a theory, which itself is a simplification of reality, e.g., 
theory presents some idea of the implicit rules of the game by which the explicit observable 
moves of the game are more intelligible (Kaplan, 2009). As a consequence of the conjectural 
nature of speculating on implicit rules of nature, a full-blown theory must at a minimum “include 
the development of the key elements of the theory, an initial explanation of their 
interdependence, and the general limitations and conditions under which the theoretical 
framework can be expected to operate” (Lynham, 2002b, p. 232). However, others suggest that 
further operationalization of the theoretical framework is also a requirement of full-blown theory 




necessary, not optional, for any theory that has not been tested or for theoretical research on 
topics that have not been studied exhaustively” (Torraco, 2005a, p. 370) 
Lynham’s (2002b) and Torraco’s (2005a) statements regarding the requirements of a 
theory lead in two directions for understanding the anatomy of a theory. First, Lynham’s (2002b) 
minimum requirements of a theory lead to an examination of the deeper theoretical anatomy that 
is prerequisite to the theoretical propositions, questions, and hypotheses. Second, Torraco’s 
(2005a) statement leads to an examination of definition and purpose of the propositions, 
questions, and hypotheses used in the theoretical context. Examination of both (i.e., deeper 
theoretical anatomy, as well as propositions and hypotheses) follows from the perspective of 
Dubin’s theory descriptions (1976, 1978). 
The deeper theoretical anatomy of a theory may be generally characterized with four 
fundamental components. These fundamental components are: (1) the theoretical units, or basic 
building blocks, (2) the laws of interaction, or relationships among units, (3) the boundaries of 
the theory, or scope of the theory, and (4) the system states of the theory, or various conditions of 
the whole theory when all elements and structures are active together. Together, these four 
elements and structures interact to form the internal workings, external borders, and activated 
states of a theory (Cohen, 1989; Dubin, 1978; Lynham, 2002a; Torraco, 1994, 1997). 
Theoretical units. A unit is the term used to “designate the things out of which theories 
are built” (Dubin, 1978, p. 38); however, as building blocks units are only construction material 
for theory and not what the theory itself is about. Theories are built “about the properties of the 
things rather than about the things themselves” (Dubin, 1978, p. 40). There are two potential 




specific type of concept. A concept “expresses an abstraction formed by generalization from 
particulars” (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000, p. 40). Concepts are typically abstractions of observable 
things, such as human behavior, so they have their start in observable reality. Concepts are, or 
typically can be, defined operationally such that properties of the concepts could be empirically 
observed. That is, concepts represent abstractions that are intended to be assigned operational 
definitions, where an operational definition is way of: 
…specifying the activities or ‘operations’ necessary to measure it and evaluate the 
measurement..., a sort of manual of instructions to the researcher. It says, in effect, ‘Do 
such-and-such in so-and-so a manner’. In short, it defines or gives meaning to a [concept] 
by spelling out what the investigator must do to measure it and evaluate that 
measurement. (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000, p. 42) 
Critical to a construct’s distinction from a concept is its explicit use abstractly in theory. 
That is, constructs are not intended to be observed, rather they are, or typically should be, 
defined with other constructs. In contrast to a concept, a construct can be defined as a concept 
that has been: 
…deliberately and consciously invented or adopted for a special scientific purpose… that 
scientists consciously and systematically use in two ways: (1) it enters into theoretical 
schemes and is related to in various ways to other constructs… and (2) is so defined and 
specified that it can be observed and measured. (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000, p. 40) 
Constructs are abstractions invented for the purpose of relating to other constructs in 
theories, where theories might be considered imposed order on experience in which “the idea of 
order, and the tools utilized to create the sense of order, are in the mind of the theorist... the locus 
of theory is the human mind” (Dubin, 1978, p. 5). Where the utility of concepts is in their 
capacity for empirical extension, observation, and measurement, the utility of constructs is in 
their capacity for theoretical extension and use in relating to other constructs of a theoretical 




In addition to thinking about theoretical units according to the high level distinction of 
concept versus construct, Dubin (1978) proposed five important lower level distinctions relevant 
to understanding and classifying theoretical units. These distinctions were: (1) unit versus event, 
(2) attribute versus variable, (3) real versus nominal, (4) primitive versus sophisticated, and (5) 
collective versus member (Dubin, 1978; Lynham, 2002a).  
Unit versus event. A unit can be counted by two or more occurrences whenever it exists 
and under all circumstances of its existence. An event only happens once in time and 
consequently has a population of exactly one. Recall that units are about the properties of things. 
The properties of things should be considered independent of events. Consequently, when 
modeling events, even though the events described, their antecedent causes, and manner both are 
sequenced together may be an accurate reconstruction, the model “can only explain that one 
event, no more” (Dubin, 1978, p. 42). Conversely, because units represent properties of things 
with a population of more than one, when modeling units, the units defined and their manner of 
interaction are in reference to explaining “whenever these systems exist and under all conditions 
of their existence” (Dubin, 1978, p. 43). 
Attribute versus variable. A theoretical unit may be a property of a thing that possesses 
the quality of being either attribute or variable. “The thing always has this quality if the attribute 
is a property of the thing… the property is either present or not” (Dubin, 1978, p. 44). Attribute 
properties focus attention on whether or not the thing is part of the set with the property or part 
of the set without the property. In contrast, if the variable is a property of the thing, then the thing 




upon the amount or degree to which this property is present in the thing. In other words, a 
variable varies in how much of the property is present at any given time” (Dubin, 1978, p. 44).  
Real versus nominal. A real unit is a theoretical unit for which an empirical indicator 
already exists or is capable of being invented. A nominal unit is a theoretical unit for which no 
empirical indicator exists. “The distinction between a real and a nominal unit rests solely upon 
the probability of finding an empirical indicator for the unit” (Dubin, 1978, p. 44). However, 
there is somewhat an issue of intention of the inquirer that the distinction is made upon. If the 
inquirer intends to invent or discover an empirical indicator for a defined unit, then it may be 
considered real. Yet, if for the same unit the inquirer has no intention of seeking the empirical 
indicator, then the unit may be considered nominal. 
Primitive versus sophisticated. The primitive versus sophisticated distinction is one of 
definition. A sophisticated unit is a defined theoretical unit. It has a name, definition, and some 
properties associated with the theory. A primitive unit is an undefined theoretical unit. These 
often represent the something that is related to an observation that that scientist strives to 
discover, define, and explicitly incorporate into theory. A primitive unit guides theoretical 
discovery. By first noting that something undefined might be related to something else that is 
defined, a primitive unit is being defined in relationship to a sophisticated unit. Inquiry can be 
guided to define this primitive unit and perhaps introduce it as a nominal unit, and then, with 
further guided inquiry next introduce it as a real unit measureable as an attribute or variable 
(Dubin, 1978). 
Collective versus member. Here, the levels of relationship are critical. There is an 




person-organ-cell-atom. The question is one of relationship between both adjacent levels and 
levels separated by one or more level in the hierarchy. A society level unit will relate to society 
level explanations, but not person level explanations. A collective theoretical unit is the larger 
class, set, or collective. For member theoretical units the focus is much more granular, with 
attention shifted to the individual members of the class, or the elements composing the set 
(Dubin, 1978). 
Dubin further proposed a mutually exclusive classification system for defining the type of 
theoretical unit (1978). This classification system serves as means to classifying the properties of 
the defined units. Classifying the properties of theoretical units is a quality only of sophisticated 
units; and therefore, is a key characteristic of any sophisticated unit, a distinguishing feature 
between primitive and sophisticated units, as well as means to transforming primitive to 
sophisticated (Dubin, 1978). The five mutually exclusive classes are: (1) enumerative, (2) 
associative, (3) relational, (4) statistical, and (5) summative units (Chermack, 2004; Dubin, 1978; 
Lynham, 2002a).  
Enumerative units. An enumerative unit is “a property characteristic of a thing in all its 
conditions. That is, regardless of the condition of the thing that can be observed or imagined, it 
will always have that property” (Dubin, 1978 p. 58) regardless of whether the enumerative unit is 
attribute or variable. When the property characteristic is also an attribute, then the enumerative 
unit is always present in the thing. When the property characteristic is also a variable, then the 
frequency of occurrence of the property determines the degree, or how much, of the enumerative 




cannot exist a condition in which the unit takes on a not-A or zero frequency value. If the null 
condition is the case, then the unit is associative rather than enumerative (Dubin, 1978). 
Associative units. An associative unit is identical to an enumerative unit in all manners 
except that it is “a property characteristic of a thing in only some of its conditions” (Dubin, 1978 
p. 60). That is, for an associative unit, the condition in which the unit takes on a not-A or zero 
frequency value can exist. This subtle difference is quite important though. It not opens the door 
for absence of the property in the thing, but negative values of the property as well (Dubin, 
1978). 
Relational units. A relational unit is “a property characteristic of a thing that can be 
determined only by the relation among properties” (Dubin, 1978 p. 62). The relational unit’s 
existence in the theory depends upon other units in the theory relating together in some manner 
to produce a new property; that is, a relational unit “is not itself a property of a thing but a 
property of two or more properties of things” (Dubin, 1978 p. 63). Two types of relations were 
defined, that based on interaction between two or more unit properties and that based on the 
combination of two or more unit properties. In the former, at least two unit properties interact to 
produce another relational property, e.g., “a subordinate and a superior, when they interact, have 
as an outcome one property called subordination” (Dubin, 1978 p. 62). In the latter, at least two 
unit properties combine such that when taken together produce the property of a relationship, 
e.g., “the property ‘male,’ and the property ‘female’ (when they combine, not interact!) produce 
the property ‘sex ratio’” (Dubin, 1978 p. 62). 
Statistical units. A statistical unit is “a property of a thing that summarizes the 




distribution, a heterogeneously dispersed distribution, and the upper quartile of a distribution are 
examples of statistical units. These three examples, respectively, represent “three classes of 
statistical units: (1) units summarizing a central tendency in the distribution of a property; (2) 
units summarizing the dispersion of a property; and (3) units locating things by their relative 
position in a distribution of a property” (Dubin, 1978 p. 64). 
Summative units. A summative unit is “a global unit that stands for an entire complex 
thing” (Dubin, 1978 p. 66), within which there are often numerous ill-defined units and 
relationships all summed together in one large composite unit. As a consequence, summative 
units typically represent a great deal of properties of things, the details of which mostly remain 
unspecified. Due to the lack of defined properties, summative units are the least valuable 
theoretical unit for building theory (Dubin, 1978). 
Although described here as mutually exclusive unit types, “it is possible that a unit 
employed in a theory may satisfy the definition of two or more classes of units at the same time” 
(Dubin, 1978, p. 68); however, non-mutually exclusively satisfying multiple definitions is very 
different from mutually exclusive classification. Depending on the type of unit classification in 
the theory, when the unit is activated, in the manner with which the property of thing can be 
activated, it will interact with other units in a finite set of ways. As a consequence, in the fully 
developed theory each unit must take on the specific quality of only one type of unit, regardless 
of whether the unit may satisfy multiple classification definitions, depending upon the way that 
theorist conjectures that units will relate to each other in the representation of the phenomenon. 





Laws of interaction. The laws of interaction for a theory may be simply defined as “the 
linkages among units of a [theory]” (Dubin, 1978, p. 90). Laws of interaction are explicit 
formulations of the specific relationships that exist between two or more units in a theory. Here, 
causality is not implied by the specification of relationship between theoretical units. “The 
problem of interaction among units is one of accounting for variance in one unit by specifying a 
systematic linkage of this unit with at least on other” (Dubin, 1978, p. 92); however, the linkage 
is not defined as causal mechanism.  
Although defining as law may imply a sense of absoluteness to the relationship, Dubin 
highlighted that the presumed linkages among the units of a theory are nothing more than 
products of the mind that are far removed from being absolute and only “limited by the capacity 
of the human mind to invent ways of denoting relationships” (Dubin, 1978, p. 97). Even though 
qualified as tractable rather than unconditional, Dubin defined three high level categories of 
theoretical laws for all forms of unit relationships; these are, categoric, sequential, and 
determinant (Dubin, 1978; Lynham, 2002a). 
Categoric laws of interaction were defined as the category of relation between theoretical 
units “that states that values of a unit are associated with values of another unit. The association 
is in the form of the presence or absence of the respective values for the two units” (Dubin, 1978, 
p. 98). Important for understanding categoric laws are their symmetry; that is, there is no 
intended order or sequence between the units such that one is the antecedent and the other is the 
result. There is no directional quality to the relation between units. Rather, the units are merely 
determined to be associated with regard to presence or absence of unit values, but in no way 




Sequential laws of interaction were defined as the category of relation between 
theoretical units that “is one always employing a time dimension [where] the time dimension is 
used to order the relationship among two or more units” (Dubin, 1978, p. 101). Thus, a 
sequential law of interaction intentionally imposes a temporal quality to the association between 
theoretical units by ordering the units sequentially or serially in time. However, even though the 
temporal ordering of units in their relation does imply a singular directional relationship in time, 
i.e., precedes or follows, the temporal ordering of units in a sequential law does not imply a 
causal relationship (Dubin, 1978; Lynham, 2002a). 
Determinant laws of interaction were defined as the category of relation between 
theoretical units that “associates determinate values of one unit with determine values of another 
unit” (Dubin, 1978, p. 106). Consequently, determinant laws of interaction impose a predictive 
relation between theoretical units, where, “if we know the value of one of the units, we can know 
the value of another” (Chermack 2004, p. 310). A regression line is an example representation of 
a determinant relationship in which 
…the distribution of values for one unit may be said to be related to a distribution of 
values for another unit. The essential feature is that these values are paired, with each 
value for the first unit having a mating value on the second unit (or units), and that these 
associated values on the units are invariantly linked. (Dubin, 1978, p. 107) 
Theoretical boundaries. As discussed previously, a theory is an attempt to simplify and 
explain or describe some portion of reality. As a consequence of this limited focus on a portion 
of reality, the extent of that modeled reality must be defined so that the limits to empirical reality 
that the theory may extend to are known (Dubin, 1978; Lynham, 2002a). “The boundaries of a 
theory therefore establish the real-world limits of the theory and in so doing distinguish the 




by the theory” (Lynham, 2002a, p. 253). In other words, if one was to think about or apply a 
theory, then one must also have a clear understanding of the empirical areas that the theory was 
intended, by design, to simplify and explain or describe. The theoretical boundaries separate 
those areas within which the theory should hold up from those that are of no intended 
consequence for the theory. As a result, determining theoretical boundaries “…requires that the 
theorist identify the domain or multiple domains in which the theory is expected to operate [in 
the empirical world] (Dubin, 1978). The boundaries locate the theoretical model in the 
environment that it concerns” (Chermack, 2004, p. 311). 
To an extent, the boundaries of a theory represent the assumptions of the theorist 
(Bacharach, 1989), but more than assumptions, the boundaries represent specific characteristics 
of the theory and congruence between its units, laws, and reach. With regard to the reach of the 
theory in application, the boundaries may, in part, be thought of as the time and space context of 
the theory.  
…some theories may be unbounded in time, but bounded in space. That is, these theories 
are only applicable to specific types of organizations, but can be applied over different 
historical periods. Other theories are unbounded in space (that is, they may be applicable 
to many types of organizations), but very much bounded in a specific temporal context. 
Finally, theories may be relatively unbounded in both space and time. Such theories have 
a higher level of generalizability than those bounded in either or both space and time. 
(Bacharach, 1989, p. 500) 
With regard to congruence of units, laws, and reach, Dubin (1978) defined two types of 
theoretical boundaries (i.e., open and closed) and two origins of the theoretical boundaries (i.e., 
internal and external). The distinction on type of theoretical boundary is one of interaction or 
exchange of something relevant to the theoretical process (e.g., inputs, feedback, etc) from 




boundary as open or closed “…depends on exchange over the boundary of the system between 
itself and its environment” (Dubin, 1978, p. 126). However, as somewhat differently defined by 
Freese (1980), an open versus closed system may also apply to its level of idealization; where, an 
open system even when “of nonlimited spatio-temporal scope” (Freese, 1980, p. 191) is meant to 
apply to empirical data and a closed system is meant to apply only to abstract regularities. In this 
sense of a closed system, theories are… 
…not meant to be generalizations about the world of everyday experience. The 
regularities they describe exist in a theoretically possible world but not in the actual 
world. Theories and laws… describe what is true in a hypothetical world whose 
antecedent conditions are not satisfied in our ordinary world. (Freese, 1980, p. 191) 
Even though somewhat differently defined as information exchange on one hand and level of 
idealization on the other, both describe contained systems, contained (or not) from the 
environment in the former and contained (or not) from context in the latter. 
Dubin’s (1978) distinction on origins of the theoretical boundaries also follows in the 
logical consistency of the theory’s characteristics. Depending on what types of units and laws 
were defined, as well as what type of boundary was determined appropriate, the formation of the 
theoretical boundaries may logically be driven by either internal conditions or external 
conditions. “Interior criteria are those derived from the characteristics of the units and laws 
employed in the model. Exterior criteria are those imposed from outside the model” (Dubin, 
1978, pp. 128-129). In other words, the extent of the reach of a theory into the empirical world 
may be determined by either forces internal to the theory or external to the theory, but in either 
case, the theory must have some scope stipulations for which empirical circumstances it is 




System states. The system states of a theory may be considered the “conditions under 
which the theory is operative” (Torraco, 1997, p. 129). More specifically, Dubin (1978) defined 
three features of theoretical system states: 
1) all units of the system have characteristic values, 2) the characteristic values of all 
units are determinant, and 3) this constellation of unit values persists through time. The 
essential notion of a system state is that the system as a whole has distinctive features 
when it is in a state of the system. (Dubin, 1978, p. 144) 
Thus, the system states of a theory are the situations within which all of the defined 
theoretical units are active in a manner that the defined type of unit would be active, each having 
a value also appropriate to the type of value that the defined type of unit would have, and all 
units are interacting in the manners that the set of units would be interacting given the defined 
laws of interaction. In analogy, if each theoretical unit was a type of electrical switch and each 
law of interaction was a pathway between switches, then 1 of N complete combinations of all 
switch positions and pathways for the entire circuit would represent one of the systems states. 
Similarly, for a theory, all of the theoretical units and laws of interaction are presumed to 
combine in a number of specific ways; each combination of all units is a system state of the 
theory (Dubin, 1978).  
Critical to the definition of a theoretical system state is that all of the theory’s units have 
determinate values; it is a gestalt condition of the theory.  “A system state is a state of the system 
as a whole. It is defined by the unique combination of values of all units composing a system. 
This combination gives to the system as a whole a distinctive condition” (Dubin, 1978, p. 146). 
Drawing attention to the difference between theoretical system states and theoretical outcomes, 




conditions in which the focus is on only one or a subset of all units that have special values. A 
theoretical outcome may be defined as: 
…a region of values (or a single critical value as well) for one (or some) unit of a model 
that gives to that unit (or units) a distinctive analytical character. An outcome, then, is a 
special condition of one or more units, but not of all units. (Dubin, 1978, p. 145) 
Therefore, the line separating outcome conditions for subsets of theoretical units and system 
states of a theory as a whole is drawn between the focus on a region of values for a subset of 
units in the former and all units simultaneously in the latter. 
Certain system states of a theory are of more interest to researchers applying a theory, 
often due to a particularly salient or valuable set of theoretical outcomes. The subset of 
theoretical units of interest in these particular system states can typify the system state of the 
theory. As a consequence, the specific system state may usefully be named after the theoretical 
units “that exemplify the characteristics of the system state” (Dubin, 1978, p. 151). The 
theoretical units that exemplify the specific system state are called the state coordinates of the 
system. Not only are the state coordinates used as the descriptive terms for the particular system 
state, but 
Those units of a system that are given the characterization of state coordinates are the 
ones that name the particular state of the system. In a more exact sense, these are the 
units often used as the so-called independent units (or variables) in an analytical 
statement. (Dubin, 1978, p. 151) 
It is because of the independent variable – state coordinate relationship that certain system states 
are of more interest to researchers during the application of the theory. 
Based on the types of theoretical laws of interaction that have been defined for the units 




theory’s system states. The general format for presenting a “a system state characterized by a 
categoric law of interaction typically has the following format: If …, then… under conditions of 
… ” (Dubin, 1978, p. 152). The general format for presenting a system state characterized by a 
determinant law is “a change in value of A (in a given direction; by a given amount; in and by 
both) is accompanied by a change in values of B (in a given direction; by a given amount; in and 
by both) under conditions… ” (Dubin, 1978, p. 153). The general format for presenting a system 
state characterized by a sequential law of interaction is “A change in the value of A (in a given 
direction; by a given amount; in and by both) is followed in time by a change in the value of B 
(in a given direction; by a given amount; in and by both)” under conditions… (Dubin, 1978, p. 
153). 
Propositions. Once a theory’s units, laws of interaction, boundaries, and system states 
have been defined, an initial theoretical framework is in place (Lynham, 2002a, 2002b). “This 
theoretical framework is essentially the core explanatory container of any theory” (Lynham, 
2002b, p. 232). The theoretical framework is made more complete by specification of theoretical 
propositions, but the theory remains conceptual and unready for testing or application in the real 
world until empirical indicators and hypotheses are also specified (Torraco, 1994, 1997, 2005a). 
Theoretical propositions, empirical indicators, and hypotheses help extend the theory into the 
empirical world of practice (Dubin, 1978; Lynham, 2002a, 2002b; Torraco, 1997). This 
preparation of theory for extension into empirical research and practice is called 
operationalization of the theoretical framework (Lynham, 2002a, 2002b). “Once the theoretical 
framework has been operationalized, the researcher-theorist can begin the conduct of related 
research to test and confirm, or indeed disconfirm, the theoretical framework in practice, or 




Theoretical propositions are truth statements about the theoretical framework in operation 
(Dubin, 1978; Lynham, 2002a; Torraco, 1997); also referred to as theoretical statements (Cohen, 
1989; Reynolds, 1971). That is, “a proposition, then, is a truth statement about a model when the 
model is fully specified in its units, laws of interaction, boundary, and system states” (Dubin, 
1978, p. 160). Given this definition, two important clarifications should be made about 
theoretical propositions. The first is clarification on the distinction between the correspondence 
of theoretical propositions and its theoretical framework versus theoretical propositions and 
empirical reality. The second is clarification on the content of theoretical propositions with 
regard to the predictions the propositions make. 
Theoretical propositions are “logical deductions about the theory in operation” (Torraco, 
1997, p. 129). As a consequence, propositions have a special relationship to the theoretical 
framework from which they were derived; specifically, it is that they were derived. Propositions 
are not mere statements of truth about the world or what should be experienced within it. 
Propositions are truth statements specifically about conditions of the theoretical framework from 
which they were deduced. As a consequence, propositions do not stand on their own merit. Any 
theoretical proposition that may be considered true is only true to the extent that it may be 
demonstrated as a logical derivative from a fully specified theoretical framework (Chermack, 
2004; Dubin, 1978; Lynham, 2002a; Torraco, 1997). Therefore, on the distinction of truth 
statements, it is important to note the difference in “the correspondence between the predictions 
of the model and the empirical domain it purports to represent” (Dubin, 1978, p. 160). With 
theoretical propositions, it is only the former predictions that need necessarily to be true. In fact, 




model to which it applies. Thus, all propositions of a model satisfy logical rules and not 
empirical rules to establish their truth” (Dubin, 1978, p. 164). 
Dubin (1978) further articulated the distinction of correspondence that theoretical 
propositions have with the theoretical framework in his analysis of the term truth statement. 
There, he makes the distinction between truth in a metaphysical sense and truth in a bounded 
theory-propositions logical sense. 
The term truth should not cause any trouble if it is kept clear of its metaphysical 
connotations. We could just as well employ the term logical consequence in place of 
truth statement in the definition of proposition. Care has been taken to state that any 
system of logic may be employed to establish a truth statement about a theoretical model. 
This relativity with respect to the system of logic employed makes clear that the truth 
statements about a model may be changed if the system for defining truth is changed. The 
only criterion of consistency that propositions of a model need to meet is the criterion 
that their truth be established by reference to only one system of logic for all propositions 
set forth about the model. (Dubin, 1978, p. 160) 
The content of a theoretical proposition is a truth statement about the values taken by 
theoretical units within the overall theoretical system of units, interactions, boundaries, and states 
(Lynham, 2002a; Dubin, 1978). These propositional truth statements about system values are 
predictions about “what must be true about the model in operation if we know the components, 
units, laws of interaction, boundaries, and system states that characterize the model” (Dubin, 
1978, p. 163). That is, using the theoretical framework to generate truth statements about the 
theory in operation is using the theoretical framework to make predictions about the values taken 
on by the theoretical units under different system states; “the problem of prediction is a problem 
of establishing unit values” (Dubin, 1978, p. 164) under specific conditions of the theory. In 
specification of the theoretical model, the various states of activation of the units have already 




1978, p. 170) between theoretical elements; and for the whole, the system’s limitations in scope 
have been defined. However, the prediction of a theoretical proposition extends established 
relationships and states to predictions about specific values of theoretical units under the relevant 
theoretical conditions of the theoretical framework (Dubin, 1978). 
When developing theoretical propositions, or making predictions about the values of 
theoretical units in a theoretical model, there are only three types of predictive statements that 
can be made. Dubin (1978) identified these as follows. 
1) Propositions may be made about the values of a single unit of the model, the value of 
that unit being revealed in relation to the value of other units connected to the unit in 
question by a law of interaction; 2) Propositions may be predictions about the continuity 
of a system state that in turn involves a prediction about the conjoined values of all units 
in the system; or 3) Propositions may be predictions about the oscillation of the system 
from one state to another that again involves predictions about the values of all units of 
the system as they pass over the boundary of one system state into another. (Dubin, 1978, 
p. 166) 
The set of three general classes of theoretical propositions are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. 
There exist no additional classes and all theoretical propositions derived from its underlying 
theoretical framework must conform to one of these three classes (Dubin, 1978). 
Empirical indicators and hypotheses. As defined, “an empirical indicator is an 
operation employed by the researcher to secure measurements of values on a unit” (Dubin 1978, 
p. 182). Key to the definition of empirical indicator is the term operation. An empirical indicator 
is not just a thing; rather, it is both the process of measurement on a theoretical unit and the 
measured value resulting from the process of measurement (Dubin 1978; Lynham, 2002a). As an 
operation, empirical indicators include means to measurement (i.e., instrumentation), the act of 




empirical procedures (operations) which generates an instance of a concept” (Cohen, 1989, p. 
153). Empirical indicators are “empirical measures used to make the propositions testable” 
(Torraco, 1997, p. 129). Prior to defining empirical indicators, theoretical units remain abstract 
and disconnected with the empirical world; the theoretical units remain only the properties of the 
things that the theory is about (Dubin, 1978). It is through the operation of empirical indicators 
that the abstract properties of things in the theory are given in empirical example. Empirical 
indicators serve as the critical link between theory and the empirical world; that is, an empirical 
indicator “emphasizes the relationship between ideas and observations” (Cohen, 1989, p. 155). 
Given that empirical indicators provide the operation for linking the theoretical 
framework to the empirical world, hypotheses allow the researcher to make specific “statements 
about the predicted values and relationships among the units” (Torraco, 1997, p. 129). “An 
hypothesis may be defined as the predictions about values of units of a theory in which empirical 
indicators are employed for the named units in each proposition” (Dubin 1978, p. 206). More 
structurally, an hypothesis is “(1) a singular statement that (2) predicts a relationship between 
two or more indicators and (3) can be true or false” (Cohen, 1989, p. 241). Just as there is link 
between theoretical framework and theoretical propositions, there is also link between theoretical 
framework, theoretical propositions, and hypotheses. A theoretically-driven hypothesis “is not an 
ad hoc question to be answered by research but is rather a prediction of values on units that in 
turn are derivable from a proposition about a theoretical model” (Dubin 1978, p. 206). Of all the 
elements of a theory, the hypotheses are “the closest to the ‘things observable’ that the theory is 
trying to model” (Dubin 1978, p. 205). The “linkage between the theoretical framework and the 




hypotheses, a process further informed by the empirical indicators identified for the units of the 
theory” (Lynham, 2002a, p. 267).  
It should be clear at this point, that there is a strong interdependency among all the 
components of a theory, and as a consequence, a dependency among the ways with which the 
theory can ultimately be paired with the empirical world. Not only do the types of theoretical 
units and the types of theoretical laws relating the units begin to define the nature of the 
propositions that can be formed, but, there are further relations among the theoretical units, 
propositions, empirical indicators, and hypotheses. As a general rule, “every time the name of a 
unit appears in a proposition, there must be substituted for it an empirical indicator that measures 
values on this unit” (Dubin 1978, p. 206). More than one empirical indicator can used to measure 
each theoretical unit. Furthermore, “every proposition has the potential of being converted to a 
large number of hypotheses… a new hypothesis is established each time a different empirical 
indicator is employed for any one of the units designated in a proposition” (Dubin 1978, pp. 208-
209). 
The formulation of hypotheses represents the final element of a fully operationalized 
theoretical framework. Operationalization “is achieved by first specifying propositions derived 
from the framework, then identifying corresponding empirical indicators informed by the 
propositions, and finally constructing hypotheses based on the propositions and informed by the 
empirical indicators” (Lynham, 2002a, p. 261). Interestingly, a fully operationalized theoretical 
framework should emphasis the number of areas that may be susceptible to flawed translation of 
the theoretical framework into the empirical world. There is a multiplicative relationship 




combination to demonstrate congruence with the empirical world does not directly indicate an 
internal flaw in the theoretical framework. 
In the next section on theoretical range, the bias of the positioning of the current 
anatomical representation of theory towards theories of the middle range should begin to emerge. 
However, the bias in anatomical description is not as much intentional as much as it just happens 
to be most clearly represented in the literature at the middle range level. What is currently not 
clear though is the degree to which the defined elements of a middle-range theory persist, or 
cease to do so, when examining theory opposite middle-range theory at either end of the 
continuum, i.e., narrow-range theories and grand theories. Or interestingly, perhaps range may 
not only impact persistence of elements, but also impact the presumed order in which the 
elements form in connection with the data-explanation relationship. Differences in theoretical 
range do not appear to be simple divergences in the degree of application of the theoretical 
explanation. Differences in theoretical range speak to fundamental differences not only in the 
theory itself, but issues of theoretical range also suggest the possibility of fundamental 
differences in the inquiry paradigms and inquiry methodologies involved in the theory’s 
formulations. Many of the issues involved in considering theoretical range are addressed, if not 
at least unearthed next. 
Considering Theoretical Range 
Issues of theoretical range may be dismissed as less complex and less dimensional than 
they truly are. The language around range was popularized by Merton (1968) regarding the type 
of social science theory, i.e., “theories of the middle range… [or] middle-range theory” (Merton, 




Merton advanced middle-range theory as means to guide empirical research, to consolidate 
empirical findings, and as stepping stone towards grand theory (Merton, 1968; Pinder & Moore, 
1980; Poole, 1985). The type of theory aptly got its name from being positioned somewhere in 
between, or in the middle of, the day-to-day working hypothesis temporally and contextually tied 
to data, and, the all-embracing, temporally and contextually untethered grand theory of social 
systems (Bourgeois, 1979; Merton, 1968; Pinder & Moore, 1980; Poole, 1985).  
Given the between positioning of middle-range theory, over time, it has become 
customary to organize theory along a continuum of abstraction ranging from Meta-theory  
Grand theory  Middle range theory  Narrow range theory (Brink, 2006; Merton, 1968; 
Pinder & Moore, 1980; Poole, 1985). Other distinctions include macro to micro theory and molar 
to molecular theory (Kaplan, 2009). However, when considering issues of theoretical range, it 
becomes apparent that the simplified continuum may actually be much more multidimensional 
than the singular continuum implies (Kaplan, 2009). Due to the extensive attention that Merton’s 
concept of middle-range theory has received over the years, Merton’s proposal has been 
interpreted and articulated by a number of authors. For that reason, discussion of Merton’s 
theories of the middle range serves as an appropriate entry point into the conversation on 
theoretical range as means to providing context for further exploration of the potential 
dimensionality of the range concept. 
Merton’s middle range theory. Specifically, Merton defined his conception of middle-
range theory as those “theories that lie between the minor but necessary working hypotheses that 
evolve in abundance during day-to-day research and the all-inclusive systematic efforts to 




organization, and social change” (Merton, 1968, p. 39). The emphasis being made here is on 
Merton’s conception of middle-range theory and not necessarily any broader conception held 
collectively today. A number of scholars have interpreted Merton’s 1968 chapter on social 
theories of the middle range (e.g., Bourgeois, 1979; Layder, 1993; Pinder & Moore, 1980; Poole, 
1985); those as well as Merton’s original writing are used here to position and describe his work. 
A number of key features have been used to define Merton’s middle-range theory over the years. 
Poole (1985) summarized seven of these features of Merton’s middle-range theory as: 
(a) it could be used to guide further empirical research; (b) it was intermediate to general 
theories which were too distant from particular phenomena to provide an accurate 
account or explanation of what was being observed, and to detailed orderly descriptions 
of particulars that are not generalized at all; (c) it made use of abstractions which were 
still sufficiently similar to observed data to be used in propositions which could be tested 
empirically (thus we know it contains propositions); (d) it dealt with delimited aspects of 
data; (e) it was not logically derived from a single universal theory; (f) it consolidated 
empirical findings; and (g) it could only be developed effectively after a great mass of 
basic observations had been accumulated. (Poole, 1985, pp. 84-85) 
In Merton’s conception, middle-range theories are smaller than “comprehensive 
theories… whose construction is a function of the state of knowledge in a field” (Bourgeois, 
1979, p. 443). Comprehensive theories are “too remote from particular classes of social 
behavior… to account for what is observed” (Merton, 1968, p. 39). However, middle-range 
theories are larger than narrow-range theory “that deals with one person in one situation at one 
point in time” (Brink, 2006, p. 21). Narrow-range theories are embedded in temporally and 
contextual bound data and “those detailed orderly descriptions of particulars that are not 
generalized at all” (Merton, 1968, p. 39). Middle-range theories have a strong connectedness to 
the empirical world (Layder, 1993; Poole, 1985); that is, they are generated from data, rather 
than derived from grand or comprehensive theory (Pinder & Moore, 1980; Poole, 1985). There is 




only are the abstractions formed from empirical data, but the abstractions serve hypothesis 
generating functions (Bourgeois, 1979; Merton, 1968; Pinder & Moore, 1980; Poole, 1985) that 
are in turn verified through empirical research (Bourgeois, 1979; Layder, 1993; Merton, 1968; 
Pinder & Moore, 1980). Because middle-range theories are connected to the empirical world 
both in generation and testing, the primary purpose of middle-range theory is to guide empirical 
inquiry (Bourgeois, 1979; Merton, 1968; Poole, 1985). However, given the smaller-than-
comprehensive theory nature of middle-range theories, they do not deal with all social data and 
all social phenomena; rather, only a delimited set of both (Merton, 1968; Pinder & Moore, 1980; 
Poole, 1985). 
Of particular importance to the concept of middle-range theories is the concern with “the 
recurrent [emphasis added] aspects of social life rather than those that are unique and fleeting 
since these are not general enough to count as properly social characteristics” (Layder, 1993, p. 
21). Recurrence is demanded in order to make prediction, and making prediction is an essential 
feature of middle-range theory’s testability. In order for middle-range theory to guide inquiry, in 
the particular way it guides inquiry, the relationship between abstraction and empirically 
measurable variables is emphasized; thus, “the theoretical significance of an empirical regularity 
allows… for the cumulative and systematic development of theory since it is given a firmer 
grounding by continually testing it against empirical evidence” (Layder, 1993, p. 22) 
A broader look at issues of theoretical range. In consideration of the broader meaning 
of theoretical range outside of Merton’s middle-range conception, review of the literature reveals 




towards understanding the meaning of theoretical range, but if anything, begin to elucidate the 
potential dimensionality of the idea of theoretical range. Some of these terms include: 
 Purpose, where purpose is generally defined as guiding empirical inquiry, .e.g., 
through generation of predictions, delimiting data of interest, formation of hypotheses 
(Brink, 2006; Bourgeois, 1979; Layder, 1993; Merton, 1968; Poole, 1985). 
 Scope, where scope is generally defined as the number of problems explained by the 
theory, e.g., one behavior or a number of them (Brink, 2006; Kaplan, 2009; Merton, 
1968; Pinder & Moore, 1980). 
 Level of abstraction, where abstractedness is defined as the degree of empirical 
context or length of the reduction chain connecting the theoretical constructs with 
observable ones (Brink, 2006; Kaplan, 2009). 
 Range, itself, where range is defined as the things to which the theory applies from 
broad to limited, e.g., human behavior versus animal behavior or individual behavior 
versus organizational behavior (Kaplan, 2009). 
Further review of the literature on theory with an emphasis on explanations of the 
meaning of range reveal a number of concepts that start to shed some light not only on the 
dimensionality of the meaning of theoretical range, but many of the specific dimensions as well. 
Three general types of explanations of theoretical range seem to give range its full character. 
These three can be described as those capturing the boundedness defined by range, those that 
explain what’s inside the boundedness of the range, and those differentiating the specific features 




To a limited extent, the boundedness of a theory relates to the bigness or smallness of the 
theory in terms of the boundary of the theory, e.g., postpostivist “small theory” (Guba, 1990c, p. 
251). The boundedness that determines the size of a theory may be understood in a couple of 
ways. First, there is the “theoretical boundary” (Dubin, 1978, p. 125) as described by Dubin. 
Recall that a theoretical boundary has been defined as the demarcation between that limited 
portion of reality modeled by the theory from everything else. In defining how big or small that 
boundary is, Dubin further noted that “there is an inverse relationship between the number of the 
boundary-determining criteria employed in a model and size of the domain covered by the 
model” (Dubin 1978, 134); thus, the boundary-determining criteria imposed on a theory stipulate 
the limited empirical circumstances to which the theory is intended to be meaningful. As a 
consequence, the more stipulations on relevant empirical circumstances of the theory, the smaller 
the theoretical boundary or the greater the boundedness of the theory. 
In addition to Dubin’s (1978) theoretical boundary, the boundedness of a theory may also 
be understood in terms of the theory’s “explanatory shell” (Kaplan, 2009, p. 299) as described by 
Kaplan. Here, the shell may be considered “a sphere containing whatever is referred to in the 
theory… The contents of the shell constitute what is, from the standpoint of the theory, an 
effectively isolated system” (Kaplan, 2009, p. 299). In other words, if a theory is intended to 
represent properties and relationships of things, then the explanatory shell defines all the things 
that theory may be considered in reference to in reality and distinguishes them as a subset from 
all other things. Kaplan draws the contrast in the nature of the explanatory shell as the length of 
the radius of that shell, thus a longer radius would imply that more things are being referred to by 
the theory; but defines it as distinct from the extensiveness of the sorts of problems that the 




Given that the boundedness of a theory may be described as the explanatory shell 
discriminating the limited portion of reality modeled by the theory, attention may now be put on 
further understanding what is within the bounded shell of a theory. Dubin defined the region 
inside the theoretical boundary as “the territory over which we can make truth statements about 
the model and, therefore, about the values of the units composing the model” (Dubin 1978, pp. 
134-135). Dubin emphasized the relation between the building blocks of the theory and theory’s 
propositions; that is, the connectedness of the theoretical units as referents in the truth statements 
that can be generated from the theory. This idea that the territory within the boundedness of the 
theory is both the source and limitation of the theoretical propositions was something that was 
also reflected in the writings of Whetten (1989) and Merton (1968). Whetten further described 
this territory as the Who, Where, and When of the theory (Lincoln & Lynham, 2011; Whetten, 
1989). Specifically, the Who, Where, and When of the theory are the “temporal and contextual 
factors [that] set the boundaries of generalizability, and as such constitute the range of the 
theory” (Whetten, 1989, p. 492). What’s inside the boundedness of the theory directly relates to, 
as well as limits, the propositions that can be formulated about the theoretical framework in 
operation (Dubin, 1978; Lynham, 2002a; Torraco, 1997); therefore, the theoretical range relates 
to both the boundary condition of the theory and the content of the truth statements that can be 
made about the theory. 
Numerous features of theoretical range can be distilled from the literature on theory. 
Figure 9 graphically presents a number of features relevant to understanding theoretical range. 
Even though the specific features that comprise theoretical range add further detail to the broader 




that make theoretical range a multi-dimensional concept. A number of the features considered 
dimensions of the character of theoretical range are listed below. 
Theoretical range involves (among other issues): 
 The size of the explanatory shell or theoretical boundary that includes everything that 
is referred to by the theory (Brink, 2006; Dubin, 1978; Kaplan, 2009; Merton, 1968; 
Pinder & Moore, 1980) 
 The implied level of analysis of the theory, i.e., behavior, whole person, group, 
organization, etc (Kaplan, 2009). 
 The extent of the direct connection of theory with the empirical world, and therefore 
its guiding influence on research and/or practice (Bourgeois, 1979; Layder, 1993; 
Merton, 1968; Poole, 1985). 
 The accuracy versus generalizability of the theory, i.e., the possibility of being 
general, accurate, and simple simultaneously (Weick, 1980, pp. 398-400, in Pinder & 
Moore, 1980). 
 The level of abstraction or contextualization of the theory, i.e., nomothetic vs 
idiographic (Bacharach, 1989; Brink, 2006; Kaplan, 2009; Lincoln & Lynham, 2011; 
Whetten, 1989).  
 The time-boundedness of the theory, i.e., “event” Dubin, 1978, i.e., nomothetic vs 
idiographic (Bacharach, 1989; Dubin, 1978; Lincoln & Lynham, 2011; Whetten, 
1989). 
 The forms of knowledge that the theory represents, as well as the implied paradigm 




postpositivists, reality is what works, what can be warranted or verified; knowledge is 
small theory” (Guba, 1990c, p. 251). 
 The theoretical strategy: research-then-theory vs theory-then-research, e.g., middle 
range theories are not derived from axioms, but driven by contact with data (Layder, 
1993; Reynolds, 1971). 
 
Figure 9. Graphical representation of some of the concepts of theoretical range. 
The Roles of Theory in Inquiry 
Theory scholars have suggested a number of roles that theory plays in inquiry (e.g., 
Campbell, 1990; Cohen, 1989; Lynham, 2002b; Lynham, 2000b; Torraco, 1994; Torraco, 1997; 
Torraco, 2002; Van de Ven, 1989; Van Maanen, Sorenson, & Mitchell, 2007). These roles 




















































































for interpretation, and prescribing and evaluating solutions to research problems. However, as a 
whole, the role of theory in disciplined inquiry is one of symbiotic guidance. In disciplined 
inquiry, within which the goal is the formation of knowledge, theories serve a number of 
essential functions in the development and evaluation of that knowledge (Cohen, 1989). This 
chapter later explores in detail the range of roles that theory plays in inquiry. 
For the current exploration of the range of the roles of theory in inquiry, a small number 
of sources were sampled from across the disciplines of Industrial/Organizational Psychology, 
Sociology, HRD, and Management. Each source explicitly discussed the role(s) of theory in the 
activities of inquiry. All of the discussed roles of theory in inquiry were individually recorded, 
categorically sorted, and then a list of roles that theory may play in inquiry was compiled. While 
the small sample is clearly not representative of all disciplines, the compiled list may be at least 
considered generalizable of theoretical roles in inquiry because, as noted by Torraco (1997), “the 
roles that theory serves in HRD are essentially the same those served by theory in other 
disciplines. Indeed, theory’s potential value for guiding scientific understanding, explanation, 
and prediction cuts across all professional disciplines” (p. 116).  
A number of roles of theory in inquiry suggested by Campbell (1990) have been 
reiterated over the years by other theory scholars (Lynham, 2000b, 2002b; Torraco, 1994, 1997, 
2002). These roles of theory in inquiry include: 
 “Theories tell us that certain facts among the accumulated knowledge are important, 
and others are not” (Campbell, 1990, p. 65; also cited in Lynham, 2000b, 2002b; 




 “Theories can give old data new interpretations and new meaning” (Campbell, 1990, 
p. 65; also cited in Lynham, 2002b; Torraco, 1994, 1997, 2002), e.g., old data can be 
reinterpreted within new explanatory frameworks. 
 “Theories identify important new issues and prescribe the most critical research 
questions that need to be answered to maximize understanding of the issue” 
(Campbell, 1990, p. 65; also cited in Lynham, 2000b, 2002b; Torraco, 1994, 1997, 
2002; similar notion referenced in Van de Ven, 1989), e.g., theories highlight gaps in 
our knowledge. 
 “Theories provide a means by which new research data can be interpreted and coded 
for use” (Campbell, 1990, p. 65; also cited in Lynham, 2000b, 2002b; Torraco, 1994, 
1997, 2002), e.g., theories provide the explanatory framework for organizing and 
understanding new data. 
 “Theories provide a means for identifying and defining applied problems” (Campbell, 
1990, p. 65; also cited in Lynham, 2000b, 2002b; Torraco, 1994, 1997, 2002), e.g., 
issues in practice can be highlighted by the explanatory power of theories, or 
conversely, issues in practice can highlight the need for theory. 
 “Theories provide a means for prescribing or evaluating solutions to applied 
problems” (Campbell, 1990, p. 65; also cited in Lynham, 2000b, 2002b; Torraco, 
1994, 1997, 2002), e.g., because theories can help highlight the research problem, 
they can also help researchers define appropriate solutions both a priori (prescription) 
and a posteriori (evaluation). 
 “Theories provide a means for responding to new problems that have no previously 




2002b; Torraco, 1994, 1997, 2002), e.g., Kaplan’s knowledge growth by extension 
(2009). 
However, in addition to the roles of theory prescribed by Campbell (1990), a number of 
additional roles of theory in inquiry have been suggested by theory scholars. These include: 
 “Theory provides members of a professional discipline with a common language and 
a frame of reference for defining boundaries of their profession” (Torraco, 1997, p. 
119; similar notion also referenced in Cohen, 1989; Lynham, 2000b, 2002b) 
 “Theory allows us to avoid recreating the wheel in our research” (Torraco, 2002, p. 
174) 
 “Theory can open up new intellectual perspectives to catalyze research” (Torraco, 
2002, p. 174) 
 “A theory organizes ideas and, in so doing, may uncover hidden assumptions” 
(Cohen, 1989, p. 189) 
 “A theory generates new ideas” (Cohen, 1989, p. 189) 
 “A theory may display the complexities of a problem” (Cohen, 1989, p. 189) 
 “A theory may relate what on the surface are different problems” (Cohen, 1989, p. 
189) 
One of the more significant roles of theory in inquiry, and of particular importance to the 
current work, is the methodological role that theory plays in inquiry. It has already been 
highlighted that theory can both illuminate problems and prescribe solutions (i.e., entry and exit 
conditions of the inquiry process); theory can focus our attention on certain data and provide a 




questions and important gaps in our understanding. However, with regard to “how the empirical 
regress is to be carried out” (Kant, 2007, p. 449), theory also informs and guides methodological 
choices of the researcher; that is, “theory can generate and shape method” (Van Maanen, 
Sorenson, & Mitchell, 2007, p. 1146). Van Maanen, et al (2007, p. 1147) suggest a few ways that 
theory can shape method in inquiry: 
 Theory may generate and shape method through “its level of analysis” (Van Maanen, 
et al, 2007, p. 1147) by defining the size of the system of relations of interest: 
individual, group, organization, etc. 
 Theory may generate and shape method through “its stage of articulation” (Van 
Maanen, et al, 2007, p. 1147) depending upon the maturity of the theory-building 
development cycle. 
 Theory may generate and shape method through “the types of constructs it proposes” 
(Van Maanen, et al, 2007, p. 1147); as described previously with the nature of the 
theoretical units. 
 Theory may generate and shape method through “its descriptive or prescriptive 
nature” (Van Maanen, et al, 2007, p. 1147) given an emphasis on describing the way 
things are versus the way things should be, could be, or ought to be given some 
criteria. 
 Theory can inform “research design” (Van Maanen, et al, 2007, p. 1147) choices 
given a set of “state coordinates” (Dubin, 1978, p. 151) serving as independent 
variables. 





 Theory can inform selection of “samples” (Van Maanen, et al, 2007, p. 1147) given 
theoretical boundaries. 
While this list is not intended to be exhaustive of all possible roles that theory can play in 
inquiry, it does underscore the importance of theory for inquiry. Nearly every facet of inquiry 
can be guided and informed by theory (Cohen, 1989; Lynham, 2000b, 2002b; Torraco, 1997), so 
that “we do not have to approach new research opportunities blindly” (Torraco, 2002, p. 174). 
The list of methodological implications of theory in inquiry stresses the relationships between 
theory and ways of understanding as well as theory and ways of engaging in the inquiry process. 
As pointed out by Van Maanen, et al (2007, p. 1146), “methods without theoretical substance 
can be sterile, representing technical sophistication in isolation” or the generation of “data 
primarily for the purpose of applying rigorous statistical techniques” (Bourgeois, 1979, p. 443). 
Theory can provide both context and justification for methodological choices. 
In summary, the six key roles of theory in inquiry may be pulled forward as a 
reorganization of the numerous roles of theory identified in the literature; each of the six roles of 
theory in inquiry are further detailed in Table 45. These six roles are:  
 Theory as means to organizing what is known and what is not known 
 Theory as means to identifying/prioritizing research issues 
 Theory as means to identifying research problems 
 Theory as means to prescribing and evaluating solutions to research problems 
 Theory as means to framing data for interpretation 





Table of Roles of Theory in Inquiry 
Role of Theory in Inquiry Examples of Theoretical Role 
Theory as means to organizing what is 
known and what is not known 
“Theory allows us to avoid recreating the wheel in our research” 
(Torraco, 2004, p. 174) 
“Theory can open up new intellectual perspectives to catalyze 
research” (Torraco, 2004, p. 174) 
“A theory organizes ideas and, in so doing, may uncover hidden 
assumptions” (Cohen, 1989, p. 189) 
“A theory generates new ideas” (Cohen, 1989, p. 189) 
“A theory may display the complexities of a problem” (Cohen, 1989, 
p. 189) 
“A theory may relate what on the surface are different problems” 
(Cohen, 1989, p. 189) 
Theory as means to 
identifying/prioritizing research issues 
“Theories tell us that certain facts among the accumulated knowledge 
are important, and others are not” (Campbell, 1990, p. 65; also cited 
in Lynham, 2000b, 2002b; Torraco, 1994, 1997, 2004), e.g., theories 
help prioritize important research issues. 
“Theory provides members of a professional discipline with a 
common language and a frame of reference for defining boundaries of 
their profession” (Torraco, 1997, p. 119; similar notion also 
referenced in Cohen, 1989; Lynham, 2000, 2002b) 
Theory as means to identifying research 
problems 
“Theories identify important new issues and prescribe the most 
critical research questions that need to be answered to maximize 
understanding of the issue” (Campbell, 1990, p. 65; also cited in 
Lynham, 2000b, 2002b; Torraco, 1994, 1997, 2004; similar notion 
referenced in Van de Ven, 1989), e.g., theories highlight gaps in our 
knowledge. 
“Theories provide a means for identifying and defining applied 
problems” (Campbell, 1990, p. 65; also cited in Lynham, 2000, 
2002b; Torraco, 1994, 1997, 2004), e.g., issues in practice can be 
highlighted by the explanatory power of theories, or conversely, 
issues in practice can highlight the need for theory. 
Theory as means to prescribing and 
evaluating solutions to research 
problems 
“Theories provide a means for prescribing or evaluating solutions to 
applied problems” (Campbell, 1990, p. 65; also cited in Lynham, 
2000b, 2002b; Torraco, 1994, 1997, 2004), e.g., because theories can 
help highlight the research problem, they can also help researchers 
define appropriate solutions both a priori (prescription) and a 
posteriori (evaluation). 
“Theories provide a means for responding to new problems that have 
no previously identified solution strategy” (Campbell, 1990, p. 65; 
also cited in Lynham, 2000, 2002b; Torraco, 1994, 1997, 2004), e.g., 
Kaplan’s knowledge growth by extension (2009). 
Theory as means to framing data for 
interpretation 
“Theories can give old data new interpretations and new meaning” 
(Campbell, 1990, p. 65; also cited in Lynham, 2002b; Torraco, 1994, 
1997, 2004), e.g., old data can be reinterpreted within new 
explanatory frameworks. 
“Theories provide a means by which new research data can be 
interpreted and coded for use” (Campbell, 1990, p. 65; also cited in 




provide the explanatory framework for organizing and understanding 
new data. 
Theory as means to generate and shape 
method 
Theory may generate and shape method through “its level of 
analysis” (Van Maanen, et al, 2007, p. 1147) by defining the size of 
the system of relations of interest: individual, group, organization, etc. 
Theory may generate and shape method through “its stage of 
articulation” (Van Maanen, et al, 2007, p. 1147) depending upon the 
maturity of the theory-building development cycle. 
Theory may generate and shape method through “the types of 
constructs it proposes” (Van Maanen, et al, 2007, p. 1147); as 
described previously with the nature of the theoretical units. 
Theory may generate and shape method through “its descriptive or 
prescriptive nature” (Van Maanen, et al, 2007, p. 1147) given an 
emphasis on describing the way things are versus the way things 
should be, could be, or ought to be given some criteria. 
Theory can inform “research design” (Van Maanen, et al, 2007, p. 
1147) choices given a set of “state coordinates” (Dubin, 1978, p. 151) 
serving as independent variables. 
Theory can inform “choice of measures” (Van Maanen, et al, 2007, p. 
1147) given empirical indicators. 
Theory can inform selection of “samples” (Van Maanen, et al, 2007, 
p. 1147) given theoretical boundaries. 
The Axiomatic Form of Theory 
According to Reynolds axiomatic theory “is typically defined as an interrelated set of 
definitions and statements” (Reynolds, 1971, p. 92) that includes: (a) theoretical concepts or 
constructs, (b) scope conditions, (c) axiom statements, (d) propositions derived from axiom 
combinations, and (e) a logical system within which to relate the theoretical concepts and derive 
propositions. As further defined by Reynolds (1971), the axiomatic form of theory should 
include a consistent and parsimonious set of axioms that result in an easy to understand theory 
rather than complicated and cumbersome set of relationships.  
As described in further detail by Lincoln and Guba (Guba & Lincoln, 1982a; Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985b; Guba & Lincoln, 1989), axioms are “basic beliefs” or “self-evident truths” 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985b, p. 33) from which accepted practices, rules of thumb, or “theorems” 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985b, p. 34) can be deduced. Therefore axioms are “the set of 




intuitively) or established by practice as the basic building blocks of some conceptual or 
theoretical structure or system” (Guba & Lincoln, 1982a, p. 236). Whereas axioms represent 
basic truth statements, or here basic beliefs, theorems represent derived statements of the 
axiomatic theory in operation, or in the case of the paradigm theory, operational characteristics 
of the postures typically assumed by practitioners following the orientation of a paradigm’s set of 
axioms (Lincoln & Guba, 1985b). 
The axiom-theorem relationship is one where the theorem, as a common practice or 
statement of practice, can be proven, or shown to be truth, based on logical derivation from the 
axiom or self-evident truth. Thus, unproven self-evident statements are axioms and proven 
logical deductions of the axioms are theorems. However, the truth of the derived theorems 
depends upon the truth of the unproven, yet undemonstrable truth of the axiom. Even if accepted 
only as analogs to derived theorems, the conceptually derived postures demonstrate the strongest 
alignment with enacted elements of the process of inquiry in action, and most readily lend 
themselves to observation within actual inquiries and thus tests of fit (Lincoln & Guba, 1985b). 
As operationalized propositions, they truly represent action statements for engaging in inquiry.  
The appropriateness of an axiomatic system and its theorems or derived operational 
characteristics of inquiry are judged by two standards: justification and fit with reality. A 
justified set of axioms are coherent and synergistic (Reynolds, 1971). A justified set of theorems 
are synergistic and stand in deductive logical relation with their underlying axioms; however, a 
justified set of theorems need not fit empirical reality, and in fact, is not a requirement of the 
justified set (Lincoln & Guba, 1985b; Reynolds, 1971). Yet, where justification meets standards 




(1987), the test of an axiomatic system for inquiry is whether or not its theorems turn out to be 
useful for and congruent with the inquiry experienced.  
Value judgments concerning the justification of an axiomatic system’s theorems are 
made by evaluating two factors: (a) the logical dependence of the set of theorems upon the 
axioms that undergird the paradigm, and (b) the coherence and interdependence among set of 
derived theorems (Lincoln & Guba, 1985b). That is, justified theorems must arguably be logical 
derivatives of the underlying axiomatic system (Guba, 1987a/b), and, hang together in such a 
way that they “display a synergism such that, once one is selected, the others more or less 
follow” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985b, p. 39). There is no requirement in the value judgment of 
justification that the set of theorems fit the empirical world (Guba, 1987a/b). However, a test of 
fit depends first upon deducing a set of theorems and second upon applying the theorems and 
evaluating weaknesses.  
I shall take the tack that in geometry one can test the utility of one's axioms by deriving 
whatever theorems it yields and applying those theorems; problems in the belief system 
will become evident quickly enough. Similarly, I will argue, one can derive theorems 
from the paradigmatic axioms and attempt to apply them; again, the test for us will be to 
see which set turns out to be more useful for… [inquiry], more congruent with the world 
of… [inquiry] experience as we typically confront it. (Guba, 1987, p. 33) 
Value judgments concerning the empirical fit of an axiomatic system’s theorems is one of 
utility. Even though a justified set of theorems may demonstrate synergy and deductive logical 
relation with underlying axioms, they may still present no utility for understanding the empirical 
world if there is a large enough gap between the logical theory and the world of experience, i.e., 
usefulness and congruence. It is important to highlight that justification is a different animal than 
testing fit. That is, fit tests a paradigm’s “utility for performing in the arena in which one wishes 




It is also important to further emphasize that the axioms themselves are not directly 
testable (even though they may rationally fit); rather, the theorems derived from the axioms serve 
as operationalized statements of observable characteristics (here, characteristics of inquiry) that 
may actually be empirically observed and compared for test of fit. The operational nature of 
theorems allows direct comparison with actual inquiry for judgments of fit with, or utility for, 
human inquiry. Therefore, operationalizing inquiry characteristics in specific features of the 
“research process” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 21) is essential, or in the very least helpful, for 
the direct comparisons with inquiry experiences necessary for utility judgments regarding the 
axiomatic system.  
In summary, the following key features of axiomatic theories may be pulled forward. The 
axiomatic form of theory includes five basic components: 
 Theoretical concepts or constructs 
 Scope conditions 
 Axiom statements 
 Propositions derived from axiom combinations 
 A logical system within which to relate the theoretical concepts and derive 
propositions 
Furthermore, the axiomatic form of theory is capable of being evaluated with two types 
of value judgments: 
 Value judgments of justification 




Typologies and Taxonomies 
Broadly speaking, taxonomies are classification systems that describe sets of 
semantically different categories, and attributes of the categories, that constructs, concepts, or 
phenomena may be organized into. Taxonomies further provide the decision rules by which 
semantically heterogeneous constructs, concepts, or phenomena can be grouped through 
assignment of category membership (Bobko & Russell, 1991; Doty & Glick, 1994). Typologies 
on the other hand are exhaustive systems of ideal types, where each ideal type is similar to a 
theoretical system state in which the ideal type represents a unique combination of attributes that 
together take on a unique system characteristic (Doty & Glick, 1994; Dubin, 1978). Furthermore, 
due to the theoretical properties of typologies, when correctly developed, typologies may also be 
considered a form of theory. Taxonomies, typologies, and the typological form of theory are 
each discussed in further next. 
Taxonomies 
“Taxonomies are, quite simply, attempts at classification” (Bobko & Russell, 1991, p. 
293). As a classification system, the categories of a taxonomy distinguish heterogeneity among 
the elements being classified, while simultaneously identifying the elements with sufficient 
homogeneity to fit together within any single category. Within category attributes may be 
defined to further account for additional heterogeneity among grouped elements resulting in even 
greater homogeneity among elements than accomplished with the high level category alone. The 
efficiency of the taxonomy exists in the tension of between-category heterogeneity and within-
category homogeneity. The opposite extremes of the tension are one category for all elements 




full complexity of all unique elements to some degree by meaningfully aggregating them into 
fewer categories than elements, i.e., at least n-1 categories; thus, the process of classification 
(Bobko & Russell, 1991; Doty & Glick, 1994; Guba, 1978b; Guba & Lincoln, 1981). 
Typologies 
Typologies share similar components with taxonomies, but impose greater integration 
and specification among the elements than the mere classification rules of taxonomies. 
Typologies have two types of constructs, first-order constructs and ideal types. First-order 
constructs are the “building blocks” (Doty & Glick, 1994, p. 234) of an ideal type. In typologies, 
the category and attribute structure of taxonomies are leveraged as the first-order constructs; 
however, unique holistic configurations of sets of first-order constructs are further used to define 
a complex, synergistic pattern greater than the sum of the first-order constructs, i.e., an ideal 
type. The typology defines numerous ideal types among the taxonomic-like set of first-order 
constructs. In this sense, there is both hierarchical and holistic organization to typologies; the 
organizing framework of ideal types and the specific, unique patterning of holistic ideal type. 
The dual organization of information is one made analogous to a grand theory with multiple 
nested middle range theories (Doty & Glick, 1994; Pinder & Moore, 1980). 
The Typological Form of Theory 
Typological theories are explicit theoretical formulations of fully specified typologies. 
The typological approach to theory building is a unique method of generating theoretical 
frameworks by developing a classification scheme of concepts (i.e., a taxonomy), and then, both 




(Doty & Glick, 1994). As theories, typological theories must meet certain minimum criteria to be 
considered theory. The suggested minimum criteria to be considered theory are as follows (Doty 
& Glick, 1994; Bobko & Russell, 1991; Pinder & Moore, 1980):  
 Inclusion of first-order constructs, 
 inclusion of holistic ideal type constructs comprising the first-order constructs,  
 specific relationships between first-order constructs that together define a unique 
Gestalt-like pattern for each ideal type 
 complex hierarchical organization that includes a grand theory –like structure that 
generalizes to all forms of the phenomenon explained and several middle range –like 
theories (i.e., ideal types) that explain specific instances of the phenomenon, and  
 it must be testable in the sense that the internal consistency of ideal types can be 
judged and it is extensible to some empirical world so that some assessment of its 
degree of fit may be had. 
The last requirement is more ambiguous than the others. One of the advantages of 
typological theories are the capability to extend beyond a purely empirical world (Doty & Glick, 
1994; Mintzberg, 2005). That is, because typological theories specify ideal types, typological 
theories allow specification of instances of a phenomenon that may extend beyond anything 
empirically observed. Rather, ideal types are notions about something potentially more perfect, 
or orderly, or idyllic than exists. As a consequence, while rich in description, the ideal types of a 
typological theory may have less descriptive power than prescriptive, normatively reinforcing 
influence; “thus, typologies may not only allow theoretical advances, but they may also allow 




In summary, three general characteristics of typological theories may be pulled forward. 
The theory must exhibit certain taxonomic characteristics, exhibit certain typological 
characteristics, and further must meet certain minimum criteria to be considered typological 
theory. The taxonomic characteristics of a typological theory include: division of elements into 
semantically heterogeneous categories, inclusion of within category attributes to further account 
for additional heterogeneity among grouped elements, decision rules for classification, and a 
resulting simplification of all unique elements in an aggregate classification scheme within 
which the number of categories is at least n-1 elements. The typological characteristics include: 
first-order constructs, ideal types comprising first-order constructs, and a resulting holistic 
organization of category attributes into ideal types and ideal types into typologies.  
The minimum criteria that must be met to be judged as typological theory include:  
 First-order constructs 
 Ideal types comprising first-order constructs 
 A unique Gestalt-like pattern for each ideal type defined by its first-order constructs 
and the relationships between first-order constructs 
 Complex hierarchical organization that includes: 
o a grand theory –like structure generalizing to all forms of the phenomenon 
explained and 
o several middle range –like theories (i.e., ideal types) that explain specific 
instances of the phenomenon 
 The internal consistency of idea types can be judged. 




APPENDIX C. REVIEW OF THEORY PROCESS 
The Theory-building Process 
A theory may be generally defined as “any coherent description, explanation, and 
representation of observed or experienced phenomena” (Gioia & Pitre, 1990, p. 587). 
Accommodating the influence of one’s worldview, Lynham (2000, p. 161) offers a sufficiently 
broad, i.e., paradigmatically neutral, definition of theory building that builds on Gioia and Pitre’s 
(1990) theory definition: 
Theory building is the process of building a theory, a process that is informed and 
influenced by one’s view or definition of theory …the process or recurring cycle by 
which coherent descriptions, explanations, and representations of observed or 
experienced phenomena are generated, verified, and refined. (Lynham, 2000b, p. 161) 
In other words, given that “descriptions, explanations, and representations of observed or 
experienced phenomena” (Lynham, 2000b, p. 161) rest at the core of theory, theory building is 
the “ongoing process of producing, confirming, applying, and adapting” (Lynham, 2002b, p. 
222) those descriptions, explanations, and representations of the world around us. 
Theorizing Versus Theory Building 
Although there are many different process representations of theory building, each with 
differing phases and/or steps, a common conception is the two part high level distinction of a 
theorizing half, i.e., “the theory development side” (Lynham, 2000b, p. 243), and a practice half, 
i.e., “research operation side” (Lynham, 2000b, p. 244), of the theory-building process 
(Chermack, 2006, Lynham, 2000b, 2002b; Reynolds, 1971; Torraco, 1994, 1997). The theorizing 




a hierarchical relationship. Theorizing is one part of the overall process of theory building; 
“theorizing is how we think about the relationships among the elements in the world that occupy 
our research attention” (Van Maanen, Sorenson, & Mitchell, 2007, p. 1147).  
In the simplified two component view, theorizing is one of two components that the 
overall process of theory building may be deconstructed into. Conceptual development is “one of 
two phases that dominate the theorizing component of theory-building research” (Lynham, 
2002b, p. 232). The output of this phase is the theoretical framework. The second phase included 
in the theorizing part of theory building is operationalization in which the theoretical framework 
is “translated, or converted, to observable, confirmable components/elements” (Lynham, 2002b, 
p. 232). Operationalization is achieved with the theoretical propositions, empirical indicators, 
and hypotheses (Dubin, 1978; Lynham, 2002b, 2002b; Torraco, 1997). However, this bifurcation 
of the theory-building process need not imply completely mutually exclusive activities, as is the 
case with Lynham’s explicit Ongoing Refinement and Development (2002b) phase of the overall 
theory-building process that encompasses the continuous improvement of theory (and theoretical 
products) through the “ongoing study adaptation, development, and improvement of the theory in 
action” (Lynham, 2002b, p. 234). 
Consider the following similarities and differences between the theorizing part of theory 
building and the whole of theory building. At a high level, theorizing and theory building are 
both explicitly used in relation to the process of generating theory and both produce interim 
products of the theory process (Weick, 1995). With regard to differences, theory building is a 
more complete recurring cycle (Weick, 2005) that also includes aspects of verification, 




and products associated with theorizing (Lynham, 2000b; Lynham, 2002b; Weick, 1989). Thus, 
theorizing aligns with the type of nonlinear theoretical thinking (Mintzberg, 2005) that must 
occur within the process of generating theoretical ideas, i.e., “the experience of sensemaking” 
(Weick, 2005, p. 394), where “the process of theorizing consists of [ongoing] activities like 
abstracting, generalizing, relating, selecting, explaining, synthesizing, and idealizing” (Weick, 
1995, p. 389). 
Theorizing may be thought of as the set of mental activities intentionally engaged in for 
the purpose imagining (Weick, 1989) coherent descriptions of constructs, their interrelationships, 
and the circumstances for they provide explanation or representation. “Hence, the point of 
theorizing, when viewed as a cognitive process, is not simply to produce validated knowledge 
but, rather, to suggest plausible connections and relationships that have not yet been glimpsed” 
(Van Maanen, Sorenson, & Mitchell, 2007, p. 1148). By contrast, theory building aligns with the 
type of full recurring process by which theory is generated, articulated, tested, taken to 
application, and continuously refined (Lynham, 2002b). 
Weick points out that most of what are passed off as theories are actually approximations 
to theory (Weick, 1995, 2005); the byproducts of working through theorizing phases of the 
theory-building process over time. He further adds that for theorists engaged early in the 
theorizing process lesser substitutes (in the form of references, data, variable lists, diagrams, 
hypotheses, etc) may still “represent interim struggles in which people intentionally inch toward 
stronger theories” (Weick, 1995, p. 385). Here, Weick positions the act of theorizing in a 
theoretical trajectory that takes a great deal of time, but along the way produces incremental 




(e.g., 1974, 1989, 1995, 1999a, 1999b, 2005) emphasize that theorizing and the products of 
theorizing are both highly theoretical and often what is actually passed off as full-blown theory. 
His writings additionally emphasize that what does count as full-blown theory, even though a 
more complete (and often vetted) operationalize theoretical framework, still remains a dynamic 
“direction that is subject to revision” (Weick, 2005, p. 398). 
Theory-building Research Methods 
Theory-building research methods saw considerable growth and attention from the 
1970’s through to the first decade of the 2000’s. As a result, multitudes of theory-building 
research methods are available to theorists that span both paradigmatic boundaries as well as 
boundaries between phases of the various theory-building processes (e.g., Advances in 
Developing Human Resources, volume 4, issue 3). Further, a number of reviews and analyses of 
theory-building research methods were conducted in a five year span from 2002 to 2007 (i.e., 
Lynham, 2002b; Storberg-Walker, 2003, 2006, 2007; Storberg-Walker & Chermack, 2007; 
Torraco, 2002, 2005a; Torraco & Holton, 2002). Two of those reviews stand out in particular as 
means to framing the landscape of literature on theory-building research methods: Torraco 
(2002) and Storberg-Walker (2006).  
Both Torraco (2002) implicitly and Storberg-Walker (2006) explicitly used Lynham’s 
(2002b) General Method of Theory Building in Applied Disciplines as a way to organize theory-
building research methods by the phases of the theory-building process covered by the methods. 
In addition to using the General Method (Lynham, 2002b) as a universal template for 




building research method exemplars into four categories. They were as follows (Storberg-
Walker, 2006, 2007): 
 Type I – Extensive descriptions of a complete theory-building research process. 
 Type II – Process descriptions of segments of a complete theory-building research 
process. 
 Type III – Mono-paradigm descriptions of specific theory-building research methods.  
 Type IV – Multi-paradigm theory-building process and strategy descriptions. 
The current review of theory-building research methods borrows from Torraco (2002) 
and Storberg-Walker (2006, 2007) by framing theory-building research methods according to (a) 
the phase(s) of theory-building research that the methods cover and (b) the type of theory-
building method description, using Storberg-Walker’s (2006, 2007) categories and Lynham’s 
(2002b) General Method, respectively (see Table 46 in example). The purposes of reviewing 
theory-building research methods against the phase and type criteria were to: (1) identify a way 
to position the current theoretical thinking within a specific phase of theory-building research, 
(2) identify theoretical processes relevant to the identified phase, and (3) narrow down the 
appropriate method approaches to review specific to the identified phase of theory building.  
Table 46 
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Conceptual 
Development 


















x x    
Source: Adapted from Torraco (2002) and Storberg-Walker (2006, 2007). 
Storberg-Walker (2006) chose the General Method of Applied Theory Building 
(Lynham, 2002b) as universal template for understanding the whole of theory-building research 
processes, because it “illuminates a basic framework that can be found in most, if not all, theory-
building attempts regardless of the purpose of the theory” (Storberg-Walker, 2006, p. 251), i.e., 
Type I exemplar. Given that the Lynham’s general method is being used as frame for 
understanding the theory-building research methods reviewed, an overview of the general 
method is warranted prior to discussion of the theory-building methods that met the three goals 
of the review of literature on theory building.  
The General Method is all-inclusive way to think about the process of theory building. It 
provides “a contextual overview and reconstruction of the general logic-in-use embedded in the 
nature and challenges of the journey of theory building” (Lynham, 2002b, p. 224) and presents a 
basic framework within which any specific theory-building research method can be situated. In 
other words, the General Method is not a theory-building research method, but rather, a 
description of the overall process of applied theory building; a process common to all specific 
theory-building endeavors. The General Method accommodates multiple paradigms of inquiry 
and multiple forms of logical inference, but does not provide step-by-step sequences on how to 
build theory. Instead, the General Method presents phases of theory-building research that 
encompass and position all specific theory-building research methods. The choice of which 




process, and which metaphysical assumptions serve as underlying framework of beliefs are all 
decisions left up to the theorists given the theory-building need (Lynham, 2002b; Storberg-
Walker, 2006). 
Lynham (2002b) positioned the General Method within two common theory-building 
research strategies, theorizing to practice and practice to theorizing (Lynham, 2002b; Reynolds, 
1971). However, regardless of strategy, Lynham defined five universal phases of the applied 
theory-building process common to any particular complete theory-building approach. These 
five interdependent, interacting phases are: conceptual development, operationalization, 
confirmation, application, and continuous refinement and development of the theory (Lynham, 
2002b; Storberg-Walker, 2003; Storberg-Walker, 2006). Each of these phases is detailed below 
in a non-specific order, since, the five phases do not exist in any general order; rather, the 
specific order is prescribed the theorist and the theory-building need. 
The conceptual development phase is the stage in theory building when the theoretical 
framework is generated that provides initial understanding of the phenomenon in terms of its 
units, laws, boundaries, and system states (Dubin, 1978; Lynham, 2002b; Storberg-Walker, 
2006; Storberg-Walker, 2003). “At a minimum this process will include the development of the 
key elements of the theory, an initial explanation of their interdependence, and the general 
limitations and conditions under which the theoretical framework can be expected to operate… 
This theoretical framework is essentially the core explanatory container of any theory” (Lynham, 
2002b, p. 232). Through the systematic conceptualization of units, laws, boundaries, and system 
states, the theory may begin to serve its purpose as “the answers to questions of why” (Whetten, 




it should be understood that diagrams or figures by themselves are neither theories nor 
theoretical frameworks. Diagrams and figures by themselves fail to answer the question of why, 
yet can be useful in highlighting some of the more complicated interactions or important patterns 
of a theory (Sutton & Staw, 1995; Whetten, 2002; Weick, 1995); yet, “regardless of their merits, 
diagrams and figures should be considered as stage props rather than the performance itself” 
(Sutton & Staw, 1995, p. 376). 
The operationalization phase is the stage in theory building when “the theoretical 
framework must be translated, or converted, to observable, confirmable components/elements” 
(Lynham, 2002b, p. 232). The translated components are the propositions, empirical indicators, 
and hypotheses that together make claims about the phenomenon in practice in the empirical 
world (Cohen, 1989; Dubin, 1978; Lynham, 2002b; Reynolds, 1971; Storberg-Walker, 2006). 
The output of the operationalization phase is “an operationalized theoretical framework, that is, 
an informed theoretical framework that has been converted into components or elements that can 
be further inquired into and confirmed through rigorous research and relevant application” 
(Lynham, 2002b, p. 233). However, it is important to note that the nondirectionality of phases in 
the General Method (Lynham, 2002b; Storberg-Walker, 2006) can lead to operationalization in 
at least a couple different ways, both demonstrating the vital connection between the elements of 
a theory framework and the propositions, empirical indicators, and hypotheses. When 
progressing from the conceptualization phase to the operationalization phase, it is important to 
understand that the propositions, empirical indicators, and hypotheses are derivations of the 
elements of the theoretical framework (Cohen, 1989). When moving from an empirical phase to 
the operationalization phase, the propositions, empirical indicators, and hypotheses are 




The confirmation or disconfirmation phase is the stage in theory building that “involves 
the planning, design, implementation, and evaluation of an appropriate research agenda and 
studies to purposefully inform and intentionally confirm or disconfirm the theoretical framework 
central to the theory.” (Lynham, 2002b, p. 233). The purpose of the confirmation or 
disconfirmation phase is to “conduct purposive research and study that intentionally discovers 
whether the theory can help inform practice. In other words, the objectives of the research 
agenda directly connect with the operationalization of the theory” (Storberg-Walker, 2003, p. 
213). Given the trustworthiness goal of this phase of theory building, one output may be a 
“confirmed and trustworthy theory” (Lynham, 2002b, p. 233) that is ready to inform better action 
and practice through application. However, a confirmed and trustworthy application ready theory 
need not be the only output of the confirmation or disconfirmation phase. Once completing the 
defined research agenda within the phase, the “theorist may develop another way of looking at 
the phenomenon (e.g. paradigm or hypothesis) and move back again into the conceptual 
development and/or operationalization phase” (Storberg-Walker, 2006, p. 254). 
The application phase is the stage in theory building when the vetted theory is brought to 
practice and the theory is applied to real world problems with real world stakeholders (Lynham, 
2002b; Storberg-Walker, 2006). Not only does the application of theory enable “further study, 
inquiry, and understanding of the theory in action… [but] …it is in the application of a theory 
that practice gets to judge and inform the usefulness and relevance of the theory for improved 
action and problem solving” (Lynham, 2002b, p. 233). However, the application phase does not 
imply a terminal end to the theory-building process. The experience of the theory in practice is a 




real world problems, information that can be used to further refine and develop the theory 
(Lynham, 2002b). 
The continuous refinement and development phase is the stage in theory building that 
involves ongoing reformulation, refinement and improvement of the theoretical framework. This 
phase is a requirement of theory building because theories are never complete (Lynham, 2002b; 
Storberg-Walker, 2006; Weick, 1995, 2005). Theory, by nature, is a dynamic “direction that is 
subject to revision” (Weick, 2005, p. 398). As a consequence,  
This recursive nature of applied theory-building research requires the ongoing study, 
adaptation, development, and improvement of the theory in action and ensures that the 
relevance and rigor of the theory are continuously attended to and improved on by 
theorists through further inquiry and application in the real world. (Lynham, 2002b, pp. 
233-234) 
Continuous refinement and development of a theory keeps the theory fresh, relevant, and up to 
date with current knowledge and understanding of the phenomenon. However, the ongoing 
refinement also ensures that the theory continues to be useful for solving problems in the real 
world and that when it is shown not, the theory is modified accordingly (Lynham, 2002b). 
Lynham highlights that “there is no one supreme method of theory building, and nor 
should there be” (Lynham, 2002b, p. 224). The specific theory-building research method used by 
the theorist “should be dictated by the nature of the theory building being engaged in, and not by 
the preferred inquiry methodology of the researcher-theorist or the practitioner-theorist” 
(Lynham, 2002b, p. 224). The General Method encompasses all such methods, theorist choices, 
and belief systems by representing the general process of building applied theory, the lens 
through which all theory-building research methods can be viewed. Through the lens of the 




thinking with its focus on initial generation of a theoretical framework to explain the 
phenomenon of interest. The focus of the theory-building method review will as a consequence 
be framed by (1) the theoretical processes relevant to the conceptual development phase of 
theory building, i.e., Type II segment specific process descriptions, and (2) method approaches 
specific to the conceptual development phase of theory building, i.e., Type III specific theory-
building research methods. 
Theoretical Processes of the Conceptual Development Phase 
The prior section focused on describing theory as a product and characterizing what a 
theory is. In this section attention turns to description of theory as a process in inquiry. There are 
two ways that theory can be perceived as process (Lynham, 2000b, 2002b). The first is the 
manner with which a developed theory engages inquirers in the conceptual and empirical worlds 
as it is serves as catalyst for testing, confirmation, application, and refinement, as well as 
methodological framework for doing so. The majority of the ways that theory can be perceived 
as process in this first sense of developed theory have already been implicitly addressed in the 
prior section on the roles of theory in inquiry. The second way that theory can be perceived as 
process is the manner with which theory is initially developed through theory-building research. 
This second sense of theory as process by way of theory-building research is the focus of the 
current section; specifically, theoretical processes and methods of the conceptual development 
phase of theory-building research will be reviewed. 
Five sources were identified as relevant process descriptions (i.e., Type II, Storberg-




 Weick’s (1989) paper on Theory Construction as Disciplined Imagination 
 Weick’s (2005) chapter on The Experience of Theorizing: Sensemaking as Topic and 
Resource 
 Folger’s (2005) chapter section on Towards a Theory of Theory Building 
 Mintzberg’s (2005) chapter on Developing Theory about the Development of Theory 
 Storberg-Walker’s (2007) paper on Understanding the Conceptual Development 
Phase of Applied Theory Building 
Each of the five process descriptions of the conceptual development phase of theory 
building are individually reviewed and then the general theoretical process of conceptual 
development is synthesized. 
Weick (1989): Theory construction as disciplined imagination. Weick’s (1989) paper 
on Theory Construction as Disciplined Imagination describes the intellectual processes of the 
theorist during conceptual development of a theoretical framework. As noted by Weick, “when 
theorists build theory, they design, conduct, and interpret imaginary experiments” (Weick, 1989, 
p. 519); these imaginary experiments require disciplined thinking on the part of the theorist. 
Weick (1989) emphasized three general elements fundamental to good theoretical thinking: (1) 
well defined theoretical problem statements, (2) independent, heterogeneous thought trials, and 
(3) diverse selection criteria for evaluating thought trials and conjecture (Storberg-Walker & 
Chermack, 2007; Torraco, 1997; Weick, 1989); these “three elements form the basis of 
‘conceptual development’ in Lynham’s model” (Storberg-Walker & Chermack, 2007, p. 506). 
In social inquiries, the theoretical problem statements underlying the theorizing process 




Not only do they [problem statements] contain an anomaly to be explained, but they also 
contain a set of assumptions that can be confirmed or disconfirmed, a set of domain 
words that can be connected differently, details that can be generalized, a text that can be 
sorted into form words and substance words, an implied story whose plot may be 
implausible, and answers to questions not yet asked. (Weick, 1989, p. 521) 
The theoretical problem statement is central to the process of conceptual development; 
“without clear and precise problem statements, attempts at theorizing about solutions are 
misguided and vague” (Storberg-Walker & Chermack, 2007, p. 507). This underscores some of 
the critical roles of theory in inquiry; not only can it define research problems and prescribe the 
most critical research questions to address, but theory can also prescribed and evaluate solutions 
to the theoretical problem (Campbell, 1990). That is, the problem statement defines the closed 
system within which the theoretical problem and solution are connected in a meaningful manner. 
“When faced with a problem, the theorist generates conjectures about ways to solve it” 
(Weick, 1989, p. 522). Thought trials are the imaginary experiments conducted by theorists as 
means to solving theoretical problems, typically comprising conjectures in the form of if-then 
statements (Storberg-Walker & Chermack, 2007; Weick, 1989). As emphasized by Weick (1989) 
the greater the number of independent and heterogeneous conjectures, the better the resulting 
theory-building process. One suggested mechanism for producing heterogeneous thought trials 
was through the use of classification systems. As example of possible classification systems, 
Storberg-Walker and Chermack (2007) note that these could include conjectures across “varying 
philosophical perspectives (Does a potential solution look different to a positivist and a social 
constructionist?), varying demographic perspectives (Does a potential solution look different to 
the first year-employee of the organization and someone preparing to retire?), and so forth” 




For Weick (1989), the key to evaluating thought trials was an explicit selection process 
and set of selection criteria. Two critical characteristics of selection criteria were noted, 
consistent application of selection criteria by the theorist to all thought trials and utilization of a 
large number of diverse selection criteria (Storberg-Walker & Chermack, 2007; Weick, 1989).  
The greater the number of diverse criteria applied to a conjecture, the higher the 
probability that those conjectures which are selected will result in good theory. 
Furthermore, selection criteria must be applied consistently or theorists will be left with 
an assortment of conjectures that are just as fragmentary as those they started with. Every 
conjecture can satisfy some criterion. Thus, if criteria are altered each time a conjecture is 
tested, few conjectures will be rejected and little understanding will cumulate. (Weick, 
1989, p. 523) 
Weick’s (1989) selection process involved the theorist posing questions to him/herself 
about each thought trial, asking whether the conjecture is “interesting, obvious, connected, 
believable, beautiful, or real, in the context of the problem they are trying to solve” (Weick, 
1989, p. 524). The six selection criteria represent reactions of the theorist to evaluation of each 
thought trial (Table 47). Of particular importance in Weick’s (1989) paper was the reaction of 
that’s interesting to a conjecture because he substitutes interesting for validity in the 
experimental thought trials of theorizing. Further, the reaction that’s interesting to a conjecture is 
tied to the theorist’s past experience and assumptions about the phenomenon central to 
theorizing. 
“Whenever one reacts with the feeling that's interesting, that reaction is a clue that 
current experience has been tested against past experience, and the past understanding 
has been found inadequate… Theorists are usually pleased when their assumptions are 
disconfirmed, whereas nontheorists are worried when their assumptions are disconfirmed. 
A disconfirmed assumption is an opportunity for a theorist to learn something new, to 
discover something unexpected, to generate renewed interest in an old question, to 
mystify something that had previously seemed settled, to heighten intellectual 






Weick’s Six Selection Criteria Concerning Conjectures 
Is the conjecture… Theorist’s Reaction Interpretation 
Interesting 
That is interesting (assumption 
of moderate strength is 
disconfirmed) 
“The judgment that's interesting selects a conjecture 
for retention and further use… Thus, plausibility is a 
substitute for validity” (Weick, 1989, p. 525). 
That is absurd (strong 
assumption is disconfirmed) 
The conjecture is dropped from further thought 
trials. 
That is irrelevant (no 
assumption is activated) 
The conjecture is dropped from further thought 
trials. 
Obvious 
That is obvious (a strong 
assumption is confirmed) 
The conjecture is dropped from further thought 
trials. 
That is obvious, but “for whom 
might this not be obvious”? 
“The search for an answer to this question might 
help establish the boundary conditions (Dubin, 1976) 
inside which a conjecture will hold true but outside 
of which it won’t” (Weick, 1989, p. 526). 
Connected 
This event is connected to that 
event 
That’s interesting: “Theorists often assume that 
events are unrelated and reactions of interest often 
result when unexpected connections are discovered 
(Davis, 1971). To discover an unexpected 
connection is to discover a new set of implications” 
(Weick, 1989, p. 527). 
These events are not connected 
That’s not interesting and either irrelevant or 
obvious. 
Believable 
That is believable 
“To judge a conjecture believable, in the context of a 
story, is to assess the degree to which it makes the 
story one starts with into a prototypical story; ‘a 
prototypical story identifies a protagonist, a 
predicament, attempts to resolve the predicament, 
the outcomes of such attempts, and the reactions of 
the protagonists to the situation’ (Robinson & 
Hawpe, 1986, p. 112). If a conjecture strengthens 
one of these five elements in the story that spurs 
theory construction, or if it supplies an element that 
is missing, then the conjecture is more likely to be 
retained” (Weick, 1989, p. 527). 
That is not believable 
“If, however, the conjecture neither strengthens nor 
completes, then it is likely to be rejected” (Weick, 
1989, p. 527). 
Beautiful 
That is beautiful 
“Theorists sometimes use aesthetic criteria such as 
beauty to select conjectures… elegant models in the 
social sciences have the capacity to generate the 
same feeling” (Weick, 1989, p. 527), and therefore, 
are likely to be retained. 
That is not beautiful 
The conjecture lacks elegance and is likely to either 
be reformulated or rejected. 
Real That is real 
“There are intense debates about the degree to which 
the concepts of science correspond to the "things" it 
thinks about (e.g., Gergen, 1986; Needham, 1983), 




and perhaps also for those with vivid, accurate, and 
detailed problem statements, the criterion that's real 
is a viable selector. The criterion that's real invokes 
a combination of experience, practice, and 
convention to select among conjectures, whereas 
earlier criteria such as interest rely more heavily on 
imagined realities as selectors” (Weick, 1989, p. 
528). 
That is not real 
May be rejected if close correspondence between 
theoretical concepts and empirical reality is valued. 
Source: Weick (1989). 
Weick’s (1989) article is a highly cited work on theory construction. His paper describes 
the creative yet simultaneously systematic thought process of the theorist during the conceptual 
development phase of theory building. The theorist’s thought process may be characterized as 
experimental thought trials in which a number of alternative criteria, including the criterion of 
interesting, is substituted for the empirical criterion of validity for the evaluation of each 
conjecture contained within a thought trial.  
Weick (2005): The experience of theorizing. In his chapter of Great Minds in 
Management, Weick (2005) makes the comparison of the experience of theorizing to that of the 
experience of sensemaking; where, sensemaking is defined as “the ongoing retrospective 
development of plausible images that rationalize what people are doing” (Weick, 2005, p. 397), 
and, “consists of activities that construct reality” (Weick, 2005, p. 395). Weick describes that: 
Both [i.e., theorizing and sensemaking] consist of actions that are explicative [serving to 
explain], evocative [serving to evoke or bring to mind], equivocality reducing [serving 
the reduction of ambiguity], exegetical [explanatory], transient [temporary, time-
dependent, ‘passing especially quickly into and out of existence’ or ‘producing results 
beyond itself’], narrative [the representation of events, experiences, etc. as an account, 
report, or story], embedded in paradigms [not external to, or in relation to philosophical 
paradigms, but rather existing within them], and meaningful [intentional and oriented 
towards understanding why]… And it is respect for the correspondence that is 
characteristic of the actual process of theory development that will be described. (Weick, 




Ultimately, Weick makes the argument that sensemaking is central to the process of 
theorizing itself, and, then further couches the sensemaking context within the process of theory 
construction; therefore, positioning the discussion in the conceptual development phase of theory 
building. The following main points structure Weick’s (2005) discussion of the process of 
theorizing and sensemaking; the process involves: 1) intentional deployment of a vocabulary to 
talk the phenomenon into existence, 2) constructing plausible boundaries around a phenomenon, 
3) treating the process as an ongoing retrospective activity always subject to revision, and 4) 
knowing when one has developed a theory. 
Talking a phenomenon into existence. As already indicated, Weick (2005) portrays the 
processes of theorizing and sensemaking as an activity that serves as means to constructing 
reality, not simply defining it. As something constructed, the question then becomes whether or 
not reality is created by the act of definition itself. However, to construct a reality is to generate 
and articulate an understanding of it, and describing that reality through definition is only one 
part of generating the understanding; the other part is solving the problem of how “to bring a 
meaning into existence” (Weick, 2005, p. 396). Here, inventing new meaning acts as a way to 
recognize something as itself distinct from everything that contains it or exists in parallel. Telling 
what the story is brings an event into existence. Further answering the question of action takes 
the defined event and brings it meaningfully into existence as something that organizes actors 
into action (Weick, 2005). 
Words are how theorists bring a meaning into existence. “Naming, interpreting, and 




therefore through the intentional deployment of a vocabulary that phenomena are talked into 
existence.  
To theorize… is partly to craft a vocabulary and grammar for… description. When that 
grammar is imposed on events, one’s thinking tends to be channeled in directions that 
embody the relationships highlighted in the language of the theory. Thus, people who talk 
the language of… [a phenomenon], literally talk… [the phenomenon] into existence. In 
doing so they are thereby enabled to think for the moment as if… [the phenomenon] 
mattered in ways defined in the theory. (Weick, 2005, p. 400) 
The deployment of language about a phenomenon, in part, defines what is a fact and what 
is not a fact. Facticity, as Weick called it, shares a dependency with the verbally articulated 
understanding of the phenomenon. “The talk enacts facts because it makes that understanding 
visible, explicit, and available for reflective thinking, but the talk does not create the 
understanding. Instead, it articulates the understanding by converting know how into know that” 
(Weick, 2005, p. 405). 
Constructing plausible boundaries. According to Weick (2005), the process of defining, 
and then continuously redefining, the boundary condition around human or social phenomena is 
also a fundamental activity of theorizing. Defining plausible boundaries is addition means to 
making the phenomenon distinct from everything else. To construct, define, or put up boundaries 
is:  
…to walk a thin line between trying to put plausible boundaries around a diverse set of 
actions that seem to cohere, while also to trying to include enough properties so that the 
coherence is seen as distinctive and significant but something less than the totality of the 
human condition. (Weick, 2005, p. 395) 
Continuously redefining the plausible boundaries of around a phenomenon can occur 
because it turned out that the theory applied to more than originally anticipated, less than 




theory which resulted in new internal boundary determining criteria (Dubin, 1978). However, the 
continual redefinition of boundaries is one way that the theorist constantly struggles with 
creating a theory that is simultaneously accurate, general, and simple (Weick, 1980, 2005). 
An ongoing retrospective activity. A key piece of Weick’s (2005) definition of 
sensemaking, and therefore the process of theorizing, is emphasis of ongoing retrospective 
development. In this sense, theorizing shares a tension between definition of the past and 
relevance in the present. By this, Weick means that the articulated description of a phenomenon 
in theory is an understanding afforded by hindsight and reflection. Theorizing involves: 
…continuously rejustifying what has newly been included and excluded. In theorizing, as 
in everyday life, meanings always seem to become clear a little too late. Accounts, 
cognitions, and categories all lie in the path of earlier action, which means that definitions 
and theories tend to be retrospective summaries of ongoing inquiring rather than 
definitive constraints on future inquiring. (Weick, 2005, p. 395) 
The continuous balance of theorists for the tension between definition of the past and 
relevance in the present results not only in the seemingly persistent incompleteness of a theory 
but also in the persistent ongoing refinement of a theory by theorists over time. This portrayal of 
theory as both retrospective and always capable of further refinement is highlighted by two 
features. First, Weick (2005) pointed out that the process of theorizing is distinct from decision 
making given its amenability to revision; second the experience of theorizing is much the same 
as one of playing catch up. 
Weick noted that theorizing should be “treated as a direction that is subject to revision, 
rather than as a decision that invokes selective attention in the service of justification” (Weick, 
2005, p. 398). Both theorizing and sensemaking involves replacing working versions of 




observations, experiences, and reflections than originally incorporated into the stories that are 
replaced. It is in this sense that theorists “don’t reach single decision points so much as they 
shape what they will next think about, act upon, and bring into existence” (Weick, 2005, p. 398). 
In example, Weick offered an analogous statement about decision making versus sensemaking 
made by the wildland firefighter Paul Gleason: 
If I make a decision it is a possession, I take pride in it, I tend to defend it and not listen 
to those who question it. If I make sense, then this is more dynamic and I listen and I can 
change it. A decision is something you polish. Sensemaking is a direction for the next 
period. (Personal communication, June 13, 1995 in Weick, 2005, p. 398) 
For Weick, agility in theorizing occurs in much the same way when the theorist embraces 
the activity as one of always playing catch up with the phenomenon being described. This 
process of playing catch up underscores the retrospective nature of theory. Weick parallel’s the 
retrospective nature of theorizing to Geertz comment on the reactive, retrospective nature of 
consciousness. Here, Geertz describes an “after-the-fact, ex post, life-trailing nature of 
consciousness generally—occurrence first, formulation later on… [By extension, theorists also 
make] a continual effort to devise systems of discourse that can keep up, more or less, with what, 
perhaps, is going on” (Geertz, 1995, p. 19 in Weick, 2005, p. 402). This sort of “recursive” 
(Lynham, 2002b, p. 233), ex-post agility in theorizing is also characteristic of Lynham’s (2002b) 
continuous refinement and development phase of the General Method.   
Knowing when you have a theory. Due to the retrospective, ongoing reformulation 
process that is characteristic of theorizing, Weick (2005) acknowledged the need for some stop 
rules, or general heuristics to guide the theorist towards outputting a meaningful theory. Even 
though the meaningful output remains direction subject to update, it does not mean that the 




theory, e.g., “sooner or later [the theorists] articulates an explanation that matters in a seriously 
plausible way” (Weick, 2005, p. 405). Without stop rules, the theorist risks treating the 
theoretical work in progress as an ongoing approximation of a theory, rather than as a full-blown 
theory susceptible to revision if/when the thinking about the phenomenon is changed by new 
information. Weick (2005) offered nine such rules for putting your work out there as theory.  
Again, there are no hard and fast rules. But any of the following help: 
1. Someone tells them that they have a theory. 
2. The saying resembles other theories that they’ve seen. 
3. The saying explains events not used in its construction. 
4. The saying depicts abstract, conceptual, generalizable patterns. 
5. The saying fits one of Merton’s four categories of approximations to theory1 
6. The saying is a useful guide to what one can expect to see in a future event. 
7. The saying serves as a higher order frame for a lower order cue to which it can be 
connected. 
8. The author claims that it is a theory and others subject that claim to their own 
truth tests. 
9. The author ignores the questions “is it a theory or not” and simply uses it. 
This is not as haphazard as it sounds. Instead, these stop rules for theory simply recognize 
that theories are coherent orientations to events, sets of abstractions, consensually 
validated explanations and embodiments of aphoristic thinking. (Weick, 2005, pp. 405-
406) 
In Weick’s (2005) chapter, he underscored the centrality of the sensemaking role in the 
process of theorizing; a role he characterized as constructing reality through the rationalization of 
what’s going on and why. Weick (2005) identified a number of processes that captured the core 
                                                 
 
1 Weick identified Merton’s four categories as: (1) a general orientation in which broad frameworks specify 
types of variables people should take into account without any specification of relationships among these 
variables…; (2) an analysis of concepts in which concepts are specified but not interrelated…; (3) a post factum 
interpretation in which ad hoc hypotheses are derived from a single observation, with no effort to explore new 
observations or alternative explanations…; and (4) an empirical generalization in which an isolated proposition 





of his conceptual development description; these were, talking a phenomenon into existence, 
constructing plausible boundaries around a phenomenon, and treating the process as a 
retrospective activity always subject to revision. In addition, Weick further listed a number of 
heuristic stop rules associated with the end of the conceptual development phase of theory 
building. 
Folger (2005): Toward a theory of theory building. In his chapter of Great Minds in 
Management, Folger (2005) discussed three pointers for building theory. However, of particular 
interest is his description of the “internal logic” (Folger, 2005, p. 58) of the proposed Huh? Aha! 
model of theory building. The description of internal logic is germane because it is the only 
theorizing description of the conceptual development phase that explicitly uses an inferential 
process described as reasoning/inference to the best explanation, also referred to as abduction 
and retroduction.  
Folger characterized his Huh? Aha! model of theory building such that the 
‘Huh?” refers to a puzzling phenomenon; ‘Aha!’ refers to mechanisms or processes 
postulated as its potential explanation. Proceeding along the Huh-Aha path has an 
internal logic (known by philosophers as abduction or retroduction) but does not 
necessarily follow in the order I describe. (Folger, 2005, p. 58) 
The theoretical path described by Folger (2005) included three parts: 1) think and reflect 
before you read, 2) start with a dependent variable or genuine phenomenon to investigate, and 3) 
explore a variety of antecedent conditions. Central to Folger’s theory-building process is starting 
with an incident or phenomenon of interest, both to the researcher and others, that can be placed 
as the consequence in a chain of events, and then trying to figure out a reasonable explanation of 




Think before reading. The first part of Folger’s theoretical path through his Huh? Aha! 
model of theory building involves thinking about the phenomenon of interest as a conclusion to 
the inquiry. The theorist should try to reflect upon the phenomenon and attempt to draw some 
preliminary conclusions and assumptions about it. The process of engaging in “prior 
introspection creates a frame of reference for a wider variety of reactions to what gets read 
thereafter” (Folger, 2005, p. 58). Folger describes the consequence of developing a frame of 
reference prior to digging into the literature as twofold. First, the prior frame of reference alters 
the way that literature is interpreted. Information mined in the literature is juxtaposed against the 
a priori assumptions and can “help preclude taking a literature’s conclusions for granted or 
accepting them without question” (Folger, 2005, p. 58).  
Second, the frame of reference potentially avoids a simple assimilation of information 
from the literature. Rather, the prior frame provides a baseline against which to actively question 
the information in the literature, facilitating a compare and contrast approach to analysis of the 
information discovered, e.g., is the prior frame in any way contrary to the information discovered 
or is it confirmed by the information discovered (Folger, 2005). If in disagreement, ask why you 
formed the contrary impression you did a prior and why the information source seems to be at 
odds with it. If in agreement, can you identify the explanatory antecedents of the phenomenon 
central to your prior impression, and if so, again juxtaposing against the literature, do they seem 
to agree or disagree with the literature’s explanatory antecedents of the phenomenon? 
Start with a dependent variable. In this context, the dependent variable is the 
consequence, from which, the theorist works backwards toward identifying antecedent 




argument for this approach is in favor of originality and against incremental research with little 
new theoretical insight. Starting with existing theory builds reliance upon another’s explanations 
first, and then leads to testing of the existing theory. Starting with an unexplained phenomenon 
forces a larger creative investment when the theorist has to “start from scratch” (Folger, 2005, p. 
59). As an example, Folger described his theorizing process as “a variation of on Flanagan’s 
(1954) critical incident technique…in terms of Antecedents, Behavior, and Consequences… 
Drawing attention to the antecedent and behavior aspects of an incident simply provides a means 
for disciplining one’s description of events” (Folger, 2005, p. 60). By focusing attention first on 
the consequence, the theorist is allowed to then devote attention to understanding what led to the 
consequence and why. In other words, the theorizing process becomes oriented to answering and 
articulating the question of why.  
Exploring a variety of antecedent conditions. When examining potential explanations, 
Folger (2005) recommended contrasting commonsense explanations against those less 
straightforward, i.e., “an A  X versus A  Y juxtaposition of alternative cause-effects” (Folger, 
2005, p. 61). Here, A  X is taken as a causal sequence predicted from commonsense reasoning 
involving a common event and the most reasonable explanation. On the other hand, A  Y is 
taken as an anomalous or surprising event that stands in contradiction with the commonsense 
explanation. Collecting examples of both types of instances forces the theorist to consider richer 
explanatory context, because “no such anomalies will prove explainable by means of applying 
the same rote procedure in each instance; rather, part of the creativity of theorizing comes from 




Folger’s (2005) writing on the theorizing process provides a valuable new perspective on 
the inferences made by theorists during the conceptual development phase of theory building. 
His writing discusses the inferential process of reasoning to the best explanation, i.e., “abduction 
or retroduction” (Folger, 2005, p. 58). Here, Folger emphasizes not only the formulation and 
description of constructs to characterize a phenomenon, but also the type of reasoning engaged in 
by the theorist in order to explain the phenomenon. 
Mintzberg (2005): Developing theory about the development of theory. As cited 
earlier in the section on what theory is not, Mintzberg (2005) presents a strong argument for 
conceptualizing our social theories as false by nature over true and choosing them “according to 
how useful they are, not how true they are” (Mintzberg, 2005, p. 356); “they are, after all, just 
words and symbols on pieces of paper, about the reality they purport to describe; they are not 
that reality” (Mintzberg, 2005, p. 356). Mintzberg’s (2005) chapter emphasizes the process of 
creating and articulating explanation, something he represents… 
…along a continuum, from lists (categories), to typologies (comprehensive lists), to 
impressions of relationships among factors (not necessarily ‘variables’: that sounds too 
reified for many of the factors I work with), to causations between and patterns among 
these relationships, to fully explanatory models (which interweave all the factors in 
question). (Mintzberg, 2005, p. 360) 
To Mintzberg theory should be insightful, and “theory is insightful when it surprises, 
when it allows us to see profoundly, imaginatively, unconventionally into phenomena we 
thought we understood” (Mintzberg, 2005, p. 361). Similar to Weick (2005) and Folger (2005), 
Mintzberg (2005) emphasizes creativity in the process of theorizing. Interesting theory is created 
when “we let go of all this scientific correctness, or to use a famous phrase, suspend our 




immersed in an interesting, revealing context” (Mintzberg, 2005, p. 361). Mintzberg’s creative 
process for conceptually developing interesting theory is described as “generalizing beyond the 
data” (Mintzberg, 2005, p. 361). For this, he describes a nonlinear, twenty step theorizing 
process. 
Mintzberg dedicated a great deal of text to describing the 20 step process in his chapter 
(i.e., “this subjective, idiosyncratic musing like mad in order to climb the scale from lists to 
models?”, Mintzberg, 2005, p. 361); consequently, readers are referred to his text for a detailed 
account (Mintzberg, 2005, pp. 361-371). However, his description of the theorizing process akin 
to the conceptual development phase of theory building is summarized next. 
Step one. Do not close yourself down to possibilities and too tightly limit what you 
investigate by starting with elegant hypotheses rather than interesting questions. If you ask small 
questions, you’ll get small answers.  
Ask the big questions. In my experience, the problem in doctoral theses, and subsequent 
research people do, is not that they bite off more than they can chew, but they nibble less 
than they should consume. Or to use another metaphor, I admire researchers who try to 
build cathedrals, not lay a few bricks. (Mintzberg, 2005, p. 362) 
Step two. Use a body of rich inputs to stimulate theoretical thinking. Rich inputs should 
include thick descriptions, stories, tangible data, existing literature, and anecdotes; “anecdotal 
data is not incidental to theory development at all, but an essential part of it” (Mintzberg, 2005, 
p. 362). The theorist should keep an open mind to what is considered data. The type of data the 





Step three. Begin creating an outline that conveys the theoretical thinking in a linear 
manner. Even though theoretical thinking tends to be nonlinear, the outline serves two purposes. 
First, it helps the theorist organize and express their own thoughts, “I must have an outline to 
write down my ideas, even if the object of writing down my ideas is to come up with an outline” 
(Mintzberg, 2005, p. 362). Second, the outline helps the theorist express the theoretical thinking 
to others in an understandable manner, “No matter how we think about our theories, ultimately 
we have to convey them to other people in linear order… The trouble with linear order, of 
course, is that the world we are trying to explain does not function in linear order” (Mintzberg, 
2005, p. 362). 
Step four. Utilize as many means as possible to help express ideas, i.e., diagrams to 
indicate relationships. Diagrams, and other tools, can facilitate the thinking of the theorist such 
that a single representation can embody a set of ideas that the theorist is trying to connect. In 
addition, using representations of ideas can help express the ideas outside of the head of the 
theorist; therefore, allowing the theorist (and others) to see what he or she was thinking 
(Mintzberg, 2005). 
Step five. Ideas do not develop in a linear fashion so make lots of notes about passing 
thoughts to avoid forgetting them while developing current thoughts; theory development is a 
“messy process” (Mintzberg, 2005, p. 365). There is nonlinearity in the conception of theoretical 
ideas. Often while working on one point, other points are being generated both in consequence 
and in parallel. In this sense, the outline is nonlinear and the act of creating it is, in and of itself, 
generative of ideas. Here, theorists are responding to what was put in front of them and continue 




Step six. The theorist must be able to move back and forth between details and the big 
picture. That is, the theorist must: 
…connect and disconnect. In other words, you have to get as close to the phenomena as 
possible in digging out the inputs (data, stories, and lots more), but then be able to step 
back to make something interesting out of them. Too connected and you risk getting co-
opted by the phenomenon. (Mintzberg, 2005, p. 365) 
When connected avoid immersion in unnecessary detail, when disconnected avoid being too 
distant to tell an interesting story. The continuous interplay between connection and 
disconnection is one of stimulating imagination with data, and then stepping back to let the 
theoretical imagination develop (Mintzberg, 2005). 
Step seven. Avoid overemphasis on methodological elegance if it risks leading to trite 
conclusions; that is, do not choose methodological elegance in the theorizing process over 
meaningful outcomes, “elegant means often get in the way of elegant ends” (Mintzberg, 2005, p. 
366). The value in methodology is in enabling justifiable ends, but the ends must still be 
meaningful. Use methodology as creative tool for generating elegant means, but not at the cost of 
conforming in process and restricting creativity. 
Step eight. Theorizing and research are detective work. “You have to dig, dig, dig, for 
every scrap of information you can get. Do not forget about that ‘you never know’” (Mintzberg, 
2005, p. 366). Theorizing is both about figuring out what you know and figuring out what you do 
not know. 
 Step nine. Re-emphasizing steps five and six, “take prolific notes” (Mintzberg, 2005, p. 




Step ten. “At early stages, keep it messy” (Mintzberg, 2005, p. 366). Write down 
everything, about anything. Do not be afraid to rewrite, rephrase, and/or reframe ideas. Do not 
worry about getting it right the first time, just worry about getting something the first time. You 
can fix it later, but you ca not do anything later with what you never got the first time through. 
Sometimes one is just a better way to word a particular idea I already recorded in 
another… there are ideas I have probably written down fifteen different times. Not 
because I forget the earlier versions: only because I think I have expressed it better each 
time. (Mintzberg, 2005, p. 366).  
Step eleven. Keep theorizing until you can express the ideas in a manner that others can 
understand as well, “it is not only having the ideas that make a successful theory but also 
expressing them engagingly” (Mintzberg, 2005, p. 366). If the theorist cannot express the theory 
without jargon, it may be an indicator to the theorist that they need to understand the 
phenomenon and theory better. “Understanding evolves through three phases: simplistic, 
complex, and profoundly simple” (Mintzberg, 2005, p. 367).  
Step twelve. Think, outline, take notes, and code notes simultaneously and iteratively. 
The purpose of the outline in advance of the formal paper is to both get the theoretical ideas out 
and get the ideas organized. Allowing the outline to evolve nonlinearly through jumping around 
and coding (and recoding) idea chunks allows the full thought to evolve in an organized manner 
as well (Mintzberg, 2005). 
…how could I even come up with these notes unless I have the sense of an outline? So I 
need the outline to think the thoughts and get the codes. But only after I have the thoughts 
can I really do the outline, and so the codes. This means I have to recycle back repeatedly 
to redo and flesh out whatever outline I do have, in order to enhance the codes and so to 
recode what has been coded… All of this effort is to get everything in linear order, to get 
all those notes in one sequence, piles out one by one, in order, to do sub-outlines of each 




Step thirteen. Embrace ideas that do not fit, do not discard them. “Cherish them 
[anomalies]. Repeatedly return to them. Ask why? Why? Why?” (Mintzberg, 2005, p. 367). It is 
not always the ideas that fall neatly into place that will result in the theoretical breakthrough. The 
breakthrough may finally come when the theorist understands the idea that does not fit 
(Mintzberg, 2005). 
Step fourteen. Be a bulldog. “Never give up trying to figure out what they mean. If you 
can come to grips with the anomaly, you may have something big” (Mintzberg, 2005, p. 367).  
Steps fifteen and sixteen. “Everything depends on the creative leap” (Mintzberg, 2005, p. 
367); not necessarily on being correct. Searching for explanation often means that the theorist 
must be comfortable moving forward methodically and intentionally towards an unknown end, 
i.e., the creative leap. “What you set out to do doesn’t matter; it’s what you end up doing” 
(Mintzberg, 2005, p. 36). Here, Mintzberg (2005) re-emphasizes step seven. It is the elegant end 
that matters in theorizing.  Mintzberg further points out that steps fifteen and sixteen can be scary 
given a mainstream of research and peer critique: 
Fear is antithetical to theory development—fear of being different, fear of standing out, 
fear of not belonging, fear of being wrong, or subversive (if not obvious).  Yet we have 
build fear into the whole process by which we do and assess research.  (Mintzberg, 2005, 
p. 369).   
Step seventeen.   Theorizing is about discovery more than being right or confirming what 
was already known. “Theory development is really about discovering patterns… recognizing 
similarities in things that appear dissimilar to others, i.e., making unexpected connections. 
Theory is about connections, and the more, and the more interesting, the better” (Mintzberg, 




Step eighteen. Weave it all together. Theorizing is about linking and relating insights. 
Interesting theory is not a singular novel insight; rather it is the connecting of many insights in a 
provocative and compelling way. Interesting theory results from: 
…the weaving together of many insights, many creative leaps, most small and perhaps a 
few big. It’s all the weaving. And that comes, for me at least, in the writing, whether of 
the text itself (as I hope you have been able to see here) or of the detailed outline. 
(Mintzberg, 2005, p. 370) 
Step nineteen. Write. Use paper and notes. Clear the desk of technology. Surround 
yourself with your notes, papers, outlines, and rich data. Write and rewrite in ways that ca not be 
done with keyboard and computer. Things are less messy on screen than they really are in the 
outlining process of theorizing. 
Step twenty. Do not be lazy. “Iterate, iterate, iterate... write draft after draft after draft… 
keep correcting, fixing, adjusting, reconceiving, changing, until it all feels right” (Mintzberg, 
2005, p. 371). 
The points central to Mintzberg’s discussion on the theorizing process may be 
summarized as creativity, nonlinearity, and evolution. The conceptual development part of 
theorizing is about the construction of ideas and explanations. It requires a creativity to think and 
rethink, and openness to change and surprise throughout.  
Storberg-Walker (2007): Understanding the conceptual development phase of 
applied theory building. Storberg-Walker’s (2007) paper on Understanding the Conceptual 
Development Phase of Theory Building focuses on description of the process and outcome of 
theorizing through the conceptual development phase of theory-building research. Her work 




formulating initial ideas about a phenomenon (Lynham, 2002b; Storberg-Walker, 2007; 
Storberg-Walker & Chermack, 2007). Storberg-Walker’s paper was motivated by the following 
questions: “(1) What are the critical components of conceptual development? (2) What are the 
relationships between the components?” (Storberg-Walker, 2007, p. 65). In response, her work 
identified five process components generic to the conceptual development process and the 
relations between them (Storberg-Walker, 2007; Storberg-Walker & Chermack, 2007). These 
were:  
1. Examine alternative theory research perspectives and processes 
2. Resolve paradigmatic issues 
3. Identify and resolve foundational theory issues 
4. Resolve preliminary research design issues 
5. Identify and select the appropriate modeling process 
Component #1: Examine alternative theory research perspectives and processes. There 
are a large number of theory-building options available to the theorist (Lynham, 2002b; 
Storberg-Walker, 2003, 2006, 2007; Storberg-Walker & Chermack, 2007; Torraco, 2002, 2004, 
2005; Torraco & Holton, 2002); not all options are appropriate to all theory-building endeavors. 
Some represent different paradigmatic perspectives, some phase-specific methods, while others 
variations on the problem-solution process. As a consequence, it is important that the theorist 
familiarize him or herself with the alternative theory-building methods available, weigh the 
alternatives, choose one, and justify choice in the context of the research problem and their own 




Component #2: Resolve paradigmatic issues. Citing Lynham (2002b) for contending that 
“theorists need to explicitly state their paradigmatic assumptions in order to complete the 
conceptual development phase” (Storberg-Walker, 2007, p. 68), Storberg-Walker emphasized 
the necessity for theorists to acknowledge and consider the impact of paradigms upon their 
theoretical development. Once the most appropriate paradigm for theory building has been 
identified, it is also important for the theorist to explicitly state and justify their paradigmatic 
choice and positioning (Storberg-Walker, 2007; Storberg-Walker & Chermack, 2007). 
Component #3: Identify and resolve foundational theory issues. For this third process 
component, Storberg-Walker puts the emphasis on identification more than resolution. Here, she 
notes that resolving in the choose one over the other sense may be less beneficial than 
identifying and juxtaposing different theories “expressly for the contradictions and tensions that 
arise” (Storberg-Walker & Chermack, 2007, p. 518). The process of identifying 
core/foundational theories is described as one including: 
…identifying foundational literature, specifying explicit core theories from that literature, 
and exploring the impact of those explicit alternative core theories on the process of 
evidence gathering and analysis… Core theories are the foundational theories that a new 
theory builds on… theories somehow interact with each other to generate new 
understandings and theories” (Storberg-Walker, 2007, p. 76) 
Component #4: Resolve preliminary research design issues. As suggested in Appendix B 
on the anatomy of theory, the choice of theoretical units, laws of interaction, theoretical 
boundaries, system states, propositions, empirical indicators, and hypotheses all relate to the type 
of empirical inquiry to come out of the specified theory. Thus, the theorist’s choices about the 
theoretical framework can influence research design issues, but, the same case can be made vice 




theory-building research phases, the theorist may want to make pragmatic theory development 
decisions on the front end of theory building informed by the types of feasible research designs 
available on the back end (Storberg-Walker, 2007; Storberg-Walker & Chermack, 2007). 
…the output of this component is an explicit process that leads to decisions related to 
research design. The value of this component is not the research design itself per se but 
disclosure of how the processes within conceptual development worked together with 
research design issues to come up with an interesting theory. (Storberg-Walker & 
Chermack, 2007, p. 518) 
Component #5: Identify and select the appropriate modeling process. Because some sort 
of model or visual representation of the phenomenon as a theoretical framework is often the 
output of the conceptual development phase of theory building, it is important for theorists to 
understanding their modeling options as well as the timing of the modeling process (Storberg-
Walker, 2007; Storberg-Walker & Chermack, 2007). Process descriptions of relevant modeling 
activities are available in the literature, e.g., Whetten’s (2002) Modeling-as-Theorizing. 
Modeling theories helps theorists get the ideas out of their heads and onto paper (e.g., Mintzberg, 
2005), but “in addition to helping theorists create a visual representation of a theory, the process 
of modeling can also inform and shape the theorist’s intellectual processes of conceptual 
development” (Storberg-Walker, 2007, p. 69). Timing-wise, modeling does not need to be the 
last part of conceptual development; it can coincide with very early theorizing efforts. “The 
visual mapping process can be started at any time during the conceptual development phase... 
and in fact it may act as a catalyst for more inquiry if the modeling process is started at the 





Critique and summary of the theorizing processes of conceptual development. In 
review, five sources were identified and analyzed as relevant process descriptions (i.e., Type II, 
Storberg-Walker, 2006) of the conceptual development phase of theory building. These were 
Weick (1989), Weick (2005), Folger (2005), Mintzberg (2005), and Storberg-Walker (2007). 
The main points of each are recapped below. 
Weick (1989) described a process of disciplined imagination in which theorists engage in 
the conceptual development phase of theory building by designing, conducting, and interpreting 
imaginary experiments, i.e., thought trials, as means to developing understanding and structure 
of a phenomenon. Weick (1989) emphasized three general elements fundamental to good 
theoretical thinking: (1) well defined theoretical problem statements, (2) independent, 
heterogeneous thought trials, and (3) diverse selection criteria for evaluating thought trials, 
including the criterion of interesting as a substitution for the empirical criterion of validity for the 
evaluation of each conjecture contained within a thought trial. Weick’s (1989) work does much 
in terms of capturing the qualities of disciplined intellectual thinking during theorizing, but 
makes only marginal gains shaping the overall notion of process during conceptual development.  
In 2005, Weick describes a process of conceptual development in which sensemaking 
plays a central role; a role he characterized as constructing reality through the rationalization of 
what’s going on and why. Four main activities capture the process of theorizing and 
sensemaking at the core of his conceptual development description: 1) intentional deployment of 
a vocabulary to talk the phenomenon into existence, 2) constructing plausible boundaries around 
a phenomenon, 3) treating the process as an ongoing retrospective activity always subject to 




contribution to the process of characterizing theoretical phenomena and pairs very 
complementary with his prior work on disciplined thinking (Weick, 1989). 
Folger (2005) described his Huh? Aha! model of theory building; the three parts were: 1) 
think and reflect before you read, 2) start with a dependent variable or genuine phenomenon to 
investigate, and 3) explore a variety of antecedent conditions. However, in addition to defining a 
three part model of theorizing, Folger (2005) also uniquely contributed language to the process 
description of conceptual development with his description of the “internal logic” (Folger, 2005, 
p. 58) of theorizing. Here, Folger (2005) describes an inferential process of reasoning/inference 
to the best explanation (also referred to as abduction and retroduction). Folger’s (2005) work 
adds the unique idea of internal logic to the conversation of theorizing process in the literature. 
His further begins to suggest three potential sub phases of the conceptual development. 
Mintzberg (2005) described a process for generating insightful and interesting theory 
through creative, nonlinear, imaginative thinking in which the theorist suspends disbelief. 
Mintzberg characterized the theorizing process of conceptual development as one of generalizing 
beyond one’s data. For this, he described a nonlinear, twenty step theorizing process that requires 
the theorist to creatively think and rethink, as well as be open to change and surprise. 
Mintzberg’s (2005) writing is accomplished in its presentation of the theorizing as a twenty step 
process simultaneously with a strong balance of nonlinear, recursive emphasis. 
Storberg-Walker (2007) described the conceptual development phase of theory-building 
research as the process of formulating initial ideas about a phenomenon. She characterized the 
conceptual development phase of theory-building research with five process components. These 




paradigmatic issues, 3) Identify and resolve foundational theory issues, 4) Resolve preliminary 
research design issues, and 5) Identify and select the appropriate modeling process. Storberg-
Walker (2007) presents a thoughtful deconstruction of conceptual development into five process 
components. Her emphasis on the role of research design considerations within the theorizing 
process particularly makes the work stand out. 
Across the reviewed works of Weick (1989, 2005), Folger (2005), Mintzberg (2005), and 
Storberg-Walker (2007) a particular way of thinking and acting begins to emerge that is directly 
positioned within the conceptual development phase of theory-building research (review goal 
#2). In sum, the following picture of the process of conceptual development emerged that can be 
characterized by a number of heuristic qualities. These are: 1) Talk and write the phenomenon 
into existence, 2) Understand where you are coming from, 3) Be explicit about and own your 
own style of thinking, 4) Write, i.e., tell, the story, 5) Be your own toughest critic, and 6) Iterate 
until you have theory. 
Talk and write the phenomenon into existence. Talking (and writing) a phenomenon into 
existence requires the deployment of a vocabulary with which to capture the phenomenon. This 
is fundamental to communication. A theoretical idea cannot be effectively communicated until a 
language exists to characterize and describe it. The purpose of theory is to answer the question 
why. Not only does answering why require the theorist use the language of the theory, but 
phenomenon itself cannot exit as theory without a specific vocabulary with which capture its 
theoretical nature. A number of activities illustrate this heuristic. 
 Develop a clear problem statement (Weick, 1989). A clear problem statement will 




point from the inquiry. Together, the two define the closed system within which the 
theoretical problem and solution are connected in a meaningful manner. 
 Carefully craft into existence with language the basic elements of the theory and their 
interrelationships (Dubin, 1978). 
 Define, and continuously redefine, the plausible boundaries of around the 
phenomenon of theory (Dubin, 1978; Weick, 2005). It is as important to understand 
the contexts that do not apply as it is to be able to define the contexts that do. 
 Use a body of rich inputs to stimulate theoretical thinking (Mintzberg, 2005). Do not 
rely solely on neat data. Pull from literature, research findings, thick descriptions, 
anecdotes, etc. 
 Connect and disconnect (Mintzberg, 2005). Move back and forth between immersion 
in the phenomenon and storytelling about the phenomenon. 
Understand where you are coming from. However, also understand where you are going. 
Storber-Walker (2007) discussed the importance of choosing a modeling approach and starting 
with it early in the theorizing process. This requires an idea of what type of theoretical output 
would resolve the research problem. Knowing where you are headed with your theorizing 
requires and understanding grounded in paradigms, research methods, and theories. A number of 
activities illustrate this second heuristic. 
 If you’re theorizing your are not laying a few bricks, you’re attempting to build a 
cathedral. Ask the big questions (Mintzberg, 2005). Recognizing the scope of what is 




 Position the problem tackled with theorizing paradigmatically (Storber-Walker, 2007; 
Weick, 2005). Paradigms define the possibility of experience (Kant, 2007); and 
therefore, the type of knowing contained by the theory.  
 Understand issues of both theory-building research method and research design in 
later phases (Storber-Walker, 2007). Theory building requires that the theorist make 
two method choices: the choice of specific theory-building research method from 
among the numerous alternatives, and, theoretical choices given consideration of 
research design issues that will later allow the theory be properly vetted. 
 Identify core or contributing theories (Storber-Walker, 2007). A number of theoretical 
perspectives (and theoretical ranges) provide context to theorizing. Make those 
theoretical influences an explicit part of the theorizing foundation. 
 Think and reflect before you read (Folger, 2005). All of the above are captured in 
Folger’s (2005) statement about creating a frame of reference prior to theorizing 
process. Not only is it important for readers, but it is important for the theorist to 
make this frame explicit to him or herself; it will influence the way the theorist thinks 
about, and reacts to, their own theorizing activities. 
Be explicit about, and own, your own style of thinking. Part of making the creative leap in 
theorizing is acknowledging that as a theorist, you are constructing a representation of reality 
(Mintzberg, 2005). Coming to terms with the style of thinking required for theorizing is 
important for the theorist. A number of activities illustrate this third heuristic. 
 Know your internal logic and make it explicit (Folger, 2005). What form of logic is 




the data into information, and then interpreting the data in order to make knowledge 
claims? 
 Given your internal logic, structure your thought trials accordingly (Folger, 2005; 
Weick, 1989). 
 Embrace the premise  conclusion (or vice versa) chain of generative reasoning 
(Folger, 2005).  
 Theorizing is a creative, nonlinear process (Weick, 2005; Folger, 2005; Mintzberg, 
2005). Everything depends on the creative leap, not being correct (Mintzberg, 2005). 
Write, that is tell, the story. Writing the story is as important as creative thinking for 
theorizing.  The theoretical ideas are not only communicated through writing, but come to exist 
through writing. The story never written down is the story never told. A number of activities 
illustrate this fourth heuristic. 
 Theorize nonlinearly and write nonlinearly, but end up with a linear story. To write 
down a theory is to create a linear outline of nonlinear thinking (Mintzberg, 2005). 
 When writing, keep in mind that a theory should be “explicative, evocative, 
equivocality reducing, exegetical, transient, narrative, embedded in paradigms, and 
meaningful” (Weick, 2005, p. 394) 
 Be open to surprise (Weick, 1989, 2005; Folger, 2005; Mintzberg, 2005). Theoretical 
surprises are interesting conclusions. Theorists closed down to surprises may be 
closed down to anything theoretical interesting. 
 Utilize as many means as possible to help express ideas, i.e., diagrams to indicate 




 Take lots of notes. Use the outline to stimulate thinking about other ideas and write 
them down so that you can revisit them later (Mintzberg, 2005). 
 Continue to connect and disconnect while you write (Mintzberg, 2005). 
 Keep theorizing until you can express the ideas in a manner that others can 
understand as well. If you have not quite figured out how to express the theoretical 
ideas simple, take it as a sign that you may need to understand them further 
(Mintzberg, 2005). 
 Writing the theoretical story is about weaving it all together. Theorizing is about 
linking and relating insights, lots of them. Interesting theory is not a singular novel 
insight; rather it is the connecting of many insights in a provocative and compelling 
way (Mintzberg, 2005). 
Be your own toughest critic. Given the intense intellectual nature of theorizing and the 
disciplined imagination required, the theorist likely has to be their own devil’s advocate during 
conceptual development. Both Weick (1989) and Mintzberg (2005) offer some insights on how 
to methodically be self critical in this theoretical sense. These insights illustrate the fifth 
heuristic. 
 Being creative does not mean that you have to lack any systematic or methodical 
qualities, but there are not any creative procedures per se (Weick, 1989). Weick 
(1989) provided examples of systematic ways to generate heterogeneous thought 




 Evaluate your phenomenon against an explicit and diverse set of criteria (Weick, 
1989). For thought trials, Weick suggested using the criteria of “interesting, obvious, 
connected, believable, beautiful, or real” (Weick, 1989, p. 524). 
 Embrace ideas that do not fit, do not discard them (Mintzberg, 2005). Allow the lack 
of fit to challenge and inspire the creative process, both now and later on. 
 As emphasized during the writing process, if you have not quite figured out how to 
express the theoretical ideas simple, take it as a sign that you may need to understand 
them further (Mintzberg, 2005). 
Iterate until you have theory. It should be clear by this point that thinking about and 
writing about theory is a nonlinear process. Theorizing requires continuous iteration and 
revision. Key to both are not simply repeating the same things over again, but rather, working 
through the same issues again and reformulating your conclusions given additional thinking on 
the topic. A number of activities illustrate this last heuristic. 
 The process of theorizing should be treated as an ongoing retrospective activity 
always subject to revision (Weick, 2005). Do not treat theory, or theorizing, as a 
possession to be defended; rather, as an outcropping of theoretical thought to guide 
future thinking about the phenomenon. 
 Write, iterate, and rewrite (Mintzberg, 2005). “Write draft after draft after draft… 
keep correcting, fixing, adjusting, reconceiving, changing, until it all feels right” 
(Mintzberg, 2005, p. 371). 
 Know when to stop (Weick, 2005). Weick (2005) offered nine rules-of-thumb for 




activity, e.g., Lynham’s (2002b) continuous refinement and development phase of 
theory-building research, the conceptual development phase does not have to be a 
never ending phase of theorizing. At some point, the theorist needs to pause, and offer 
up their work as theory. 
Specific Methods of the Conceptual Development Phase 
The review of methods of theory building continues with the focus on the perception of 
theory as the manner with which theory is initially developed through theory-building research. 
Consequently, four types of relevant theory-building method descriptions (i.e., Type III, 
Storberg-Walker, 2006) specific to the conceptual development phase of theory-building 
research were identified and are presented below. These are the axiomatic method, a modeling 
method, grounded theory methods, and typological / taxonomic methods. For each of the theory-
building method descriptions discussed, it is important to draw attention to the close tie between 
the theory representation (e.g., models, axioms, taxonomies) and the theory-building 
approach/method (e.g., modeling-as-theorizing). 
The axiomatic method. According to Reynolds (1971), the axiomatic form of theory has 
four important features. 
(1) A set of definitions, including theoretical concepts, both primitive and derived 
(nominal), and operational definitions (to allow the identification of some abstract 
theoretical concepts in concrete settings).  
(2) A set of existence statements that describe the situations in which the theory can be 
applied, sometimes referred to as the scope conditions since they describe the scope 
of conditions to which the theory is considered applicable. (These statements are not 
required in a completely imaginary theory, such as in mathematics, that is not 
intended to be applied to concrete or ‘real’ phenomena.)  
(3) A set of relational statements, divided into two groups: (a) Axioms – A set of 




Propositions – All other statements in the theory, all derived from combinations of 
axioms, axioms and propositions, or other propositions.  
(4) A logical system used to: (a) Relate all concepts within statements, and (b) Derive 
propositions from axioms, combinations of axioms and propositions, or other 
propositions. (Reynold, 1971, p. 92) 
As a method of theory-building research, Reynolds recommended the axiomatic form as 
most efficient for a “theory-then-research strategy” (Reynold, 1971, p. 96); an approach to theory 
where “theory is made explicit through the continuous, reiterative interaction between theory 
construction and empirical inquiry… Of an interactive inductive-deductive nature, this theory-to-
research strategy is well suited to the applied nature of the behavioral and human sciences” 
(Lynham, 2002b, pp. 227-228). The theory-then-research strategy was described as a five step 
process: 
1. Develop an explicit theory in axiomatic form (i.e., complete conceptual development 
phase). 
2. Select an existence or relational statement generated axiomatic form for comparison 
with the results of empirical research (i.e., operationalization phase). 
3. Design and execute inquiry to confirm or disconfirm the selected statements (i.e., 
confirmation/disconfirmation phase). 
4. If any selected statements derived from the axiomatic theory are disconfirmed, adjust 
the theory or the research design and continue with the research (i.e., continuous 
refinement and development phase); and 
5. For all selected statements derived from the axiomatic theory confirmed, select 
further statements to confirm or disconfirm in attempt to determine the limitations of 




In addition, Reynolds outlined a few criteria relevant to evaluating axiomatic forms of 
theory. One general criterion was defined for all axiomatic forms of theory; that is, logical 
consistency in selection of axioms: “no two axioms, or any combination of axioms, should make 
conflicting predictions” (Reynold, 1971, p. 95). One criterion was defined for axiomatic forms 
that deal with substantive matters of the real world, ease of understanding regardless of the 
number axioms: “select as axioms that set of independent statements that makes the theory 
easiest to understand, no matter how large…if it is found that some other set of statements is 
more clearly understood… the theorist should feel free to use it” (Reynold, 1971, pp. 95-96). 
Finally, for axiomatic forms that are completely abstract systems with no intended empirical 
connection, a final criterion was defined, smallest set: for completely abstract systems that have 
no intended empirical connection, there is “a preference for simplicity and elegance” (Reynold, 
1971, p. 95). 
Modeling-as-theorizing. Whetten’s (2002) description of modelling-as-theorizing is a 
“complete and systematic” (Whetten, 2002, p. 47) scholarly description of the conceptual 
development phase of theorizing; one focused on describing the theoretical process efficiently in 
order to express how to craft conceptual, and therefore theoretical, arguments. He presents the 
description as “a formal methodology for codifying theoretical assumptions and claims” 
(Whetten, 2002, p. 46). Whetten offers a step-by-step systematic process that builds off from 
Weick’s (1989) disciplined imagination process and includes heuristics for explicitly modeling 
the key constructs, mediating and moderatoring relationships, importance of modeled constructs, 
foundational assumptions, and theoretical boundaries (Storberg-Walker & Chermack, 2007; 
Whetten, 2002). Underlying the formality of the explicit methodology was a goal of improving 




systematic conceptions are more likely to arise from systematic conceptual processes” (Whetten, 
2002, p. 46). 
Whetten’s (2002) proposed theorizing methodology is a four step, sequential process for 
completing the conceptual development phase of theory-building research (Storberg-Walker & 
Chermack, 2007). Explicit in the methodology are a number of heuristic questions that the 
theorist must entertain and answer throughout the process; these are, “What, How, Why, 
When/Where/Who” (Whetten, 2002, p. 51). The four inclusive steps of the methodology are: (1) 
identify the Whats by generating a comprehensive list of constructs, (2) identify the Hows by 
defining the relationships between constructs, (3) establish the “sensibility” (Whetten, 2002, p. 
59) of suggested explanations by espousing foundation theory, and therefore, the Whys 
underlying the theory, and (4) determine the When/Where/Who of the contextual assumptions 
that drive the theory boundaries (Whetten, 2002). Each of the four steps is summarized in further 
detail next. 
Step one: Whats-as-constructs. Whetten’s (2002) process begins with generating a list of 
the constructs relevant to explaining the phenomenon of the developing theory. Starting with 
identification of the core construct and continuing with all adjacent constructs, Whetten (2002) 
suggested writing down each construct as a noun or phrase and represent it as a box or circle in 
emerging diagram. In order to avoid stifling the generation of a complete set of constructs, 
initially “err on the side of inclusion rather than on the side of parsimony” (Whetten, 2002, p. 
52). Once all potentially relevant constructs have been identified, the theorist must then evaluate 




Two evaluation criteria were suggested for the set of constructs, the scope and the 
coherence. Scope refers to “the breadth of the behavior or activity covered, the class of things to 
which it applies, or the totality of the objects that it identifies” (Whetten, 2002, p. 52), and, 
coherence refers to “the ability of the constructs to fit together to establish a meaningful story, 
picture, or model of the phenomenon” (Storberg-Walker & Chermack, 2007, p. 510). To evaluate 
scope, Whetten (2002) recommended assessing the data collection requirements necessary to test 
the theory, i.e., the feasibility of constructing adequate research designs. This can be 
accomplished by grouping “constructs according to their associated data collection requirements, 
for example, tally the number of different types of data..., the number of sources of data… and 
the number of data collection cycles” (Whetten, 2002, p. 53). Whetten further emphasized that 
“It is important to keep in mind that a model is a visual aid for telling a story, and that the story 
needs to be coherent. An argument is coherent to the extent that it ‘hangs together’” (Whetten, 
2002, p. 53). Coherence can be evaluated by assessing the number of constructs and agreement 
in their levels of analysis. The greater the number of constructs and a lack of sharing a common 
level of analysis can result in unnecessarily complex, “hard-to-follow, difficult-to-understand 
explanations” (Whetten, 2002, p. 53).  
Step two: Hows-as-relationships. The second step of Whetten’s (2002) theorizing 
methodology involves transitioning the list of constructs towards a theoretical framework 
through defining relationships between those constructs, e.g.,  
…the specification of relationships between constructs is the key difference between a 
theory and a list of reasons or examples... Basically, a list is an incomplete theory – it 
contains ‘whats’, but no ‘hows’, which means it ca not inform questions of why. 




Here, Whetten (2002) recommended considering categoric ‘hows’, e.g., when A, then B, or 
sequential ‘hows’, e.g., A precedes B. However, if sequential ‘hows’ are defined, be sure to be 
prepared to further articulate distinctions such as X logically follows Y, Y generally precedes X, 
or X emerges from Y. 
Graphically, Whetten (2002) suggested organizing the constructs and relationships along 
a horizontal and vertical dimension. To do so, first disambiguate explanatory constructs from 
explained constructs by placing the core construct in the center of the page and arrange all 
remaining constructs to the left if it explains the core construct or to the right if it is explained by 
the core construct. Everything on the left is considered a contribution to the core construct, while 
all constructs to the right are considered a contribution of the core construct. “Specifically, what 
is on the left side can be thought of as a ‘contribution to’ your explanation of the core construct, 
whereas what is on the right can be thought of as a ‘contribution of’ the core construct’s 
explanation” (Whetten, 2002, p. 56). This left/right organization can also be viewed as cause-
effect ordering where the core construct is caused by the left side constructs, and, means-ends 
ordering where the core construct is the means to the right side constructs as ends. 
The second part to graphically organizing constructs and relationships along a horizontal 
and vertical dimension is to map the core sequence (i.e., the horizontal dimension) and any 
moderating sequences (i.e., the vertical dimension). The horizontal dimension is modeled by 
selecting from the left/right organization the constructs that represent the core sequence of the 
theory. “These constructs constitute the primary elements of your theory” (Whetten, 2002, p. 
57); for example,  




The intermediate constructs in this sequence… [B and C] are referred to as mediators, in 
the sense that they mediate the relationship between the constructs on either side. According to 
this model… [C] is based on… [B], not… [A]. Hence, the relationship between… [A] and… [C] 
is said to be mediated by… [B]. (In other words, the link between… [A] and… [C] goes 
through… [B]). (Whetten, 2002, p. 57) 
The vertical dimension is modeled by arranging the remaining constructs above and 
below the core sequence by locating constructs near places in the core sequence that the theorist 
suspects further relationship. “Constructs that are located above and below the horizontal axis 
generally serve as moderators. A moderating construct is one that changes the relationship 
between two other constructs when it is present” (Whetten, 2002, p. 57). For example,    
X     Z 
↓    ↓ 
A  B  C  D 
↑ 
Y 
In the above example, X is included as a moderating construct between A and B, suggesting that 
in order to fully understand the relationship between A and B, X must also be taken into 
consideration. 
The last part of step two is explicitly model the relationships between constructs. Here, 
arrows serve as convention, e.g., double arrows for reciprocal causality, strength of relationship 
with solid versus dotted lines, or the sign of the relationship to indicate effective impact of 
relationship. “The ability to portray specific relationship, as well as an overall pattern of 
relationships, is one of the strengths of graphical modeling” (Whetten, 2002, p. 57). Given the 




may be evaluated by assessing its necessity and sufficiency. To test its necessity, “begin from the 
left side of your model and consider whether each of the antecedent constructs is necessary for 
what follows. If you think of your model as a story, can you tell your story without this plot 
element?” (Whetten, 2002, p. 62). To test its sufficiency, “begin with the constructs on the right 
side of your model and work backwards, asking yourself how confident you are that a given 
outcome can be adequately explained using the antecedent constructs” (Whetten, 2002, p. 62).  
Step three: Whys-as-conceptual assumptions. Steps three and four of Whetten’s 
modeling-as-theorizing process involve the transition from construction of the model to 
contextualizing the assumptions of the model. “Whereas the first two steps in the methodology 
focused on constructing a graphical representation of a theory, these final two steps require us to 
specify the context, or boundary conditions, of our theory” (Whetten, 2002, p. 58). The third step 
of Whetten’s (2002) theorizing process establishes the legitimizing external theories and 
foundational assumptions upon which the developing theory is based. These conceptual 
assumptions explain why the theoretical explanations make sense. Whetten’s (2002) three 
guidelines for generating explicit conceptual assumptions: 
1. “Think of this as a side bar conversation between you and your readers, something 
like, ‘The sensibility of this explanation is predicated up on the following 
assumptions about human behaviour’. For example… a theory of decision-making 
would likely be predicated on some form of rational choice…” (Whetten, 2002, p. 
59). 
2. “To stimulate your thinking, consider reviewing various typologies in our filed, 




classifying cultural assumptions held by organizational members…” (Whetten, 2002, 
p. 59). 
3. “…consider how the number and variety of your conceptual assumptions can pose a 
similar threat to coherence” (Whetten, 2002, p. 59), as was previously considered 
regarding constructs in step one. 
Step four: When/Where/Who –as-contextual assumptions. The fourth and final step in 
Whetten’s (2002) theorizing methodology is the specification of contextual boundaries within 
which the theory, and any proposition, is expected to hold. Whetten underscores the importance 
of the theorist understanding and defining contextual assumptions; “failure to understand how 
contextual constraints temper general claims significantly undermines the utility, and hence, the 
credibility, of scholarly explanations” (Whetten, 2002, p. 61). That is, the theorist cannot fully 
understand the consequences of acting upon the theory if the theorist does not fully understand 
that the viability of the theory in practice is entirely dependent upon the When/Where/Who 
contexts that it was intended to operate (Whetten, 2002). The importance of defining, and 
continuing to redefine, the contextual boundaries is further emphasized in advice on utilizing 
major propositions or hypotheses to define where the theory is likely or unlikely to hold later on 
during theory testing: 
 “…empirical tests of a hypothesized theoretical relationship should not focus on whether 
the hypothesis is true or false, but rather on the conditions under which the hypothesis 
holds. Supporting this argument, negative research results can often be more informative 
than positive ones, if they suggest important limiting conditions that should be examined 





Grounded theory methods. Grounded theory has its roots in sociological study, and 
therefore, development of sociological theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Specifically, grounded 
theory refers to “a product of a research process as well as to the research process itself” 
(Thornberg, 2012, p. 249). Generally speaking though, grounded theory is a generic way of 
discussing theory that is generated from data, i.e., “…systematic discovery of the theory from the 
data” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 7). As both a theoretical process and a theoretical concept, 
grounded theory can be difficult to understand due to its breadth of instantiations within and 
across paradigms of inquiry (e.g., Glaser, 1978, 1992; Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Charmaz, 2000, 
2006).  Different instances of grounded theory are distinguished based on paradigmatic 
grounding, the role of prior conceptions (theory, literature review, coding paradigms) and precise 
form of logic. The diversity of grounded theory processes can be captured at a high level by 
dividing the literature and practice of grounded theory into three groups: 1) a Glaserian, 
postpositivistic, pure inductivist group, 2) a Straussian, postpositivistic, abductivist group, and 3) 
a constructivist group. However, these three high level groupings are not exhaustive because 
other formulations can also be found in the literature on grounded theory (e.g., Clarke, 2005; 
Kelle, 2005; Thornberg, 2012). 
The Glaserian, postpositivistic, pure inductivist form of grounded theory was advocated 
by one of the founders of grounded theory, Barney Glaser. In the near 40 years after initial 
publication of Discovery (1967), Glaser continued to promote a form of grounded theory that 
sought to identify real patterns in data by following an inductive strategy that demanded no prior 
literature review and no a priori theoretical frameworks or coding paradigms. This “empty head” 
(Kelle, 2005, p. 4) strategy elevated the importance of “total emergence” (Pettigrew, 2000, p. 




contamination of the data with any preconceptions of the theorist. Coding was an ad hoc process, 
all theory emerged from the data, and literature was to be held off until the end of the research 
process (Allen, 2010; Glaser, 1992; Kelle, 2005; Pettigrew, 2000; Thornberg, 2012). Glaser 
maintained that “researchers following the ‘true path’ of Grounded Theory methodology have to 
approach their field without any precise research questions or research problems” (Kelle, 2005, 
p. 8). 
For further detail on the Glaserian form of grounded theory, some relevant materials on 
this perspective include: 
 Glaser, B.G., & Strauss, A.L. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies 
for qualitative research. Aldine de Gruyter, Hawthorne, NY. 
 Glaser, B.G. (1978). Theoretical sensitivity. Sociology Press, Inc., Mill Valley, CA. 
 Glaser, B.G. (1992). Basics of grounded theory analysis: Emergence verses forcing. 
Sociology Press, Inc., Mill Valley, CA. 
 Glaser, B.G. (1998). Doing grounded theory: Issues and discussions. Sociology Press, 
Inc., Mill Valley, CA. 
 Glaser, B.G. (2001). The grounded theory perspective I: Conceptualization contrasted 
with description. Sociology Press, Inc., Mill Valley, CA. 
 Glaser, B.G. (2003). The Grounded Theory Perspective II: Description's Remodeling 
of Grounded Theory Methodology. Sociology Press, Inc., Mill Valley, CA. 
 Glaser, B.G. (2005). The Grounded Theory Perspective III: Theoretical coding. 




The Straussian, positivistic, abductivist form of grounded theory was advocated by the 
other founder of grounded theory, Anselm Strauss, and a collaborator Juliet Corbin (e.g., Corbin 
& Strauss, 2007; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). The primary differences between Glaserian and 
Straussian grounded theory lies in the form of logical inference, role of coding schemes, and 
timing of literature review. The Straussian form of grounded theory opened the door to abductive 
reasoning, in which inquirers go “beyond the data as well as the pre-existing theory or theories. It 
is an innovative process because every new insight is a result of modifying and elaborating prior 
knowledge or putting old ideas together in new ways” (Thornberg 2012, p. 247). There is a back 
and forth between data and prior explanatory hypotheses in which both are continually being 
compared and re-evaluated with the aim of eventually generating the best potential explanation 
(Lipton, 2004). Some cases suggest a process of backwards reasoning (Folger, 2005; Kelle, 
2005; Thornberg 2012), but regardless of direction it maintains an iterative form of reasoning in 
which the theorist is always testing existing explanations against the data and then using the 
insights gained to form new and more feasible explanations of the data. In abduction, inferences 
“are neither inductive nor deductive. Instead they represent a special kind of logical reasoning 
whose premises are a set of empirical phenomena and whose conclusion is an explanatory 
hypothesis” (Kelle, 2005, p. 12). 
The abductive inference of Straussian grounded theory also altered the necessary timing 
of the literature review and formation of a coding scheme. Here, literature review and prior 
sociological theoretical conceptions were leveraged before engaging in the grounded theory 
process to form a coding paradigm that was used “to produce concepts that seem to fit the data” 
(Strauss, 1987, p. 28) by offering ways to categorize and relate data. The criticism, by Glaser 




conversely data to categories with forcing. For further detail on the Straussian form of grounded 
theory, some relevant materials on this perspective include: 
 Strauss, A. (1987). Qualitative analysis for social scientists. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, UK. 
 Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1990). Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and 
procedures for developing grounded theory. Sage Publications, Inc., Thousand Oaks, 
CA. 
 Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1998). Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and 
procedures for developing grounded theory (2nd ed.). Sage Publications, Inc., 
Thousand Oaks, CA. 
 Corbin, J., & Strauss, A. (1990). Grounded theory research: Procedures, canons, and 
evaluative criteria. Qualitative Sociology, 13(1), 3-20. 
 Corbin, J., & Strauss, A. (2007). Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and 
procedures for developing grounded theory (3rd ed.). Sage Publications, Inc., 
Thousand Oaks, CA. 
The constructivist form of grounded theory is most prominently recognized under the 
advocacy of Kathy Charmaz (Charmaz, 2000, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009). The most dramatic 
difference between the Glaserian and Straussian forms of grounded theory and constructivist 
grounded theory was the paradigm of inquiry; here, the constructivist paradigm. Consequently, 
constructivist grounded theory is not aimed at approximately identifying real patterns from data, 
but rather, generating an “interpretive portrayal of the studied world” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 10). In 




…concern is not with the emergence of theory, but rather with whether or not the 
researcher has been explicit in stating that the data and theory are a construct of both the 
researcher and the respondent. According to Charmaz, theory neither emerges nor is 
discovered, instead it is constructed. (Allen, 2010, pp. 1613-1614) 
In other words, the fundamental shift across inquiry paradigms shifted the focus of grounded 
theory away from discovery of theory from data and assumptions of a single reality, and onto, 
assumptions of multiple realities and the construction of narrow range theory by inquirer and 
inquired into (Allen, 2010; Charmaz, 2006; Thornberg, 2012). For further detail on the 
constructivist form of grounded theory, some relevant materials on this perspective include: 
 Charmaz, K. (2000). Grounded theory: Objectivist and constructivist methods. In N. 
Denzin & Y.S. Lincoln, Y. (Eds.), The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research (2nd 
ed., pp. 509-535). Sage Publications, Inc., Thousand Oaks. 
 Charmaz, K. (2005). Grounded Theory in the 21st Century: Applications for 
Advancing Social Justice Studies. In N. Denzin & Y.S. Lincoln, Y. (Eds.), The Sage 
Handbook of Qualitative Research (3rd ed., pp. 507-535). Sage Publications, Inc., 
Thousand Oaks, CA. 
 Charmaz, K. (2006). Constructing grounded theory. A practical guide through 
qualitative analysis. London: Sage . 
 Charmaz, K. (2008). Constructivism and grounded theory. In J.A. Holstein & J.F. 
Gubrium (Eds.), Handbook of Constructivist Research (pp. 397-412). The Guilford 
Press, New York, NY. 
 Charmaz, K. (2009). Shifting the grounds: Constructivist grounded theory methods. 




Developing grounded theory: The second generation (pp. 127-154). University of 
Arizona Press, Walnut Creek, CA. 
 Bryant, A. (2002). Re-grounding grounded theory. Journal of Information 
Technology Theory and Application, 4, 25-42. 
 Bryant, A., & Charmaz, K. (2007). The Sage Handbook of Grounded Theory, Sage 
Publications Inc, Los Angeles, CA. 
 Mills, J., Bonner, A., Francis, K. (2006a). Adopting a constructivist approach to 
grounded theory: Implications for research design. International Journal of Nursing 
Practice, 12, 8-13. 
 Mills, J., Bonner, A., Francis, K. (2006b). The development of constructivist 
grounded theory. International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 5, 25-35. 
The typological approach to theory building. The typological approach to theory 
building is a unique method of generating theoretical frameworks by developing a classification 
scheme of concepts (i.e., a taxonomy), and then, both specifying the relationships among 
concepts and identifying system states as sets of ideal types (Doty & Glick, 1994). What is often 
missing from typological theories are the specified relationships and set of ideal types in favor of 
rich descriptions of classification rules. The underspecification as “simplistic classification 
systems instead of theories” (Doty & Glick, 1994, p. 230) may be driven the standard to achieve 
parsimony in the theoretical model; however, typological theories are by nature complex 
organizations of grand and middle range theories. As a consequence, “it seems only reasonable 
that meaningful and useful subgrouping schemes incorporate commensurate levels of 




Doty and Glick (1994) highlight that: 
…the problems with many existing typologies are the result of a misunderstanding about 
what typologies are (or should be), improper development of the typology, and a failure 
to take full advantage of the unique form of theory building represented by the typology 
approach. (Doty & Glick, 1994, p. 231) 
Appendix B reviewed the differences between taxonomies and typologies, as well as the 
characteristics of typological theories. For more information, see Bobko and Russell (1991), 
Doty and Glick (1994), and Pinder and Moore (1980). Not covered in Appendix B was the 
process for developing typological theory. For heuristics on the typological theory-building 
method, Doty and Glick (1994, pp. 246-248) recommended five steps: 
1. Make grand theoretical assertions specific 
2. Completely define all ideal types 
3. Completely describe all ideal type using the same set of constructs or taxonomic 
categories 
4. Explicitly describe all theoretical assumptions of the constructs used in the ideal types 
and which constructs, if any, are of greater importance for the ideal type in operation 
5. Test the typological theory with conceptual and analytical models that are consistent 
with the theory 
Critique and summary of methods specific to conceptual development. Regardless of 
how one approaches conceptual development, there appear to be at least a couple basics that are 
in some ways unavoidable, but in others fundamental to methods of the phase. These basics are 




they are fundamental in the sense the goal of conceptual development making these basic 
elements explicit.  
First, conceptual development is, by definition, generation of concepts. How one 
approaches conceptual development determines whether the generation process is one of 
intersubjective construction (e.g., constructivist grounded theory), one of tabula rasa 
identification (e.g., Glaserian grounded theory), or something in between. No matter the 
approach though, the outcome is the same; that is, a set of concepts or constructs that define a 
phenomenon. Second, the set of constructs must be related to each other systematically. There 
appears to be at least three ways that constructs can be related: by law, by similarity, and by 
organization. Dubin’s (1978) laws of interaction capture the nature of the ways that constructs 
can relate to each by law. Constructs can further relate to each other by similar through 
belonging to the same category of construct. Similarly, constructs can relate to each other by 
organization within the same taxonomic or typological system of categorical constructs. Lastly, a 
context must be defined for the theory, one that both suggests where the theory comes from and 
the things about which it is meant to explain. 
Key Considerations of the Theory-building Process 
Understanding the process of theory building involves consideration of numerous 
features of the research process. (At least) seven key features of theory-building research may be 
pulled forward in summary. These include: 
 Justification of the research as a theory-building process, e.g., why may the 




 Understanding of the theoretical products produced and any evidence of becoming a 
full-blown theory. 
 Positioning of the research as the theorizing half, i.e., “the theory development side” 
(Lynham, 2000b, p. 243), or the practice half, i.e., “research operation side” 
(Lynham, 2000b, p. 244), of the theory-building process (Chermack, 2006, Lynham, 
2002b, 2002b; Reynolds, 1971; Torraco, 1994, 1997). 
 Mapping of the inquiry process to a theory-building research strategy: Lynham 
(2002b) positioned the General Method within two common theory-building research 
strategies, theorizing to practice and practice to theorizing (Lynham, 2002b; 
Reynolds, 1971).  
 Mapping of the theory-building research to phases of theory-building process 
(Lynham, 2002b). 
 Mapping of the theory-building research to specific theoretical processes, i.e., Type II 
(Storberg-Walker, 2006). 
 Mapping of the theory-building research to specific theoretical methods, i.e., Type III 
(Storberg-Walker, 2006). 
Requirements for Theory Building 
Theory building is a specialized and highly skilled research activity that involves both 
theorizing and empirical proficiencies (Sutton & Staw, 1995). Torraco describes the process of 
producing good theory as… 
…the result of intensive study of the phenomenon or topic of the theory, intense thought 
and conceptualizing by the theorist about the phenomenon and how it might work, and, 




the necessary elements of the theory and that appears to offer a defensible explanations of 
the phenomenon. (Torraco, 2005, pp. 364-365) 
Given the complexities of the full theory-building process, a number of requirements for 
theory building have been offered by theory-building scholars (e.g., Lynham, 2002b; Torraco, 
2005a). At a high level, the requirements may be split into requirements of the theory-building 
process and requirements of the theorist. Three requirements of the theory-building process will 
be discussed here: (a) a clear demonstration of a theoretical gap in knowledge (i.e., theoretical 
need or problem), (b) an explicit linkage of theoretical problem to theoretical solution, and (c) 
operationalization of the theoretical framework for extension into empirical practice (Torraco, 
2005a). In addition, three requirements of the theorist engaged in theory building will also be 
discussed: (a) expertise with the core phenomenon to be theorized about and (b) expertise with 
theory and the theory-building process (Lynham, 2002b; Torraco, 2005a). 
Requirements of the Theory-Building Process 
In his chapter on Theory Development Methods, Torraco (2005a) defined three specific 
requirements for excellence in the theory-building process; they were: (a) a clear demonstration 
of a theoretical gap in knowledge, (b) an explicit linkage of theoretical problem to theoretical 
solution, and (c) operationalization of the theoretical framework for extension into empirical 
practice.  
A theoretical gap in knowledge relates to the research problem or need that is both 
catalyst for, and entry point into, the theory-building research process. The first requirement for 
excellence in the theory-building process is clear and explicit demonstration of the research 




process of producing, confirming, applying, and adapting” (Lynham, 2002b, p. 222) theoretical 
descriptions, explanations, and representations of and with the world around us. Depending on 
the particular point, or phase, in whole of the theory-building process, different research needs 
will be relevant. To this point, Torraco (2005a) clearly articulated what a research need is, and 
made the distinction between the research need and other elements of the research process, in 
particular, the purpose: 
Need is defined here as a condition or situation in which something is required or wanted. 
When applied to a piece of theoretical research, the notion of need is not synonymous 
with the purpose of the work. The notion of need retains a key element that is, a priori, 
external to the interests and purposes of the individual researcher. The problem or need 
for theory building on a phenomenon or area that has been previously studied is based on 
identifying deficiencies, omissions, and inadequacies in existing theoretical knowledge 
about the phenomenon. Readers of articles addressing this type of theory expect to see a 
comprehensive review of literature related to the topic of theory, on which the problem or 
need to be addressed by additional theory should be based. (Torraco, 2005a, p. 369) 
Once a research need has been clearly demonstrated as catalyst and entry point into the 
research, the inquiry process does not head haphazardously forward towards and an undefined, 
unknown solution state; “The selection and use of theory-building research methods depends, in 
part; on the nature of the phenomenon and the problem or need to be addressed by theory-
building research” (Torraco, 2005a, p. 370). The second requirement for excellence in the 
theory-building process is definition of the theoretical solution and explicit demonstration of “the 
logic and theoretical reasoning used by the theorist to link the research problem with the 
theoretical outcome” (Torraco, 2005a, p. 364). While the degree of detail that the theorist might 
define the theoretical solution with will vary across phases of theory-building research, some 
definition of solution state or theoretical outcome is a necessary part of demonstrating how the 
proposed solution will meet, and in hindsight met, the defined research need with the envisioned 




process and the theory offers a holistic view of theory-building research. Such research provides 
a means for tracing the author’s theory-building strategies as they give rise to a theoretical 
product” (Torraco, 2005a, p. 370). Not only does this resonate with Goldman’s (2002) ex ante 
and ex post justification, but this similarly reflects the Kuhnian puzzle solving activity where the 
solution itself is of less interest than demonstration of the puzzle solving process that arrives at 
the solution; a solution whose existence was presumed, even ensured, by the theory prior to 
engaging in the inquiry (Kuhn, 1996).  
Because a theory is intended to be a description, explanation, or representation of the 
world around us (Lynham, 2002b), theoretical research should attempt to relate the theoretical 
outcome back to the empirical world it is meant to represent. Relating theoretical products to the 
empirical world is done through operationalization of the theory framework with propositions, 
empirical indicators, and hypotheses, as well as through application and definition of further 
theoretical research to be done. The third requirement for excellence in the theory-building 
process is extension of the theory into practice and ongoing research by proposing and discussing 
“research propositions, questions, or hypotheses for further theoretical and empirical study of the 
phenomenon” (Torraco, 2005a, p. 364). 
Table 48 synthesizes the key characteristics of each requirement of the theory-building 
process and organizes the key characteristics under one of the three more general categories 
described (i.e., a clear demonstration of a theoretical gap in knowledge, an explicit linkage of 
theoretical problem to theoretical solution, and operationalization of the theoretical framework 






Key Characteristics of the Requirements for the Theory-building Process 
Requirements of the 
Theory-building Process 
Key Characteristics of 
Requirements 
Description 
Clear demonstration of a 
theoretical gap in 
knowledge 
Theoretical Need 
Identified deficiencies, omissions, and inadequacies 
in existing theoretical knowledge about the 
phenomenon (Torraco, 2005, p. 369). 
Entry point into the theory-
building cycle 
The entry point into the theoretical process (i.e., 
conceptual development, operationalization, 
confirmation, application, and continuous refinement 
and development of the theory [Lynham, 2002b]) 
commensurable with the theoretical need. 
Explicit linkage of 
theoretical problem to 
theoretical solution 
Description of the 
theoretical solution 
Characterization of the theoretical outcome of the 
theory-building process that is expected to address 
the theoretical need 
Description of the 
theoretical logic 
Description of how the logic employed in the theory-
building process links the theoretical need to the 
theoretical solution 
Extension of the 
theoretical framework 
into empirical practice 
Operationalization of the 
theoretical framework 
Definition of propositions, empirical indicators, and 
hypotheses, so that the theoretical framework is 
extended into practice 
Definition of further 
theoretical research to be 
done 
Suggested research questions or hypotheses for 
further theoretical or empirical study 
Requirements of the Theorist 
The knowledge requirements of the theorist engaging in theory building can be further 
understood as possession of two types of expertise by the theorist, a) expertise with the core 
phenomenon to be theorized about and b) expertise with theory and the theory-building process. 
In particular, in this case, expertise is defined as the conjunction of conceptual knowledge and 
practical knowledge; where conceptual knowledge is gained through intensive study and 
scholarly attempts to abstractly understand, and, practical knowledge is gained through 
experience from practice (Lynham, 2002b; Storberg-Walker, 2007; Torraco, 2005a). 
Viewed systematically, the expertise requirements of the theorist come in two forms of 




have the required knowledge, i.e., (1) the core phenomenon, (2) theory, (3) and theory-building 
research methods. That is, the theorist is required to have conceptual and practical “knowledge of 
the elements of theory and of the process of developing new theoretical knowledge (i.e., 
knowledge of theory-building research methods)” (Torraco, 2005a, p. 365), in addition to, 
conceptual and practical knowledge of “the phenomenon central to the theory” ” (Lynham, 
2002b, p. 229). Together, the two forms of knowledge and three topics highlight the six specific 
requirements of the theorist engaged in theory-building research. These six requirements are 
summarized in Table 49 below. 
Table 49 
Table of the Requirements of the Theorist Engaged in Theory Building 
Form of Expertise Knowledge Requirements of the Theorist 
Practical knowledge of: 
Theory-building research methods from experience attempting to build theory 
Theory from experience attempting to apply theory in practice 
The phenomenon and topic of theory from experience with the phenomenon in 
practice 
Conceptual knowledge of: 
Theory-building research methods from intensive study of theory-building 
processes 
The elements and structures of theory from intensive study of theory itself 
The phenomenon and topic of theory from intensive study of the phenomenon itself 
Source: Modified from Torraco (2005a) and Lynham (2002b). 
 
